

THE CITY IN CRISIS

A Report by the Special Advisor
to the Board of Police Commissioners
on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles

October 21, 1992

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By

Special Advisor William H. Webster

Deputy Special Adviser Hubert Williams

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THE

CITY

IN

CRISIS

**A Report by the Special Advisor
to the Board of Police Commissioners
on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles**

October 21, 1992

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TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES

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and Members of the
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150 No. Los Angeles Street
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Dear Commissioners:

We have been honored by the opportunity to serve the citizens of Los Angeles in our capacity as Advisors to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Our Report represents the work of more than 100 volunteers and a small dedicated staff on loan to the Office of the Special Advisor from police departments in other cities. Over the past 160 days, this team has worked diligently to carry out the Commission's charge to ascertain the nature of the L.A. Police Department's response to the recent civil disorders, as well as its level of preparation. In the process, we have interviewed more than 400 people, conducted various surveys, held seven neighborhood meetings and met with high level police officials across the country. This report represents our best judgment as to the questions we have been asked to answer.

We have not hesitated to identify shortcomings where we have found them, and have made corresponding recommendations for corrective measures. Nothing said in this report is intended to reflect upon the dedication and ability of the brave men and women who wear the badge and daily stand in our place "to protect and to serve."

Sincerely,


Hubert Williams


William H. Webster

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

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OVERVIEW

The firestorm of April, 1992 burned deeply into the fabric of Los Angeles. The toll of death, destruction and human misery left this time compels us to recall another such tragedy — one that scorched the ground of the City and its people just over a quarter of a century ago. To read the report of the Governor's Commission impeleled to study that tragedy causes us to experience a profound sense that, while much has changed since 1965, much remains the same.

The City has become a vast sprawl of peoples and cultures now living together in quite different personal circumstances, as we describe in **Chapter Two**. The 1990 Census reported that 40 percent of the City's residents were Hispanic, 37 percent Anglo, 13 percent African-American, nine percent Asian-American and one percent Native American. The approximately 640,000 students enrolled today in its schools speak 100 different languages. A wide gulf of disparity in economic circumstances between its most affluent and its most disadvantaged residents has opened up over the past ten years. The poverty rate here has climbed to almost 33 percent as recession holds the country in its grip. Over the decade, the Los Angeles youth gang culture has mushroomed, bringing a wave of violence and crime to the City. By early 1992 the problems of the inner-city — gangs, crack cocaine, poverty, and racial and ethnic tension — made Los Angeles a tinderbox, ready to explode with the striking of a single match.

The “not guilty” verdicts announced in a crowded Simi Valley courtroom on the afternoon of April 29, 1992 struck that match. The trial had been brought to prosecute four officers of the Los Angeles Police Department for their part in the arrest and beating of Rodney King, a young African-American motorist whose case has come to symbolize a great deal about the relationship between the police and many of the people of this City. There is much deep-seated hostility, mistrust and suspicion in this relationship, and it cries out for change in the old ways of doing business. The

words spoken at our seven town meetings, held largely in the most heavily impacted neighborhoods of the City, speak eloquently to this condition. Appendix 17 contains a summary of the transcribed testimony.

By motion adopted on May 11, 1992, the Board of Police Commissioners instigated this study of the performance of the police department in connection with the events in April. While the focus of our inquiry in the 160 days since that date has been upon the police department, we concluded early in our study that it would be inaccurate and unfair for us to examine what the Department did without the benefit of learning about the surrounding circumstances and activities of other officials and agencies involved in responding to the disorder. We have learned that both leaders of the City and of its police force share responsibility for what happened after the verdicts were announced.

We have discovered a general lack of emergency preparedness, and a specific lack in the period before the Simi Valley verdicts of preparedness for the possibility of civil disorder. As we describe in **Chapters Three and Four** of our report, the City and the police department each have created general mechanisms intended to cope with emergencies. As we describe in **Chapters Five and Six**, to varying degrees, each has devoted modest effort to preparedness planning and training. However, the preparedness efforts of neither have resulted in anything that reasonably can be considered a “plan” for response to an emergency. Rather, it appears to be more accurate to state that each has collected and summarized a variety of materials having to do generally with emergency powers of government and the subject of emergency response. However, neither the City nor the police department has produced much in the way of substantive guidance with regard to specific emergency response objectives, priorities, tasks or assignments. Moreover, despite the recognition that City-wide emergencies require a coordinated City-wide response, and may also require coordinated use of mutual aid resources from outside the City, there has been practically no inter-departmental or mutual aid planning or training.

We are troubled perhaps most by the disorganization of the response itself. Confronted with very real danger of terrifying proportions, City government and police leaders do not appear to have worked well together as a team or to have been nearly as effective in their response as one might have hoped. Moreover, while numerous individual instances of bravery and dedication by rank and file police officers were reported to us, we have also learned that a number of senior police commanders, including the Chief of Police, apparently found it difficult under the pressure of the event to make decisions and to give meaningful direction to the forces under their command. As we show in **Chapters One, Seven, Eight, and Nine** such leadership deficiencies appear to have resulted in a failure to mobilize and deploy quickly, and the possibility that an opportunity to contain the disorder may have been lost at the outset. In all events, it would appear that the unhappy combination of such factors may have unduly prolonged the crisis.

Our study has led us to believe deeply in the need for a profound change in the relationship between the police department and the communities of the City. Many factors have led the City and its police force to the current crossroads. We describe in **Chapter Two** some of the more important historical causes, including the successful struggle of the Department to free itself from political influence and corruption. This laudable effort did not, however, achieve success without a price. Over time and a succession of Chiefs, the police department has grown aloof and removed from the City and its people. As we describe in **Chapter Ten**, changing circumstances now call for a changed relationship. The police department must become involved in a working partnership with the people of Los Angeles.

Our final conclusions and recommendations are discussed and itemized in more detail in **Chapter Eleven**. For purposes of this brief overview, we summarize three of our most important recommendations:

1. Recognizing the need for increased resources to fight crime on the City's streets, it is our first recommendation that the Department adopt new priorities that place renewed emphasis upon basic patrol duties. We urge the Chief of Police to re-allocate police officers away from special units and toward patrol assignments to the greatest extent possible. At the same time, we urge that field command experience in patrol become a primary criteria for advancement within the command ranks of the Department.
2. We recommend that significantly increased attention be paid to emergency response planning and training, not only within the police department, but also for the City as a whole. Since it is apparent that the City in most instances will find itself unable to respond without outside help, particular attention should be devoted to the use of and coordination with mutual aid resources. We especially recommend that leadership levels of the City and the Department be involved in training designed to enhance their crisis management experience and skills.
3. Finally, as part of an overall program to simplify and upgrade the capability of the City and the Department to exercise effective command and control over emergencies, we recommend a number of specific improvements in the City's emergency operations center and emergency communications systems. Modernization of the communications system, in particular, is essential to permit the City to conduct both normal and emergency operations. Accordingly, we strongly urge the adoption of Ordinance Proposition M on the November ballot.

We are mindful that some of the recommendations we make involve policy decisions on the application of scarce resources at a time of economic stress. Much can be accomplished by better use of existing resources, but the City leadership must determine carefully what additional expenditures it is prepared to commit as an investment in the safety and quality of life of its citizens.



PART
ONE:
THE
CONTEXT

1

WHAT HAPPENED?

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The “not guilty” verdicts from the jury trial of four police officers who arrested Rodney King sparked an unprecedented firestorm of violence in Los Angeles. Our inquiry will focus upon the preparation for, and response to, this disorder. We begin with an overview of what happened before and after the announcement of the verdicts.

THE CITY CAUGHT UNPREPARED

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, the District Attorney’s office was informed by Court personnel that the jury deliberating in the trial of the four police officers accused of beating Rodney King had reached verdicts. Although they did not know the content of the verdicts, prosecutors did learn that the jury had not reached a verdict on all counts. At the request of prosecutors, Judge Weisberg ordered a two-hour delay prior to announcing the verdicts to enable the media, who had been providing unprecedented live coverage of the trial, to ready themselves to broadcast the event.

When the jury’s verdicts were read to a packed courtroom in the Simi Valley courthouse at 3:00 p.m., they were simultaneously broadcast by the media to the entire City — indeed, to the entire country and many parts of the world. The reaction to the verdicts in many quarters of the City was one of shock and anger. Although there were limited expres-

sions of support for the verdicts and the operation of the criminal justice system, many who had seen the taped beating replayed over and over again during the preceding weeks and months found it hard to accept the outcome.

Almost immediately, crowds began to congregate in South Central Los Angeles to protest the verdicts. As these street corner protests began to grow in number and size, they first became angry and then turned violent, a situation dramatized most vividly by the beating of Reginald Denny just about four hours after the verdicts were announced. Over the course of the next six days, the reaction escalated into a terrifying reign of violence, widespread looting, and mass destruction of property in many communities across the City. The swiftness and ferocity of these events stunned the entire City and its people.

Common sense, as well as substantial available information, indicated in advance of these events that some manner of public outcry to a verdict other than conviction was predictable. It is thus reasonable to want to know why it was that the City was so apparently unprepared and unable to respond when the reaction in fact occurred. Despite the many months that passed between the beating and the trial, the more than 12 weeks of trial, the week of jury deliberations and the two hour advance warning that a verdict other than guilty on all counts would be handed down, City leaders and LAPD commanders alike seem to have been caught by surprise as the lawlessness escalated following the verdict. Although a handful of public

**Wednesday
April 29
1992**

Notice is given that verdicts
will be announced in two
hours.

12:45 p.m.

Angry crowds gather at 55th
and Normandie and spot
where Rodney King was
beaten.

3:20 p.m.

First looting occurs at
Florence and Normandie.

4:15 p.m.

3:10 p.m.

Verdicts are announced.

4:00 p.m.

Television stations broadcast
Mayor Bradley’s announcement of
shock and dismay over verdicts.

EOC activated.

officials appeared to have realized that a total failure to convict was a possibility, particularly after the case was transferred to Simi Valley, most public officials, including members of the City Council, the Mayor's Office, the Police Commission, and the District Attorney's Office, apparently did not seriously anticipate the possibility of a *complete* acquittal. Indeed, the most commonly expressed response on the part of the City's leaders to the absence of even one conviction was one of shock and disbelief. Even those who had contemplated the possibility of disorder following the verdicts were unprepared to deal with the violence.

The initial response of City officials was marked by uncertainty, some confusion, and an almost total lack of coordination. Within the police department, there was initially no meaningful integration with any of the other arms of City government, and uncharacteristic hesitancy in responding to initial incidents of disorder. Indeed, the tentativeness of the response to initial incidents now appears to have been a factor that enabled the violence, looting and destruction to take hold and grow. It now appears that the Command Staff had no specific plan in place for dealing with potential unrest following the verdicts. It was therefore unable to implement any preconceived and carefully thought out response. The absence of such a plan, coupled with holes in the Department's command structure and a generally poor state of mental readiness, severely hampered the performance of many commanders and the overall response.

THE APPROACH OF "ZERO HOUR"

During the two hours that elapsed between the time prosecutors were notified that the jury had reached verdicts and the actual reading of the verdicts, little was done to prepare for the possibility of a widespread and disorderly reaction. The failure of City and police leaders to position the City's resources properly to respond to the coming firestorm, however, started long before this two-hour window. The videotaped beating of Rodney King and the indictment and trial that followed were the subject of intense public scrutiny and unprecedented media attention for months before the jury reached its verdicts on April 29th.

The Rodney King beating was a racially charged event from the moment of its occurrence, and, as discussed below, took place against a backdrop of racial and ethnic tension in the City. Existing passions were fueled by the fact that, unlike most controverted events, the King beating was captured on video that was shown over and over again on television. Moreover, even before the trial commenced, the decision to transfer the case from Los Angeles County to Simi Valley caused concern among many people, in particular many within the African-American community, that a fair and just outcome might not be achieved. By the time the trial finally began on February 3, 1992, the event had been subjected to such an exhaustive blitz of media coverage and public debate — much of which discussed the racial overtones

Chief Gates makes public appearance and states "We are prepared for this."

5:00 p.m.

Over 2,000 people attend a meeting at First A.M.E. Church.

6:00 p.m.

Mayor Bradley appears on television and expresses shock at verdicts.

6:10 p.m.

Chief Gates turns over command to Deputy Chief Frankle before going to fundraiser in Brentwood.

6:20 p.m.

Rioters at Florence and Normandie attack cars and motorists with crowbars, bottles and rocks. LAPD Lt. Moulin, 77th Street Watch Commander, orders dispatchers not to send units to the area.

5:45 p.m.

L.A.F.D. Engine 46 and Rescue Ambulance 33 are attacked at corner of 71st and Normandie.

6:05 p.m.

Lt. Moulin begins to establish Field Command Post at 54th and Arlington RTD Bus yard.

6:15 p.m.

of the incident — that it is hard to imagine any resident of the City who was not aware of the beating incident, the pending trial, and the significant social and political issues they raised.

The trial itself lasted 12 1/2 weeks — from February 3 through April 22, 1992. The entire trial was carried live on cable television and was the subject of extensive daily publicity and commentary in all forms of local and national media. During this extended period, the trial was one of the most extensively covered and publicized events in the City, if not the country, and was at the forefront of public discussion and debate. As the trial neared its end in late April, that fact was known not just to those who were involved in the trial or followed it closely, but to residents throughout the City who were anticipating the trial's conclusion. Indeed, the closing arguments of the prosecution and of attorneys for the four police officers were publicly broadcast, replayed, and dissected as the City openly debated the jury's possible decision.

The jury spent seven days deliberating before rendering its verdicts. Given the length of the deliberations and certain questions that were asked by the jury during the process, people began to speculate openly that acquittals were possible. While the jury was deliberating, the press reported a statement by Chief Gates that an overtime allocation of \$1 million had been set aside in the event extra police manpower was required. Some City leaders publicly urged restraint by the community and the police no matter what the jury's verdicts might turn out to be. Thus, when the jury's verdicts were read on April

29, the announcement marked the much-anticipated culmination of an event that was at the forefront of the City's collective conscience. At the same time, the reading of the verdicts fell like a matchstick upon the dry tinder of the City's already tense climate.

THE PRE-TRIAL TEMPERATURE OF THE CITY

The Rodney King incident did not occur in a vacuum but within the context of the entire social, economic, and political climate of the City. The tensions that existed in these areas undoubtedly had a profound impact on the public's perception of and reaction to the videotaped beating and on the nature of the LAPD Command Staff's response to the lawlessness that followed the jury verdicts.

TENSIONS IN THE COMMUNITY

In the past decade, Los Angeles has experienced rapid demographic and economic changes. The population of the City as a whole has grown by 17 percent during that period and now exceeds 3.5 million people. At the same time, the make-up of the population has shifted to 40 percent Hispanic, 37 percent Anglo, 13 percent African-American, nine percent Asian-American, and one percent Native American. As the ethnic makeup of the City has changed fundamentally, so too has the economic stratification

100 LAPD officers at 77th Street Command Post.

6:30 p.m.

City-wide Tactical Alert called by LAPD Communications Division.

6:45 p.m.

Officers in riot gear disperse crowd at Parker Center. Governor Wilson announces that 2,000 National Guard will be sent to Los Angeles.

8:00 p.m.

6:45 p.m.

Reginald Denny pulled out of truck and beaten at Florence and Normandie. Television stations cover the attack live.

7:00 p.m.

Parker Center stormed by protestors smashing lobby windows. Guard shack in parking lot burned. 480 LAPD officers assigned to 77th Street Command Post. Governor Wilson calls Mayor Bradley to offer 2,000 California National Guard troops.

8:15 p.m.

First fatality: Youth shot in head by unknown gunman at Vernon and Vermont.

of its population. By 1990, more than 18.5 percent of Los Angeles residents were living below the poverty line. These changes in the City's makeup have caused significant stratification of Los Angeles by neighborhood. Thus, those areas of South and Central Los Angeles that are overwhelmingly populated by African-American and Hispanic citizens are the same areas that have experienced despairingly high unemployment and in which 20-40 percent of the residents are living below the poverty line. By contrast, several of the elite communities on the Westside of Los Angeles remain fairly homogenous Anglo neighborhoods and have minimal levels of poverty.


These profound shifts have contributed to greatly increased tensions between the City's affluent and less well off citizens, and among members of different racial and ethnic groups. Notable among these tensions is the conflict in South Central Los Angeles, between African-Americans and Korean-Americans who live alongside one another but who have in the main experienced dramatically different economic success during the past decade. Existing tensions in this community were heightened by the Harlins-Du incident just several months before the King verdict. The sentence of five-years' probation imposed in that case on a middle-aged Korean-American grocery store owner, who was found by a jury to be guilty of fatally shooting a fifteen-year-old African-American girl, deeply angered and caused many in the African-American community to lose confidence in the law enforcement and judicial systems. Without question the apparent leniency shown to Ms. Du inflamed racial and political tensions and

contributed to the brittle atmosphere preceding the unrest.

Los Angeles on the eve of the verdicts was also in the midst of a worsening economic downturn. Although the strain of the deepening recession had been hard on the entire City, it was hitting the African-American community especially severely. The disproportionately high levels of unemployment, poverty, and homelessness in Los Angeles' African-American neighborhoods was by most accounts giving rise to a growing level of tension, frustration, and anger that contributed to the tense atmosphere preceding the unrest.

TENSIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND LAPD

The atmosphere preceding the verdicts was also characterized by widespread tension be-



South-Central Los Angeles on the afternoon of Wednesday, April 29.

LAPD South Bureau Commanding Officer, Deputy Chief Hunt, arrives at Field Command Post and assumes command. Mayor Bradley declares a local emergency. Governor Wilson calls out the National Guard.

9:00 p.m.

Chief Gates goes to 77th Street Command Post; orders change in deployment procedures.

11:00 p.m.

Governor Wilson declares state of emergency.

12:10 a.m.

**Thursday
April 30
1992**

8:45 p.m.

First report of arson: Three columns of smoke along Vermont Avenue and 85th Street.

10:00 p.m.

Protestors ransack City Hall, City Hall East and Los Angeles Mall, smashing windows and setting fires. Chief Gates views City from helicopter, then by auto, and cannot find any police patrols.

**Midnight to
3:00 a.m.**

Three new fires per minute reported.

tween minority communities and the LAPD. African-Americans, especially young African-American males, widely perceive that they are frequently the victims of police mistreatment, racism, and abuse. The result of this belief is an apparently large reservoir of anger and frustration directed at the LAPD, which has been exacerbated by a commonly-held belief in Los Angeles' minority communities that the legal system does not work to discipline officers who mistreat people of color or to vindicate the rights of the victims of this unfair treatment. For many, the videotaped King beating merely confirmed their perception of widespread abuse of force by the LAPD against people of color.

Perceptions of improper and biased treatment by the LAPD are not confined to the African-American community. Leaders of Los Angeles' Hispanic communities believe that their communities receive inadequate police protection, and that Hispanics are victims of prejudice and racism by the LAPD and are frequent victims of police excessive force. Leaders of the Korean-American communities express a similar view that Korean-Americans do not receive adequate protection from the LAPD. In general, there is a widespread perception within Los Angeles' minority communities that the police give priority to protecting affluent Anglo neighborhoods over minority communities, such as South Central, the Pico-Union area, or Koreatown.

TENSIONS BETWEEN THE CHIEF OF POLICE AND OTHER CITY LEADERS

When the unrest began on April 29, the City's Mayor and Chief of Police had not spoken to one another directly for more than one year. Some observers felt that latent dislike between Mayor Tom Bradley and Chief Daryl Gates escalated to a complete rupture of their relationship in April, 1991, when the Mayor openly called upon the Chief to resign. That rupture significantly changed the way the Office of the Mayor related to the LAPD. At the same time, relations between the Chief and the Police Commission had become severely strained. The City Council's decision to reverse the attempt by the Police Commission to suspend the Chief in the wake of the King incident and the subsequent adoption on June 4, 1991 of Charter Amendment 5 — granting the Council power to override actions of the City's citizen commissions — led to virtually a complete turnover of the membership of the Police Commission, including the election of a new President. Whereas previous Commissions had been relatively passive in their dealings with the Chief, the new Commission tried to adopt a more proactive stance that did not necessarily increase the effectiveness of their oversight of the Department. The Chief had been given clear signals by the Council that he could safely ignore the Commission.

Transformers exploding west of Vermont Avenue to Central Avenue. Darkened area extends from Manchester to Vernon. At least 30 to 40 buildings are smoldering or actively burning. Numerous stores continue to be entered and looting.

2:55 a.m.

Vons at 3rd and Vermont is looted. Nearby apartment building burning. No police present.

10:30 a.m.

Mayor Bradley declares entire area within City subject to curfew.

1:45 p.m.

12:15 a.m.

Mayor Bradley imposes curfew on limited area of City, restricts sale of gasoline and bans sale of ammunition.

10:15 a.m.

Mayor Bradley extends curfew to wider area of City.

1:30 p.m.

First National Guard troops deployed into South Central Los Angeles.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Finally, by April 29, 1992 there had been a recognizable deterioration in the motivational level and state of mental readiness within the LAPD. To start, there appears to have been a significant level of polarization and dysfunction within the senior ranks. Observers noted the evidently displeased reaction of the Chief to the cooperation by some of his subordinates with the police department investigation conducted by the Christopher Commission. This appears to have resulted in a measure of estrangement of the Chief from some of his key subordinates. Still another factor contributing to a widely-perceived breakdown in cooperation amongst top commanders was the intense competition to replace Gates and become the new Chief. These problems at the top levels all contributed to a lessening of confidence within the Department.

At the same time, the report of the Christopher Commission itself, while properly identifying significant problems within the Department, had the unfortunate side-effect of doing further damage to the professional self-confidence of many rank and file police officers who had not themselves done anything wrong. Not the least among these changes was the community-based policing plan that required seven police Areas — including 77th Street, Harbor and Southeast Areas — to report directly to Chief Gates for some purposes.

Taken together these factors combined to seriously undermine the morale of the Department and its police officers, and leave it

in a poor state of psychological preparedness for the events of April 29. The situation was made all the worse by critical retirements, transfers and command changes that left significant vacancies in parts of the command structure and created critical vulnerabilities of inexperience in other parts.

PREPARATION FOR THE VERDICT

In addition to whatever planning and training is carried out generally to prepare for emergency situations, Los Angeles City officials had months to prepare specifically for the possibility of a public reaction to a verdict in the King beating case. Yet, apart from relatively limited efforts in particular LAPD Areas and isolated consideration by the Mayor's office and in other City agencies of the possibility of a public outcry, there seems to have been very little meaningful preparation for the King verdicts. There was no City-wide planning effort, no specific coordination with county, state, and federal authorities and, indeed, no event-specific planning within the LAPD itself. The City's standing emergency "plan" was so general and unspecific, untested, unfamiliar to those who were later called upon to carry it out, and in large part non-responsive to the nature of the civil disturbance that occurred, that it proved to be essentially useless. The police department's "plan" consisted of its Tactical Manual and its "standing plans" which together proved to be equally unspecific and non-responsive. As a result, when the violence and destruction

Major structure fires. Entire block is burning at Pico and Alvarado.

3:30 p.m.

2,000 more National Guard troops are requested. Mayor Bradley announces plans to request federal troops.

9:00 p.m.

Death toll stands at 25. 572 injuries. 1,000 fires. 720 arrests. 30 active structure fires. 119 ongoing incidents with 122 LAFD Fire Companies and 20 Rescue Ambulances committed.

Midnight

3:55 p.m.

Curfew, gasoline and ammunition restrictions extended City-side until sunrise on Friday, May 1, 1992

10:00 p.m.

Department of Water and Power reports 12,700 customers, mostly in the South Central area, are still without power.

did come, City officials and police commanders had given little specific thought to the problem of what strategies were appropriate to implement.

Under the City's Local Emergencies Ordinance, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the Emergency Operations Organization is charged with responsibility for "direction and control of local emergency preparation, response and recovery."¹ Upon activation of the Emergency Operations Organization, the Mayor becomes its "Director" and is given direct supervisory control over all of its operations and personnel, including the Emergency Operations Board established to manage preparations for and response to emergencies. As Director, the Mayor is also given extraordinarily broad discretionary power during the period of the emergency to promulgate, issue and enforce rules, regulations and orders for the purpose of protecting life and property. The Emergency Operations Board is made responsible for supervising, regulating, controlling and managing the affairs of the Emergency Operations Organization. However, the Board is not brought into existence only in times of emergency. The Board was created to oversee and direct City-wide emergency planning and training activities as well. Hence, it has been given the power to make and enforce all necessary and desirable rules and regulations for the purpose of governing the Emergency Operations Organization during periods of preparation, local emergency, response and recovery, including the right to issue instructions to the heads of the City's departments and the power to appoint any committees it needs to do its work.

The Board reports directly to the Mayor in his capacity as Director of The Emergency Operations Organization. In its day-to-day operations, however, there is a split of responsibility under the ordinance. The Board is chaired permanently by the Chief of Police, who is also designated as the Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization. At the same time, the City Administrative Officer ("CAO") is designated as the Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator. From the ordinance, it is evident that the City Council intended that the Chief of Police be in charge of the Board, subject to the direction of the Mayor, during actual periods of local emergency, when its activities must be directed toward emergency response. On the other hand, the City Administrative Officer is charged with responsibility for management of the Board in non-emergency times, when its activities must be directed toward emergency preparedness.

This split of responsibilities explains why Chief Administrative Officer Keith Comrie is responsible for directing the activities of the Emergency Management Committee ("committee"), which forms the working arm or staff of the Emergency Operations Organization and consists of representatives from all of the involved City departments and agencies. The primary responsibility of the Committee is to manage the City's planning and training activities. Unfortunately, the Committee's preparatory activities have been confined almost exclusively to earthquake "recovery," with virtually no attention being devoted to civil disorder preparation.

**Friday
May 1
1992**

National Guard
federalized.
12:01 a.m.

Mayor Bradley signs
Order extending City-
wide curfew.
9:00 a.m.

5:00 a.m.
President orders 1,200
federal agents to assist in
restoring order to Los
Angeles.

Early p.m.
Rodney King makes
statement over television
and radio.

**Saturday
May 2
1992**

Mayor Bradley announces
City-wide curfew in effect
indefinitely.
11:30 a.m.

It is now evident that the Emergency Operations Organization was not used in any way to plan for the possibility of a reaction to a verdict in the King beating trial. Mayor Bradley, as the Director of the Emergency Operations Organization, did not direct the Emergency Operations Organization to develop any planned response to that threat. Similarly, neither Chief Gates, the Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization and Chairman of the Emergency Operations Board, nor City Administrative Officer Comrie, the Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator, nor any of their staffs, sought to develop a coordinated plan for response through the Emergency Operations Organization.

Although Chief Gates claimed that the LAPD had a plan to deal with the possibility of violent public reaction following a verdict, he apparently was talking only about the LAPD Tactical Manual and the so-called "standing plans" of the Department's geographical Areas. The Tactical Manual is a basic procedures and training manual that provides general concepts to deal with a City-wide disorder. The "standing plans" consist of a collection of lists and procedure manuals for a wide range of situations from civil defense to flood control, and again offer no *specific* plans for responding to a massive disturbance. Indeed, Chief Gates rejected a suggestion beforehand by one Deputy Chief that the Department needed to be more concerned about the possibility of civil disorder. In so doing, he implicitly decided not to develop a single event plan, although in the past such plans had been developed by the Department in special cir-

cumstances, such as the 1984 Olympic Games. As a result, the Department was caught flat-footed on April 29. It should have been part of an LAPD plan to place the entire department on alert as soon as it was learned that verdicts were imminent. However, more than an hour after the LAPD learned that the jury had reached verdicts, there still was no Department-wide declaration of a Tactical Alert, no contemplation of mobilization, nor even a decision as to whether officers should be held over at the end of their watches, although individual Watch Commanders made decisions on their own to do so.

Neither the Mayor, the Council nor the Police Commission made any adequate efforts to determine if there really was a plan. All appear to have simply accepted the Chief's representation that his Department was ready without further verification. In retrospect, all plainly had a duty to do more than this.

In the absence of any specific plan, preparation within the LAPD beforehand had been limited to a review of Area "standing plans," checks of disturbance equipment in some bureaus, and sporadic roll call discussions and drills. Under the guise of "earthquake preparedness," some individual units held disturbance-control drills on station rooftops or in their parking lots. However, no practical training was given to members of the Department Command Staff, and no Department-wide drills were carried out. Nor was there any effort to establish liaisons or coordinate preparation and planning with law enforcement agencies outside the LAPD.

Mayor Bradley announces Peter Uberroth will head the Rebuild L.A. effort. President declares Los Angeles a disaster area.

5:15 p.m.

**Sunday
May 3
1992**

Time Uncertain

Television programming back to normal, power lines repaired, limited bus service restored.

L.A. County Sheriff approves withdrawal of law enforcement mutual aid forces from L.A.

9:55 a.m.

**Monday
May 4
1992**

12:06 p.m.

CHP demobilizes.

ECC is shut down.

8:00 a.m.

THE POST-VERDICT FIRESTORM

Although he did not use the Emergency Operations Organization framework, the Mayor evidently anticipated the possibility of an adverse reaction to the trial verdicts and directed his staff to map out a response plan with community leaders. His staff claims to have focused their energies in this direction after receiving assurances from Chief Gates, as well as Deputy Chiefs Matthew Hunt and Bernard Parks, that the police department was ready to respond to any possible disturbance.

The Mayor's plan seems to have been a relatively good one, as far as it went. Working with community leaders, the Mayor planned to provide a centralized forum at the First A.M.E. Church from which the congregated community could voice its reaction to a verdict. In addition, "talking points" were developed for use by officials and community leaders to help calm public reaction. Patrols from local churches were arranged to fan out through the community to calm tensions following the verdicts. While various community leaders assisted with this process, however, it is unclear whether any City Council members or Chief Gates were involved or received copies of the "talking points." In any event, before the verdicts were announced the Mayor had four different speeches prepared and he delivered one of them on television at about 5:00 p.m. on the evening of April 29.

The public reaction to the verdicts began almost immediately after they were broadcast live at 3:00 p.m. on April 29. Initial demonstrations of protest quickly sprung up outside the Simi Valley courthouse and on street corners in South Central Los Angeles. These protests grew angrier as the afternoon progressed.

The initial incidents in the City, which occurred within an hour or so after the verdicts were announced, took place in the Hyde Park neighborhood of the 77th Street police Area. The intersection of Florence and Normandie, which was the subject of live television coverage and was widely regarded as one of the "flash points" for the disorder, experienced repeated violent activity beginning before 4:00 p.m. Events there reached their peak at approximately 6:45 p.m., when cameras captured live several young African-American males dragging Reginald Denny, a passing motorist, from his truck and beating him close to death. It was shortly after the Denny beating that the violence began to spread and accelerate.

By 6:30 p.m., a crowd of about 150 protestors had also assembled outside of Parker Center, which was stormed and vandalized within the hour. This incident appears to have riveted the attention of police commanders, although their focus should have been on South Bureau where the first incidents of

Sheriff Block and Chief Gates agree federal law enforcement presence no longer needed.

11:50 a.m.

**Friday
May 8
1992**

10:40 a.m.

Curfew is lifted; ban on gasoline in containers and alcohol remains.

Time Uncertain

Federal troops begin pullout of Los Angeles area.

**Sunday
May 10
1992**

Federalization is lifted.

12:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

City-wide mobilization terminated.




FIGURE 1-1

arson were beginning to occur. Firefighters responding to initial incidents were attacked by protesters, and one firefighter was hospitalized early in the evening after being shot while responding to a call. The first fatality, the death by shooting of an 18-year-old youth, occurred at approximately 8:15 p.m. The youth was shot by an unknown assailant at the corner of Vernon and Vermont.

Our analysis of events shows, however, that as late as 7:00 p.m., outbreaks of violence were largely confined to part of the 77th Street and Southwest Areas. As we document in Chapter Eight, it was within the next hour after 7:00 p.m. that the fires started and the violence began to spread. Thus, any chance the Command Staff had to contain the disturbance at the onset ended around 7:00 p.m. the first night. After that, the violence steadily worked its way north and west.

The lawlessness that occurred involved physical violence, looting and massive destruction of property, primarily through arson. The lawlessness was cyclical in nature but, unlike past disorders, occurred with equal intensity in

daylight hours and during the nighttime. Thus, after the destruction on the first night, in each of the next five days the activity tended to start in the morning, build during the day, reach a high point in the evening and then tail off in the early morning hours. This overall pattern is illustrated by Figure 1-1, which is a plot of all emergency incidents recorded by the City's 9-1-1 system during the six days of the disturbance.² From this plot, it can also be seen that the second day of violence was the most severe in terms of the overall number of incidents. However, even on the third day the level of lawlessness was more severe than the first day. Only on the fourth and fifth days did the levels begin to fall off.

By the time the mayhem subsided some six days later, violence, looting and arson engulfed seven police Areas that make up the core of the central City: Southeast, 77th Street, Southwest, Newton Street, Rampart, Wilshire and Hollywood Areas. These seven Areas, shown on the accompanying map identified as Figure 1-2, were by far the most active during the disorder. Lesser incidents also occurred in Westwood, Venice, San Pedro, and Culver City.




FIGURE 1-2

INCIDENTS FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS BY DAY




FIGURE 1-4

The total number of incidents occurred in the four geographic police Bureaus as shown in Figure 1-3, with 59 percent of the incidents reported in Central and South Bureau. West Bureau was next with 24 percent, and Valley Bureau was lowest with 17 percent. It is instructive as well to look at the levels of incidents experienced by the seven most active police Areas. Figure 1-4 shows the number of incidents each of these Areas experienced over the six days of the disturbance. It can readily be seen that the pattern of activity levels generally follow the overall

pattern of activity plotted in Figure 1-1. What is most noteworthy in Figure 1-4, however, is that *all* of these Areas experienced sharp increases in activity on day two. It can also be seen that, although activity diminished in each of the following days for these seven Areas, day three again was worse and day four about the same as day one.

Given the widespread looting that occurred during the disorder, it is not surprising to find that most of the reported incidents involved property crimes. As shown in Figure 1-5,

INCIDENTS BY BUREAU APRIL 29 - MAY 4




FIGURE 1-3

INCIDENTS BY CRIME CATEGORIES APRIL 29 - MAY 4




FIGURE 1-5

fully 58 percent of the incidents fell into this category, followed by 19 percent reported crimes against persons, and 17 percent reported in the category for unruly crowds and other disturbances. In the seven most active Areas, property crimes overwhelmingly predominated as well, with the largest numbers of incidents occurring in the Rampart, Wilshire and Newton Areas.

In the end, during the six days of the disturbance, at least 42 people lost their lives,³ more than 700 businesses were burned, and some \$1 billion in property was damaged or destroyed. Although the violence stretched to many areas in the City, the hardest hit remained the communities of South and South Central Los Angeles and Koreatown. On many of the major commercial streets in these communities, 50 percent or more of the buildings were damaged or destroyed. In South and South Central, more than 560 businesses were destroyed by fire, hundreds more were victimized by looters, more than 21,000 people were left without electricity, and the entire area was left without mail service or public transportation. During the six days of rioting and for days beyond, it became impossible in these communities to purchase the bare necessities of life.

In Koreatown, located partly in Central but mostly in West Bureau, more than 100 fires were reported on the first night alone, and over 300 businesses were burned and looted before the terror ended. Damage in Koreatown alone is estimated to exceed \$200 million. It thus is understandable — although seriously troubling — that many in the Korean-American community saw the need to arm and defend themselves and their property from the attacks of lawbreakers. Gunfights between these citizens and their attackers tragically

were an all too frequent occurrence during the disorder.

The storm of fire was especially horrifying. As shown in Figure 1-6, almost half of the structure fires over the six day period were set in South Bureau, with another third in Central Bureau and 17 percent in West Bureau. Valley Bureau was mostly spared.⁴ The plot of all structure fires for the disorder period repeats the cyclical pattern established by the plot of 9-1-1 incidents shown in Figure 1-1. Again it is instructive to look at the seven

STRUCTURE FIRES FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS BY DAY




FIGURE 1-7

most active Areas which, as shown in Figure 1-7, mirror the overall fire pattern. The predominance of fire in South Bureau is readily apparent.

The perpetrators of this violence were not confined to any single racial or ethnic classification.⁵ Although the initial violent incidents immediately following the verdicts appear for the most part to have involved African-American males, members of all racial groups were involved in the spreading physical assaults and looting. People of all ages and gender participated in the looting, although the preponderance of participants were young males. In one widely publicized incident on the second day of the violence, for example, men, women and children of all ages and races could be seen lining up in order to loot an enormous Fedco store in Culver City.

The widespread violence does not appear to have been directed by any single individual or group. Although gang members seem to

STRUCTURE FIRES BY BUREAU APRIL 29 - MAY 4




FIGURE 1-6

have been involved in many cases, the scope of the violence was massive and appears to have gone far beyond gang activity. Moreover, although persistent rumors suggest that there might have been pre-conceived plans among gangs or others to carry out the pattern of violence and destruction that occurred, our study has uncovered no hard evidence to confirm such a supposition. A notable exception, discussed in Chapter Eight, was the evidently organized assault by gang members on gun and sporting goods stores and pawnshops that resulted in the taking of more than 4,300 firearms from just 19 locations. On the whole, however, the disturbance seems to have largely begun with explosive outbursts of physical assaults and property destruction that took place as a result of pent-up anger and frustration. However, once the violence began and it became evident that the police were not able to check the lawbreaking, others apparently joined in, fueling the expansion of the disturbance.

THE CITY'S RESPONSE

With few exceptions, the failure of City officials and police department commanders adequately to prepare specifically for the possibility of the public reaction to the verdicts seems to have left many of these leaders — and the rank and file of the police department — mentally unready to confront the disorder when it came. It is therefore not surprising that when the verdicts arrived, the response suffered from a lack of leadership. The failure of individual commanders to react quickly, as contemplated by Department policy, to the initial incidents of violence led to situations that spread, intensified and careened out of control.

THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

The Emergency Operations Organization (“EOO”) should have been the nerve center of the City’s emergency response. In this

case, however, the EOO was largely dysfunctional. The Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”), located four stories underground in City Hall East, was supposed to swing into action as the City’s central command and coordination location. It was designed to be staffed during an emergency by representatives of each City department or agency involved in the response. Less than an hour after the verdicts were announced, but more than three hours after he learned that the verdicts had come down, Chief Gates activated the EOC. However, activation appears to have accomplished little more than turning on lights in an almost empty room.

At the time the City’s emergency apparatus was theoretically activated, the Mayor and the Chief of Police still had not spoken with one another and seem to have taken no steps to coordinate their activities. Shortly after “activating” the EOC, Chief Gates left City Hall for a political fundraiser in Brentwood. Members of the LAPD division specifically-trained to staff the EOC were allowed to go home at 4:00 p.m., at the end of their regular shift. It was hours before these individuals could be located and ordered back into action. The other City agencies whose presence is necessary to staff the EOC did not even begin to learn that it had been activated until after 4:45 p.m., when someone asked a City Hall operator to start making telephone calls to them. Mayor Bradley left for the pre-planned meeting at the First A.M.E. Church intended to provide an outlet for the community’s anger. No one thus appears to have been left at the EOC to direct the City’s response.

Beyond staffing problems, the EOC mechanism did not work well. At the beginning, the EOC was unable to obtain timely and reliable information from the police field commands. Late in the night of April 29, the EOC still had not been able to establish a direct telephone link with the LAPD’s South Bureau Field Command Post. Moreover, within the EOC, procedures for communication and routing of information were apparently overwhelmed by the volume of information and did not work. Virtually every element of the EOC’s command, control,

communications and information network seems to have broken down, with the result that the EOC never seems to have been in a "catch up" position for most of the disorder period. While there seems to have been modest improvement in conditions by the third day, it does not appear that the EOC ever provided effective command and control. Hence, it is questionable whether the EOC ever served as an effective mechanism to coordinate the activities of either the police or the many other agencies called upon to assist in the response.

THE LAPD

Although the LAPD appeared to stay on top of events in much of the City — responding effectively to troublesome situations, for example, in Westwood Village and at the Foothill station — they could not keep up with the violence that erupted in the seven most active police Areas. Handicapped by the failure at the highest levels of the Command Staff to engage in specific planning and preparation for the possibility of unrest, rank and file police officers in the seven most active Areas seemed to have been put on the defensive and forced to react to the race of events. During the entire crisis, the Chief of Police appears never actively to have taken command of the Department and its response, preferring to leave that critical responsibility in the hands of less experienced subordinates.

In the 77th Street Area, where the initial violence occurred, officers responding to the first incidents were outnumbered by demonstrators and ordered to retreat by their Watch Commander, Lieutenant Michael Moulin. This decision appears to have made sense under the circumstances, but the failure after that to regroup and return rapidly to the scene appears to have been a critical error. At approximately 6:15 p.m., an order went out for all South Bureau units, which included the 77th, to report to a command post that was being established at an RTD facility at 54th and Arlington. While all units were being drawn from the streets into this staging area, none were being sent back out to deal with the growing violence, with the conse-

quence that the 77th — and ultimately much of South Bureau — was left with a much-reduced police presence during the critical first hours of the disorder.

At the Field Command Post, the commanding officers on the scene appear to have been given very little information about the situation in the rest of South Bureau or the City at large, and communications difficulties made it almost impossible for them to receive guidance from the Department Commander. The rest of the City watched on live television as the incidents became more violent, more numerous and quickly grew out of control in the absence of any LAPD response. All of the Los Angeles television networks had helicopters continuously in the air from the outbreak of violence through the end of the disturbance — thereby enabling the public to watch the violence spread throughout the City. Many LAPD commanders, however, were unable to watch the television reports from these helicopters and did not get the benefit of reports from the Department's own helicopter units which generally were not used for reconnaissance. Television commentators openly remarked on the absence of police.

At around 6:45 p.m., the explosion of 9-1-1 emergency calls caused the LAPD Communications Division Commander to broadcast a City-wide Tactical Alert. Just after 8:00 p.m., the LAPD was put into emergency mobilization, a process that took several hours more to complete. At 8:45 p.m., the Mayor declared a local state of emergency and, shortly thereafter requested that the Governor mobilize 2,000 National Guard troops. This occurred almost immediately after Chief Gates returned to City Hall from the fundraiser. When the Mayor requested National Guard troops from the Governor, he evidently did so without calling upon local police agency mutual aid resources intended to provide the first line of additional support in such a situation.

During the first evening of the disorder, the LAPD seems to have lost all control over the mobs of demonstrators in South Bureau, who looted and burned at will. Circumstances did

not improve on Day Two, as the violence spread north and west. The best strategy would seem to have been to get people off the streets and to arrest lawbreakers. However, confusion over the City's curfew order may have hampered this effort and the failure specifically to plan in advance for this contingency seems to have inhibited implementation of a City-wide arrest strategy. Figure 1-8 is a table that summarizes arrests made by each Bureau during the six day period. Few arrests were made the first night. Although the level of arrests began to pick up the next day, it did not keep pace with the explosion of looting and violence. Over the entire six days of mayhem, a total of only 5,002 arrests were made in the entire City of Los Angeles. Of this number, 4,880 were made by the LAPD and 122 by other law enforcement agencies.⁶ Once the LAPD began making arrests, the system for processing lawbreakers rapidly appears to have bogged down in many instances, with the result that fewer arrests were made than seemingly were required by the circumstances.

THE RESPONSE FROM OUTSIDE

The sheer size of the deployment of mutual aid resources to assist the City and the LAPD in responding to the disturbance points to the importance of mutual aid to both preparation and response. The California National Guard was called out during the first evening of rioting. However, a significant number of troops do not appear to have reached the streets until May 1. The initial deployment of 2,000 was augmented by two subsequent call ups, reaching a maximum Guard deployment of over 7,000 troops. Federal forces were deployed to bases around Los Angeles beginning on May 1st, although they did not reach their street assignments until Sunday, May 3rd. All told, federal troops numbered 3,500, and were supplemented by a deployment of more than 1,200 riot-trained law officers. At the regional level, the California Highway Patrol ("CHP") deployed 1,500 officers to assist the local efforts, and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LASD") mobilized all of its forces, although only a small number were deployed inside City boundaries.

Although large in scale and clearly essential to the ability of the City and the LAPD to control the disturbance, response was hindered by a lack of planning and coordination with, and effective use of, these outside resources, including the region's mutual aid resources, the National Guard, and federal troops. It is apparent that prior to April 29th neither the City nor the LAPD participated in any meaningful preparations with outside resources for the possibility of a civil disturbance that would exhaust City and Department resources.

The result of this lack of planning was a parallel lack of understanding of the function of the mutual aid system as soon as the unrest broke out. On the evening of April 29, when it was determined that outside assistance

SUMMARY OF ARRESTS IN EACH BUREAU

Day	Central Bureau	South Bureau	West Bureau	Valley Bureau
1	83	48	9	20
2	556	258	278	173
3	481	149	236	216
4	403	179	219	415
5	194	276	182	259
6	111	94	65	98
Total	1828	1004	989	1181

FIGURE 1-8

would be needed by the City, police commanders did not call upon the local police resources most readily available under the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. Instead they bypassed local mutual aid entirely and urged the Mayor directly to request of the Governor that the California National Guard be deployed, even though the first elements of such a deployment could have been anticipated to—and did in fact—take 17 hours or more to effectuate. As the

National Guard began to deploy on April 30, the City's "out-of-channel request" caused some temporary confusion as to whether the National Guard was to function under the direction of the LAPD or the Sheriff, who actually appears to have assigned initial Guard units to duty in parts of the County outside of City boundaries.

Additional problems arose when the President ordered federal troops to be deployed to assist in the response. At the forefront was confusion as to the proper role of the military. Despite an express written declaration by the President to the contrary, the federal troop commander, Major General Covault, took the position that the defense Department's internal plan for handling domestic civil disturbances coupled with the *posse comitatus* statute prohibited the military from engaging in any law enforcement functions. This position required each request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determine whether the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or a military function. As a result, after the federalization on May 1, not only were the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for most assignments requested by the LAPD, but the National Guard, under federal command, was made subject to the same restrictions, and therefore had to refuse many post-federalization requests for help.

QUESTIONS RAISED

The foregoing description raises many questions to which the balance of this report is directed. In broad outline, the search for answers to these questions begins with an exploration of the context in which the disorder arose including a description of the emergency framework of the City and its police department. Next, we will consider questions related to emergency preparations, including the crucial areas of planning, training and information assessment. Finally, we will evaluate the response itself, including questions related to command and control, police operations and the use of outside resources.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

- ¹ See Appendix 2 for the full text of all relevant portions of the ordinance.
- ² The 9-1-1 emergency system is described in Chapter Four. Our study analyzed all of the emergency incidents recorded by the 9-1-1 system during the six day period. The methodology of this analysis is described in Appendix 5.
- ³ Of the 42 known deaths in the City during the period of the disorder, 36 appear definitely to be disorder-related. See Appendix 9.
- ⁴ We analyzed all available data with regard to fire incidents during the disorder. The methodology of this analysis is described in Appendix 6.
- ⁵ An imperfect, but perhaps the best available, portrait of the participants emerges from our analysis of arrest data from the disorder period, and it confirms these general conclusions. This analysis appears in Appendix 8.
- ⁶ By way of comparison, 3,952 persons were arrested during the six days of the 1965 disorder in Los Angeles. REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY — AN END OR A BEGINNING? 1 (Dec. 2, 1965) [hereinafter the McCONE COMMISSION REPORT] at 1.

2

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

THE STRUGGLE TO BE FREE
OF INFLUENCE AND CORRUPTION 31

THE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE COMMUNITY 34

POVERTY, WEALTH AND DIVERSITY 38

THE MAKING OF A TINDERBOX 41

Once hailed as a city of new beginnings, Los Angeles was the first of the great American cities to suffer violent disorder in the 1960s. Hailed in the 1980s as the new American melting pot, Los Angeles again fell victim to violence in the firestorm of April 1992. How did this happen? The possible answers to this question are numerous and complex, but their roots lie in the story of two struggles that have gripped this City and its police force. The first struggle began a long time ago as the City and its police force fought to break free of the debilitating effects of political influence and corruption. This was a laudable struggle for independence, but it had a price. The Police Department emerged as a tough, corruption-free crime-fighting force that is largely divorced and aloof from the City and its people. The second struggle has just begun. This is a struggle to overcome the growing deterioration and tensions that now divide and separate the City and its people. This is a struggle to preserve the basic commitment to community necessary for the City to survive. This Chapter is about these two struggles and how they have led us to where we are today.

THE STRUGGLE TO BE FREE OF INFLUENCE AND CORRUPTION

In the "Wild West" atmosphere of Los Angeles in the nineteenth century, attempts to enforce the law with a marshal and six deputies met with little success. In 1876, Los Angeles created a Police Department with a Chief and thirteen officers, but the City still struggled to control the general lawlessness. A "political machine" controlled the City government, however, supported by an alliance between the railroads, local businessmen seeking to keep unions out of Los Angeles, and even the fledgling Police Department seeking to maintain a corrupt system of

vice "protection" payoffs. The machine dominated local government, approving all nominees for elected office so that it did not matter who won the general election. Faced with corrupt politicians and police officers in addition to the usual lawbreakers, the first LAPD police chief left the job after a year, only to be followed by 16 other Chiefs over the next 13 years, each of whom was appointed and removed due to political considerations.

The Progressive Movement developed in response to this corruption. Its ultimate ideal was greater citizen control through citizen commissions. The commissions were intended to take politics away from the politicians by weakening the powers of the Mayor and City Council, and giving citizen panels many powers that were traditionally reserved for elected officials. Citizen commissions were formally introduced to Los Angeles in 1878, when the California state legislature passed a bill that acted as a city charter; the first locally-adopted Los Angeles City Charter was passed in 1889. The 1889 Charter maintained the ward system for electing the Council and increased the Council's power relative to that of the Mayor, by providing the Council with control of the budget and by limiting mayoral appointment and veto powers and shortening the Mayor's term in office to two years. Political abuse persisted, however, as the Council was still dominated by the machine.

Eventually a Progressive mayor was elected and the Progressives moved to abolish the councilmanic ward system altogether and establish nonpartisan election rules. Nomination for all municipal offices was made by direct primary rather than party caucus, meaning that these office-seekers ran at large, with party identification on the ballot prohibited. Other amendments to the 1889 Charter increased the relative importance of the Mayor at the expense of the City Council in the years leading up to enactment of the current Charter of 1925, which significantly altered the structure of Los Angeles city government. Designed to insulate the citizen commissions from the control and corrupting

influence of the Council and Mayor, it standardized the features of the various commissions — each commission now numbered five members with staggered five-year terms — and gave them more power. In addition, the 1925 Charter removed the Mayor from all commissions. The new City Charter also focused on the problem of police corruption; it removed from the Mayor the authority to appoint the Chief of Police and vested such authority solely in the citizen Police Commission.

Corruption and scandal were never far below the surface, however, and Los Angeles went through another twenty police chiefs from 1900 to 1933. Reformers struggled with corruption in the Police Department into the late 1930s, with reform initiatives prevalent during the 1930s because of the LAPD's frequent dismissal of officers for purely political reasons. Various charter amendments during the 1930's provided the police department and its chief with protection from improper political interference, but it was not until 1938 when high-ranking police and city officials, uncomfortable with the success of the reformers, directed the LAPD Special Intelligence Section to blow up a car owned and occupied by a private investigator working for the reformers, that police corruption began to end. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Shaw became the first mayor of a major United States city to be recalled. The new Mayor of Los Angeles, reformer Fletcher Bowron, appointed a new Police Commission and took steps to retire 23 top officials of the LAPD.

In 1950, William H. Parker became the new Chief of Police. Chief Parker had an unprecedented mandate and the protection of the City Charter and Civil Service, which had not been enjoyed by his predecessors, and he vowed to clean up the LAPD. Under Parker, the LAPD became one of the most professional, corruption-free police forces in the United States. Parker's military model made the relatively low police staffing levels in Los Angeles a virtue. The "thin blue

line," a phrase that Parker coined, became synonymous with the LAPD, which was widely-admired and emulated across the country. The "Dragnet" television show helped to promote the LAPD's tough but professional crime-fighting image. This image of a police force that was incorruptible, could do no wrong, and never abused its power was broadcast across the country. Chief Parker gave his approval, and arranged for the producers of the show to have access to the Department. Parker created his own television show in 1956, called "The Thin Blue Line," to further burnish the Department's image.

Occasional scandals arose during Parker's tenure as Chief of Police, however. The "Bloody Christmas" beating of seven LAPD prisoners in 1951 forced Parker to deal with charges of police brutality by the Department. While he initially denied such charges, he later conducted a thorough internal investigation that resulted in the transfer of 54 officers, including two deputy chiefs, and the suspension of 39 others. In addition, a grand jury indicted eight officers for felonious assault; of these, five were convicted.

Parker's immediate successors, Tom Reddin and Ed Davis, were not as politically powerful or well-known as Parker, but the Chief named in 1978 was a Parker protege. Chief Daryl Gates enforced the teachings of his mentor, and prided himself on a department that was aggressive, tough, and professional, and completely free of corruption. Chief Gates promoted the professional model of policing favored by Parker, in which aggressive crime-fighting, rather than crime prevention, is the principal objective. He developed a police force that was well-disciplined, highly-trained and technically sophisticated, and favored specialized units over officers patrolling the streets. As a result, while insulated from political influence and corruption, the LAPD became isolated from the community it was supposed to serve.

The recent push for police reform is not new to Los Angeles. The Department's traditional style of law enforcement, with its emphasis on aloof crime-fighting and arrests — fostered conditions that ultimately made possible a number of “highly charged, notorious events” and abuses of police authority. Over 25 years ago, the McCone Commission issued a report on the underlying causes of the Watts riots in August 1965, which report began with an examination of law enforcement in Los Angeles. The Commission found “a deep and longstanding schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department. ‘Police brutality’ has been the recurring charge.” It concluded that promoting communication between the police and the African-American community was essential, as was a better understanding by the police of the attitudes within the community.

In the years after the McCone Commission's report, Chiefs Tom Reddin and Ed Davis, made some efforts to incorporate some of the features of community-oriented policing programs into the professional model of policing to which the Department adhered. Chief Reddin appointed Department lieutenants as Community Relations Officers (“CROs”), and charged them with serving as liaisons to neighborhood organizations. In 1970, Chief Davis instituted the “basic car plan,” a neighborhood beat system. In this system, small teams of officers had 24-hour responsibility for patrolling a given neighborhood within their precinct. The Department created a new rank, that of senior lead officer (“SLO”), to lead these teams. Under the leadership of the SLOs, these teams were to monitor conditions within their assigned neighborhoods, organize Neighborhood Watch groups, and hold crime-prevention meetings with the residents of the neighborhood. In the mid-1970s, Chief Davis also implemented team policing, which was an attempt to decentralize authority within the Department by creating a number of smaller, autonomous policing units throughout the City. Chief Davis' goal in implementing team policing was to promote

communication between the police and the community and to respond to citizen concerns for the overall well-being of the community.

When Daryl Gates became Chief of Police, the Department's policing style reverted to Parker's more paramilitary model. This was due, in part, to budget constraints in the post-Proposition 13 years and a reduction in the number of sworn officers in the Department. Due to a lack of funding, the position of CRO lieutenant was eliminated, and area captains took over their responsibilities. Although the rank of SLO continues to exist, the Department's emphasis on producing arrests and performing other, regular patrol functions effectively has precluded most of those officers from performing community policing activities. Gates also moved the Department away from contact with the community by placing more and more of his officers outside regular patrol functions and into highly-trained, technically-sophisticated, specialized units that had little day-to-day contact with the community.

Chief Gates did experiment with a few programs that reflected some elements of community policing. In 1983, Gates developed a highly visible program, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (“DARE”), in which officers teach children in the City's schools about the dangers of drug use. The DARE program has become a national model for drug abuse education programs. In 1985, in response to citizen complaints about dissatisfaction with police services, the Department's Wilshire Area started its Community Mobilization Project (“CMP”). Wilshire Area SLOs were relieved of patrol responsibilities and, instead, directed to concentrate on responding to the needs of the community. Subsequently, when the Area's response time rose to the worst level in the City, the SLOs were returned to patrol.

Beginning in 1979, a number of well-publicized incidents during Gates' tenure as Chief increased the level of antipathy between the

community and the Department. Two LAPD officers fatally shot Eulia Love, an African-American woman, in a confrontation, after she assaulted a gas company serviceman with a shovel earlier in the day; the officers in question were not disciplined. In April 1988, the Department conducted Operation Hammer which descended upon ten square miles of South Central Los Angeles with a thousand extra-duty patrolmen, backed by elite tactical squads and a special anti-gang task force, to arrest 1,453 African-American youths, more arrests than at any one time since the 1965 Watts disturbance.

Only a few months later, 88 LAPD officers wielding shotguns and sledgehammers engaged in a drug raid on four apartments in the 3900 block of Dalton Street, which caused extensive property damage and yielded only two minor drug arrests. Even Chief Gates later admitted that the raid "got out of hand." In June 1990, approximately one hundred LAPD officers confronted four hundred striking janitors and other supporters of organized labor's nationwide "Justice for Janitors" campaign in Century City. The confrontation turned violent, and resulted in forty demonstrators being arrested, injuring sixteen.

Finally, the videotaped beating of Rodney King by uniformed LAPD officers, in the presence of a sergeant and with a large group of other officers standing by, raised fundamental questions about the LAPD, and not simply in the minds of the African-American community, which had complained of police brutality for many years. The study and report of the Christopher Commission in response to this incident painted a disturbing picture of the relationship between the police and the people of the City.

THE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE COMMUNITY

The incidents just described did not happen in a vacuum — the face of Los Angeles has not gone unchanged as the City's police force became increasingly confrontational and controversial. Tensions among different segments of the community have increased, just as they have between the community as a whole and the Police Department.

Los Angeles has undergone explosive growth for over a century, with much of that growth coming from other countries. When Mexico ceded California to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, Los Angeles was




FIGURE 2-1

just a sleepy village of 1600.² By 1965, Los Angeles had grown to have over 2.5 million residents³, and another million have been added since then. Figure 2-1 shows the population density of the City as of the 1990 census.

Everything suggests that Los Angeles will continue to experience significant immigration for the indefinite future. This influx of people provides an enormous amount of creativity and energy which drive an economy dwarfing most *national* economies, but the rapid growth also frustrates the development of a common civic culture. Indeed, the increasingly diverse population of Los Angeles is viewed as increasingly difficult to govern and, in particular, increasingly difficult to police.⁴

A MAJORITY OF MINORITIES

This population growth was paralleled by a change in the City's ethnic and racial composition. Since its beginnings as a Spanish mission, the City has seen a steady immigration of diverse peoples. In the early nineteenth century, Chinese workers migrated to the western U.S. to build railroads, and many of them settled in Los Angeles. There was also a heavy influx of Japanese and Filipino immigrants.⁵ World War II and the industrial boom that accompanied it created 550,000 jobs in Southern California, which increased the attractiveness of Los Angeles to job-seeking migrants.⁶ Due to the severity of the worker shortage created by the war, the government ordered its contractors and their unions to integrate, and in 1943 forbade its contractors to discriminate on the basis of race. A stream of African-Americans began leaving other states to come to Los Angeles to share in the City's industrial boom. This migration of farmers and factory workers tripled the African-American population in the 1940's, and the growth of the African-American population continued into the 1960s.⁷ For every African-American resident in Los Angeles at the beginning of the Second World War, nearly nine lived in the City by 1965. Sixteen percent of the City's population was African-American. Of the 278,410

people in South Central Los Angeles in 1965, nearly one-fourth had moved to California less than five years earlier.⁸

Although the City was the nation's second largest industrial center during Chief Parker's tenure as head of the LAPD,⁹ Los Angeles was merely beginning its development as a major multi-racial urban center. The City continued to experience segregation in housing and services.¹⁰ Mexican-Americans began to move out of East Los Angeles, with the help of GI benefits, into the suburbs of Montebello, La Puente and Alhambra, but many remained behind.¹¹ Indeed, East Los Angeles still formed the second largest city of Mexicans in the world in the 1980's.¹² Most African-American families remained in South Central Los Angeles, and did not move into other neighborhoods as Mexican-Americans had done.¹³

Immigration from Latin America and Asia began to increase markedly in the later 1960's. This influx of people was driven primarily by political and economic events occurring in the countries they left behind. The economies of several major countries in these regions, including Mexico and the Philippines, proved increasingly incapable of providing reasonable employment opportunities for their residents. Many countries, including the Central American countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua and the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, were racked by political turmoil or civil war, creating wave after wave of refugees. Countries such as Taiwan and South Korea saw many of their people migrate in search of what they perceived as better opportunities in the United States.

The large influx of immigrants to the City is reflected in the increased use of languages other than English in the home. According to the 1990 census, almost one-third of state-wide residents over the age of five years reported that they spoke a language other than English at home; in Los Angeles the number stood at an astonishing 50 percent.¹⁴ Also, 16 percent of the state's population reported that it did not speak English very

well; in Los Angeles this number was almost doubled.¹⁵ Less than one-quarter of the state's residents were foreign born in 1990; in Los Angeles, over a third were foreign born, an increase of 66 percent during the previous ten years.¹⁶ By 1980, the City was no longer dominated by its Anglo population: 48 percent were Anglo, 28 percent were Hispanic, 17 percent were African-American, seven percent were Asian-American, and one percent were Native American.¹⁷ This trend continued during the 1980s, and by 1990, 40 percent were Hispanic, 37 percent were Anglo, 13 percent were African-American, nine percent were Asian-American, and one percent were Native American.¹⁸

It is instructive that the Hispanic and Asian-American populations in the City increased dramatically during the 1980s, while the Anglo and African-American populations decreased. The Anglo population has been decreasing for a number of years, reflecting a movement of middle class Anglos from more urban neighborhoods to the suburbs. The decrease in African-American population during the 1980s suggests that a similar phenomenon is occurring among middle-class African-Americans who are leaving the inner City in search of more hospitable living environments. The African-American population of South Los Angeles actually decreased by 20 percent during the decade, while the African-American population in the rest of the City increased slightly. The African-American population of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, which are more suburban and where housing costs are much more reasonable, increased by 99 percent and 134 percent, respectively.¹⁹

These general City-wide figures on racial and ethnic makeup show increasing diversity in the City, but they do not begin to reveal the mosaic of groups and cultures which inhabit different areas within the City. The City's Asian-American population, which constitutes nine percent of the total, or 320,000, is not monolithic, but rather is comprised of a number of discrete ethnic groups which have their own languages and customs.²⁰ Furthermore, some areas of the City are still dominated by one, or possibly two, racial groups, while other

1990 POPULATION BY RACE

	% Asian- American	% African- American	% Hispanic	% Anglo
Westside				
Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	5	1	5	90
Bel Air - Beverly Crest	5	2	5	88
Westwood	14	3	7	76
Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	14	6	26	54
Westchester - Playa del Rey	8	7	13	72
Downtown/Northeast				
Boyle Heights	3	1	94	2
Eagle Rock - Highland Park	16	2	64	18
Central City	13	23	42	21
Westlake	11	3	80	6
Chinatown - Little Tokyo	42	17	30	11
Silverlake - Echo Park	24	2	53	21
Mid Wilshire	21	11	39	29
Hollywood	10	4	39	50
South L.A.				
South Central	3	48	45	4
Southeast	1	39	59	1
West Adams - Baldwin Hills - Leimert Park	5	62	28	5
Harbor				
San Pedro	5	5	34	55
Wilmington - Harbor City	7	5	63	24
Harbor - Gateway	19	14	45	22
San Fernando Valley				
Granada Hills - Knollwood	13	3	12	72
Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	13	2	13	72
Encino - Tarzana	4	2	8	86
Woodland Hills - Canoga Park - Winnetka	8	2	18	71
Reseda - W. Van Nuys	8	3	26	63
Mission Hills - Panorama City - North Hills	11	7	45	37
Sunland - Tujunga	5	5	21	68
Arleta - Pacoima	4	9	75	12
Sun Valley	10	3	55	33
Sylmar	4	4	52	39
Sherman Oaks - Studio City - Toluca Lake	4	3	7	86
Van Nuys - N. Sherman Oaks	6	5	35	54
City-wide	9	13	40	37

FIGURE 2-2

areas are inhabited by significant numbers of three or more racial groups. As Figure 2-2 illustrates, the Westside of Los Angeles is primarily Anglo, with relatively small populations of Asian-Americans, Hispanics and African-Americans.²¹ Further east, by contrast, the mid-Wilshire and Hollywood areas are more racially mixed. On the whole, the San Fernando Valley is predominantly Anglo, with a large Hispanic population, and much smaller Asian-American and African-American populations. A closer glance at the Valley's neighborhoods reveals a range of combinations of groups, however. The western portion of the Valley is largely Anglo, while the central Valley is predominantly Hispanic, with a considerable Anglo population. The Eastern portion of the Valley, on the other hand, is more evenly split between Anglos and Hispanics. Even within the Eastern Valley, however, some areas have predominantly Anglo populations, while others have larger Hispanic populations and smaller Anglo populations. Figures 2-3 through 2-6 show distributions for the African-American, Anglo, Asian-American and Hispanic populations of the City as of the 1990 census.




FIGURE 2-3

The City's diverse racial and ethnic groups are also reflected in school enrollment data for different schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District, which has changed dramatically over the past several decades. In 1965, schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District were 70 percent Anglo; 1991 enrollment was approximately 64 percent Hispanic, 15 percent African-American, 13 percent Anglo, and eight percent Asian-American and Pacific Islander.

A decade ago, only seven percent of the students spoke only limited English, while today 33 percent speak limited English. The number of schools considered "minority" elementary schools (a majority of the students are from minority groups) went from 217 in 1979 to 400 today. Many of those have over 90 percent minority student populations. Today, the Los Angeles Unified School District consists of 700 schools with approximately 640,000 students who speak 100 different languages.




FIGURE 2-4




FIGURE 2-5




FIGURE 2-6

The racial and ethnic diversity would alone present significant challenges to educators in communicating with non-English speaking children and in choice of curricula, but the lack of public funds severely complicates responding to these challenges. A huge influx of students has led to severe overcrowding, even though the McCone Commission report, published after the 1965 disorder, recommended that schools with low achievement should implement “emergency programs” limiting class size to a maximum of 22 students.²² Today, 60 percent of the City’s public school students are scoring below average in basic skills proficiency. Adding to the financial drain on the school district, more than half of the students in the district come from families with incomes low enough to qualify for free meals. By 1990, one in five students lived in poverty; 33 percent of all students lived in families with no health insurance and many had never seen a physician before they began their schooling. Today, 40,000 teenagers are both out of schools and unemployed.

POVERTY, WEALTH AND DIVERSITY

Recent immigration patterns have had a major effect on how native-born Californians and Los Angelenos view their immigrant neighbors. For instance, nearly 60 percent of all African-Americans in Southern California and almost half of the Anglos, according to a 1983 Urban Institute poll, were convinced that immigrants were taking jobs away from native-born Americans. The tensions were especially acute between African-Americans and Hispanics. The huge influx of Hispanics into Los Angeles coincided with the loss of thousands of unionized blue-collar positions in Los Angeles and especially in

South Central. Although studies such as those conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research and Urban Institute concluded that immigrants, in fact, do not have any appreciable effect either on the availability of jobs or the wage rates, the sentiments remain unchanged leading to even greater tensions among the various minority groups.²³

Ninety-five percent of the businesses in Los Angeles have fewer than 50 employees, and manufacturing accounts for only 20 percent of the jobs in the area.²⁴ Although the City has some high-wage industries in the areas of high technology and services, it also has many low-wage businesses. On the average, income levels in the City are not as high as statewide incomes. Whereas the median household income statewide in 1990 was almost \$36,000, in Los Angeles it was less than \$31,000.²⁵ Statewide, 12.5 percent of all residents lived below the poverty level; City-wide, 18.5 percent lived below that level. Wide income disparities persist, as they do throughout the state and the nation: Almost a quarter of households had incomes below \$15,000, while 14 percent had incomes above \$75,000. To put these numbers into perspective, it is important to remember that the median value of a home in Los Angeles in 1990 was \$244,500, while the median rent was \$544.²⁶

Not surprisingly, these income disparities are reflected in data for different areas in the City. In view of the fact that average incomes for Anglos and Asian-Americans are higher than average incomes for Hispanics and African-Americans, it is not surprising that the areas with the highest incomes are largely Anglo, that more racially mixed areas have lower incomes, and that the lowest average incomes are in areas where Hispanics and African-Americans predominate. The 1990 census data indicates that Anglos and Asian-Americans in the County had median household incomes of over \$39,000, while African-Americans and Hispanics had median household incomes of \$26,000 and \$28,200, respectively.²⁷ Data on unemployment levels and the percent of the population below the poverty level track the income figures. Fig-

ure 2-7 is a map showing distribution of per capita income for the City as of the 1990 census.

As illustrated in Figure 2-8, in the affluent (and largely Anglo) Westside of Los Angeles, the mean household income approached \$100,000, and incomes in certain neighborhoods were even higher.²⁸ Percentages of residents who lived below the poverty level or who were unemployed were correspondingly low. On the other hand, the mean household income in the racially mixed Westside area of Palms-Mar Vista-Del Rey was \$45,000. Further east, in the more racially mixed areas of Hollywood and mid-Wilshire, the mean household incomes were \$42,000 and \$38,000, respectively. In these areas, the poverty level and the unemployment rate were closer to City averages. In the Hispanic and African-American communities of South Central and Southeast Los Angeles, mean household incomes were \$25,000 and \$22,000, respectively, with very high levels of poverty and unemployment. In South Central, 31 percent lived below the poverty level, and the unemployment rate was 13.7 percent. In Southeast Los Angeles, 40 percent lived below the poverty level, and the unemployment rate was




FIGURE 2-7

17.4 percent. In largely African-American West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Park, the situation is somewhat better. The mean income was \$31,000, 20.6 percent lived below the poverty level, and the unemployment rate was 10.5 percent.

Within these areas, there were still wide ranges in incomes from neighborhood to neighborhood.²⁹ For example, in the South Central community of Watts, one of the City's poorest areas, the median household income was slightly more than \$12,000, the unemployment rate was over 26 percent, and almost half of the households received public assistance. Only a mile or two away in the Crenshaw area, by contrast, the median household income was over \$22,000, the unemployment rate was less than 11 percent, and only 21 percent of the households received some form of public assistance. Similarly, in Koreatown, just north of South Central, the median household income was about \$18,000, the unemployment rate was about 10 percent, and only 12 percent of the households received some form of public assistance.

The lack of public funds has severely curtailed spending on local programs and services. The City has suffered from this lack of funds since June 1978, when, by a 65 percent-35 percent margin, California voters approved Proposition 13, a landmark state constitutional amendment that reduced property taxes by two-thirds and made it more difficult for local governments to raise taxes. During the post-Proposition 13 era, California government finances have been strained like never before. The City of Los Angeles, in turn, has struggled with budget cuts required by the passage of Proposition 13.

While the federal government had poured billions of dollars into community development programs in the 15 years since the Watts riots, starting in 1981 it began to cut back programs such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act ("CETA"). Over the course of the last 12 years, federal funding for job training has shrunk from \$23

billion in 1980 to \$8 billion today; General Revenue Sharing, a \$6 billion program designed to assist local governments, has been eliminated entirely; Community Development Block Grants, a program for local economic development, has also been severely cut from \$21 billion in 1980 to less than \$14 billion today; and overall federal support for housing programs has been cut by 80 percent. As a result, the great gulf between rich and poor has continued to widen.

The decade of the 1990s brought fewer jobs. With rising unemployment, by 1991, the recession had hit the country, and Southern California, hard. By early 1992, the recession had deepened, wiping out not only industrial jobs, but also white-collar positions. The poverty rate climbed to almost 33 percent. In addition, the Los Angeles City government was in a fiscal crisis with its tax bases depleted. Large cuts in the City Budget resulted in fewer community programs and services.

INCOME AND POVERTY (SELECTED AREAS)

	Mean Household Income	% Below Poverty Level	% Unempl. Rate
Westside			
Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	123,000	5%	4.0%
Bel Air - Beverly Crest	195,000	5%	4.0%
Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	45,000	12%	5.1%
Downtown/Northeast			
Hollywood	42,000	22%	9.6%
Mid Wilshire	38,000	21%	8.5%
Silverlake - Echo Park	37,000	20%	9.1%
Westlake	21,000	36%	11.8%
South L.A.			
South Central	25,000	31%	13.7%
Southeast	22,000	40%	17.4%
West Adams - Baldwin Hills - Leimert Park	31,000	20.6%	10.5%
San Fernando Valley			
Encino - Tarzana	86,000	6%	4.3%
Mission Hills - Panorama City - North Hills	40,000	14.8%	7.3%
Sunland - Tujunga	50,000	9.1%	5.3%
Arleta - Pacoima	39,000	15.3%	7.8%
Sun Valley	39,000	17.7%	9.4%
City-wide	46,000	18.5%	8.4%

FIGURE 2-8

DECLINING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

During the decade of the 1980s, major demographic changes in the City left politicians without any impetus to look out for the needs of the City's neediest communities. While the population increased dramatically in these communities, the number of voters dropped significantly. Those moving into these communities were mostly Hispanic immigrants. The communities they moved into were being abandoned by middle-class African-Americans, who are more likely to participate in the political process. The voting population in the City as a whole became increasingly white, older, more affluent and educated, while the City's population was moving in the opposite direction.

The most marked change in voter turnout did not appear so much in elections at the national level as it did at the state and particularly the local levels. It is virtually a truism that voter participation has been declining at all levels for the past few decades, and Los Angeles is no exception to this trend. The decline is gradual in Presidential elections; eighty percent of registered voters turned out to vote in the 1976 election, while only seventy-two percent turned out in 1988. These numbers, along with turnout for the primaries in the same years, track numbers recorded in California state elections quite closely. In Los Angeles municipal elections in years when there is a mayoral contest, however, the turnout is astonishingly low by comparison. Seven months after eighty percent of the registered voters turned out to choose a President in 1976, only twenty-nine percent showed up to select a mayor and other municipal officers, even though the latter group was much more likely to affect the voters' lives on a daily basis. By June 1989, only 11 percent of registered voters bothered to vote in a mayoral elections.

This 11 percent was not uniformly distributed across the City however. In 1989, although City-wide voter turnout had declined since the previous decade, the Westside cast 78 percent more votes than the inner-City districts. By 1990, in one inner-City district,




FIGURE 2-9

voter turnout was so low that the City Councilwoman from that district was elected with only 6,251 votes out of a district population of 250,000. In addition, the political power of inner-City residents has been further diminished by the disproportionate influence of political contributions from the Westside, the San Fernando Valley and the downtown corporate community.

THE MAKING OF A TINDERBOX

The decade of the 1980s brought fewer jobs — but plenty of drugs, crime and violence — to many Los Angeles neighborhoods. Los Angeles street gangs now had crack cocaine. Like no other drug before it, crack had a devastating impact on families, diverting

thousands of dollars from the incomes of modest households. Figure 2-9 shows the distribution of the index figures for crimes against persons and property across the city, where the norm across the country is represented by 100.

Over the decade, the youth gang culture of the City mushroomed, and an average of two gang-related murders a day now take place in Los Angeles County. This growing drug, crime and gang problem has further exacerbated the pressures and tensions at work upon our youngest City residents. Five years ago, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office prosecuted 945 youths for carrying firearms, but that number more than doubled last year. In 1970, 10 percent of all fatal shootings involved teens; today that figure stands at 25 percent.

Our survey of 66 of the largest American cities ranks Los Angeles 12th in violent crime (with a rate of 24.05 violent crimes per thousand persons) and 21st in homicides (with a rate of 0.28 homicides per thousand persons) as of 1990.³⁰ Figure 2-9 is a map showing the distribution of the serious (Part 1) crimes against persons and property index for the City. By early 1992, the problems of the inner city — gangs, crime, crack cocaine, poverty and homelessness, and racial and ethnic tension — had come to dominate daily life for a great many residents of Los Angeles. The struggle to preserve a sense of community in the City had begun in earnest. The City of Los Angeles had become a tinderbox ready to explode at the striking of a single match. This was the environment into which the matchstick verdicts of April 29, 1992 were struck.

How ready was the City and its police department to respond? To begin our search for answers to this difficult question we need first to understand the emergency response frameworks established by the City and the LAPD.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

¹ McCONE COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* Chapter 1, note 6 at 27.

² LOS ANGELES 2000 COMMITTEE, LA 2000, A CITY FOR THE FUTURE, FINAL REPORT 9 (1988) [hereinafter referred to as "LA 2000"].

³ *Understanding the Riots Part I, The Path to Fury*, Los Angeles Times, May 11 1992, at T4.

⁴ The demography, based upon 1990 Census data, of Los Angeles is illustrated by maps in the text showing Population Density (per square mile), in Figure 2-1; Percentage of African-American Population, in Figure 2-3; Percentage of Anglo Population, in Figure 2-4; Percentage of Asian-American Population, in Figure 2-5; Percentage of Hispanic Population, in Figure 2-6; and Per Capita Income, in Figure 2-7. Also included is a map showing the Los Angeles Crimes Against Persons and Property Index, Figure 2-9. See Appendix 13.

⁵ PETER WILEY AND ROBERTA GOTTLIEB EMPIRES IN THE SUN 105 (1982).

⁶ *Understanding the Riots Part I, The Path to Fury*, Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1992, at T5.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² WILEY AND GOTTLIEB, *supra* note 5, at 105.

¹³ *Understanding the Riots Part I, The Path to Fury*, *supra* note 3, at T4.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 CPH-L-4, Table 1, Selected Population and Housing Characteristics.

¹⁷ RESEARCH SECTION, LOS ANGELES CITY PLANNING DEPT., RACE/ETHNICITY IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, AS OF APRIL 1990 (May 21, 1991) [hereinafter the "Los Angeles City Planning Report"].

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ M. Corwin, *L. A.'s Loss: African-American Flight*, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 13 1992, at A1.

²⁰ Census data compiled by Los Angeles County Dept. of Regional Planning, STF90-07, Sept. 5, 1991.

²¹ LOS ANGELES CITY PLANNING REPORT, *supra* note 17.

²² MCCONE COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* Chapter 1, note 6, at page 67.

²³ J. Kotkin, "Fear and Reality in the Los Angeles Melting Pot," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, Nov. 5, 1989, at 9-11.

²⁴ LA 2000 *supra* note 2, at 60.

²⁵ U.S. Bureau of the Census. See 1990 CPH-L-82, Table 4, Income and Poverty Status in 1989: 1990 Los Angeles City.

²⁶ 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics, California, Table 10, at 153 (Aug. 1991).

²⁷ See S. Hubler, *80's Failed to End Economic Disparity, Census Shows*, L. A. Times, Aug. 17, 1992, at A1.

²⁸ L. A. CITY PLANNING DEPT., *supra* note 17.

²⁹ U.S. Bureau of the Census. See 1990 CPH-L-82, Table 4, Income and Poverty Status in 1989; 1990 Watts Stat. Area, Los Angeles County.

³⁰ See Appendices 15-19 and 15-20.

3

THE CITY EMERGENCY FRAMEWORK

THE CITY GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 47

THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION 49

The Los Angeles city government has been aptly characterized as a decentralized, or diffused, power structure.¹ The essential components of this structure include a relatively strong City Council, a relatively weak Mayoralty, citizen commissions heading the City's departments, professional general managers running the departments, strong civil service protections for city workers, and direct democracy exercised by the voters in the form of initiative, referendum and recall elections. As we shall see, the Council, the Mayor, the City Administrative Officer and his staff, the Police Commission, the Chief of Police and his Department all share responsibility for the City's preparation and response to the events of April. To understand the extent of their responsibility, we need first to understand their respective roles in the City emergency framework.

THE CITY GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

For most practical purposes, the City Council is "the governing body" of the City.² The Council enacts ordinances subject to the approval or veto power of the Mayor. It orders elections, levies taxes, authorizes public improvements, approves contracts, and adopts traffic regulations. The Council adopts or modifies the budget proposed by the Mayor and provides the necessary funds, facilities, equipment and supplies for the budgetary departments and offices of the City. It creates positions, fixes salaries, and authorizes the number of employees in budgetary departments. Finally, the Council confirms or rejects appointments proposed by the Mayor, prescribes duties for boards or officers not defined by the City Charter, and may even suspend elective officers.

The Mayor is the executive officer of the City, charged with exercising "a careful supervision over all of its affairs."³ While the

Council retains ultimate authority over the affairs of the City, the Mayor submits proposals and recommendations to the Council, approves or vetoes ordinances passed by the Council, and is delegated the duty to enforce the City's ordinances, to supervise the acts and conduct of all City officers and employees, and "to secure cooperation between the various departments and offices of the City."⁴ The Mayor is also the Director of the City's Emergency Operations Organization. Tom Bradley has held this position since first elected in 1973, a 19-year period that is longer than the tenure of any other mayor in Los Angeles history.

To help manage the City's affairs, the City Council by ordinance has established the position of City Administrative Officer (CAO)⁵ and delegated to this position the duties, among others, of (1) keeping the Mayor and Council "advised of the condition, finances and future needs of the City" and making such recommendations with respect thereto as the CAO "shall deem expedient;" (2) giving the Mayor or City Council "such aid, information or recommendation" as is requested of the CAO in writing; and (3) performing all other duties required of the CAO by the Mayor, or the City Council by ordinance.⁶ Keith Comrie has held this important City leadership position since 1980.

As City Administrative Officer, Comrie is the chief financial advisor to the Mayor and Council and reports directly to both.⁷ The combination of his unique reporting relationship with his financial and oversight duties make Comrie one of the most powerful officials in the City government. In addition to his duties in connection with the preparation and administration of the budget, he is charged with responsibility for conducting investigations, carrying out research, and making recommendations on a wide variety of City management matters to the Mayor and City Council. It is Comrie's job to direct the development of work programs and standards, to conduct periodic management audits of City departments, to administer a risk management program, and to coordinate the City's emergency preparedness activities and

City of Los Angeles

Emergency Operations Organization




FIGURE 3-1

programs.⁸ To help him perform these critical emergency-preparedness functions, Comrie is designated as the Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator, with the duties, among other things, to establish and maintain liaison with other government agencies and City departments, as well as to coordinate the authorities, powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Emergency Operations Board.⁹ Comrie has a separate staff to whom he has delegated the day-to-day responsibility for his emergency preparedness duties.

The Police Department is placed by ordinance under the “control and management” of a citizen commission¹⁰ that, like most Los Angeles city commissions, consists of five members¹¹ appointed by the Mayor, subject to City Council approval, for staggered five-year terms.¹² By Charter, the Chief of Police is the general manager of the Police Department, and its “chief administrative officer.”¹³ The Chief’s powers and duties are made coextensive with the Police Department’s mandate to enforce the law and maintain public order. Before the adoption of Charter Amendment F on June 2, 1992, the Chief had a “substantial property right” to his position, and was fully protected by civil service. The Christopher Commission observed that the Chief’s civil service status made it difficult to hold the Chief accountable.¹⁴ As a result, for most practical purposes the Department was “controlled and managed” by its Chief during the time period relevant to this report.

Of course, the parts of the City structure are not intended to function alone in the event of an emergency. To the contrary, they are supposed to plan and train together so that when an emergency does occur they are well-prepared to function as a smoothly coordinated emergency response team. To ensure such a response, and to put in place the necessary framework to make it possible, the City created an Emergency Operations Organization.

THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

Having found it “necessary to centralize the direction and control of local emergency preparations, response and recovery,” the City Council enacted a Local Emergencies Ordinance in 1980. In so doing, the Council clearly stated its intention to centralize the direction and control of “the duties, responsibilities and activities of all persons, organizations [and] departments of the City government,” as well as its desire “to enable the City to more effectively cooperate with” other agencies and means of state and local government in emergency preparations and response.¹⁵ To achieve these ends, the Council empowered the Mayor to declare the existence of a local emergency whenever the Mayor finds that there has been “an occurrence which by reason of its magnitude *is or is likely to become* beyond the control of the normal [capacities] of the City government.”¹⁶ The Mayor’s declaration immediately activates the City’s Emergency Operations Organization¹⁷, which is summarized in Figure 3-1.

Upon activation of the Emergency Operations Organization, the Mayor becomes its “Director” and is given direct supervisory control over all of its operations and personnel, including the Emergency Operations Board, established to manage preparations for and response to emergencies. As Director, the Mayor is also given extraordinarily broad discretionary power during the period of the emergency to promulgate, issue and enforce rules, regulations and orders for the purpose of protecting life and property. Any such emergency rules, regulations or orders take effect immediately upon their issuance.¹⁸ Anyone found to have wilfully obstructed

the enforcement of an emergency order, or to have done any act forbidden by any such order, may be charged with a misdemeanor crime punishable by a fine not to exceed \$500, imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, or both.¹⁹

As noted above, the ordinance also establishes an Emergency Operations Board, which is made responsible for supervising, regulating, controlling and managing the affairs of the Emergency Operations Organization.²⁰ However, the Board is not only brought into existence in times of emergency. The Board was created to oversee and direct City-wide emergency planning and training activities as well. Hence, it has been given the power to make and enforce all necessary and desirable rules and regulations for the purpose of governing the Emergency Operations Organization during periods of preparation, local emergency, response and recovery, including the right to issue instructions to the heads of the City's departments and the power to appoint any committees it needs to do its work.²¹ To fulfill these responsibilities, the Board has met from time to time and as needed in periods of emergency. It is composed of the City Administrative Officer and the general managers of the City departments of Police, Fire, Building and Safety, Personnel, Public Works, Water and Power, General Services, Transportation and Recreation and Parks.

The Board reports directly to the Mayor in his capacity as Director of The Emergency Operations Organization. In its day-to-day operations, however, there is a split of responsibility under the ordinance. The Board is chaired permanently by the Chief of Police, who is also designated as the Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization. In this capacity, Chief Gates was empowered to act on behalf of the Mayor on all matters delegated to him and to "coordinate" use of the City's resources as well as to arrange with other municipalities and State and Federal agencies for "cooperation, mutual aid and protection during a local emergency."²² At the same time, the City Administrative Officer is designated as the Emergency Operations Organization Coordina-

tor. As such, CAO Comrie was entrusted with duties — consistent with the other audit, risk management and preparedness functions assigned to his office — as follows:

1. To coordinate the authorities, powers, duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Operations Board and Organization;
2. To establish and maintain liaison with other governmental agencies, City departments, and such private agencies as may be deemed necessary;
3. To prepare and process emergency operations program papers and applications for Federal or State funds;
4. To notify the Board in writing prior to the beginning of each fiscal year of the recommended budgetary items relating to emergency services activities of each City department having control of a division of emergency service and which items are included in the City Administrative Officer's annual budgetary recommendations to the Mayor;
5. To assign necessary personnel from the City Administrative Office to perform staff duties for the Emergency Operations Board as may be required by said Board;
6. To coordinate and provide for the dissemination of public information relating to the emergency operations activities as required; and
7. To exercise such further powers and duties as may be conferred upon the City Administrative Officer by the Board.²³

From the foregoing, it is evident that the Council intended for the Chief of Police to be in charge of the Board, subject to the direction of the Mayor, during actual periods of local emergency, when the Board's activities must be directed toward emergency response. On the other hand, the City Administrative Officer is charged with responsibility for management of the Board in non-emergency times,

when its activities must be directed toward emergency preparedness.

This split of responsibilities explains why CAO Comrie is responsible for directing the activities of the Emergency Management Committee (EMC), which forms the working arm or staff of the Emergency Operations Organization. While the Committee was established by and operates under the direction of the Emergency Operations Board, its Chair is the Chief Administrative Analyst in the Office of the City Administrative Officer. In addition to its CAO staff-member Chair, the Committee is composed of representatives from the LAPD, Fire Department, Public Works, Water and Power, Harbor Department, Department of Airports, City Planning, Building and Safety, Animal Regulation, Recreation and Parks, Transportation, General Services, Personnel and the City Attorney's office.²⁴

The primary responsibility of the Committee is to manage the City's planning and training activities, but it also acts as liaison, where appropriate, to various outside agencies, ranging from the American Red Cross to the Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, the Committee is responsible for preparation of legal documents required in an emergency, including the initial declaration of local emergency and subsequent emergency orders that may be required. Unfortunately, the Committee's preparatory activities have been confined almost exclusively to earthquake readiness, with virtually no attention being devoted to civil disorder preparation.

For times of crisis, the City has established an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to function as the venue for information exchange between the agencies comprising the Emergency Operations Board. The EOC is intended to be the location for assembling the Emergency Operations Organization to coordinate and direct the City's resources toward controlling emergencies. In theory, it is supposed to be a coordination center; Emergency Operations Organization materials contemplate that actual field activity will be directed from command posts at the scene of

the occurrence or from the offices of the involved city departments.²⁵ The EOC is only staffed in emergency situations, when representatives from every City department involved in the response are mobilized.

The EOC is located four floors underground in City Hall East, and consists of a main room, which contains a large horseshoe-shaped table with telephones and computers in pre-assigned department locations around the table, and satellite rooms accessed by the surrounding corridors. In operation, the main room is used as the EOC by the LAPD and representatives of the various agencies called to participate in the EOC. The main room is adjoined by side rooms which are intended to be used by support personnel whose presence is not needed in the EOC.

The main EOC room contains a small number of television monitors, as well as a few telephone lines to the various desks within the room. Very few of its operations are computerized, and there is no "E-mail" or other automated information network. A "magic marker" updated status board is used to list the status of various emergency operations. Various other "paper and pencil" systems are used to record and distribute intelligence and other messages received on the EOC telephones.

In civil disturbance situations, the LAPD takes the lead role in the EOC. The LAPD officer in charge of the EOC is primarily responsible for coordinating the flow of information within the EOC, and is not responsible for making command decisions concerning the allocation of resources within the LAPD. Questions concerning the allocation of LAPD resources that cannot be resolved by the Field Commanders are supposed to be referred by the EOC to the LAPD Department Commander, who makes the decision.

The LAPD's Planning and Research Division (PRD) is primarily responsible for the police role in the EOC. The PRD's day-to-day responsibilities include directing the research and planning relating to various issues

for the LAPD. When the EOC is activated, the entire PRD staff is transferred to the EOC to assist in its operations. The officer in charge of the PRD then becomes the officer in charge of the EOC. In addition to the PRD staff, the LAPD staffs the EOC with personnel from other LAPD administrative divisions. The "cadre" of individuals assigned by the LAPD to the EOC is not assigned to the EOC on a permanent basis. At any given time, the EOC's roster of available personnel in theory includes over 100 people.

This, then, was the City's emergency framework. Under the Local Emergencies Ordinance, the Council established the Emergency Operations Organization and placed it under the exclusive direction of the Mayor. To prepare for and respond to emergencies, the Council established the Emergency Operations Board, consisting of the principal City departments whose services would be needed in an emergency. The Chief of Police, as Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization and permanent Chair of its Board, was placed in charge of response operations, subject to the Mayor's direction. The City Administrative Officer, as Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator, was placed in charge of the City's preparation activities. To assist in this effort, the Board has appointed the Emergency Management Committee, which constitutes the working staff of the Emergency Operations Organization and is directed by a member of the CAO's staff. In the event of an emergency, coordination of the City's response comes from the Emergency Operations Center, located in a concrete bunker four floors beneath City Hall East and staffed by LAPD officers and representatives of other departments who assume these responsibilities as a second job.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

¹ See generally Carney, *The Decentralized Politics of Los Angeles*, in *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE* (May, 1964).

² Division 2, LOS ANGELES ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, § 2.2.

³ *Id.* Division 3 § 3.1.

⁴ *Id.* Division 3 § 3.3.

⁵ *Id.* Division 20 § 20.1.

⁶ *Id.* § 20.9.

⁷ City of Los Angeles, Budget for the Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1992 and Ending June 30, 1993, § 2, at 8.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 9.

¹⁰ Division 22, LOS ANGELES ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, § 22.215.

¹¹ CITY OF LOS ANGELES CHARTER, §§ 70, 70.1. (1925).

¹² *Id.*, §§ 72-73.

¹³ *Id.*, § 199.

¹⁴ REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 200-201 (July 9, 1991) (hereinafter referred to as the CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT).

¹⁵ Division 8, LOS ANGELES ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Chapter 3, § 8.21.

¹⁶ *Id.*, § 8.22.

¹⁷ *Id.*, § 8.28.

¹⁸ *Id.*, § 8.29.

¹⁹ *Id.*, § 8.77.

²⁰ *Id.*, § 8.41.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*, § 8.45.

²³ *Id.*, § 8.37.

²⁴ *Id.*, §§ 8.40, 8.45; Emergency Operations Organization Pamphlet at 1-2. Another member of the City Administrative Officer's staff has been the City's Emer-

gency Preparedness Coordination since at least 1988; before that this staff member served with the LAPD for 23 years, specializing in tactics.

²⁵ City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan, § 103.01.

4

THE LAPD EMERGENCY FRAMEWORK

NORMAL POLICE OPERATIONS 57

EMERGENCY POLICE OPERATIONS 66

According to the Manual of the Los Angeles Police Department, the motto of the Department — “To Protect and To Serve” — states the essential purpose of the LAPD.¹ The Department’s mission is to protect persons within its jurisdiction and to serve the people of Los Angeles by performing the law enforcement function. We turn next to a description of how the Department organizes, deploys and directs its force to fulfill its mission, first under normal policing conditions and then under emergency conditions such as those created by an occurrence of widespread disorder.

NORMAL POLICE OPERATIONS

The Los Angeles Police Department has become a very complex organization. Much of its force has been assigned to highly-specialized units designed to perform unique and non-interchangeable tasks. In normal operations, its patrol force is deployed to geographical Areas that are left to function on a decentralized basis, for the most part in response to calls received over the 9-1-1 emergency network and dispatched to individual patrol cars. Patrol officers function singly or in pairs with a wide degree of discretion, within Department policies and procedures, as to how they respond to their 9-1-1 calls. To understand the many difficult changes the Department must perform in the emergency environment created by widespread disorder, we must first understand how it performs normal police operations.

ORGANIZATION

Both sworn and civilian personnel carry out the Department’s mission. Some perform staff roles, while others are in line command positions.² The order of sworn rank within the LAPD is Chief, Deputy Chief, Commander, Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant/Detective, Police Officer. The title “Assistant Chief” is used to designate an officer holding the rank

of Deputy Chief II. The term “Deputy Chief” is used to designate an officer holding the lower rank of Deputy Chief I. Under Chief Gates, these personnel were divided into one of the most specialized police forces in the country. In addition to the Office of the Chief, the Department was broken into three main Offices — the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of Special Services, and the Office of Operations — each of which was supposed to be under the command of a Director holding the rank of Assistant Chief (Deputy Chief II). These Offices and their respective Bureaus, Areas, Divisions and Sections as they existed on the morning of April 29 are shown on Figure 4-1, the Department Organization Chart.³


Office of the Chief of Police

As Chief of Police, the powers and duties of Daryl Gates were coextensive with the Department’s mandate to enforce the law and maintain public order. He was the general manager and chief administrative officer of the Department and, as such, managed the employees of the Department in the line of their duties, recommended the annual Department budget, and expended the funds of the Department in accordance with the budget. A Chief of Staff and several other administrative staff sections, including Employee Relations, Press Relations, an Administrative Section and the Inspection and Control Section reported to Chief Gates as part of the Office of the Chief of Police. As described below, during part of the relevant time period seven police Areas also reported directly to the Chief because of their placement in a community-based policing program.

Office of Administrative Services

Assistant Chief David Dotson was the Director of the Office of Administrative Services, which consisted of the Fiscal Support Bureau, the Personnel and Training Bureau and the Support Services Bureau. Within each of these Bureaus were several Divisions and Sections. The Fiscal Support Bureau contained the Fiscal Operations Division, Motor Transport Division, Property Division and

ORGANIZATION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



Source: Manual of the Los Angeles Police Department

FIGURE 4-1

Supply Division. The Personnel and Training Bureau included the Personnel Division, Training Division, Employee Opportunity and Development Division and the Behavioral Science Services Section. The Support Services Bureau included the Information Resources Division, the Communications Division, the Records and Identification Division, the Jail Division, the Scientific Investigation Division and the Planning and Research Division. In addition, the Police Facilities Construction Group reported directly to the Director.

Office of Special Services

The position of Director of the Office of Special Services was vacant, due to recent retirements of Assistant Chiefs and a City-wide hiring freeze that prevented replacement of the retirees. No one had even been named to serve as Acting Director to oversee its Bureau of Special Investigation, containing the Narcotics Group, Administrative Vice Division, Labor Relations Division and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Division, and the Internal Affairs Division and the Organized Crime Intelligence Division (OCID), which were supposed to report directly to the Director.

Office of Operations

Until his retirement in early June 1992, Assistant Chief Robert Vernon held the position of Director of the Office of Operations. On account of accumulated vacation time, however, Vernon was on leave for the entire period from April 24 until the date of his retirement in June 1992. The Office of Operations accounted for approximately 84 percent of the Department's total personnel and 89 percent of the Department's sworn personnel, including the patrol officers and detectives whose activities are most familiar to the public. Within the Office of Operations, there was a Headquarters Bureau and four geographical Bureaus—Central, South, West and Valley.

Headquarters Bureau

On the morning of April 29, 1992, the Commanding Officer of Headquarters Bureau was Deputy Chief Ronald Frankle. Headquarters Bureau consisted of two groups whose activities were directly related to the Department's preparations for and response to the April firestorm: The Uniformed Services Group and the Detective Services Group. The first group included the Air Support Division, Metropolitan Division and the Tactical Planning Section. The Air Support Division was responsible for providing air support to regular operations, as well as for assisting other units of the Department, when necessary. The Division was also responsible for providing surveillance of persons engaged in criminal activities and assisting field commanders during unusual occurrences and special events. Other roles for the Division included assisting with traffic control and flying photographic missions as required for gathering evidence.

Metropolitan Division, sometimes called "Metro," was responsible for providing assistance to LAPD units during civil disorders and other unusual occurrences that require additional resources, and for providing and deploying personnel for dealing with special crime problems which are beyond the capabilities of a particular geographical Bureau. Additionally, the Metropolitan Division was responsible for administering the activities of the Department's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, and providing Crisis Negotiation Teams for deployment during barricaded suspect, hostage and attempted suicide occurrences. The Division also included responsibility for the Department's Mounted and Canine Units.

The Tactical Planning Section was responsible for maintaining the Department's Tactical Manual, as well as for certain activities specifically related to the control of unusual occurrences. The Section coordinated organization and deployment plans for major unusual occurrences, and evaluated procedures, tactics and equipment to be employed during such occurrences. In addition, the

Section was responsible for training and exercises to prepare for Field Command Post operations, maintaining and deploying the Department's Mobile Command Fleet, notifying the Field Command Post Cadre when the Field Command Post Division had been activated and monitoring the activities of the Field Command Post Division after it had been activated.

The Detective Services Group included Detective Headquarters Division, the Detective Support Division, and six specialized Divisions and Sections — Bunco-Forgery Division, Robbery-Homicide Division, Burglary-Auto Theft Division, Juvenile Division, Investigative Analysis Section and Traffic Coordination Section. The Detective Services Group Divisions were responsible for assisting other Department units by providing investigative services. In addition, the Detective Headquarters Division was responsible for the special duties of (1) acting as the Department Command Post when the Office of the Chief of Police was closed; (2) acting as the Operations-Headquarters Bureau Command Post when those offices were closed; (3) acting as the Office of Operations Detective Command Post during an unusual occurrence; (4) activating, as required, during a "serious" or "major" unusual occurrence, or when such an occurrence appeared imminent, the Emergency Control Center (ECC), Emergency Control Center Division, Field Command Post Division, Mobile Command Fleet and Casualty Information Center (CIC); and (5) coordinating the activities of the CIC when it was activated during an unusual occurrence.

Geographical Bureaus

As depicted on the accompanying map, Figure 4-2, each of the four LAPD geographical Bureaus was divided into separate geographic regions, formerly referred to as "Divisions," but now called "Areas." There were 18 separate Areas City-wide; five each located in the Central and Valley Bureaus, and four each located in the South and West Bureaus. Within each of these 18 Areas there was both

a Patrol and a Detective Division. Additionally, there was a Traffic Division within each geographical Bureau, and a CRASH Section (responsible for gang-related activities) within each of Central, South and West Bureaus. The geographical Bureaus were organized and commanded as follows:

Central Bureau normally included the Central, Hollenbeck, Northeast, Newton and Rampart Areas, the Central Traffic Division and a CRASH Section. On April 29, the Commanding Officer of the Bureau and its Areas was Deputy Chief Bernard Parks, except that Hollenbeck and Northeast had been removed from the normal chain of command and directed to report to Chief Gates as part of the community-based policing program described below.

South Bureau included the Southwest, 77th Street, Harbor and Southeast Areas, the South Traffic Division and a CRASH Section. On April 29, the Commanding Officer of the Bureau and its Areas was Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt, except that 77th Street, Harbor and Southeast Areas had been placed into the community-based policing program.

West Bureau included the Hollywood, Pacific, West Los Angeles and Wilshire Areas, the West Traffic Division and a CRASH Section. On April 29, the Commanding Officer of the Bureau and its Areas was Deputy Chief Glenn Levant, except that Pacific Area had been placed into the community-based policing program.

Valley Bureau included the Van Nuys, West Valley, Foothill, North Hollywood and Devonshire Areas, and the Valley Traffic Division, as well as two administrative sections. On April 29, the Commanding Officer of the Bureau and its Areas was Deputy Chief Mark Kroeker, except that Foothill Area had been placed into the community-based policing program.




FIGURE 4-2

BUDGET AND DEPLOYMENT

Compared to other major police departments around the country, the LAPD would appear to be relatively well supported and staffed. There is a substantial question, however, as to how well the Department has used its resources. The City budget for the 1990-91 fiscal year appropriated about \$954 million to cover the total direct costs of police department operations.⁴ This figure represents about 26 percent of the total City budget of just under \$3.7 billion.⁵ Of the \$954 million appropriated for direct costs, by far the greatest share was allocated to salaries. The total for all Department salaries was about \$532 million, or approximately 56 percent of the police budget. Of this number, about \$425 million was allocated to salaries for sworn officers, with another \$15 million allocated for their overtime, making a total of approximately \$440 million or 46 percent of the police budget.⁶ The next biggest category consists of pensions and benefits, which totals about \$344 million or 36 percent.⁷ After that, approximately \$13 million each was allocated for communications and data processing, making a total of \$26 million, or approximately 3 percent, for services and equipment in these areas.⁸ All together, these three broad categories — salaries, pensions and benefits, and communications and data processing — account for 95 percent of the police budget.

The category of equipment only had allocated to it a total of some \$392,000.⁹ Approximately \$3.8 million was allocated to upgrade or replace some of the Department's ageing fleet of police cruisers. At year-end for calendar 1991, the fleet consisted of about 2,573 sedans. Only 925 of these cars, or just about 36 percent, were black and whites. The remaining 64 percent consisted of some 1,648 "unmarked" police cars, split amongst the various non-patrol special units of the Department.¹⁰ A total of 420 of these cars are classified as "dual purpose" sedans, equipped with lights, sirens and shotgun racks, with 115 assigned to the Metro Division. Budget requests in 1991-1992, however, to replace 180 black and whites with over 90,000 miles in service and in 1992-93 to replace 369

black and whites in the same condition were both denied.¹¹ At the same time, a 1991-92 request to replace 253 unmarked cars with over 100,000 miles in service was approved.¹²

The Special Advisor's survey of 66 police departments through the Police Department Questionnaire seems to show that the LAPD's level of funding compares favorably with other departments in the country. The survey results, which are shown in Appendices 15-17 and 15-18, place the LAPD budget per capita fourth in the ranking of the police budgets in the 41 cities responding to these questions. For the 1990-91 fiscal year, the Department's budget of \$954 million amounts to \$274 per person in the City, based upon 1990 Census data, in terms of spending per capita. This ranks the LAPD behind Washington D.C. (\$412 per person), Las Vegas (\$372 per person), and Detroit (\$324 per person). On a per officer basis, the LAPD's budget per sworn officer ranks fifth. The LAPD's 1990-91 fiscal year budget of \$954 million amounts to \$121,000 per officer, placing the Department behind Oakland (\$137,000), Anaheim (\$134,000), Fresno (\$131,000), and Long Beach (\$123,000).

At the end of 1991, which is the date of the most recent available figures, the LAPD had a total of almost 11,000 employees. Of this total, 8,190 were sworn officers and 2,670 were civilian personnel deployed by Chief Gates to perform both non-patrol and patrol functions within the Department. Due to the Department cap on sworn overtime, however, on any given day in 1991 some 700 of the 8,190 sworn officers had to be sent home to take compulsory leave time until they accumulated enough time off to "pay for" overtime hours in excess of Department regulations. Thus, on any given day, only about 7,490 sworn officers were actually available for duty. As we shall see, only a small fraction of these sworn officers patrolled the streets of the City. This tiny group of officers made up the real "thin blue line" left to serve after all of the Department's desk jobs and special unit assignments were taken into account. This remarkable fact is reflected in the following data.

Of the total 8,190 sworn officers, 96 were deployed into administrative positions in the Office of the Chief of Police, and 20 were deployed into such positions in the Office of the Police Commission. Among the three Offices of the Department, 704 sworn officers were deployed into the Office of Special Services, 586 sworn officers were deployed into the Office of Administrative Services, and 6,784 sworn officers were deployed into the Office of Operations.

Within the Office of Operations itself, 1,055 sworn officers were deployed into Headquarters Bureau. The remaining 5,729 sworn officers were deployed into the four geographic Bureaus. Of these 5,729 sworn officers, approximately 4,100 were deployed in theory to patrol functions in the four geographic Bureaus: Central was given 1,200, South was given 950, West was assigned 950 and Valley the remaining 1,000. Taking into account a proportionate share of the 700 officers lost due to overtime limitations, however, reduced this number to about 3,700 sworn officers.

This does not, however, tell the whole story. Assuming roughly equal deployment amongst the Department's three normal operations watches, only one-third of these officers — just over 1,200 in number — were deployed to patrol functions during any given watch period. Because there were only some 150 to 180 police cars routinely deployed on the streets, even this number does not represent the bottom line. That number is no greater than 350 officers, or slightly more than four percent of the total population of sworn officers in the Department, who actually took to the streets in vehicles during their watch.

While retirements had dropped the total number of sworn officers to around 8,000, these officers were deployed by Chief Gates on the morning of April 29, 1992 according to the same priorities and in the same basic manner we just described. Most were behind desks or assigned to special units. Less than one sworn officer per square mile was on the streets in a black and white to patrol the 469 square miles of the City. The Chief's deploy-

ment decisions thus made each of these police officers responsible for protecting more than 10,000 of the City's approximately 3.5 million residents. Hence, while the Department probably ranks in the middle when compared nationally in terms of its total force of sworn officers per thousand persons, so many are assigned to special units that the number left for patrol is quite small.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The LAPD Manual states that because the Chief of Police must necessarily limit the number of persons who report to him, clearly defined lines of authority must be drawn in order to ensure unity of command. This permits each employee to be aware of his or her relative position in the organization, to whom he or she is immediately responsible, and those persons who are accountable to that employee.

Command within the Department is said to involve, at each level, receiving and assessing information about the environment in which the Department operates, generating and considering options, selecting a best option and sending out the orders to implement that option. Control within the Department is supposed to reflect responsibility as well as authority, and to be exercised through the lines of command through which a Commanding Officer passes orders, advisories, admonitions and queries to his or her forces. Communications within the Department are the means by which information is carried back and forth between the Commanding Officer and the forces and the public the Department serves.

Command of the Department during normal operations is in the hands of the Chief of Police. The Directors of each of the three Offices of the Department — Administrative Services, Special Services and Operations — are Assistant Chiefs (Deputy Chief II), and report directly to the Chief of Police. Within each of these Offices, Commanding Officers of the Bureaus, Divisions and Sections report to their respective Office Director. In the Office of Operations, the Commanding



A crowd gathers at the post office at Vermont Avenue and 82nd Street to try to pick up mail. A police officer with a bullhorn gives information.

Officers of each of the five LAPD Bureaus are Deputy Chiefs, who report directly to the Director of the Office of Operations. Within each of the five Bureaus, Area Commanding Officers report directly to the Bureau Commanding Officer. Area Commanding Officers are normally a Captain-III, supported by junior Captains, Lieutenants and supervising Sergeants. These officers, in turn, supervise the police officers in the field. The LAPD Manual gives to these members of the Command Staff of the Department (officers with the rank of Captain and above) responsibility and accountability for every aspect of their respective commands. Thus, within Department policies and legal constraints, these Commanding Officers are supposed to have the authority to coordinate and direct assigned personnel and other allocated resources in achieving Department objectives.

While this chain of command ordinarily would have been in place throughout the Department on the morning of April 29, such was not the case. The previous January, in response to the Christopher Commission report and at the urging of the City Council, Chief Gates implemented a new "community-based policing program" that, among other things, changed the command structure for seven Areas normally assigned to the four geographical Bureaus. Those Areas included 77th Street, Harbor and Southeast in the South Bureau, Hollenbeck and Northeast in the Central Bureau, Foothill in the Valley Bureau and Pacific in the West Bureau.¹³ Instead of reporting to their respective Bureau Chiefs, the Commanding Officers of these seven Areas were required to report directly to the Chief of Police. The command structure of what was referred to as the "Magnificent Seven" or "Mag Seven" thus was altered so as to remove the Director of the Office of Operations and the applicable Bureau Chiefs from the chain of command.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Emergency Command Control Communications System, known as "ECCCS," is the Department's badly outdated and over-

loaded command, control and communications system. As such, ECCCS is supposed to provide the essential link between the Department Command Staff, the police force and the public. Called upon to serve as the 9-1-1 answer point for all police, fire and paramedic calls for service in the City of Los Angeles, the system is supposed to dispatch police units in response to citizen calls for service; maintain the status of police units; provide car-to-car, car-to-station, car-to-dispatch center, station-to-station and station-to-dispatch center communications; and provide law enforcement database capabilities.

The entire system is built around 9-1-1 emergency response. The American Telephone & Telegraph Company made the 9-1-1 telephone number available as a standard nationwide emergency response number in 1968. Four years later, the California State Legislature mandated 9-1-1 as a State-financed, regulated and administered program, and required 9-1-1 to be implemented State-wide by December 1985. The LAPD was designated in October 1984 as the Emergency 9-1-1 implementation agency for the City of Los Angeles.

Prior to October 1983, the LAPD maintained two communications centers, one at Parker Center and the other at the Valley Police Headquarters Building. These two centers were combined at the time of the creation of ECCCS, which was co-located with the LAPD Central Dispatch Center (CDC) in the fourth-level basement below City Hall East. The system consists of six central computers, one million lines of software code, 1,000 mobile digital terminals (MDTs), 400 radio receivers, 68 dispatch consoles and 22 Area Command Center (ACC) terminals (one for each of the 18 geographical Areas and four Traffic Divisions). Unfortunately, by the time the system was up and running in October, 1985, its design and technology were out-of-date and already running at full capacity, without any room for expansion.

The system uses a two-tier structure to answer its 9-1-1 lines. The primary tier employs

a staff of telephone operators who screen incoming calls to determine where they fit in four basic categories: (1) emergency dispatch (fire/rescue response, crimes in progress and Part I, or serious, crimes); (2) non-emergency dispatch (all other crimes and situations requiring police response of a non-emergency nature); (3) information or report calls; and (4) prank or nuisance calls. Under normal conditions, all dispatching of citizen calls for service is done through the underground Central Dispatch Center, rather than through the Bureaus or Areas. If a call fits into the emergency dispatch category, the primary 9-1-1 operator handles the call by transferring to the Fire Department or, if a police matter, dispatching and broadcasting the call immediately. Information from the incoming 9-1-1 call is transferred to the ECCCS Computer Aided Dispatch ("CAD") system, which is supposed to automatically determine the appropriate police personnel available to respond to the emergency. The operator then dispatches the call to the field unit selected through the CAD system. The LAPD's 1991 average response time for the most serious ("Part I") crimes was seven minutes, slightly higher than the median of the 36 departments responding to the Special Advisor's survey of 66 police departments.¹⁴ The average response times for these other departments range from a low of two minutes to a high of 28 minutes.¹⁵

Non-emergency dispatch calls are transferred to the secondary tier, which puts them into a non-emergency waiting line or "queue" at the appropriate Bureau, Area or Division, where they are handled in order of receipt. Information or report calls are transferred to recorded messages that advise the caller to either telephone the Information and Report Office or their local police station.

Once calls are dispatched to the field, or placed in the non-emergency answering queue in the Bureaus, Areas and Divisions, communications in the field and between the field and the Areas, Divisions and the Central Dispatch Center are handled through MDT computers located in the patrol vehicles.

The MDTs receive automatic dispatches and allow officers in the field direct access to ECCCS database information. Using their MDTs, officers can obtain call status and emergency messages, as well as send and receive messages to other personnel, both in the field and in the Bureaus or Areas. However, even normal operations often seriously overload the system causing lengthy waiting time between MDT transmissions.

EMERGENCY POLICE OPERATIONS

During an emergency (which the Department calls an "unusual occurrence"), the Department must not only continue with its normal operations, it must also respond to the unusual occurrence. In order to do this, the Department must adjust its command and control structure to permit both objectives to be fulfilled. This is especially true when the Department is responding to widespread civil disorder which would be classified under Department terminology as "serious" or "major."¹⁶ Such an event requires an adjustment that completely changes the way the Department works. In place of its highly specialized and decentralized normal structure for operations, the Department attempts to substitute a complex highly-centralized command structure. According to the then-effective Tactical Manual of the Department — the document Chief Gates believed to be a "plan" — the Department achieves this transformation in the following manner.¹⁷

MOBILIZATION

Modern police departments have long since recognized how easily their normal patrol deployment can be overwhelmed by a major emergency. To deal with such a contingency, police departments have put in place procedures to give alert in the event of an emergency and to allow commanders to concentrate additional resources as needed

to respond to the emergency. In Los Angeles, the Department is supposed to use the procedures of “Tactical Alert” and “Mobilization” to achieve these objectives.

“Tactical Alert” is the preliminary stage of the Department’s mobilization plan for major emergencies. It has two purposes that are relevant here. First, a Tactical Alert is intended to *announce the fact* of a major emergency and to *alert or warn* all levels of the Department in affected Areas that it may be necessary to redistribute police officers to meet the emergency. Second, the calling of a Tactical Alert requires impacted Areas to set aside up to half of their normal field complement as a *reserve force* available to respond to the event. Thus a Tactical Alert is supposed to be the “trip wire” that sets in motion the Department’s ability to respond to a major emergency.

A Tactical Alert is supposed to be called “as soon as possible” when a Watch Commander or other Field Commander forms the judgment “that [such] action is necessary to ensure the availability of sufficient personnel to control the incident.”¹⁸ However, it can also be called — or expanded to a broader geographical area — by the Watch Commander of the Communications Division “when the redistribution of Department personnel is necessary” to meet the immediate or *anticipated* needs of a Field Commander. Although the Department’s Tactical Manual does not expressly say so, the Chief of Police and, in the event of delegation to someone other than the Chief, the Department Commander presumably also may call a Tactical Alert. Once a Tactical Alert is called, on-duty watches in effected Areas are held over, non-uniformed personnel may be used to supplement or replace uniformed personnel and additional resources can be directed to the emergency from the available reserve force created upon the calling of the Tactical Alert.

“Mobilization” is the “principal personnel deployment plan” for control of an emergency. In addition to the implementation of a Tactical Alert, Mobilization immediately

changes the Department over from three 8-hour watches to two 12-hour watches, cancels all leave and recalls all off-duty police officers.¹⁹ A Mobilization may involve the entire Department or selected Areas and divisions. It can only be ordered by the Department Commander.²⁰

According to the Tactical Manual, a Mobilization will be ordered to provide the necessary personnel resources whenever an emergency is “of sufficient magnitude to require major deviation from normal police operating procedures and necessitates a general modification of Department organization and command,” or when the forces assembled by a Tactical Alert are “insufficient to meet the tactical situation.”²¹ Further, the Manual expressly notes that “a Mobilization *shall be initiated without delay if, at the beginning of [the emergency], it is obvious that the on-duty forces will be insufficient to meet the immediate needs of the Field Commander.*”²²

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Department’s Tactical Manual places upon the Command Staff a continuing responsibility to respond rapidly with sufficient personnel and logistical resources necessary to fulfill police responsibilities when a disaster or other emergency occurs.²³ While the Chief of Police has the ultimate responsibility for control of an unusual occurrence, he may designate another officer within the Department to act as the Department Commander for the duration of an unusual occurrence. This allows the Chief to function as expected under normal conditions.²⁴ The Department Commander is then responsible for (1) evaluating Department needs in an involved area; (2) issuing appropriate instructions to ensure a coordinated and effective deployment of personnel and equipment for control of an unusual occurrence and policing the remainder of the City; and (3) when necessary, requesting Law Enforcement Mutual Aid.²⁵ The Department Commander is also responsible for directing the activation of the Emergency Control Center (ECC) and its

components, the Intelligence Control Center (ICC) and the Casualty Information Center (CIC), if needed.²⁶

The Emergency Control Center was supposed to be the Department Command Post and headquarters for the Department Commander during a serious or major unusual occurrence.²⁷ As such, it was supposed to coordinate all of the Department's emergency control activities.²⁸ However, the Tactical Manual also provided that the Department Commander's headquarters were to be in the City's Emergency Operations Center when the LAPD Emergency Control Center was activated.²⁹ Consequently, both City-wide and police department-wide emergency control activities were placed in the same physical location.

According to the Tactical Manual, the commanding officer of an Area experiencing an unusual occurrence has the ultimate responsibility for emergency control operations within the boundaries of that Area.³⁰ However, any individual police officer may become Field Commander for a particular unusual occurrence based upon the following order of succession: (1) The commanding officer of the Area in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence is occurring; (2) the commanding officer of the operations division in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence exists; (3) the commanding officer of the support division of the Area in which the major portion of the unusual occurrence exists; and (4) the senior police officer at the scene.³¹

When a "serious" or "major" unusual occurrence appears imminent, the commanding officer of the operations division of occurrence, or in his absence, the senior officer of the operations division of occurrence, is supposed to assume field command until relieved of such responsibilities by a superior officer, or by the appropriate officer of an ensuing watch.³² During an escalating emergency which has the potential of becoming a serious or major unusual occurrence, the Area commanding officer is supposed to go to the scene (or Field Command Post, if estab-

lished) and assume command. If the unusual occurrence involved two or more Areas, the officer assuming Field Command is supposed to be determined by mutual agreement of the concerned commanding officers, or as directed by the bureau commanding officer, who is designated as the Field Task Force Commander.³³

An officer of superior rank may assume Field Commander status from the existing Field Commander at any time during an unusual occurrence.³⁴ The existing Field Commander, however, must specifically be informed that he has been relieved of command.³⁵ The mere presence of a senior officer at the scene of an unusual occurrence does not indicate that the senior officer will necessarily assume command.³⁶ Thus, unless the senior officer specifically assumes command, the senior officer remains in an advisory capacity.³⁷

The portion of an area which is affected by an unusual occurrence and which becomes the responsibility of a Field Commander (or is assigned to any individual, unit, or Field Task Force element), is defined as that individual's tactical area of responsibility. Regardless of rank, the Field Commander is supposed to have complete authority and responsibility for conducting the Field Task Force operations within his Tactical Area.³⁸ The Tactical Manual provides that all orders of command within the tactical area of responsibility concerning a given unusual occurrence are supposed to originate from the Field Commander, or an officer acting under the Field Commander's authority.³⁹ A Field Commander's order or request may be countermanded only after the countermanding officer has specifically relieved the Field Commander of his command, unless the situation is such that time will not allow such assumption of command.⁴⁰ The Field Commander is supposed to enjoy access to the full resources of the Department, but is required to requisition from the Emergency Control Center (ECC), when activated, all Department personnel and equipment necessary to contain the occurrence and prevent injury, loss of life, destruction or loss of property, or the threat of any of these.⁴¹

The Field Commander in a tactical area is responsible for coordinating Field Task Force activities with other elements of the Unusual Occurrence Control Task Force, and is supposed to establish and maintain communications with the Communications Division or the Emergency Operations Center, when it is activated, to exchange information concerning the unusual occurrence.⁴² If appropriate to the particular situation, the Field Commander is given the responsibility of recommending to the Department Commander that a disaster be declared, and defining the involved area. In addition, the Field Commander is responsible for declaring a Tactical Alert when there is an apparent or anticipated need to do so, and notifying the watch commander of the Communications Division of the Tactical Alert.⁴³

All department personnel committed to line and support activities directly concerned with the control of an unusual occurrence are formed into an Unusual Occurrence Task Force. The Task Force has responsibility for accomplishing the department mission with respect to the unusual occurrence. Depending upon the magnitude of the occurrence and the extent of activation of department personnel, the Task Force is made up of the following components: (1) Department Commander; (2) an Emergency Control Center (ECC) which is intended to support the Field Commander's exercise of command and control; (3) Intelligence Control Center (ICC) which is intended to provide a centralized location for the collection, assessment and dissemination of information gathered during an unusual occurrence; (4) Casualty Information Center (CIC) which is intended to keep track of casualty data; (5) Field Task Force; and (6) one or more Field Command Posts.⁴⁴

According to the Tactical Manual, the Field Task Force consists of the Department's overall field operations concerned with the control of any emergency, regardless of how many Field Command Posts (each with its own Field Commander) are in operation. The Field Task Force does *not* include the Emergency Control Center (ECC), the Intelli-

gence Control Center (ICC), or the Casualty Information Center (CIC).⁴⁵

The Field Task Force Commander is given the responsibility for (1) evaluating the needs of the Field Task Force; (2) coordinating distribution of resources as needed; and (3) advising the Department Commander as to the utilization of available personnel and reassignment of personnel and equipment.⁴⁶

A Field Command Post is supposed to be a temporary facility designed to enable the Field Commander to direct Field Task Force operations required to control a major police incident or unusual occurrence.⁴⁷ Once established by the Field Commander, the Field Command Post is expected to: (1) direct Field Task Force operations towards control of an emergency; (2) assemble and assign Department resources; (3) collect intelligence; (4) communicate with control forces; and (5) maintain necessary records. The Field Command Post may be mobile or fixed, based on the location, nature and extent of an emergency. The components of a Field Command Post include the (1) Field Commander; (2) Assistant Field Commander; (3) Executive Officer; (4) Personnel Section; (5) Intelligence Section; (6) Operations Section; and (7) Logistics Section. The Field Command Post may consist of all or part of these components. According to the Tactical Manual, it should not, however, normally function with a staff smaller than three persons, including the Field Commander, a Personnel or Staging Officer and a radio operator. If the workload of the Field Command Post staff increases, the Field Commander is supposed to proportionately increase the Command Post staff.⁴⁸

The Bureau Field Command Post Cadre is a temporary cadre activated to assign trained personnel to staff the Field Command Post during a "serious" or "major" unusual occurrence, or when such an occurrence appears imminent. Personnel assigned provide staff assistance to the Field Commander, but remain under the line command of the Bureau Commanding Officer. All or selected portions or units of the cadre may be activated as a temporary cadre by the Chief of Police, the

Director of the Office of Operations, the Bureau commanding officer, or any of their designated representatives.⁴⁹

The foregoing discussion illustrates only some of the complexities of the Department's emergency operations structure. It is readily apparent that the emergency structure sets up an entirely new command and control apparatus — with new titles and job descriptions — to deal with the unusual occurrence. Further, this new structure is burdened with numerous layers of command. In the case of a single event in a single location, such changes may not prove unduly difficult to implement even without practice. In a case of City-wide disorder, however, the potential for confusion and paralysis would appear to be quite high.

Upon declaration of a City-wide Tactical Alert and Mobilization, the entire force is directed to leave behind the command and control infrastructure of its stationhouse to bivouac in temporary Field Command Posts scattered across the City in bus yards, playgrounds and other similar locations. Once decamped, without the benefit of established communications channels, or even portable cellular telephones or televisions to follow events as they develop, Field Command Posts are left to function largely in the dark. As we shall see in the following chapters of this report, in the absence of intensive preparations — consisting of careful planning integrated with a comprehensive training program — both the concept and the implementation of this structure appear to present problems.⁵⁰

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

¹ MANUAL OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT § 110, at 97 (1992) [hereinafter LAPD DEPARTMENT MANUAL].

² *Line command* within the Department is the exercise of the authority of command delegated by the Chief of Police to his immediate subordinates, and by them to their subordinates, down the lines of direct command to the lowest level of authority. *Staff responsibility* within the Department is given to a staff officer for developing and recommending policies and procedures, and evaluating the Department's compliance with those policies and procedures. According to the

Department Manual, "policy" consists of principles and values which guide the performance of Department activity; "policy" is not a statement of what must be done in a particular situation. "Procedure" is defined as a method of performing an operation or proceeding on a course of action. Both policies and procedures are objective oriented. "Policy" establishes the limits of action, while "procedure" directs response within those limits. LAPD DEPARTMENT MANUAL §§ 010, 020, at 97.

³ LAPD DEPARTMENT MANUAL 117.

⁴ City of Los Angeles, Budget for the Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1990 and Ending June 30, 1991, at B-145.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.* at 48.

⁷ *Id.* at B-145.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 48.

¹⁰ LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT STATISTICAL DIGEST 7.23 (1991).

¹¹ These requests apparently became caught up in a dispute between the Mayor and City Council. The requested replacement vehicles would have cost about \$9 million.

¹² The City budget for the fiscal year in which the April disorder occurred appropriated about \$987 million to cover the total direct costs of police department operations (about 25 percent of the total City budget of just under \$3.9 billion). Approximately \$556 million was allocated to Department salaries (about 56 percent of the police budget); of this amount, approximately \$446 million was allocated to salaries for sworn officers. Another \$16 million was allocated to their overtime, making a total of \$462 million (approximately 47 percent of the police budget). The allocations for pensions and benefits totaled \$358 million (36 percent). In addition, about \$12 million each was allocated for communications and data processing, or a total of \$24 million (slightly over 2 percent). All together, these three categories — salaries, pensions and benefits, and communications and data processing — account for 95 percent of the police budget. The category of equipment only had allocated to it a total of some \$250,000. This tiny figure included no allocation to upgrade or replace any of the Department's ageing vehicle fleet. See City of Los Angeles Budget for the Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1991 and Ending June 30, 1992.

¹³ Chief Gates did not personally favor starting this program with so many Areas, but wanted to begin with a smaller number to work out any problems that might arise before expanding the program. Pressure from members of the City Council evidently led to inclusion of a larger number of Areas than the Chief initially planned.

¹⁴ See Appendix 15-2.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ See definition of "Unusual Occurrence" in the Quick Reference Guide.

¹⁷ The organization charts from the LAPD Tactical Manual for the Department's emergency organization appear in Appendices 3-1 to 3-9. They may be a helpful guide to the following discussion.

¹⁸ LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT TACTICAL MANUAL 101.03 [hereinafter LAPD TACTICAL MANUAL].

¹⁹ LAPD TACTICAL MANUAL 102.01.

²⁰ *Id.* at 102.03.

²¹ *Id.* at 102.02.

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.* at A 201.

²⁴ *Id.* at A102.01.

²⁵ *Id.* at A302.

²⁶ *Id.* at A303.01.

²⁷ *Id.* at A303.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ *Id.* at A102.01.

³⁰ *Id.* at A204.01.

³¹ *Id.* at A106.02.

³² *Id.* at A106.03.

³³ *Id.* at A204.01.

³⁴ *Id.* at A106.05.

³⁵ *Id.* at A106.15.

³⁶ *Id.* at A106.03.

³⁷ *Id.* at A106.04.

³⁸ *Id.* at A106.01.

³⁹ *Id.* at A106.07.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at A106.08.

⁴¹ *Id.* at A106.09.

⁴² *Id.* at A319.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ *Id.* at A301.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 006.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at A150.02.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 006.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at A318.

⁴⁹ LAPD Office of Operations Order No. 6 (Mar. 14, 1990).

⁵⁰ In January 1992, the Department completed a revision of the LAPD Tactical Manual. Although not in effect at the time of the April disorder, the revision was implemented shortly thereafter. While generally helpful, the changes are for the most part non-substantive and do not make the LAPD Tactical Manual any more of a "plan." Thus, for example, the manual is reorganized into three parts (one each for preparation, response and recovery). Newly created "guides" are included as Appendices (Staff/Command Officer's Guide, Watch Commander's Guide, and First Responder's Checklist). These guides provide, in a form that is more suitable for use in the field, checklists of procedures and priorities for various emergencies.

Interestingly, one change probably requires re-thinking. The new LAPD Tactical Manual eliminates the Department's ECC and, in its place, designates the EOC as the Department Command Post and headquarters for the Department Commander. One of the major criticisms of the EOC during the April disorder was the presence of Command Staff, which often required police officers assigned to the EOC to perform command post functions instead of their EOC duties. The in-house LAPD analysis of these events criticized that situation and recommended the placement of the Department Command Post outside the EOC.



PART

TWO:

PREPARATION

5

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WERE THERE ANY PLANS?

The rebuttal to the criticism of inadequate civil disorder planning — advanced by both the LAPD Command Staff and the other officials responsible for the City's emergency response — was that in fact there existed comprehensive plans for handling a large-scale civil disturbance. For example, during an appearance on the *Nightline* television program, Chief Gates held up for the camera a stack of 3-hole punched paper wrapped by a rubber band that he claimed was proof that comprehensive plans existed. We have been unable to determine for certain what Gates held in his hand on television. Later, he indicated that the "plan" was in the Department's Tactical Manual and the so-called "standing plans" for the police. At the City-wide level, officials responsible for preparing the City's emergency response point to the so-called "Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures."

It is now clear that none of the documents to which these officials point can be described as "plans" within any reasonable meaning of the word. The fact that these officials, who are charged with the duty of ensuring adequate planning, point to these documents as evidence of the existence of civil disorder planning, is itself confirmation of the extensive planning problems suffered by the City and the LAPD. Moreover, this confirms the need for a more complete understanding of exactly what a plan is.

WHAT IS A PLAN?

Many of the operations that a response agency will be required to undertake during a civil disturbance are quite different from the normal or daily operations of that agency. The agency generally will have little or no experience responding to a large scale emergency, let alone a civil disturbance. And because no single city department or agency has the resources or experience to fulfill all of the diverse tasks required of an emergency re-

sponse to a large-scale civil disturbance, many city and outside agencies must come together in a coordinated action. The complexity and uniqueness of these tasks is compounded by the severe limitations imposed on the ability of response agencies to learn their coordinated functions following the outbreak of the disturbance. These limitations arise due to the chaotic environment and the enormous time constraints inherent in an emergency response to civil disorder.

Fundamentally, planning (together with the training necessary to both learn and test the plans) must compensate for the complexity and uniqueness of a civil disorder response, as well as the substantial limitations on the ability to learn response functions **after** the onset of civil disorder. A civil disturbance response plan must do so by resolving these complexities and teaching the participants their roles in the response **in advance** of the outbreak of the civil disturbance.

A plan for civil disorder response, whether it be at the police department level, the City-wide level, or the mutual aid level, must include certain indispensable elements: (1) **Objectives** to be accomplished through the emergency response must be set out in the response plan. The objectives serve as both goals for the response team to achieve, and as benchmarks for the progress of the response. (2) Given the limited resources and the serious time constraints, these objectives must be **prioritized**. A plan must account for (3) the **means** (or resources) and (4) **tactics** (or tasks) necessary to successfully achieve these objectives. And (5), a plan must provide for individual **assignments** of each task, from the top of the command structure to the bottom.

WHAT PLANS WERE NEEDED?

Planning must be conducted at each of the levels of the Department, the City, and the mutual aid system. At the same time, however, the planning at these three levels must be to a large extent coordinated between each level. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, plans "should

include instructions for all ranks; should include the roles of other local government departments (for example, the fire department), neighboring jurisdictions, and state and federal agencies; and be taught, tested, and refined through training.”²

City-Wide Planning

City-wide civil disturbance planning contemplates the development of a comprehensive and coordinated formula for responding to the disorder with all necessary City resources. Such a plan must account for the interaction between the various departments and agencies, and the coordination of the individual plans of these entities with those of the other entities. It must provide for a command structure for carrying out the coordinated response, and must establish an order of precedence for the achievement of the City-wide objectives in the response. Once prioritized, the tactics, resources and assignments of the individual response agencies must be coordinated so as to carry out these objectives.³

LAPD Department Planning

The LAPD’s plans must provide for a Department-wide response to a civil disturbance, including an alert and mobilization of forces, the operations and tactics to be employed, and the resources to be deployed.

In order to account for the varying nature and magnitude of civil disturbances, it might be advisable for planners to provide for the mobilization of the Department in phases. These phases might combine various components of a mobilization, including an alert of personnel of an occurrence, placement of personnel on standby, holding over of shifts, redeployment of on-duty personnel, cancellation of days off, conversion to twelve hour A and B watches, mobilization of reserve forces, and calls for mutual aid assistance. A mobilization plan with these varying levels of mobilization should strike a balance between the need to respond promptly and forcefully to an occurrence and the fiscal and political pressure not to overreact to an occurrence,

and should be clear as to who can initiate each level of mobilization. However, it is critical that, given the time limitations associated with effective civil disturbance responses, the emergency civil disturbance plans provide for the immediate deployment of the existing on-duty personnel even before the department has been mobilized. The San Diego Police Department employs a phased concept of this kind.

The Department’s operational or tactical plans should begin with the **prioritized objectives** of the Department’s overall response to the emergency. Operational plans should also include the specific **tactics** that are to be used along with the **resources** to be employed in order to effectuate these objectives. Lastly, the plans should provide for individual **assignments** of these tasks to the units and officers that will carry them out.

The Department’s operational plans should also address the command, control and communications issues unique to an unusual occurrence operation, as discussed in Chapter Seven. And because access to adequate resources is essential to the ability of individual officers to carry out their assigned tasks, logistical and resource planning must be substantially coordinated with the Department’s operational plans. This logistical planning would include maintaining and deploying sufficient communications (televisions, handheld radios, cellular phones), transportation (cruisers, vans, prisoner transportation), and personal resources and equipment (vests, helmets, shields, gas masks, tear gas, maps) to meet the mobilization and operational needs of the department under the civil disturbance plan.

Mutual Aid Planning

Distinct from City-wide inter-departmental planning and Department-wide planning is mutual aid planning, the planning for the likelihood that the City may be required to call on the resources of surrounding jurisdictions for assistance. In order to draw upon the mutual aid resources of surrounding jurisdictions during an emergency response that

overwhelms the jurisdiction's own resources, both a written agreement and a plan of mutual assistance must be created in advance of the emergency. The agreement must address issues such as reciprocal responsibilities, compensation and indemnification. The planning, however, is more complicated. Because a simple resource mechanism does not account for the complexity inherent in any system of mutual aid, mutual aid planning must go beyond the provision of resources and into the coordinated deployment and use of those resources. In this sense, a mutual aid response plan requires the same elements as any other emergency response scheme, the objectives and prioritization of those objectives, the resources and tasks or tactics, and the assignments. The plan must also address issues such as how requests for assistance are submitted, the establishment of lines of authority, and the responsibilities of participants. And because the mutual aid response is both complex and unfamiliar to its participants, each of these elements must be thoroughly planned in advance, including testing, training and evaluation.

WHAT PLANS EXISTED?

It is apparent from our survey of the public's perceptions, through both the community meetings and the City-wide telephone survey, that much of the public blame for the inadequacies in the planning and preparation for civil disorder is directed at the LAPD. However, our study makes it clear that although much of this blame is justified, the planning failures are by no means limited to the LAPD, but extend broadly across the City's political structure and to the highest offices of the City government.

City-Wide Plans

The general "plans" maintained by the City's Emergency Operations Organization ("EOO") consist of the Emergency Operation Master Plan and Procedures Manual (the "EO Master Plan"). Although it is given the title of a "plan" and contains many headings that would indicate that it is a plan, the EO Master Plan is nothing of the kind. The

EO Master Plan provides neither the overall strategies nor the specific tactics and assignments that are to be implemented in the event of a large scale emergency such as a civil disturbance. The EO Master Plan is more nearly a hybrid of a procedures manual, a broad policy or mission statement, a recitation of legal authorities, and a detailed outline of the structure and responsibilities of the EOO.

As an example, the section of the EOO Master Plan related to civil disturbances provides simply that:

Control of a civil disturbance lies primarily with the Police Division. Plans for civil disturbance control are included in Police Division operational plans. Other EOO divisions may be called upon to assist the Police Division with logistical support as well as initial situation estimates.

Completely lacking among this broad statement of responsibilities is a recitation and prioritization of objectives of the City-wide emergency response: What does the City consider the highest level of priority for the use of scarce resources: To rescue victims, to help fight fires, to arrest looters, to contain a rioting crowd, or to secure certain vulnerable and important facilities? These are but a few of the competing demands for police services that arise in the context of a disorder, as discussed more fully in Chapter Eight. Our study uncovered no planning that answers these critical questions for emergency preparedness. In fact, it is not even certain that the powers that be, the Mayor, the City Council, the Chiefs of Police and Fire, and the City Administrative Officer, have even considered and discussed these issues among themselves.

The general EOO planning fares no better upon evaluation of the other indispensable elements of a plan. None of the EOO planning documents contain specific tasks to be employed and resources to be deployed through assignments in order to achieve the objectives of the emergency response. Rather,

the extent of the EOO planning appears to be the creation of an agency liaison structure to be implemented by the City in the event of an emergency.

There appears to have been no specific EOO planning for the possibility of unrest following the King verdicts. "Planning" for this possibility appears to have been limited to the drafting of an emergency declaration during the days that preceded the verdicts. Although analysis and drafting of legal authority is an important planning task for the EOO, it is hardly sufficient preparation for the City-wide emergency response.

The effects of this wholesale lack of planning for a coordinated City-wide response can be seen clearly in a single example — the coordination of escorts for fire department forces to fight the many fires that raged throughout the City. As we discuss more fully in Chapter Eight, the lack of planning made this a serious problem during the early stages of the disturbances.

LAPD Plans

The extent of the LAPD's planning for a Department-wide response to a civil disturbance was limited to the Tactical Manual, and the "Standing Plans" of the police Area. The LAPD Tactical Manual articulates the Department's procedures and basic strategic concepts for response to all types of Unusual Occurrences, including civil disorders.³ The Tactical Manual does not, however, set forth any "plan" for the Department or any Area to follow in the event of civil disorder. In fact, the Tactical Manual states in various places that it is the responsibility of the person holding a particular position to develop plans to respond to a certain situation. And this is the basic problem: The Tactical Manual seems to assume that there will be time to make a plan once the action starts. While this may be true in many cases, more is needed to prepare for a city-wide emergency.

In addition to the Tactical Manual, each of the Areas also supposedly maintains a "standing plan" developed for that particular geo-

graphic part of the City. In general, these 6-inch thick packages consist of excerpts from the Tactical Manual, lists of key locations (for example, Department of Water and Power facilities), and locations for the establishment of field command posts and staging areas. It is supposed to be the responsibility of each Area Commanding Officer to review and update these "standing plans" on at least an annual basis.

Although the Department in the past prepared a number of "Single-Standing Plans" for a variety of events, including the 1984 Olympics, Operation Rescue protests, Mardi Gras in the Westwood area, and demonstrations at the Federal Building in Westwood, there was no such plan prepared for the King verdicts. Probably the most widely known element of the Department's planning for possible unrest in the wake of the King verdicts was the plan to set-aside \$1 million of overtime money to put additional officers on the streets in South Los Angeles.

A few of the Department's 18 geographic Areas also undertook some degree of planning in recognition of the potential for unrest related to the King verdicts. For example, certain Areas conducted audits of emergency response readiness and limited equipment checks, including tear gas, emergency vans, and other riot-related equipment. Some Divisions developed plans for crowd control and providing training for Area Commanding Officers. In addition, although Metro Division's plan to deploy personnel in the South Central Area in a riot-ready configuration prior to the verdicts was denied, Metro officers were deployed into the Southwest, 77th, and Newton Street Areas in regular uniforms and in a "soft-patrol manner."

Taken together, these materials were fundamentally deficient because they failed to provide for the essential elements of planning — identification and *prioritization* of *objectives*, identification of *resources*, a statement of *tasks* and *assignments* to complete the tasks. At a minimum, what the Department needed was a "Single Standing Plan" for the

possibility of City-wide unrest—and this it did not have.

Mutual Aid Planning

Because it is clear that the scale of the rioting that took place following the King verdicts overburdened the City's resources including the police force, a review of the City's planning involving the mutual aid system was also an important part of our study of the response to the civil disturbance. Here too we found a disturbing lack of planning.

The Law Enforcement Division of the California Office of Emergency Services ("OES") is responsible for preparing the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan (the "OES Plan"). The OES Plan is designed to provide a mechanism by which law enforcement entities throughout the state can combine their resources and provide a coordinated response to a variety of emergency situations which may arise.⁴ The OES Plan is administered through the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System ("LEMAS") and contemplates the involvement of individuals and agencies at four levels — city, county, region and state. The OES Plan establishes a mechanism for drawing upon the resources of the local sheriff's office (in Los Angeles, through the Sheriff's Emergency Operations Center) and the CHP before utilizing state and federal resources.

At its core, the OES Plan is nothing more than a mechanism for sharing resources. However, the function of the OES mutual aid system during an emergency must be more than simply a mechanism for dispensing resources to those departments that are overwhelmed. The mutual aid system must provide a regional (or larger) coordinated response to the threat to public order. Although the OES Plan may be sufficient in its form as a shared-resource mechanism, the City and the LAPD must initiate further planning in coordination with the other mutual aid resources.

Because the OES Plan provides only one of the essential elements of civil disturbance planning, the resources, it is incumbent on

the City and the LAPD to implement the other elements of planning: the prioritized objectives, the tactics or tasks to be employed, and the assignments to carry them out. Much of this can be accomplished by integrating the contingency of mutual aid into the City's and the Department's civil disturbance response plans (once created). But beyond this supplementation, there must be a coordination with the outside jurisdictions to both take into consideration the abilities and experience of those resources, and to educate the resources as to their function and tasks under the coordinated plan.


Although there is some evidence of limited planning in anticipation of possible unrest following the King verdicts on the part of certain regional participants in the OES mutual aid plan, particularly outside the City emergency operations structure and LAPD, none of this sporadic and uncoordinated planning could compensate for the substantial deficiencies in coordinated mutual aid planning. As discussed more fully in Chapter Nine, below, the adverse effects of the planning deficiencies were substantial, and are exemplified by the failure to use in the first instance outside resources, such as the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office, the California Highway Patrol and local police departments, during the initial days of the disorder.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING?

The responsibility for planning an emergency response to civil disorder belongs principally with three individuals — the Mayor, the City Administrative Officer ("CAO"), and the Chief of Police.⁶ The Mayor's planning responsibilities are clear. The Mayor is the chief executive officer of the City, and in that capacity the Mayor is delegated the duty to enforce ordinances, supervise the acts and conduct of City officers and employees, and



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secure cooperation between City departments and agencies. The Mayor thus has ultimate responsibility for all City departments. Moreover, the Mayor is the Director of the City's Emergency Operations Organization, the entity established by the Local Emergencies Ordinance in order "to enable the City to more effectively cooperate with" other agents and means of state and local governments in emergency preparations and response.

As described in Chapter Three, the City Administrative Officer plays a unique role in the City's government structure. The CAO is the chief financial advisor to the Mayor and City Council, and reports directly to both. The combination of his unique reporting relationship with his financial and oversight duties make the CAO one of the most powerful officials in the City government. He is not only responsible for the preparation and administration of the City's budget, but is also charged with responsibility for conducting investigations, carrying out research, and making recommendations on a wide variety of City management matters for the Mayor and the City Council. It is the CAO's job to direct the development of work programs and standards, to conduct periodic management audits of City departments, to administer a risk management program, and to coordinate the City's emergency preparedness activities and programs. To help him perform these critical emergency-preparedness functions, the CAO is designated as the Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator, with the duties, among other things, to establish and maintain liaison with other government agencies and City departments, as well as to coordinate the authorities, powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Emergency Operations Board.

The Emergency Operations Board is responsible for supervising, regulating, controlling and managing the affairs of the Emergency Operations Organization. However, the Board is not only brought into existence in times of emergency, but was created to oversee and direct City-wide emergency planning and training activities as well. As Emer-

gency Operations Organization Coordinator, the CAO is charged with responsibility for management of the Board in non-emergency times, when its activities must be directed toward emergency preparedness. The CAO directs the activities of the Emergency Management Committee (EMC), which forms the working arm or staff of the Emergency Operations Organization. The primary responsibility of the Committee is to manage the City's planning and training activities. Unfortunately, however, the Committee's preparatory activities have been confined almost exclusively to earthquake readiness, with virtually no attention being devoted to civil disorder preparation.

The Chief of Police is both the general manager of the Police Department and its chief administrative officer. The Chief's duties in this regard are coextensive with those of the department to enforce the law and maintain public order. Although substantial planning responsibilities may be delegated to others, such as the Tactical Planning Section, it is the Chief of Police who remains ultimately responsible for all Department-wide planning.

The Chief of Police also sits both as Chairperson of the Emergency Operations Board, the entity which meets from time to time to oversee and direct City-wide emergency planning and training activities, and as the Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization. As explained above, in these positions the Chief of Police is largely responsible for the City-wide response operations, subject to the direction of the Mayor, and it is the City Administrative Officer who has responsibility for the day-to-day management of the EOB's emergency preparedness activities. However, the Chief of Police nevertheless has responsibility for the Department's planning of the police role in the emergency operations structure, a responsibility that has been to a large extent delegated to the LAPD's Planning and Research Division.

Other entities also retain some element of responsibility for City-wide and Department-wide civil disorder planning. The City Council, as the entity with the "power of the purse," adopts and modifies the budgets proposed by the Mayor and provides the necessary funds for the departments and agencies to carry out their functions, including planning. The Council also confirms and rejects appointments to commissions, including the Police Commission. As a legislative body, however, the City Council is in a poor position to directly supervise the executive departments and agencies, such as the LAPD and the Emergency Operations Board. Nevertheless, its role would appear to have been more appropriately one of broad oversight, leaving direct supervision to the Mayor and the Citizen Police Commission. At least one City Councilman apparently attempted to influence the actions of the LAPD in the days leading up to the King riots. The Police Commission also has an oversight role which should have included the important task of overseeing the Department's civil disorder planning function.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

The across-the-board failures in the planning function at every level of the emergency response to the civil disorder that erupted on April 29, 1992, point to the very real and substantial need for a complete overhaul of the City's and the Department's planning for responding to an outbreak of civil disorder. The elements of the solution are not difficult to identify. First, the plan must be simple to implement, and must not deviate excessively from normal operations so as to maximize the utilization of knowledge and experience. Given time limitations inherent in containing a rapidly escalating civil disturbance, there is also a need to design a plan that can be implemented as quickly as possible, including the components of mobilizing the De-

partment or other agency and establishing a command structure.

Other considerations also affect the civil disturbance planning process. A City-wide civil disturbance plan should be coordinated by a single person or agency. The planning department must be delegated the responsibility of implementing and coordinating a consistent, response-wide plan, and bringing that plan down to the level of each individual participant. Moreover, a civil disturbance plan must be kept current through periodic review and updating, taking into account variable factors such as the nature of potential civil disturbances, the available resources and the liaisons in the community and other agencies. Specific planning for a potential disturbance should be initiated so as to give the Department and the City sufficient lead time to study and train under the plan before the outbreak of disorder.

Possibly most importantly, both the City's and the Department's civil disturbance plan must provide for its own testing and evaluation, and a feedback of that evaluation to the planning coordinator for revisions. Although the testing of the plan may overlap or coincide with training, the objectives of the two tasks should not be mistaken. Plan testing and evaluation serve the function of improving the quality of the plan while training serves the function of teaching the plan to the participants.

Within this framework, both the responsible City officials and the LAPD must first come to a new understanding of the planning function as it involves them, and then carry out that planning function. Before any progress can be made, the EOO must recognize the broad mission of the City's emergency apparatus, as well as the planning that is required to carry out that mission. It is not enough for the EOO simply to be a structure for establishing liaison between various agencies. The TEOO and the City officials who have the responsibility of preparing for a City-wide response to civil disorder, particularly the City Administrative Officer, must fulfill this

responsibility by creating and implementing a coordinated City-wide civil disorder response plan.

In order to accomplish this, the City Administrative Officer must use the Emergency Operations Board in order to build a consensus among the agencies and political leaders of the City as to the objectives of a City-wide emergency response, and a prioritization of those objectives. Once these rudimentary objectives have been established and prioritized, the CAO must bring together the agencies to define the various tasks necessary to carry out these objectives. In this stage of planning, individual response agencies must develop their response plans in coordination with the other involved agencies. Departments must develop and coordinate tasks to be assigned to specific personnel along with the necessary resources in order to achieve the objectives of the emergency response. Conflicts must be resolved and weak points identified so that alternative solutions can be prepared. The whole package must be put together in a readable master plan and then tested to see if it works. The best testing is through training, and this is our next subject.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

¹ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, AREAS OF CONCERN IN ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CIVIL DISORDERS, 4 (July 1992).

² *Id.*

³ Not to be ignored in a discussion of planning requirements at the level of the City-wide response is a planning element that might not naturally be included as response planning — media relations. The City saw the power of the media both in the videotape of the King beating itself, and in the footage of disturbance, most notably the initial chaos at Florence and Normandie and the repeated scenes of looting. Many have criticized the constant replaying of the King footage following the jury's verdicts for stirring emotions that incited lawlessness. Others have criticized the footage of the violence and looting during the disturbance for having increased lawlessness by giving the perception that the police were not responding to the civil disturbance. These examples of the power of the media both before and during civil disorder prove the power of television as an accelerator of the pace of events. City and police officials must plan to take into account the increasing speed of events covered by television.

⁴ The Department began development of the LAPD Tactical Manual in the aftermath of the Watts Riot. The version of the LAPD Tactical Manual that was in effect on April 29, 1992, had been revised several times since this version was initially prepared, but contains sections dating back to 1975. See LAPD TACTICAL MANUAL, *supra* Chapter 4, note 18, at 1. On May 27, 1992, following the riots, the Department replaced the earlier version of the LAPD Tactical Manual with a new version incorrectly dated January 1992. The revised version of the LAPD Technical Manual was in its final stages of preparation during the riots.

⁵ CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID PLAN iii (5th ed. Oct. 1991).

⁶ The responsibilities of the Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the City Administrative Officer are discussed more fully in Chapter Three, above, and the Notes to Chapter Three.

6

TRAINING

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Training in emergency response is a critical element of any emergency preparedness program, and especially of any program of preparation for responding to civil disorder. As discussed in Chapter Five, the City's preparation for large-scale emergencies appears to have been focused almost exclusively on earthquake preparedness, with little or no thought given to civil disorder training in anticipation of possible unrest related to the upcoming trial. The Department's own training program also appears to be deficient with respect to civil disorder response.

Lastly, neither the City nor the Department appear to have conducted any mutual aid training in coordination with surrounding jurisdictions to prepare for the possibility that the City's own resources might be insufficient to respond to an emergency. Each of these topics is discussed in this Chapter.

WHY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING IS IMPORTANT

In almost any job, training is critical to an employee's ability to carry out the tasks required of the job. Training is a requirement in addition to the particular qualifications, skills, and knowledge required to do the job effectively, and distinct from the other resources that are needed to complete the task at hand. Whether by a formal classroom and field exercises program, an informal on-the-job system, or a program of periodic review, training gives an employee the ability to understand the functions and requirements of his or her job. Training is even more critical in the business of emergency response, where there is no time for on-the-job learning. Given the condensed time frame of, and chaotic environment surrounding, emergency re-

sponse to a civil disturbance, training is an indispensable element for all participants in the response.

CITY-WIDE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TRAINING

Because no single department or agency has the resources or experience effectively to complete all of the diverse tasks required of an emergency response to a large-scale civil disturbance, all of the City's departments must work together in a coordinated manner. These include not just the obvious examples of the police and fire departments, but all of the departments that make up the City's Emergency Operations Organization. These departments generally have little or no experience in working with other agencies in responding to a large scale emergency, let alone a civil disturbance. Typically, the experience of each individual department is limited to the discrete tasks that the particular department performs on a daily basis, as well as possibly some experience with a natural or accidental disaster. In light of the serious threat to life and property posed by civil disorder, and the need for a rapid response on the part of the entire emergency structure, departments cannot afford to confront a civil disturbance with confusion in their command structure, ignorance of individual and coordinated functions and tasks, or fundamental problems in their underlying plans for coordinated response. In order to fill the institutional gap in experience in civil disorder response, it is important for the City to have an overall program of training for all of its departments to learn how to work together in response to emergencies, including civil disorder. A good example of the type of activity that demands such coordinated practice is provided by the mass arrest and field jail activities discussed in Chapter Eight.

POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING

Training is equally important to the police department's ability to carry out its own tasks in response to a civil disturbance. Given the

nature of police work generally, and the danger inherent in the job, training is an important component of everyday police work. Civil disorder presents a unique threat to lives, property and public order. Here, the police function during civil disorder calls for practice of crisis management skills, command and control, strategies and tactics and logistical support activities. Officers and commanders cannot be expected to gain experience in such areas through normal police operations. Nor is it practical to anticipate that they will be able to come up-to-speed on their new tasks under the pressures of a disturbance. The time to learn, practice and perfect plans for disorder response is before the moment of crisis. Moreover, training ought not be limited to responses. It also should include teaching and practice to avert the outbreak of disorder, including training in de-escalation of tensions, dispute resolution, conflict avoidance, and cultural sensitivity.

MUTUAL AID TRAINING

Distinct from City-wide inter-departmental training and police department training, but just as critical, is mutual aid training. Mutual aid refers to the assistance provided by resources of surrounding jurisdictions when the resources of the City's own emergency response apparatus are insufficient. Due to the fact that the mutual aid system is so rarely implemented and so unfamiliar to most participants, training is an indispensable component of mutual aid preparation.

TRAINING ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS

There are several practical requirements related to training for civil disorder, at all levels. First, the training objectives must be identified at the outset, a task substantially related to the planning function. Second,

given these objectives, an overall training program should be centrally-developed, preferably under the direction of a training coordinator (functionally analogous to a planning coordinator). This coordinator must be given the responsibility for creating a training scheme designed to provide for systematic and integrated training of each participant in the response and, at the department level, fitting that scheme within the larger response scheme of the City-wide and mutual aid levels of emergency response. The training coordinator also should have the responsibility to oversee implementation of the training program at every level, and to ensure its adequacy in relation to the potential challenges faced in responding to an emergency.

No matter what the level, the training program should consist of three essential elements: (1) instruction, (2) practice, and (3) testing and evaluation. Instruction should convey to each participant, whether a police officer, a police commander, a department head, or a liaison to an inter-agency command post, that participant's role and function in the response, including both how that role fits into the entire response scheme and how the role interacts with the functions of other participants. Exercises should be designed and implemented to practice these functions, alone and in coordination with other participants, in order that all participants gain experience in fulfilling their tasks. Lastly, training should include simulated responses that evaluate and test both the ability of participants to fulfill and coordinate their tasks, as well as the adequacy of the underlying plan.

The training required adequately to prepare a police force for response to civil disorder requires a substantial commitment of personnel, time and money. Given a scarcity of on-duty officers and no significant overlap in their shifts, and given that most officers have assigned duties that cannot be carried out simultaneously with civil disturbance response training, every hour that a sworn officer spends training for civil disturbances is either an hour of overtime or one less hour that the officer can devote to his or her

normal duties. Typically, only a few specialized sections in a police department, such as the Metro Division in the LAPD, have the luxury of being able to conduct training on a regular basis as a part of their assigned duties.

Other issues may also be raised when a department trains for civil disorder. A department may be reluctant to engage in mutual aid training for fear of revealing that its civil disorder response will require assistance from other agencies or police forces. There may be pressure for a department to maintain a low profile in order not to “provoke” a disturbance. Pressure of this sort was directed at the LAPD during the 13-month period leading up to the verdicts. In our view, such internal reluctance and outside pressure are both inappropriate. The police must be allowed to train, and disorder response should be a routine part of the Department’s normal training

program. City leaders should encourage such training activities and help their constituents to appreciate the value of regular training to the City and its people.

WHAT HAPPENED HERE

The inadequate preparation, both on the part of the LAPD and on the part of the other involved agencies, for the civil disorder that followed the announcement of the King verdicts was fundamentally a problem of nonexistent planning and insufficient training. Although planning and training are to a large extent interrelated, the tasks themselves are largely distinct and conducive to separate evaluation. However, many of the problems that plagued the planning for the April 29



Police guard the intersection of 6th Street and Western Avenue in Koreatown as mall goes up in flames.

civil disturbance at each level — department-wide, City-wide and in the mutual aid system — also recur in the area of training.

INTER DEPARTMENTAL TRAINING

As described more fully in Chapter Three, the City of Los Angeles has an elaborate emergency response organization, called the Emergency Operations Organization (“EOO”), of which the Mayor is Director and the City Administrative Officer is the Coordinator. The EOO is supported by the Emergency Operations Board (“EOB”), comprised of department heads and chaired by the Chief of Police. The EOB is in turn supported by the Emergency Management Committee. It is apparent from our study that no training was conducted in the City under the auspices of the Emergency Operations Organization or any of its components, in general preparation for civil disorder, or in specific anticipation of unrest following the King verdicts. It appears that the primary focus of the EOO’s preparations has been on preparedness and recovery for earthquakes and other natural and accidental disasters.

LAPD TRAINING

The LAPD’s training program for civil disorder response supposedly begins at the level of academy training. Like most other large metropolitan police departments, the LAPD conducts a training academy for new recruits, which includes training in unusual occurrence response.¹ However, the LAPD devotes a low number of instructional hours in its basic recruit/pre-service training program — only eight — to civil disturbance control issues, relative to the 66 police departments surveyed by the Special Advisor.² The Department allots only two hours of instruction to community relations, putting it near the bottom of the departments surveyed by the Special Advisor.³ The LAPD does devote an average or above average number of instructional hours to general dispute resolution techniques; use of physical force; use of deadly force; and sensitivity to cultures and traditions of major ethnic groups.⁴

The Department’s civil disorder training program apparently does not materially improve once officers are sworn into duty. Of the departments surveyed by the Special Advisor that conduct training for sworn members in tactics for handling civil disturbances, the LAPD requires a comparatively low two to four hours of such training.⁵ Most departments that conduct this type of training devote in the range of eight to 40 hours each year.⁶ The LAPD sworn officer training program supposedly includes lecture presentations, field exercises without practice crowds, problem solving, and tabletop exercises, although we have seen little evidence of any such activities aside from roll call lectures and squad level drills.

Much of the Department’s training is coordinated by the Tactical Planning Section, which is comprised of four units and a total of 19 officers. The unit relevant to training for civil disorder is the Field Command Post Unit, which has the responsibility for conducting exercises and training for the entire department related to the establishment and function of the field command post. The Tactical Planning Section supposedly conducts command level training for the response to civil disorder and other unusual occurrences at a number of specialized schools, including the Command Post Cadre School (an overview of command post operations and instruction in the operation of the Field Command System for each Bureau, supposedly conducted twice annually), Supervisory Development School (conducted seven times in 1991 for new sergeants, this training is supposed to include command post operation, first responder responsibilities, and Field Command System), and the Watch Commander’s School (conducted six times in 1991 for watch and assistant watch commanders, this training is supposed to include command post operation, first responder responsibilities, and Field Command System).

Periodic roll call training appears to be a significant part of the Department’s civil disorder training program, supposedly addressing a variety of topics, including squad formation, riot techniques and the preparation of “staging areas” within a particular

division. In addition, the Department has in the past conducted field tests of its civil disturbance readiness (field exercises without a practice crowd). At the time of the civil disturbance in April, however, the Department had not conducted such a test for at least a year. The Department's Tactical Planning Section also provides training in field jail procedures, but only to detectives and only upon the request of a Detective Division Commander. Between 1991 and 1992, eight of the eighteen geographic detective divisions requested and received such training. The Department also supposedly conducts a telephone mobilization check, and has done evaluations of its field exercises. However, unlike some other departments surveyed, the LAPD does not conduct civil disturbance training exercises that require the combined participation of all ranks within the police department.⁷

LAPD TRAINING SPECIFICALLY FOR KING CASE

It is evident that the Command Staff was well aware of the potential for an outbreak of civil disorder in the City. Nonetheless, at least some commanders appear to have believed that the Mayor, the City Council and the Police Commission did not want it to appear as if the Department was anticipating an outbreak of civil disorder. This environment did not, however, prevent the Department from conducting at least some training in anticipation of the announcement of the verdicts. What training that did take place, however, was sporadic and of varying quality. Moreover, because of the pressures that dictated a low profile approach to preparation, it is difficult to assess exactly which of the training exercises conducted by the Department in the 13 months preceding the announcement of the verdicts were conducted in recognition of the potential for unrest. Much of the training in civil disorder and unusual occurrence tactics was done under the guise of earthquake preparedness.

Command Level

Although it was not commonly known, the Department did engage in a few command

level training exercises in preparation for possible civil disorder during this general time frame. One such exercise was conducted for the South Bureau "cadre" of specially trained command post personnel on July 10, 1991. The exercise simulated a civil disturbance supposedly erupting from tension between the African-American and Korean-American communities. For this exercise, Deputy Chief Hunt and Commander Banks were told to report to a location in South Bureau and bring their Command Post cadre. The Command Post trailer was taken to South Bureau, set up with phone lines, and fed messages from the Tactical Planning Section to simulate a riot situation. An additional Command Post exercise for West Bureau was conducted in this same general time period based upon a scenario of civil disturbance in Westwood. Other command-and-control-related training appears to have occurred as well.⁸

Officer Level

As a general matter, much of the Department's officer level training was left up to the discretion of the individual Areas. At a staff meeting in March, 1992, Deputy Chief Parks instructed the captains within Central Bureau to "get ready" for the King verdicts, focus their mandated training on civil unrest, bring their equipment up to date, and update their "standing plans" relating to civil unrest. On April 10, 1992, Assistant Chief Vernon held a training-related meeting of Captains from the Areas. After instructing them to keep the contents of the meeting confidential in order that the meeting not cause any disturbances, Vernon told the assembled captains that they should focus their training programs on civil unrest and ensure that each officer's equipment was updated and complete. Chief Gates, who knew of this meeting, gave express directions that no printed materials were to be distributed by Vernon at the meeting, because of apparent concern about a possible leak that the Department was preparing for civil disturbance.

Most officer training was held during roll calls, although some Areas conducted more in-depth training exercises. Some Areas con-

ducted more training than others. For example, the Foothill Area, where the King incident occurred, conducted many training exercises and lectures in anticipation of the verdicts, including setting aside training days for crowd control and tactical maneuvers, and conducting roll call training in squad formations in the station parking lot. Other Areas conducted training in squad formation, skirmish lines, dispersal tactics, baton use, use of force in handling crowds, and other riot tactics on the roofs of stationhouses and in parking lots. A few Areas scheduled watch training days in preparation for the verdicts, although such training was difficult to arrange because it required the replacement by officers from another Area or shift to fill in for the watch taken off of patrol to train.

EVALUATION OF LAPD TRAINING

From the foregoing, it can be seen that commanders did make an effort within certain constraints imposed upon the Department to prepare for possible unrest. In hindsight, this effort was probably insufficient. The experience of the disorder would appear to demonstrate that the relatively small number of classroom sessions was not adequate for personnel to master the responsibilities of command post operations and mass arrest procedures. Moreover, not enough police officers seem to have received the training. Many more people needed to be trained and cross-trained, and they needed practice, testing and evaluation to be properly readied. Of greatest importance, Command Staff officers needed more practice in table-top and field exercises to sharpen their crisis-management, leadership and decision making skills.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

Adequate training at every level is essential to the ability to respond effectively to a large-scale civil disturbance. The International

Association of Chiefs of Police stresses that while normal law enforcement training teaches officers to act independently, in a civil disorder situation, officers must be prepared to respond as a team, through coordinated efforts. According to the Association, the objectives of civil disorder training include (1) preventing individual police actions which may lead to heightened tensions; (2) preparing officers and commanders for civil disturbance control operations; (3) practicing coordination with mutual aid providers in preparation for a coordinated response; and (4) preparing officers to be sensitive to the community they police.⁹ The Command Staff should be trained in command and control operations, utilizing the plans established for responding to civil disorder situations. Simulated exercises are the most effective training method.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TRAINING

City-wide inter-departmental training should be coordinated under the direction of a single office or department to be effective. That responsibility should lie with the City Administrative Officer of Los Angeles. It should be his job to provide a program for the necessary involvement of all potentially affected officials and entities, including the Mayor, the City Council, the police department, the fire department, and other City departments. The program should establish a City-wide training cycle to practice, test and evaluate all emergency response department functions, operating separately and in combination.

The training of the individual components, conducted on a relatively regular basis, will allow the participants to become familiar with the tasks required of their roles. All components must also train together, on a less frequent basis, in a simulation of an emergency requiring role-playing, problem-solving, and decision-making. The objective should be both for participants to gain experience coordinating with other functionaries, and for problems in the coordination plan to be identified in advance of an outbreak of civil disorder requiring a coordi-

nated response. All training, should be evaluated critically, and the evaluations should be fed back to the participants so that problems can be worked out and weaknesses eliminated.

POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING

As suggested above, police department training for the response to civil disorder takes many forms. It is typically part of the academy curriculum, in-service field officer training programs, and command level training programs. It involves, lectures, tabletop exercises, field exercises, and full-blown simulations with role playing and problem-solving. But more important than the form is the fact that training must be conducted on a regular basis, from top to bottom, and with a thorough evaluation of results. Training for civil disturbances necessarily must focus on those elements of responding to (and preparing for) a civil disturbance that differ from the normal operations of a police force. And because both the tactics and the command structure employed in a response to civil disorder are very different from normal operations of a department, training must emphasize both the tactics that police officers are to employ and the structure that the force will take on in its response to a civil disturbance.

Command and Control Training

Training of a police force to respond to an outbreak of civil disorder must occur at every level of the force from the top down, and must simulate the command and control and structure that the department will use during a civil disturbance. Training should include mobilization, establishing command and control, coordinating with other agencies including the City's Emergency Operations Center, establishing mechanisms for gathering, assessing, and using information, and media relations. These tasks typically will involve simulated implementation of Department civil disturbance plans, once they are developed.

Tactical Training

Tactical training should include the unique elements of a coordinated team response to civil disturbances with which officers would otherwise be unfamiliar. It should include crowd training drills and practice in field formations effective against unlawfully assembled crowds and violent mobs, differing tactics for crowds and mobs, crowd behavior psychology, basic commands and hand signals, handling of passive resisters, legal aspects of crowd control, weapons retention, disarming techniques, pressure point techniques, principles of handcuffing, principles of searching, and procedures for mass arrests. For example, the Miami Police Department conducts regular and extensive training of its field force configuration. Miami's field force configuration requires officers to respond as a group under the direction of their lieutenants and more senior commanders. Accordingly, the Miami Police Department requires field force training of all officers on an annual basis. This training is a full-scale dress rehearsal, with offensive participants (officers acting as mock mobs), and using actual formations and deployments.

Civil Disturbance Avoidance

A secondary, but nonetheless important, task in civil disturbance training is prevention of civil disturbances through training in de-escalation of tensions, confrontation reduction, and officer sensitivity to various cultures, races and ethnicities of the community that the force polices. Such training includes cross-cultural communication, behavioral and communication variances arising from different cultural backgrounds, prejudice and discrimination, attitudes and power, socialization process and culture, and manifestation of personal prejudices. As an example, the Philadelphia Police Department maintains a civil affairs bureau, whose principal functions are conflict-prevention and resolution. The officers in this unit receive special training in dealing with various types of groups in sensi-

tive situations, and tend to reflect the ethnic and racial mix of the city. Civil affairs personnel establish relationships with community leaders, their contacts in the community, and city officials, and try to negotiate and mediate problems, including but not limited to racial and ethnic problems. In most cases, civil affairs has been able to diffuse situations before demonstrators ever come in contact with uniformed police personnel.¹⁰

As we have seen, the twin preparation functions of planning and training go hand-in-hand. Without proper planning, it is difficult to give proper training. Without proper training, the best planning may be wasted. With these concepts in mind, it is time to see how preparation turns into response. This is the subject of the next part of our report.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

¹ See Appendix 15-7.

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ See Appendix 15-8.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ See Appendix 15-9.

⁸ On January 8, 1992, the head of Operations, Assistant Chief Vernon, sent a memorandum to all Bureau Commanding Officers announcing a four-hour course in Command Post operations to take place in February. The Bureaus were to select Bureau Command Post cadre to attend the instruction.

⁹ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, AREAS OF CONCERN IN ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CIVIL DISORDERS, pp. 4-5 (July 1992).

¹⁰ The Civil Affairs Bureau's function also includes responsibility for diffusing increased tensions that may surround any police-involved shooting, or an incident that is racially or ethnically motivated. As a matter of course, civil affairs personnel are dispatched immediately to the scene where they interface with the community and its leaders and try to dispel rumors and to avoid confrontations before there is an opportunity for escalation into mob violence. In addition, Civil Affairs will follow this sensitive case as it proceeds through the court system. Thus, if there is a trial, or if court proceedings result from the sensitive incident, civil affairs personnel will monitor the trial on a daily basis and try to reduce tensions at the trial and in the community as a result of decisions that may be rendered during the proceedings.



TAMMY LECHNER / Los Angeles Times

PART
THREE:
THE
RESPONSE

7

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION (C³I)

WHAT IS C³I? 105

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No single person in the City, alone, can do everything necessary to respond to civil disorder. No single City department can respond effectively by itself. The bigger the problem, the more help that is required. The more resources that are drawn into controlling the problem, the more difficult it becomes to coordinate those resources and to control the City's response. These are the problems of Command, Control, Communication and Information — what the experts call “C³I” (pronounced “c-cubed-i” or “c-three-i”) — and they lie at the heart of the City's response to the civil disorder that began on April 29, 1992.¹

WHAT IS C³I?

In the context of responding to civil disorder, the concept of **command** includes all of the City's organizational levels from the Emergency Operations Organization (“EOO”) — the Mayor, the City Council, the City Administrative Officer and the Chief of Police — to the police officers and firefighters in the streets responding to the emergency. At each level, it involves receiving and assessing information about a particular situation, generating and evaluating options, choosing the best option, and dispatching orders to implement the chosen option.

The concept of **control** is meant to describe the lines of command through which the commander, for example, the Chief of Police, sends orders, advice and questions to the forces who are responding to the situation, the police officers in the field. Answers from the police officers in the field are also passed back up through those same lines of command to the Chief. These lines of command should reflect both responsibility and authority. The higher the level of command, however, the more links in the chain of command. As additional officers are added to the chain of command, the weaker control becomes, and the more risk there is of information loss or distortion as information passes to and from the commander, or Chief.

Communications are the means by which information is carried back and forth between the commander and the commander's forces, the police officers in the field. The concept of communications includes everything from runners to the most sophisticated police radios and computerized systems. **Information** involves collecting, analyzing and presenting meaningful information about a particular emergency situation, such as a civil disturbance, to the commanding officer.

Without effective command, control, communications and information, it is not possible to provide meaningful leadership in response to a crisis. On paper, the City and the LAPD appear to have put in place a comprehensive C³I structure. The question, however, is whether that structure worked well enough to produce effective leadership for the City's response to the civil disorder that began on April 29, 1992.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Under the emergency framework described in Chapters Three and Four, the focal point for command and control of the City-wide response should have been the Emergency Operations Center which, under LAPD procedures, was also supposed to function as headquarters for the police department. In the following discussion, we describe first what happened at the Emergency Operations Center. We then turn to command and control at the Department and Field Command levels.

ACTIVATION OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

The Chief of Police appears to have directed the activation of the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of April 29, about three hours after notice of the verdicts was

given at the Court and about an hour after the verdicts in the King case were announced. "Activation," however, did not mean that the EOC was up and running. In fact, all that appears to have happened was the doors were opened, the lights turned on and the coffee pot plugged in. Members of the LAPD ECC Division "cadre," who are specially-trained to staff the EOC, appear to have been allowed to go home at their regular 4:00 p.m. shift change. It was to take hours before this critical C³I resource could be found, ordered back and put into action. In the meantime, the EOC was an almost empty room.

The rest of the City's emergency response apparatus also was slow to grind into action. The City Administrative Officer was notified at about the time of its occurrence that the EOC had been activated, but does not appear to have done anything in his role as EOC Coordinator. The acting EMC Chair decided to go home between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., even though she had learned both of the verdict and the demonstration beginning at Parker Center.² She had to be summoned back to the EOC hours later. The rest of the City's agencies did not begin to learn about the EOC's activation until sometime after 4:45 p.m., when the City Hall telephone operator was asked to start locating EOB members.

It was not until about 6:45 p.m. that a Department-wide Tactical Alert was called by the LAPD. At about the same time, the Commanding Officer of the LAPD Support Services Bureau, a principal police representative to the City's EMC, responded to the EOC. The LAPD's designated Department Commander, Deputy Chief Frankle arrived at the EOC about an hour later.

Around 8:00 p.m., someone was able to locate the draft declaration of local emergency in the computer of the acting EMC Chair. Shortly thereafter, a Department-wide mobilization was ordered for the LAPD. After a briefing by LAPD commanders on the rapidly deteriorating situation, the Mayor declared a state of local emergency at 9:00 p.m., formally "activating" the EOC and its EOB

structure. While this critical declaration empowered the Mayor to act on behalf of the City to respond to the developing firestorm, however, it does not appear to have put in place the C³I structure envisioned by the City's emergency ordinances.

During a local emergency, the EOC is supposed to operate as the central information conduit for the City and the location from which the City manages all of its personnel and logistical resources. For most practical purposes, however, the EOC was overwhelmed by the events that took place during the civil disorder and by its inability to gather and obtain information. The many difficulties that the EOC experienced included problems with staffing, communications, logistics and inter-agency coordination. In particular, the EOC suffered from a lack of clarity as to who was in command and who was to perform certain roles, and from the lack of trained personnel.

Because the EOC was activated without any advance warning, the EOC was understaffed in the early stages of the civil disorder. The LAPD's own specially-trained cadre of EOC personnel was unavailable for most of the critical early stages of the emergency. Those who were available, in many cases, were put into positions for which they had not previously been trained. In addition, many of the people assigned to the EOC by other agencies were either not trained at all or insufficiently trained in EOC procedures. Because of this lack of training, they were not able to function efficiently in the EOC. Worse still, many of the EOC representatives from other City departments lacked decision-making authority. All of this impaired the EOC's operational ability during the early stages of the civil disorder.

Furthermore, as a part of its responsibilities in an emergency situation, the City's EOC is supposed to be a conduit for sending and receiving information to and from Los Angeles County's EOC. Requests from City departments — including the LAPD — for mutual assistance from county or other municipal agencies are supposed to be

coordinated through the EOC. During the civil disorder, the City's EOC was used on a few occasions as the conduit for such requests. For example, a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department representative, stationed at the City's EOC throughout the disorder, helped secure buses to transport prisoners. There were many other instances, however, when requests for mutual aid apparently were made by individual LAPD field commands without contacting the EOC. LAPD police officers in the hardest-pressed field divisions called friends in federal agencies, state agencies and other police forces begging for help. Calls were made to police departments as far away as Mono County. On the second day, 100 police officers from San Diego, along with their equipment, arrived in Los Angeles in response to a request for assistance sent by someone in the City. The EOC was unable to locate the source of the request, or to decide what to do with this generous offer of aid. Eventually, the San Diego officers returned to San Diego, without their offer of aid being accepted.

THE EOC AS THE DEPARTMENT COMMAND POST

The LAPD Tactical Manual identifies the EOC as the Department Command Post and headquarters for the Department Commander during a "serious" or "major" unusual occurrence, or whenever designated as such by the Department Commander. Once activated, the EOC — in its Department Command Post capacity — became responsible, under the direction of the Department Commander, for coordinating the LAPD response to civil disorder in the City.

In addition to suffering from a lack of trained staff, the EOC experienced serious operational problems as a result of the presence of the LAPD's top commanders in the EOC. The LAPD stationed command officers in the EOC during the course of the disorder. The stationing of the command group in the EOC was intended to allow information to be directly communicated to the command group once it was received by the EOC. Instead, this interfered with the EOC's operations because

the presence of the LAPD command group resulted in a large number of LAPD personnel being present in the EOC. Due to the physical limitations of the EOC facility, this increased the traffic and resulted in overcrowding. In addition, the presence of the Department Commander and other members of the senior command drew the EOC Commanding Officer away from focusing on EOC coordination activities and effectively made him subordinate to the senior commanders. Furthermore, the command group used LAPD personnel assigned to the EOC for non-EOC purposes. These factors combined to reduce the number of personnel available to perform the City-wide management function of the EOC and materially reduced its effectiveness.

LAPD DEPARTMENT COMMAND

In addition to these command and control problems, a number of other factors had a serious impact upon the performance of the Department's Command Staff during the civil disturbance. Among the negative influences were fallout from the selection process of a new Chief of Police, the retirement of the Department's long-time head of Operations, the change in chain of command caused by the Department's modest experiment with community-based policing, various command changes made by the Chief that appeared to place inexperienced commanders in key positions at a crucial time, and the curious absence of the Chief of Police during much of the first night of the disturbance.

A morale problem arose in the LAPD's top command in the wake of the selection process for a new Police Chief. In August of 1991, following the release in July of the Christopher Commission report, Chief Gates announced that he would step down within a year. Deputy Chiefs Vernon, Dotson, Frankle, Hunt, Kroeker, Levant, and Parks all emerged as competitors to become the new Chief of Police. This highly competitive process resulted in "finger-pointing" and hard feelings among the competitors, opening wounds that, evidently, have yet to heal. For almost one year before the 1992 civil disturbance, the

top LAPD commanders appear to have functioned with a seriously impaired working relationship characterized by poor or non-existent communication and little coordination of their respective commands. This prolonged period of infighting and isolation severely impacted the LAPD's "command and control."

In the view of some observers, Chief Gates reacted strongly against the actions of certain of his subordinates in their dealings with the Christopher Commission. These observers report that this in turn resulted in a level of estrangement of the Chief from some of his key subordinates, and a breakdown of communication within the command structure of the Department. For example, the estrangement between Chief Gates and Assistant Chief Dotson, who had headed the Office of Special Services, has been viewed as a contributing factor to the disarray of the Department's command.

Many have observed as well that the retirement of Assistant Chief Robert Vernon, who headed the Department's Office of Operations until five days before the outbreak of the post-verdict civil disorder, left a critical leadership void in the top command because Chief Gates had relied heavily upon Vernon to run day-to-day operations. Chief Vernon's retirement was particularly problematic since control over at least 85 percent of the LAPD had been in Vernon's hands for a number of years. In short, dealing with operational matters had meant, until his retirement, dealing with Assistant Chief Vernon.

Many of those who are familiar with the LAPD command structure believe that Chief Gates' decision to enact a pilot "community-based policing program" by altering the LAPD reporting structure also had a deleterious effect on decision-making during the civil disorder. At the Chief's direction, the commanding officers of seven Areas, known within the Department as the "Magnificent Seven," were redirected to report to Gates himself, rather than to their respective Bureau Chiefs. Three of the seven pilot programs were in South Bureau, and would have

been under the command of Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt. Included in the program were the Harbor, 77th Street and Southeast Areas, each of which was directly and heavily affected by the civil unrest. This restructuring left Deputy Chief Hunt with only one Area to command. It is reported that before April 29, Hunt approached the Chief about preparing a disorder response strategy, but Gates refused Hunt's request. It was not until late in the afternoon of April 29, around 5:00 p.m., that Hunt finally persuaded Chief Gates to release the "Mag-Seven" Areas of South Bureau to his command, giving him back command of the Harbor, 77th Street, and Southeast Areas.



A solitary police officer watches as a two-story building near Broadway and Florence Avenue is engulfed in flames during the night of April 29.

Another important management decision that had an effect on the LAPD's command structure was the reassignment of key commanders by Chief Gates in the crucial period just before the King trial verdicts were announced. An experienced Commanding Officer from Metro Division was reassigned to Operations Valley Bureau, and a new officer was placed in command of Metro Division one week before the King trial verdicts were announced. Not long before, in December, 1991, Chief Gates also placed a new commander in charge of the 77th Area. In hindsight, these may have been ill-timed personnel decisions.

Finally, the mystifying decision of the Chief of Police to absent himself during the pivotal early stages of the disturbance compounded all of the Department's command and control problems. Chief Gates himself cannot justify his decision to take a leisurely car ride to a Brentwood political event at this critical time. Nor can he explain his two-hour helicopter ride after he finally returned from the far side of the City. Plainly, the Chief's absence contributed to the Command Staff leadership void.

LAPD FIELD COMMAND

According to the LAPD Tactical Manual, the Department Commander is responsible for making sure that there is a Field Commander in necessary locations during an unusual occurrence. In South Bureau where the need for field command was greatest at the onset, many commanders appeared at the Field Command Post, but no one seems clearly to have taken command. As a result, the Field Command Post became a sort of "black hole" into which police officers from all over the City were poured, but out of which few were deployed on the first night.

Following the announcement of the verdicts, the on-duty 77th Street Area Watch Commander, Lieutenant Moulin, ordered his officers to a bus yard at 54th and Arlington, previously designated as a Field Command Post site. It was not until approximately 6:15

p.m., however, that the Field Command Post was actually established. Shortly thereafter, other police officers arriving at the Command Post observed Captain Jefferson, the Area Commanding Officer; Lieutenant Young, the Detective Assistant Commanding Officer; Lieutenant Moulin, the Watch Commander; and Commander Banks, the Assistant Commanding Officer of South Bureau, all at the Command Post, but could not tell who was in charge. The Department's own analysis of the first six hours of response concludes that Captain Jefferson at some point became the Field Commander, but it is not clear when. Although Moulin called for help, no Tactical Alert was ever broadcast from the 77th by either Moulin or Jefferson.

At approximately 9:00 p.m., Deputy Chief Hunt arrived at the Field Command Post and assumed command from Captain Jefferson. Around 5:00 p.m., shortly after command of the 77th Street Area was returned to him by Chief Gates, Hunt had gone to the community meeting at the First A.M.E. Church. At approximately 7:00 p.m., after being informed about the incidents at Florence and Normandie, Hunt left the meeting and returned to his South Bureau office. When Hunt took over as Field Commander, the bus yard at 54th and Arlington became the Field Command Post for all of South Bureau.

Upon taking command, Hunt reorganized the staffing of the Field Command Post and assigned cadre positions. Hunt appointed Commander Banks as Executive Officer; Captain Hansohn, the 77th Patrol Division Commanding Officer, as Personnel Officer; and Captain Jefferson as Operations Officer. Aside from this staff reorganization, Hunt appears to have done nothing to develop or implement a plan to deploy the many police officers now massed in the bus yard. When Chief Gates arrived on the scene sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., he immediately took Hunt to task for failing to implement a containment strategy and for not sectoring the Area. Gates, however, remained at the Command Post for only 30 to 60 minutes, and then departed.

It thus appears that the South Bureau Field Command Post also suffered from confusion and unnecessary delays in deployment due to inexperienced and untrained staff personnel. In addition, observers report that there did not appear to be an established chain of command at the Command Post for much of the first night. There were many high-ranking officers present, but no one stepped forward to give direction to the hundreds of officers there who were waiting for assignments.

In other Areas of the City, Field Command Posts were established, as the Tactical Manual required, but generally they were set up inside the stationhouse or outside in its parking lot. Such arrangements seem to have worked far better than the bus yard. Field Commanders had the advantage of facilities that were familiar and generally superior to those at the bus yard. As a general rule, however, all of these Field Command Posts appear to have been left to function during the entire period of the disturbance on a decentralized and uncoordinated basis. Decisions to transfer police officers to South Bureau appear to be an exception. In the main, the 18 Areas appear to have been left to respond without Department-wide command and control as 18 separate police departments.

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION

A good part of the command and control problems experienced by the Department are directly attributable to the lack of preparation and the unwillingness of Command Staff officers to take responsibility and issue orders to the rank and file. Other problems were caused by breakdowns of communications systems and the absence of meaningful information about what was going on in the field.

THE 9-1-1 RESPONSE SYSTEM

The first breakdown occurred with the basic 9-1-1 response system. It soon became apparent that the ECCCS was not adequate to provide the necessary level of service and protection for the citizens of Los Angeles or to fulfill the operational and tactical needs of LAPD officers in the field. The system worked as well as it could; there was no system downtime. However, the sheer load of calls during the unusual occurrence was more than the system could handle. Citizens could not get 9-1-1 and other calls for service through to dispatchers.

During the period of civil unrest, the Department received a record number of 9-1-1 calls. The previous call load record of 20,810 calls occurred on New Years Eve 1991. On each of the first three days of the civil unrest, the call load significantly exceeded this record (Wednesday, 35,558 calls; Thursday, 62,749 calls; Friday, 33,031 calls). Significant numbers of callers on 9-1-1 lines abandoned their calls before operators could answer (Wednesday, 11,059; Thursday, 18,284; Friday, 4,586). Figure 7-1 compares the number of actual calls received by the ECCCS during the disorder to the number of emergency calls received in a normal cycle. Figure 7-2 shows the number of emergency 9-1-1 calls received, the number of abandoned calls and the number of non-emergency calls during the disorder.

The LAPD Central Dispatch Center ("CDC") adhered to the Communications Division Mobilization Policy. When the 9-1-1 call load required that the CDC be reconfigured to become almost exclusively a 9-1-1 answering point, citizens with non-emergency complaints were directed to their Area police stations. (Area stationhouses, on the other hand, were generally overloaded and unable to handle these calls.) Incoming calls to the CDC on seven digital lines were significantly delayed. While personnel were available to staff additional CDC consoles, the physical facility and lack of consoles precluded increased service levels.

ACTUAL CALLS DURING CIVIL DISORDER VERSUS NORMAL 911 EMERGENCY CALL CYCLE





FIGURE 7-1

ANALYSIS OF PHONE CALLS TO 911 SYSTEM APRIL 29 - MAY 2



SOURCE: "DELAY BEFORE ABANDONING REPORT", LAPD PROJECTS UNIT
NOTE: OTHER INCLUDES SECONDARY (ALARM) AND SPANISH CALLS

FIGURE 7-2

THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

The EOC experienced similar communications overloads from the outset. Without enough telephone lines to access the police Field Command Posts, the City's non-police officials and departments, mutual aid agencies and each other, staff at the EOC were cut off from effective communication in all directions. The few lines that did exist were jammed with traffic. Few calls could get out and even fewer calls could get in to decision-makers in the EOC.

Information thus became a serious problem. Information from field commands about the spread of the disorder, available personnel and staffing levels needed to respond was poor at best. Some of the information that the EOC did receive was incorrect, or was received 12 to 24 hours late. Internal communication breakdowns compounded the problem. As previously noted, communications within the EOC were supposed to flow from one individual to another by means of written forms that summarized the information that had been received. In theory, these messages would be taken to a central location, reviewed, prioritized and then distributed to the appropriate EOC member agency, for example, the Fire Department for events within its jurisdiction, or the DWP for events within its jurisdiction. This procedure broke down early on due to the volume of messages. As a result, messages were misrouted or ignored. Because of these problems, this system was eliminated on April 30 and information was orally communicated. As a result, observers estimate that the antiquated handwritten system for recording information received in the EOC resulted in less than 25 percent of the incoming information actually being captured.

In general, the EOC was overwhelmed even by the minimal input the EOC received from the field. Virtually every component of the EOC's communications and information network (telephone, radios, computers, manual systems) was generally unable to handle the volume of information that

resulted from the disorder. This is another reason why the EOC was unable to establish or maintain effective City-wide command and control and the LAPD Areas were left to function on their own.

In addition, the lack of meaningful intelligence before the verdict was magnified by the inability of the EOC to obtain and utilize necessary information during the emergency. Although it reported ready for duty on the first night, the Intelligence Control Center (ICC) was never activated. The overwhelmed communications and information systems of the EOC precluded real-time reporting and collection of field situations or deployment information. The Department's helicopter fleet remained unused, except for the Chief's extended ride. Worst of all, nobody in the EOC or the Department's on duty Command Staff appears to have turned on a television to watch what was broadcasting on every Los Angeles channel. They were so short of personnel in the EOC that they apparently could not even detail someone to monitor the commercial television stations. Everyone else was watching the firestorm live on television. Apparently, an off duty Captain had to call in reports of the escalating violence on the radio in his take-home City vehicle.

THE FIELD COMMAND POST

Poor communications with the EOC was one of the main problems at the South Bureau Field Command Post. Access to the EOC by telephone was very limited; there was no dedicated line to the EOC until the second or third day of the disturbance. A rapid solution to put in place at least four phone lines was lost when the City's Department of General Services elected not to deploy either of two microwave vans that were capable of providing communications capabilities during emergencies. Instead, General Services deployed a crew of telephone installers.

In addition, the Field Commander could not communicate with Metro Division, who had been deployed to the Area to assist. Part of this problem derived from the fact that Metro

occupied a separate space from that of the Command Post, from which Metro relied on a runner and a liaison officer to communicate with the Command Post. The other part of the problem derived from the fact that Metro has its own tactical radio frequency, which cannot be monitored by the patrol command. This caused major information coordination problems.

When mutual aid responders began to arrive at the Field Command Post, their mere presence in large numbers further overwhelmed the facility. Additionally, the lack of compatible communications equipment proved to be a serious obstacle to coordinated efforts. Hand-held ROVER radios were the only solution, but they were in short supply. Mutual aid responders had to be teamed with LAPD personnel who possessed LAPD radios, since additional ROVERS were not available. This was the only way the mutual aid providers could communicate with their LAPD counterparts.

Finally, although for much of the time live television provided the best information available to the LAPD, most of the command post vehicles were not equipped to receive television broadcasts.

NEED FOR CHANGE

Four things need to happen to improve the City's performance in this area. First, the entire Emergency Operations Center operation must be streamlined and upgraded. The current structure attempts to locate too many people and too many activities in this critical location. During serious or major emergencies, the level of personnel delegated by the City's departments to perform this essential crisis management task would not appear to be high enough in rank to get the job done. In such emergencies, the EOC should probably be staffed by personnel from the highest levels of the involved departments, probably at least at the deputy general manager level. Additionally, thought should be given to

staffing the EOC with a small permanent group of core personnel on duty shifts that provide round-the-clock coverage.

Ideally, a new EOC facility should be placed above ground in a central location with room for related command facilities and staging areas. Ultimately, during the recent disturbance field headquarters were moved to Exposition Park — where the Los Angeles Coliseum is located — and this proved again to be an ideal command location, as it has during past City emergencies. City leaders might be advised to explore the feasibility of establishing at least a temporary command center complex on this site, using pre-fabricated buildings to house the operations of the EOC, including needed telephone and computer equipment, and its related activities.

Second, substantial improvement is needed in the performance of decision-makers in the EOC and in the field. Too often during the April disturbance, commanders and others charged with responsibility for decision-making appeared incapable of making decisions or giving directions needed to meet the crisis. More than anything else, this inability to lead appears to be the result of inexperience and lack of training. As we discuss in Chapter Six, personnel at all levels of the emergency response structure need practice and evaluation in order properly to prepare to carry out their responsibilities. This is especially true for those who must exercise leadership and command responsibilities in a crisis. Our City's leaders and the Department's Command Staff must be given opportunities to practice crisis management. Without such opportunities, we cannot expect them to perform well in the event.

Third, both the City and the Department need to develop an improved information-gathering and assessment mechanism. Without information, the best organized and trained decision-makers will be unable to make informed decisions. Antiquated paper-and-pencil practices must be replaced with computerized information management systems. Even the smallest business now is able to afford and put in place a mini-computer

network to collect and access information critical to its operations. In a business, terminals link factory, warehouse and sales locations so that managers can keep track of their business from top to bottom. The City and the police department should be able to link Area stationhouses, Parker Center, the ECCCS, the ICC, the CIC, other departments of the City and the EOC in one information network that would allow commanders at all levels to input and access the information they need to respond to an emergency.

Fourth, without a significant upgrade for the communications systems that provide the "backbone" for the entire command and control system, none of the other changes will be of any real effect. The City does not have sufficient funds in the operating budget to completely replace the existing ECCCS, and the voters have twice rejected a proposed bond issue to raise money for a more modern system. As an interim solution, the City Council has appropriated funds to "make do" with the system currently in place, until funds can be raised for a new system. This interim solution is only a temporary one, however.

A bond proposal to fund the needed communications improvements will be placed on the November ballot. One of the motivations behind this proposal is the preservation of 39 new radio channels which must be in use by the end of 1995. These channels are needed to handle additional radio traffic and to add inter-operable communications channels so the City can make greater use of the mutual aid CLEMARS system. Unless funding for this radio "backbone" of computers, transmitters and other equipment can be obtained, additional equipment needed by the Department, such as hand-held ROVER radios, ultimately will be useless in improving the Department's communications capabilities. Without a complete overhaul of the LAPD's command, control and communications system, the City of Los Angeles will face the eventual loss of critical emergency communications capabilities.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

¹ In classic terms, the concept of C³I uses the term "Intelligence." Because of common confusion as to the meaning of this term and the extent to which it may have become identified in the popular mind with improper activities, we use the term "Information" in our formulation. In either case, what we have in mind is the process by which legitimate and available information is gathered and assessed to permit decision-makers to make informed decisions. In no way can this process be reduced to a mechanical activity. Inherently, it must involve judgment and, as a result, must always remain a process of calculated guesswork. However, information without judgmental assessment is as useless as no information at all.

² Despite the evident uncertainty of the situation, the EMC Chair left the City to attend a conference in Washington, D.C. on April 29 and 30, and did not return to her office in Los Angeles until May 1. The Chair's deputy then became the Acting EMC Chair for the duration of the disorder. The Chair remained in telephone contact with the Acting Chair during this period.

8

LAPD FIELD OPERATIONS

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What happens in the field during a widespread civil disturbance depends to a large extent upon the extent of preparation before the event and the quality of a police department's command, control, communications and intelligence systems. With proper preparations and good C³I, a police department has a fighting chance to respond effectively to disorder. Without these essential ingredients, however, there is very little chance for success.

In the preceding Chapters of this report, we have described the poor state of City-wide and departmental emergency preparedness and the almost complete breakdown of command, control, communications and intelligence at the onset of the April firestorm. These fundamental failures preordained the inadequate level of the Department's general response in the field. Separate divisional commands and individual police officers heroically tried to make the difference, but their uncoordinated efforts were simply too little to mount an effective firebreak.

In this Chapter, we discuss how specific strategies and tactics might have been used more effectively to bring the situation under control. We must emphasize here that, even with proper preparation and C³I, these field activities in our view could not have brought the disorder to an immediate stop. Tensions and other causes of the outburst appear to have reached too deep a level and spread too far across the City's fabric to have achieved such a result. On the other hand, with adequate preparation, we believe that police field operations should have been able to lessen the outburst and regain control significantly faster.

CIVIL DISORDER CONTROL

We have seen how normal police operations involve "crime-fighting" by rapid response to 9-1-1 calls for assistance relayed to

individual patrol cars through the ECCCS police radio network. Emergency police operations in response to widespread disorder require the Department to change gears and function in an entirely different mode. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed and directed by Command officers, with adequate logistical support. Field activities must be coordinated in support of overall strategies designed to contain and control the disorder. We turn now to a discussion of the Department's performance in these areas.

MOBILIZATION

In Chapter Four, we described how the Department uses the devices of "Tactical Alert" and "Mobilization" to give alert in the event of an emergency and to allow commanders to marshal forces needed to respond to the emergency. We saw how the "Tactical Alert" should be used as the preliminary stage of the Department's mobilization plan for major emergencies. It should be employed "as soon as possible" when a Field Commander forms the judgment that he needs more personnel to control the situation. "Mobilization" should be used as the "principal personnel deployment plan" for control of an emergency. It is supposed to be initiated without delay if, at the onset of the emergency, it is obvious that the Department's on-duty forces will be insufficient to meet the immediate needs of a Field Commander.

The environment in the City in the days leading up to the announcement of the verdicts can only be described as tense. People and police officers on the streets knew that trouble was likely. As the deliberations dragged on for five, then six and seven days, veteran court watchers knew the chances had increased for a defense verdict. Common sense told people that spelled real trouble. As indicated above, a public "debate" even erupted over police provocation by preparation versus restraint.


By hindsight the situation unquestionably called for heightened readiness, but even at the time some felt this to be the case. When word came down at 1:00 p.m. on April 29

that verdicts would be announced in two hours, at least one police department in the area was placed on Tactical Alert by its Chief. When “not guilty” on all counts was announced on television at 3:00 p.m., that department immediately mobilized its force.¹

The LAPD did neither. In fact, a City-wide Tactical Alert was not called until around 6:45 p.m., when the Communications Division Watch Commander decided that the volume of 9-1-1 emergency calls pouring into the communications center had overwhelmed his operators.² Although individual police officers in the 77th Division, at Parker Center and elsewhere in the City suggested beforehand that a Tactical Alert be called — if nothing else to alert the force and increase its response capability — no one in command acted. Finally at 8:00 p.m. the Communications Division Watch Commander appears to have persuaded Deputy Chief Frankle, the Department Commander at the time, to order Mobilization of the Department.

Given the circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the Command Staff of the Department was so slow to act. The situation seemed to demand the highest state of departmental readiness. Once it became known at 1:00 p.m. that verdicts were imminent, a Department-wide Tactical Alert should have been called by the Chief of Police. When the not guilty verdicts were read out at 3:00 p.m., Chief Gates should have realized the probable consequences for the City and acted immediately to mobilize the Department.

The failure to take the first step cost police officers and their commanders much needed time to prepare psychologically for the coming test, and significantly reduced the Department’s capabilities. Without any official alert, the afternoon watch went home when their watch ended at around 4:00 p.m. Many key personnel were “lost” for hours as they dispersed for the long commute home or to other locations. A Tactical Alert to hold all personnel in place,



LAPD officers protect shooting victims at 8th Street and Kingsley Drive on Thursday, April 30.

coupled with a Mobilization order at 3:00 p.m., at least would have given Department commanders the optimum personnel configuration for responding to the situation.

INITIAL RESPONSE

Civil disorders since the 1960's have proven to be fast-moving, violence-prone and likely to encompass large areas of a city.³ Hence, law enforcement authorities agree that a "wait and see" stance is not wise.⁴ The police must act quickly with strength in response to a potential disorder at the onset. In the recent words of the International Associations of Chiefs of Police, "operational control must be established quickly in order to prevent further escalation and spreading of violence." LAPD doctrine is the same:

The primary responsibility of the . . . Field Commander during the initial stages of an unlawful assembly or riot is the rapid assembly of sufficient forces to immediately confront the participants. In the case of an unlawful assembly, a dispersal order must be issued. If the dispersal order is ignored, or in case of riot, law violators must be quickly overwhelmed and arrested. (emphasis in original)

This did not happen on April 29, 1992. Diverse factors and influences combined to paralyze the Department and all levels of its initial response to the violence that began when the verdicts were announced in Simi Valley. In the last Chapter we described the confusion, indecision and inaction at the highest command levels. The same phenomena evidently gripped some commanders in the field as police officers encountered the earliest incidents of the disorder in the 77th Street Area and at Parker Center.

In the 77th, police officers on patrol felt the temperature rise on the streets immediately after the verdicts were announced. Hostile looks and shouted insults increased as the afternoon wore on. Then came the rocks and bottles. Responding to a 9-1-1 call,

officers chased down a 16 year old youth allegedly throwing rocks at a patrol car. A scuffle drew an angry crowd. The teenager was released at the scene "because there was so much confusion" and no one "actually saw him throwing rocks." The officer in charge, Lt. Michael Moulin, believed his people were badly outnumbered and ordered a retreat. After consulting with his Area Commanding Officer, Captain Paul Jefferson, Lieutenant Moulin called for help and ordered all 77th Division personnel to the bus yard Field Command Post at 54th and Arlington.

The calamity at this location has already been described. This discussion is concerned with the tactics of the situation. The initial withdrawal ordered by Lieutenant Moulin apparently made sense under the circumstances. The Department's Tactical Manual advises outnumbered police officers to withdraw, regroup and obtain additional resources, if needed, to return in strength and establish control. Lieutenant Moulin, however, did not return. While the rest of the City watched the escalating violence at the Florence and Normandie intersection on television shot live by news helicopters hovering overhead, the leaders of the 77th froze. Although clearly warranted, no one declared a Tactical Alert. There is a dispute as to whether Captain Jefferson ordered Lieutenant Moulin and the police officers of the 77th back to the scene. There is no dispute about the fact that they did not return. This failure to respond aggressively and in force appears to have been a significant tactical mistake.

The initial tactical error in the 77th was compounded by a series of decisions made and not-made in the hours that followed. Following the retreat to the 54th and Arlington bus yard, Watch Commander Moulin ordered that all 9-1-1 calls to the 77th be rerouted directly to his Field Command Post. Without a computer terminal and with virtually no telephones, this decision reduced management of the response to a primitive paper and pencil exercise. Although most if

not all of the Command Post cadre positions apparently were designated, as we observed in the previous chapter, the Command Post proved to be incapable of capturing, assessing or effectively using the information it received. Deprived by these failures of meaningful intelligence and assessment of the rapidly developing situation, the 77th was made blind.

The Watch Commander's pleas for help were not ignored. Resources poured into his bus yard. All of the on duty 77th officers were followed by patrol units from elsewhere in South Bureau and, ultimately, the City. At 6:30 p.m., there were as many as 100 police officers available for deployment. By 7:00 p.m., the number had grown to 480 officers. By 12:00 a.m., the number assigned had ballooned to more than 1,790. No less than four levels of Department command were drawn to the scene as well. Watch Commander Moulin was joined by his Area Commander, Captain Jefferson, and both the Commanding Officer and Assistant Commanding Officer of South Bureau, Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt and Commander Ronald Banks. Despite the presence of these commanding officers no one appears to have issued an order to deploy the swelling army of police officers crowded into the bus yard and, as a result, they seem to have been left standing around for hours awaiting deployment assignments. As a result, during the critical first six hours of the disturbance, the 77th was stripped bare of police service. Moreover, because scarce police resources had been siphoned off from the surrounding Areas, much of the rest of South Bureau was badly weakened and unable effectively to respond as the firestorm accelerated.

The situation as it developed at Parker Center involved tactical errors of the same kind. The crowd that gathered outside police headquarters in the late afternoon after the verdicts was angry but not unruly. As late as 6:00 p.m., there still had been no violence, but the crowd had grown to about 150 people and the temperature appeared to be heating up. By this time, the officer in

command at the scene, Captain Jim Tatreau, had been joined by the Central Area Commanding Officer, Captain Jerry Conner; the Central Bureau Commanding Officer, Deputy Chief Bernard Parks; and the Bureau Assistant Commanding Officer, Commander Maurice Moore. The presence of all these senior officers did not help to make better decisions.

There is disagreement as to what happened next. One version claims the crowd pushed forward throwing rocks, bottles and other objects that shattered the glass doors of Parker Center. A competing version claims officers were ordered to advance on the crowd and that is what provoked the violence. One way or the other, the crowd became a mob. As darkness fell, the mob set fire to a parking kiosk. Police officers asked for orders to disperse the crowd and make arrests, but their Commanders were slow to act. Eventually, orders were given to push the mob further from Parker Center and make arrests, but relatively few arrests were made. The mob was allowed to move off in the night to break windows at City Hall and set more fires.

Both of these instances were reported widely on local television stations. Both communicated the same explosive message — the police were not going to act. Regardless of public statements by elected officials and community leaders, many angry people in Los Angeles learned shortly after the verdicts that they would be allowed to take their anger to the streets. We are confident this was an unintended message, but the failure of the police to act quickly and forcefully to uphold the law was shown graphically on television for all to see. Television thus acted as a catalyst for the events to follow.

Some argue that this result was preferable to an alternative where television would have shown pictures of minority youths handcuffed and "proned out" on the ground as arrests were made. In this view, television pictures of an aggressive police response might have provoked further violence.

While this is a matter of judgment, with no provable “right” answer, police professionals — including the LAPD — agree that it is essential for officers to respond immediately to violence that has the potential to escalate into serious disorder. The effectiveness of such tactics has been proven by the experience of major police departments across the country.

Thus, for example, of the 24 disorders studied by the Kerner Commission, in one-half of the cases police withdrew from the initial encounter for fear that they might not be able to maintain control. In these cases the violence spread rapidly.⁵ More recently, the International Association of Chiefs of Police observed: “If an incident develops and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and ensure the public safety.”⁶

Having made these observations, we are unable to conclude, as some have suggested, that a proper tactical response would have been determinative in halting the violence. However, we do strongly believe that rapid and forceful responses in these two instances would significantly have altered the public perceptions of the developing environment in the City and that this was an important first step toward controlling the outburst of violence.

Why did commanders fail to act? Why did a police department unquestionably committed to a policy of rapid and forceful response in the initial stages of disorder allow itself to lapse into a passive “wait and see” posture of inaction? These are puzzling questions with no simple answer. We do not believe the paralysis was deliberately induced. We find no evidence to support the view suggested by some that the police department intentionally stood by to teach the City a lesson or for some other nefarious purpose. To the contrary, we find overwhelming evidence that rank and file police officers wanted to do their job — to protect the City — and are embarrassed by the

performance of their Department. Explanations may more readily be found in the unfortunate combination of poor preparation — especially the deficient planning, inadequate training and failure to prepare the force *mentally* — with the massive leadership failure at the Command Staff levels of the Department described in the previous Chapter.

PRIORITIES

The failure to call an early Tactical Alert and to Mobilize cost the Department precious time in responding to the escalating violence. However, even if these critical steps had been taken earlier on April 29, the Department would have been in trouble because of another consequence of deficient planning. Since there was no incident specific plan, no one actually in command on April 29 appeared to have a clear idea of the Department’s priorities for responding to the disorder. This failure was to have consequences in three areas: Protection of key people, protection of key locations and strategies for response.

Time and again during the disorder, demands were made for police officers to protect people. Many of these demands were made to protect victims calling for help on the 9-1-1 system. Police officers responded to those calls as best they could, but frequently could not keep up with the demand for their services. Thus, officers found themselves leaving a victim of a shooting to respond to another urgent 9-1-1 call, or failing to respond to a call to help an assault victim because of a sniper attack in progress.

To establish priorities for these calls was difficult, but even more troublesome policy questions were raised by the many requests for protection of persons performing critical services. Chief among these were the desperate requests by firefighters for escort protection on the first night of the disorder. Having suffered attack by automatic rifle fire and the wounding of one of their own, fire commanders were understandably reluctant to send their firefighters into the


field without police escort. With fires blazing all around them, however, the police commanders at the 54th and Arlington Command Post could not decide what priority to give to escort duty. An earlier promise to commit the Metro Division to this duty seemed the wrong decision, but no one in command could decide what was the right solution in the stress of the moment. Finally, CHP officers assumed this critical responsibility on April 30.

Other requests for police escort or protection appeared equally critical. Requests were made for police officers to help the Red Cross deliver blood to area hospitals, to escort trucks delivering fuel to fire trucks in the field, and to protect DWP personnel sent in to restore power lost in a large part of the South-Central area of the City. Police escorts were requested for water treatment facilities personnel, telephone repair crews, paramedics and civilians providing logistics and supply support. Other vexing questions of priority were posed by the evident need to protect key locations. Public buildings, police facilities such as the Mount Lee radio antenna site supporting the entire ECCCS communications system, private radio stations, the downtown public library, hospitals, power facilities and telephone switching stations, and a post office surrounded by a crowd of hundreds of people, were just a few of the vital facilities requiring protection.

Gun stores and pawn shops also asked for protection to secure their stock of firearms and ammunition. From our own survey of gun stores in the City, we learned that the failure to provide protection resulted in the theft of more than 4300 firearms, many of them automatic and semi-automatic weapons, from just 19 of these stores. One pawn store alone in Southwest Area lost 970 firearms the first night. Gangmembers reportedly posted armed guards to keep out general looters while they used a highway tow

truck to first winch out security bars and then tow the store's gun safe off down the middle of Jefferson Boulevard. Another store in the 77th Street Area lost 1150 firearms, over 600 of them automatics or semi-automatics, on the first night. A third store in Hollywood Area lost 950 rifles. This small armory remains at large in the community as an added danger for police to confront.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy, however, was the human toll exacted by the destruction of commercial buildings and businesses. According to a survey conducted by Dun &



LAPD Tactical Manual (February, 1979)

FIGURE 8-1

Bradstreet, South-Central Los Angeles and Koreatown suffered the hardest from the failure to provide this protection. An estimated 40 percent of the 560 businesses experiencing losses in the two communities have shut their doors for good. Three-fourths of the businesses reporting losses were retailers and 196 of these have gone out of business. Not only did this cause harm to the owners, virtually all of whom were underinsured or not insured at all, but it has dramatically reduced the availability of goods and services in the riot-ravaged areas. Most critically, lost businesses also means lost jobs.

There is no time during a riot to establish policy and determine such difficult questions of priority. Determinations such as these are essentially political policy judgments and it is unwise and unfair to ask the police alone to make them. The time to make these determinations is well in advance, as part of a thoughtful and collaborative City planning process for responding to emergencies. This is the kind of planning process that should have been led by the City Administrative Officer and his staff but, as we have seen in Chapter Four was not. Aside from its many other consequences, this fundamental leadership failure also severely impacted the Department's choice and implementation of control strategies.

CONTROL STRATEGIES

By definition, a major disorder on the scale of the April riots required the Department to employ strategies other than the reactive 9-1-1 response crime-fighting technique of normal police operations. These strategies should have been developed in advance, again as part of a careful City planning process, and they must be implemented in a coordinated City and Department-wide effort directed from the top. We focus upon four such strategies — *containment*, *arrests*,

local emergency orders and emergency response — because they appear to have presented the greatest opportunities for managing the disorder environment and achieving control. We will discuss each in turn.

Containment

After initial response, police commanders agree that the next most important control objective is to contain the spread of disorder. The recent report of the International Association of Chiefs of Police places “containment” first on its list of guidelines for responding to a riot situation.⁷ The IACP recommends establishing a perimeter and limiting access to areas where a disturbance is occurring.⁸ The LAPD Tactical Manual also recommends this strategy. Either in tandem with or soon after the initial rapid response in force, watch commanders are directed to establish control in all parts of the impacted area.⁹

While describing a number of tactical alternatives, the strategy of perimeter control is of particular importance in this event because there might have been a chance to block the spread of the disorder in its early hours on Thursday afternoon by using this strategy. The three basic concepts of perimeter control — linear strategy, cordoning and sectoring — are easily explained. The “linear strategy,” deploys police forces as a “blocking force” along a roadway or geographic barrier perpendicular to access routes into the impacted area. “Cordoning” means surrounding a particular problem area by using the linear strategy to seal off access on all sides. By these two maneuvers, police are able to prevent “outsiders” from being drawn into the unrest as victims or participants and, at the same time, limit the spread of violence from inside the disturbance locale. “Sectoring” means dividing the cordoned area into smaller sized units that can be taken back one-by-one once sufficient police resources are as-




FIGURE 8-2




FIGURE 8-3




FIGURE 8-5




FIGURE 8-6




FIGURE 8-4




FIGURE 8-7

sembled to begin the process of regaining control. In combination, as illustrated in Figure 8-1, use of the linear strategy, cordoning and sectoring are the essential components of containment.

Deputy Chief Hunt and Captain Jefferson appear to have considered containment as a strategy. Unfortunately, however, the confusion and paralysis at the Department Command Post and the 54th and Arlington Command Post was so great that we can find no evidence of anyone having acted to implement a containment strategy. Thus, when Chief Gates finally appeared at the Field Command Post around 10:00 p.m. on the evening of April 29, he reportedly was upset by the failure to employ a containment strategy. The Chief had reason to be upset. The failure to employ this basic strategy *might* — in this we cannot be certain — have cost the Department the chance in its early stages to confine the disorder to a relatively limited area.

We reported in Chapter One that our study included an analysis of the pattern of the violence at the onset of the disturbance. We plotted incidents recorded by the City's 9-1-1 response system over time for all 18 police Areas in four categories — property crimes; violent crimes against persons; disturbances, such as unruly crowds; and fires.¹⁰ The accompanying maps, Figures 8-2 through 8-7, reflect this analysis for the time period from 5:00 p.m. through 11:00 p.m. on April 29. These maps show the cumulative total of incidents in each police Area as of each hour for each of the four incident categories.

Our analysis of this data leads us to conclude that, while a general heightening of tension appears to have followed the verdicts in many parts of the City, the volume of reported incidents of actual violence did not begin to accelerate until after 7:00 p.m. Moreover, while such incidents before 7:00 p.m. were reported in a widely scattered pattern across the City, the greatest number of incidents was concentrated in South Bureau, with most of the activity occurring in the 77th and Southwest Areas. Thus, our analysis shows that there appears to have been a

window of opportunity to contain the violence by throwing up a linear perimeter south of the 10 Freeway — perhaps along Vernon Avenue — and on the west side of the 110 Freeway — along Figueroa Street — with the southern boundary set up along Manchester Avenue and the western boundary established along Crenshaw Boulevard. Such a perimeter would have “cordoned off” the area shown on the accompanying map, Figure 8-8. But the access routes needed to have been blocked before 7:00 p.m. and, to achieve this objective, the LAPD may have needed to get help from neighboring police forces in Culver City, Inglewood and Hawthorne. Unfortunately, as we detail in the next Chapter, no attempt at perimeter control appears to have been made until after 9:00 p.m., and by then it was too late.

Local Emergency Orders

Under the provisions of the Local Emergencies Ordinance adopted by the City, the Mayor — in his capacity as Director of the City’s Emergency Operations Organization (“EOO”) — is given the power to “promulgate, issue and enforce rules, regulations, orders and directives. . . necessary for the protection of life and property.”¹¹ Any such orders take effect immediately. It is made a misdemeanor crime — punishable by a fine of up to \$500 or by imprisonment for up to six months *or both* — for any person to wilfully obstruct enforcement or to do any act in violation of such an order.¹² This is a broad grant of authority that, for the duration of a declared local emergency, gives the Mayor extraordinary discretion to make and enforce orders to combat the threat.

Pursuant to this authority, the Mayor in fact issued an emergency order that was an es-

sential component of the City’s strategy for responding to the disorder. The first version of this order was signed by the Mayor at 12:15 a.m. on April 30, the first night of the disorder. Among other things, this order imposed an immediate curfew upon a large portion of South-Central Los Angeles. The express terms of this curfew prohibited all persons in the curfew area from being “upon” any public street, public place or empty private lot during the “sunset to sunrise” period. By its terms, the curfew exempted only designated emergency personnel from the terms of the order, and made violation punishable by the penalties provided in the City’s local emergencies ordinance. Of course, it was next to impossible to expect immediate enforcement of the curfew on the first night.

During the next day, April 30, the Mayor signed three different amended versions of the curfew order. The first of these, signed at 10:15 a.m., expanded the curfew area in




FIGURE 8-8

South-Central. The second version, signed at 12:45 p.m., extended the curfew to the entire City. Then at 3:55 p.m., the Mayor signed a version that, in addition to extending the curfew area to the full extent of the City boundaries, created an exemption for "activities that are necessary and essential for health, safety, or emergency-related purposes." This version of the curfew remained in effect until rescinded by the Mayor's order at 5:15 p.m. on May 4.¹³

The theory behind a curfew is not to make large scale arrests, filling the jails to empty the streets, but to serve as an impetus for a reverse bandwagon. Residents, seeing fewer and fewer other residents on the streets, conclude that they too should get off the streets. Law breakers are less able to meld into the crowd. For this theory to work, residents must understand the choice posed by curfew and the law must be reasonably enforceable. Otherwise, a curfew can contribute to the belief that portions of the City are lawless because it represents one more instance of laws being broken with impunity.

Unfortunately, the Mayor failed clearly to spell out the terms of the curfew. The written order issued in the middle of the *first night* unambiguously stated that residents on the streets after dark were in violation of the law. The Mayor's public statements on the *next day*, however, were to the contrary and created two critical ambiguities. First, at his press conference on April 30, the Mayor appeared to imply that the curfew was only an attempt to persuade citizens *voluntarily* to remain in their homes. The Mayor said:

I have agreed to impose this curfew citywide, and I'm calling upon business people of this city to cooperate, asking that if you don't have to be on the streets of Los Angeles tonight after dark, please don't go.¹⁴

For some reason, reporters failed to catch this discrepancy. Instead, television reporters interpreted the Mayor's comments to mean that the curfew was not mandatory.

One reporter, summarizing the Mayor's statement shortly after the press conference, stated:

The Mayor was very candid with us, saying that. . . we cannot arrest everyone and people do have to get home. So basically, it is a voluntary thing.¹⁵

Another reporter gave a similar account:

Just to recap. The Mayor has made official his dusk to dawn curfew, asking everyone to stay off the street in the City of Los Angeles tonight after sundown until sun-up tomorrow morning. . . People will not be subject to arrest, but what he's asking is that law-abiding citizens get off the street to make it easier for the police to collar people who are not law-abiding.¹⁶

The second ambiguity concerned a distinction the Mayor tried to draw between "legitimate" reasons to be on the streets and reasons that would be met with arrest. This distinction appears to have been based upon the new exemption language added to the curfew order on April 30, but the Mayor's remarks overstated the scope of the exemption. On the one hand, the Mayor said, the curfew was not meant to disrupt normal everyday activities. The police, he stated at the press conference, are "not trying to arrest everybody in town, not trying to prevent them from carrying on their normal lives." Still, he said, "those who are out there improperly with some nefarious scheme in mind" will be arrested for curfew violation.¹⁷

The Mayor thus required both citizens and police officers to distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" purposes for being out and about. Most residents would probably agree that returning from work or obtaining a prescription from a drug store would be considered "legitimate." But left to his or her own judgment, a resident could easily justify observing rioting in his or her neighborhood as proper and not necessarily nefarious. Yet such onlookers

TOTAL ARRESTS — ALL BUREAUS




FIGURE 8-9

appear to have been among the intended targets of the curfew. Police were similarly burdened with having to make this distinction.

In combination, these ambiguities in the presentation of the curfew substantially undercut its effectiveness as a tool to keep people of the streets. These ambiguities also raised significant enforcement issues for police and prosecutors alike. On the other hand, the Mayor cannot be faulted for his understandable reluctance to impose such an absolute decree upon all residents of a great City, teeming with legitimate commercial, educational and social activity at most hours of the day or night. Some provision was needed to exempt legitimate and necessary activities. Again, this impor-

tant policy question should have been identified and resolved by good staff work well in advance as part of the City's civil disorder planning process.

ARRESTS

Conditions of widespread civil disorder signal a breakdown in the basic social compact. The first priority for law enforcement must be to reestablish an understanding that the rule of law still governs society and that there will be consequences for acts of violence against persons and property. Words alone will not be sufficient to communicate this message. The police must act to arrest violators of the law. Only in this way will violators and bystanders alike receive an unambiguous message that the rule

of law will be enforced. Television coverage of police making arrests and word of mouth reports from participants and bystanders will let people know that violence will not be tolerated.

Arrests must be made for two additional reasons. First, violators must be apprehended and taken off the streets to bring the temperature down. The City needs a "cooling off" period — a break in the cycle of violence — and an effectively implemented strategy for making arrests can give it this break. Second, society demands that people who commit lawless acts of violence be apprehended and punished. Any other response inherently condones anti-social conduct and undermines the rule of law. For both reasons, the police needed to commence from the outset and sustain for the duration an aggressive strategy of arresting law violators.

While during the recent civil disturbance, the LAPD did make some arrests, when and where they were made did not seem to have a significant impact. Given the widespread scope of the problem to be dealt with, the Department needed to make arrests earlier, faster and on a much larger scale. Substantial problems appeared to have impeded the LAPD's progress in making arrests, and as a result, slowed the process of regaining control. In the future, it will be important for the Department to begin to arrest violators of the law earlier, and to arrest faster and on a much larger scale. This will enable the LAPD to regain control more quickly. Our study shows that order may not have been

restored until the fourth or fifth day at the earliest. It would seem that problems encountered by the Department in attempting to arrest the large number of law-breakers may have been a significant factor contributing to this delay.

Thus, we reported in Chapter One that law enforcement officers made a total of only 5,002 arrests over the six days of the City-wide disorder in April 1992.¹⁸ By way of comparison, 3,952 persons were arrested during the six days of the 1965 disorder in Los Angeles, and that occurred in a relatively limited area of the City. Figure 8-9 presents a summary of these arrests for all Bureaus over the period. As was the case for 9-1-1 emergency incidents in Figure 1-1, the profile of arrests generally follows a cyclical pattern. However, while the pattern for incidents appears to have peaked during daylight hours, the pattern for arrests seems to have reached its highest points during nighttime. It thus appears that enforcement activities tended to be relatively less aggressive as a whole than during the 1965 experience and, in particular, less aggressive during the daylight periods. In good part, this relatively passive enforcement performance may be a reflection of the many difficulties experienced as a result of the failure to prepare for a mass arrest environment.

While most Areas did attempt to use field jails during the civil disturbance, field jail procedures were not designed to process the quantity and variety of arrests made during the initial stages of the disorder. The field

**ARRESTS BY BUREAU
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




FIGURE 8-10

**ARRESTS BY CRIME CATEGORIES
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




FIGURE 8-13

jails were designed primarily to handle misdemeanor bookings (requiring much less complicated paperwork) such as might occur after a large demonstration. They were not set up to process mass felony bookings, although almost half of those arrested during the civil disturbance were, in fact, booked as felony arrestees. Complicating the situation was the fact that although a mobile field jail booking unit was to be deployed to the Southeast Area, because of the secrecy surrounding what few preparations were made for potential disorder, those staffing the Command Post did not know this fact in a timely manner. As a result of these deficiencies, the backlog in processing arrestees was constant, and created downtime because officers had to wait until their arrestees were processed before they could return to the field. At the Newton Area field jail, where the processing went relatively smoothly, it took an officer about 45 minutes to bring in an arrestee, complete the arrest process, and get back into the field. In addition, the unavailability of buses to transport arrestees created a problem because arrestees had to be transported in cars. This tied up police vehicles for some period of time, and was an inefficient use of those vehicles.

Figure 8-10 summarizes the breakdown of arrests by each of the geographic Bureaus. The highest number of arrests was made in Central Bureau (37 percent), followed by Valley Bureau (23 percent) and West and South Bureaus (20 percent each). The share of arrests made by officers in Valley Bureau is surprising given the relatively lower level of violence reported there. It is possible that there is a correlation between the level of enforcement and the level of incidents.

The day-by-day profile of arrests by the Bureaus is presented in Figure 8-11. It shows Central Bureau generally to have been the most aggressive in enforcement, especially during days two through four. An interesting insight into the underlying enforcement pattern is given by Figure 8-12, which shows a day-by-day summary of arrests made by the

seven most active police Areas. Hollywood Area police officers were quite active on days two through five, and Rampart Area police officers were especially active on days two and three. The Southwest and Southeast Areas were more aggressive on day two, but fell off on day three. Southeast renewed its enforcement activity on day four and reached a peak on day five. Notably, arrest levels in the 77th Street Area did not significantly increase until day five.

Figure 8-13 shows the breakdown of the




FIGURE 8-11

total number of arrests by crime category. More than 80 percent of all arrests were made for property-related crimes (42 percent) and curfew violation (41 percent). Figure 8-14 presents the distribution of these arrest categories over the six day period. It confirms the tiny number of arrests on day one, and shows that the bulk of arrests on the first three days were for property crimes. A small number of curfew arrests was made on day two, but the number sharply increased over the next three days.

One insight provided by the arrest data is its demonstration of the apparent extent to which the disorder traveled. Figures 8-15




FIGURE 8-12

through 8-18 present summaries of the home addresses for persons arrested in each of the Bureaus. These graphic figures show that two-thirds of those arrested in Central and South Bureaus were resident there. On the other hand only 37 percent of the persons arrested in West Bureau were resident there. Fully 35 percent of the West Bureau arrestees came from Central (24 percent) and South (11 percent) Bureaus, and another 26 percent came from outside the City. By contrast, 89 percent of those arrested in Valley Bureau lived there.¹⁹

The arrest data also seems to suggest a relationship between enforcement activity and the level of lawlessness. The virtual absence of arrests on day one did nothing to discourage the disorder and may even have encouraged its spread. Likewise, the apparent general failure to make arrests of daytime looters and the relatively weak overall enforcement response in South Bureau appear to have had this effect. By contrast, more aggressive enforcement in Valley Bureau, and Rampart and Hollywood Areas arguably helped to quiet the disturbance there sooner.




FIGURE 8-14

In order to be prepared to implement a more effective arrest strategy in the future, the LAPD needs to incorporate in its civil disorder planning (1) a policy decision to employ an arrest strategy; (2) sufficient plans to implement such a strategy; and (3) the necessary mutual aid and logistical arrangements to make it possible for police officers to get the job done in the field. These components were clearly lacking during the recent civil disorder. The Department needs to think ahead about how arrestees will be charged and what the logistical procedures will be for making arrests during a large-scale civil disturbance. In general, it may be more practical to charge law breakers with misdemeanor offenses, rather than felonies. While the Department must deal with felonies as they arise during a disorder, for the most part, misdemeanor charges will achieve the objective of reestablishing the rule of law and will require less paperwork to successfully prosecute law-breakers.

In order successfully to pursue an arrest-making strategy during a disorder, adequate logistical arrangements will have to be made. First, the Department will need to assemble a force of officers of a sufficient size to make the required arrests, together with sufficient personnel and transportation to efficiently process arrestees as they are apprehended. The logical division of responsibility would be for LAPD officers to make the arrests and for Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies to take custody in the field and transport the arrestees to pre-arranged holding areas. To successfully complete such an arrest, it will be necessary to have simple pre-prepared booking forms ready for use, as well as instant photographic equipment available. The booking forms could be pre-coded with identifying numbers that correspond to numbers on cards that are held up in front of the arrestee while his or her picture is taken standing next to the arresting officer.

Sheriff's Office buses need to be on the spot in the field to transport the arrestees. Once a particular bus is filled with arrestees, that bus should depart to transport the arrestees to a pre-identified facility, and another bus

PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS BY RESIDENCE IN EACH BUREAU




FIGURE 8-15




FIGURE 8-16




FIGURE 8-17




FIGURE 8-18

Source: LAPD Arrest Database.

should be ready to take its place. The pre-selected jail facility may be temporary, and it should be guarded by Sheriff's deputies or personnel from some other mutual aid agency. This facility must possess all of the necessary logistical requirements, including fencing, shelter, food, and emergency medical aid to process and care for those who are arrested.

In every respect, the arrest process needs to be handled in a constitutional, fair and reasonable manner. If carried out properly and efficiently, however, a strategy of mass arrests will provide time for those arrested to cool off, and eventually be released as bonding requirements are satisfied, and will be an essential disorder control tool for the police.

EMERGENCY 9-1-1 RESPONSE

The existence of a major civil disorder compels a police department to devote a large portion — but not all — of its attention and resources to extraordinary strategies designed to control the disorder. Once a Tactical Alert has been called, the Department's resources are supposed to be divided into a "Minimum Operating Force," defined as "the minimum essential personnel force needed... to continue essential police functions," and an "Available Reserve," defined as "officers who can be released from regular duties."²⁰ The Available Reserve is intended to be used to address the emergency while the Minimum Operating Force is directed to confine its activities to "police work of major importance" in its Area.²¹ Upon Mobilization, the Department intends to maintain the same scheme for 9-1-1 response. Units remaining in an Area are directed to restrict their activities to the same level of priority. In this manner, the Department recognizes the inherent need to continue to respond to 9-1-1 service calls, but to reduce the scope of response to the highest levels of emergency. In effect, this prioritizes the demand for patrol services to match the reduced level of response capability created by the emergency.

During a disorder of the size experienced by

the City in April, however, there simply is not adequate force to do everything. Resources pulled away to meet the emergency create vulnerabilities in their home Areas that may allow outbreaks of violence to occur where force levels might otherwise have been able to maintain control. Thus, to the extent police resources were taken from some of the most active police Areas, sent to the South Bureau Command Post and then later replaced in their own Areas by officers from a different Area, that may have reduced the ability of those Areas to respond to the disorder. This appears to have been a major problem for the Department.

When the Watch Commander of the Communications Divisions declared a Tactical Alert on April 29, he also immediately restricted the priority for 9-1-1 response to the highest levels of emergency. As our analysis demonstrates, however, even at this level the ECCCS was overloaded and patrol units in the field throughout the City were unable to keep up with the volume of calls for help. This problem needs attention by the Department on two levels. First, as discussed above in Chapter Seven, serious effort must be devoted to upgrading the ECCCS itself. Second, more thought must be given to the appropriate and practical limits of priorities for 9-1-1 service during a major disorder. Some level of 9-1-1 response must be given, but it is possible that response must be restricted to only the clearest cases of life threatening emergency according to a detailed triage scheme. Again, planning is the key to effective response.

PROTECTION OF FIREFIGHTERS

Another serious problem involved the protection of firefighters. This was more than the question of priorities discussed above, although determining priorities was and is

part of the problem. Our analysis shows that the wave of fires that engulfed the City reached its high point in the first two days. A summary of structure fires in all Bureaus is shown in Figure 8-19. On the night of April 29 alone, more than 40 structure fires blazed across the skyline at the same time. These fires brought danger and, in many cases, heart-breaking loss. Every business destroyed

Control of the fires had to be a high priority for the City and a critical control objective for the police. Firefighters went into the streets without escort at first. After the cowardly shooting of firefighter Scott Miller and the assault by an AK47-waving bully that forced Fire Department Task Force 50 to abandon its fire truck, firefighters understandably demanded protection by the po-

STRUCTURE FIRES — ALL BUREAUS




FIGURE 8-19

meant the loss of precious jobs. And they spread fear. But even more importantly, the sight of these fires was a visible reminder to all of the chaos in the City and the breakdown of the rule of law that fueled it.

lice. In the confusion at the 54th and Arlington bus yard, however, protection was difficult to obtain in the early hours of the disorder, and few firefighters were deployed. For the most part, the fires were left to burn in this period.

Sometime on the night of April 29, the job of escorting firefighters was given to Metro, the Department's elite division that includes its SWAT teams and other specialized units trained to function together in anti-terrorism, disorder and other situations that might require military field tactics. This decision seems questionable. Escort duty was a poor use of the Department's only units specially designed to work in a civil disorder context, since the escort function generally required but one or two patrol cars for each firefighting team.

When protection ultimately was provided, firefighters praised the courage and dedication of their police escorts. But there were significant problems. Communication was one of the biggest. Firefighters use different radio channels from the ones assigned to the police and there was no way to put the two together. Hand-held ROVER radios could bridge the gap, but they were in desperately short supply.

Coordination was another serious problem. Firefighters were directed by their command system to the next nearest fire as soon as they finished fighting the last. They were unrestricted by jurisdictional boundaries, and were not required to return to base before taking up the next firefighting assignment made by their command and control system. They fought fires one-after-another during their 24-hour emergency shifts, getting fuel and logistical support in the field. Police escorts were required to operate in a completely different environment. Lacking an effective command and control system, they were required to return to base after the completion of each assignment.

This problem could have been remedied by making the assignment broader, so that it encompassed providing escort to a particular firefighting task force under its command, but evidently no one thought of this solution in the heat of the event. The police escorts believed themselves to be constricted by jurisdictional boundaries as well. Whether this was the fact matters little,

since the belief caused some escorts to leave firefighters when they passed over jurisdictional boundaries. Lastly, the police emergency watches turned over on a 12-hour cycle, creating an evident mismatch with their firefighters. At best this caused confusion. Some stayed on to a convenient break point; others understandably returned to base for relief.

Finally, in the early morning of April 30, fire commanders worked out an informal arrangement with CHP commanders — formally adopted later in the afternoon — to use highway patrol officers as escorts. This arrangement was a natural for the CHP, since its people are used to working with firefighters and other emergency teams, and often perform escort and traffic control functions. The LAPD Traffic Divisions perform similar functions and might have been used for escort from the start on April 29, but neither planners nor Field Commanders thought to employ this force. Given the number of escorts required, however, it probably is true that CHP officers eventually would have been needed in any case.

The problem of protecting firefighters — and other emergency vehicles as well — was not unanticipatable. Any serious City-wide planning and training effort would readily have identified them and developed acceptable solutions. That they occurred at all — and occurred across the board — speaks volumes about the lack of City-wide preparation. Moreover, one could well expect that such problems would arise in the context of a massive earthquake, not just in a case of widespread civil disorder. Since the City's Emergency Operation's Organization reportedly has devoted its attention to earthquake — as opposed to civil disorder — preparedness, this planning issue should have been addressed beforehand.

USE OF FORCE

In the best of circumstances, the occurrence of widespread civil disorder in a City confronts a police department with a most difficult test of its policies for use of force and use of deadly force. How much more difficult was the test for the LAPD in responding to the violence of April 29? The verdicts of that day were handed down in a trial that accused four of its police officers of using excessive force. The stinging Christopher Commission report unquestionably caused many police officers to wonder what the use of force policies of the Department were, and what they should do personally if put on the line to respond to a major outbreak of disorder.

Throughout the period of controversy marked by the King beating and its aftermath, the Department's use of force policies have remained the same. The Department's Manual states the basic policy as follows:

While the use of reasonable physical force may be necessary in situations which cannot be otherwise controlled, force may not be resorted to unless other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would clearly be ineffective under the particular circumstances. Officers are permitted to use whatever force that is reasonable and necessary to protect others or themselves from bodily harm.²²

The policies for the use of deadly force are an extension of the basic use of force policy. Deadly force is only to be used when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impracticable. Even then, police officers may not use deadly force to protect themselves from assaults which are not likely to have serious results, and firing at or from moving vehicles is generally prohibited. Hence, pursuant to the Manual, a police officer is authorized to use deadly force only when it appears reasonably necessary:

- To protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, or
- To prevent a crime where the suspect's actions place persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury, or
- To apprehend a fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of deadly force where there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed.

In the event, one of the bright spots of the Department's performance was the restraint shown by its police officers. Conditions at large in the City required reasonable force to restore order. That officers often were subjected to gunfire as they responded to calls for help is demonstrated beyond doubt by numerous patrol cars laced with bullet holes. That officers did not respond in kind to the terrifying wave of random violence they faced is also readily demonstrable. Deadly force was sparingly used by law enforcement officers. Although the April firestorm left 42 dead in its wake, only 10 of those deaths were by law enforcement shootings and only six involved LAPD officers. We make no determination with regard to whether or not the use of deadly force in these instances was consistent with Department policy. By way of comparison, it is worth noting that the overall death toll in the 1965 Watts disorder was 34, and that 23 of those deaths were shootings by law enforcement officers. Individual circumstances may explain this apparent difference in response, but it does not diminish the evident self-control exercised by LAPD officers under conditions of extreme duress.²³

LOGISTICS

In times of civil disorder, efficient and effective logistical procurement and deployment of resources is particularly important to the ability of a police department to restore order. There were serious resource prob-

lems, particularly equipment shortages. While the LAPD may, in fact, be in an absolute sense "resource-poor," however, it appears that many of the logistical problems that the Department had in responding to the April violence stemmed from ineffective deployment of existing resources. In effect, the Department failed to do the best it could with what resources it actually had. In addition, the LAPD failed to recognize that in such a situation of wide-scale civil unrest, it did not, and would not ever, have sufficient personnel resources to do the job all by itself.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT

Many police officers expressed distress and frustration during the disorder over the lack of equipment. Vehicles, hand-held ROVER radios and other communications equipment, personal protective equipment and other gear all appeared to be in short supply.

The LAPD vehicle fleet consists of close to 2,570 vehicles. Not all of these are black and whites or even equipped for field duty. However, it would seem that this fleet should have been adequate to support the police force even in the circumstances presented by this disorder. The problem appears to be that most of the fleet is not assigned to patrol operations. As we discuss in Chapter Four above, over 1,640 vehicles are "unmarked" and assigned to non-patrol units of the Department. Many of these vehicles are taken home by officers at the end of their watches. During the early hours of the disorder, especially, when there was a serious need for vehicles at the 54th and Arlington Command Post, these vehicles were largely unavailable.

The Department maintained a reserve fleet of more than 75 black and whites that was vferried by the Motor Transport Division to the Command Post in the late afternoon and early evening of April 29. At four officers per vehicle, these 75 automobiles provided transportation capacity for 300 police officers. Inexplicably, 58 of the 75 black and whites were returned to the Divi-

sion, after the disorder ended, with no more than 18 miles added to their odometers. Since this mileage included the round trip to-and-from the bus yard, it would appear that these vehicles were used little or not at all during the disturbance. Moreover, it would appear that a large number of the police officers detailed to the Command Post arrived in police vehicles. Observers on the scene the first night have commented upon the logjam of police cars locked and left inside the walls of the parking lot. It probably was true that there were not enough police vehicles to provide adequate transport in the early stages of the crisis. However, it would appear to be equally true that commanders made poor use of the resources at their disposal.

The situation with respect to communications equipment presents a different story. For a variety of reasons, there was a desperate need for many hand-held ROVER radios. These were needed especially to communicate with Fire Department and other non-police forces involved in the response. Clearly, however, there was a serious shortage of these essential pieces of emergency equipment. It was not even possible to obtain adequate numbers of ROVERS by making emergency purchases from the manufacturer. The only apparent solution involved "cannibalization" of broken ROVERS from the stock of returned machines at the manufacturer for parts to fix an inadequate number of additional ROVERS. Plainly, the Department must address this critical deficiency.

Another communications problem involved the relative unavailability of cellular telephones. During the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the Department made cellular telephones available to commanders and other key personnel to facilitate coordination and emergency communication. Concerns about the expense of using these telephones appear to have caused the Department to largely discontinue their use. Thus, even though Fire Department Commanding Officers evidently are given cellular telephones as a matter of course, police com-

manders are not. Such telephones arguably are needed by police commanders for routine day-to-day operations of the Department; they are essential communications tools in an emergency.

A word should be said about the quality and availability of personal protective gear issued to police officers. The so-called riot helmets given to police officers would appear to be of dangerously poor quality. The helmets themselves are reported to crack upon moderate impact. The face shields are flimsy and would appear to present a serious risk of eye damage from splintering if struck by a rock or other missile. The safety of these helmets should be evaluated. In addition, both the quality and quantity of available bullet-proof vests and gas masks should be reviewed. The evident unavailability of masks, in particular, seems to have precluded even consideration of the use of tear gas at any time during the disorder.

It appears that breakdowns in the functioning of the EOC were responsible for many of the logistical problems the Department had in effectively and efficiently deploying its resources. Deployment of available vests and ROVERS to the Command Post are one example. Another example was the failure of the EOC to arrange for food for the officers deployed in the field on April 29. Supposedly, food for officers in an emergency was the responsibility of the City's General Services Department. The three vendors under contract with the City to provide emergency food all reported unable to meet their contractual obligations. An LAPD Logistics Officer, on his own initiative, located an alternative contractor who provided food for delivery in the field. Unfortunately, the delay in finding an alternative caused the food to be delivered after the first watch — the one that needed to be fed — ended on the morning of April 30. These are but a few of the logistics problems experienced in the disorder. All could and should be addressed by proper planning.

PERSONNEL

We have described above how the LAPD moves from normal policing to full mobilization, with half of its personnel deployed. As we discuss elsewhere, the Department-wide mobilization seems to have been slow to develop. More to the point, those personnel who were concentrated — especially at the 77th Street Command Post — appear to have been poorly utilized.

Even under normal conditions, there needs to be a general reconfiguration of the deployment of Department personnel to allocate more of the force to patrol duties in the community, as we discuss more fully in Chapter Four above. However, even if such a re-allocation is successfully accomplished, the LAPD (and for that matter, most other police departments) will in all probability not have enough personnel to deal all by itself with a major City-wide civil disturbance of widespread proportions without outside assistance. For this reason, departments such as the LAPD must look to others for help. The primary mechanism for obtaining such help is mutual aid and requests for state and federal assistance, in that order.²⁴

While assistance from these other sources is discussed in greater detail in the next Chapter, it is worth noting here that the LAPD has, for years, held itself aloof from mutual aid entanglements, believing that it was more likely that the Department would be called upon to help others than for the LAPD to receive help itself. While this may be true, as a general proposition, "what goes around comes around," and eventually there comes a time when everyone has to ask for help from their neighbor. Advance planning and participation in inter-departmental mutual aid mechanics is essential. As the next Chapter indicates, the Department's failure to make use of mutual aid resources was just one more factor that contributed to the breakdown in the Department's response to the recent civil disorder.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

¹ The Beverly Hills Police Department acted promptly both to go on Tactical Alert and to Mobilize.

² At 6:45 p.m., the first Tactical Alert was called for South, Central and West Bureaus. Just five minutes passed before Valley Bureau was added and the Tactical Alert was declared City-wide.

³ IACP Report, *Areas of Concern in Addressing Contemporary Civil Disorders*, 10 (July 1992) [(hereinafter "IACP Report")].

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 20 (Ap. 1968).

⁶ IACP Report, *supra* note 3, at 9.

⁷ *Id.* at 10.

⁸ *Id.* at 11.

⁹ We are mindful of the allegation by some that "containment" is an inherently racist concept. Such criticism may have merit to the extent that the containment concept has been articulated as a principle of urban planning where the apparent intent may have been to separate one community of people in a city from another. We intend to give no support to such a noxious concept in this report. The containment strategy discussed here is intended only to be a temporary public safety measure. It may be used appropriately to isolate any area of a city where a dangerous condition exists due to an unusual spill, a broken gas main or, as we discuss in this report, an outbreak of mob violence. Such conditions need to be isolated until the temporary danger can be repaired. In a case of disorder, containment is a necessary measure to protect innocent people who might otherwise be victimized by the violence and to assist police to restore public order and the rule of law.

¹⁰ See Appendix 5.

¹¹ Division 8, Los Angeles Administrative Code, § 8.29.

¹² *Id.*, § 8.77

¹³ The curfew orders appear in Appendix 4.

¹⁴ American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, *Civil Liberties in Crisis: Los Angeles During the Emergency* 13 (June 23, 1992) [(hereinafter "ACLU Report")].

¹⁵ *Id.* at 14.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 13.

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ In the same time period, Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies made almost the same number of arrests — 3,217 persons outside the City limits and just 13 within.

¹⁹ The breakdown of arrestees by race, sex, and age is shown in Appendix 8.

²⁰ LAPD Tactical Manual, *supra* Chapter 4, note 18, at TM 101.10 and 101.12

²¹ *Id.* at TM 101.5

²² *LAPD Department Manual*, *supra* Chapter 4, note 1, § 240.10, at 100.

²³ In 1965, police were allowed to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect in cases of burglary and looting. The Supreme Court changed the law with regard to the use of deadly force in *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

²⁴ In addition, departments such as the LAPD should look to their reserve officers for assistance. During the civil disorder, 800 LAPD reserve officers worked more than 15,000 hours to help quell the disturbance.

9

OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES

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As discussed in the previous Chapter, the LAPD has, for many years, avoided mutual aid arrangements, whereby law enforcement from one jurisdiction agrees to assist law enforcement in another jurisdiction, believing that it was more likely that the Department would be called upon to help others than be in need of help itself. It appears, however, that as a result of avoiding mutual aid arrangements, the LAPD and the City's Emergency Operations Organization did not know in advance of the civil disorder in April 1992 how to obtain efficiently mutual aid assistance or to implement that assistance in an effective manner. The LAPD and the City had not engaged in effective inter-agency planning and training with other mutual aid providers so that the LAPD and the City would be prepared to utilize mutual aid resources quickly and effectively in the event of widespread civil disorder. Consequently, the City and the LAPD found themselves overwhelmed by the widespread nature of the disorder, and without immediate assistance from other agencies. Moreover, once mutual aid was obtained, job assignments and the related deployment of personnel resulted in poor use of valuable resources.

MUTUAL AID PLANS

Although the City's Emergency Operations Master Plan contains provisions for obtaining law enforcement and military mutual aid which incorporate the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, it appears that the City and the LAPD did not fully understand the mechanics of these plans and, as a result, were unable fully to take advantage of immediate sources of mutual aid.

According to the City's Emergency Operations Master Plan, the State Office of Emergency Services is responsible for law enforcement mutual aid coordination, pursuant to the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid

Plan. The California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan is designed to provide a mechanism by which law enforcement entities throughout the state can combine their resources and respond to a variety of emergency situations which may arise. It is prepared by the State's Office of Emergency Services, pursuant to the authority of the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement, signed on November 15, 1950 by then Governor Earl Warren. The California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan is administered through the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. This system contemplates the involvement of individuals and agencies at four levels — city, county, region and state.

The California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan divides California into seven Mutual Aid Regions, which are made up of several Operational Areas, representing the counties within the Regions. The sheriff of each county is the head of that county's Operational Area, and all sheriffs within a given Region elect a Regional Coordinator from among themselves.¹ Los Angeles and Orange Counties constitute Region I, of which Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block is the Regional Coordinator. Therefore, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is in charge of both the Operational Area of Los Angeles County and all of Region I.

The California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan is triggered by any unusual occurrence which cannot be handled completely by the police agency in charge of the area in which the event occurs. The unusual event can be either a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, or a civil disturbance. Once triggered, the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan contemplates that the Regional Coordinator will provide a communications clearinghouse and nerve center for all emergency operations in the area. The Regional Coordinator should receive requests for assistance from affected police departments and apply the law enforcement resources available from the Region, or as volunteered from outside the Region.² The

California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, therefore, establishes a method for emergency response by requiring the Regional Coordinator to draw upon the resources of the local sheriff's office and the California Highway Patrol before utilizing state and federal resources.

The City's Emergency Operations Master Plan provides that LAPD resources shall be "reasonably committed" before a request is made for mutual aid. Determining whether such resources are "reasonably committed" is up to the LAPD Department Commander, along with the concurrence of the Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator, the Los Angeles County Sheriff. After this determination is made, the Emergency Operations Master Plan provides, the LAPD is to request all state and local mutual aid from the Los Angeles County Sheriff.

According to the Emergency Operations Master Plan, when an emergency is or is likely to become beyond the control capabilities of the LAPD when reinforced by state law enforcement mutual aid resources, the Department may request assistance from state and/or federal military personnel. Requests for assistance from the California National Guard are to be made by the LAPD Department Commander to the Mayor. The Mayor is then supposed to forward the request to the Los Angeles County Sheriff, who is supposed to relay the request to the State Office of Emergency Services, which, in turn, is supposed to forward the request to the Governor. The Emergency Operations Master Plan provides that state military personnel, such as the California National Guard, have the powers of peace officers when they are activated into state service, are serving within the affected area and are directly assisting civil authorities, such as the LAPD.

Should an emergency progress to the point where the LAPD Department Commander determines that the emergency is, or is likely to become, beyond the control capabilities of the Department when reinforced by state military personnel, according to the Emergency Operations Master Plan, the Department Com-

mander may request assistance from federal military personnel. Such a request is to be made through the Mayor to the Los Angeles County Sheriff, who will relay the request to the State Office of Emergency Services. The Office of Emergency Services will forward the request to the Governor, who in turn, will forward the request to the President.

The Emergency Operations Master Plan states that once the President directs that federal military personnel are to be deployed into the City, the U.S. Army Task Force Commander will assume command of all law enforcement and military personnel within the affected area as defined by the President, and that California National Guard personnel deployed into the affected area will be federalized and will be under the same federal command. The Emergency Operations Master Plan seems to assume (incorrectly, as discussed below) that in all cases, automatically upon federalization of the National Guard, the Guard no longer possesses the powers of peace officers.

LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID

Although the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan provides a command structure for addressing emergencies, the LAPD apparently failed to utilize this plan effectively. Had the LAPD done so, there could have been a central point for the coordination and allocation of available resources. Significant law enforcement resources, including Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies and California Highway Patrol officers, were available within Los Angeles County, and they were not put to full use because Sheriff Block, as Regional Coordinator, did not have adequate information from the LAPD to properly deploy those resources. In addition, before Chief Gates first requested assistance, Sheriff Block apparently had already declined offers of resources from various law enforcement

agencies from around the state because no requests for assistance had been presented. Effective coordination between the LAPD and available resources under the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System was further undermined by the failure of LAPD officers to follow established protocol by routing requests for assistance through the City's Emergency Operations Center for submission to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. It also appears that the Mayor's office did not have a clear understanding of the California Mutual Aid System, as evidenced by their request for National Guard deployment before the resources of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and California Highway Patrol had been fully utilized.

It is also possible that the LAPD's attitude of self-reliance, while admirable in principle, impeded the efficient functioning of the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. Several days before the April disturbances, the LAPD's Metro Division apparently told the State Office of Emergency Services that the LAPD was so large and well-prepared that it would never need to request assistance from anyone. The LAPD's attitude of self-reliance apparently goes at least as far back as the Watts disturbance in 1965. During the 1965 disturbance, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department called the LAPD to offer 300 deputies, who were coming off a specific mission, to aid the LAPD at the beginning of the disorder. The LAPD flatly declined this offer of mutual aid, and chose instead, to deal with the situation itself.

In early April 1992, the State Office of Emergency Services contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Emergency Operations Bureau to inquire about its own preparations. The Sheriff's Department explained that it had two platoons ready for deployment, and it had completed some specialized training in preparation for any emergency that might occur, regardless of the outcome of the King beating trial. The Sheriff's Department also organized the Operation Monarch Task Force, which met three or four times prior to the announcement of

the verdicts in an attempt to prepare for a possible emergency situation. It appears, however, that these planning efforts on the part of the Sheriff's Department were largely separate and apart from any preparations made by the LAPD.

Also in early April 1992, the State Office of Emergency Services contacted the LAPD's Tactical Planning Section to discuss planning and preparations for the upcoming announcement of the verdicts. At that time, the California Highway Patrol's pre-verdict planning was discussed. Since as early as mid-March 1992, the California Highway Patrol had been discussing with the State Office of Emergency Services the CHP's preparatory work and the pre-positioning of equipment in Los Angeles. The two agencies had met to discuss specifically the CHP's planning efforts, its potential logistical needs and deployment strategy. The LAPD's position, however, was that the Department would not need the CHP's help because the LAPD felt that it was sufficiently large and well-prepared to tackle any potential emergency.

At 7:00 p.m., on the first night of the unrest, Wednesday, April 29, Governor Wilson offered Mayor Bradley any state assistance he needed. At 9:00 p.m., Mayor Bradley requested 2,000 National Guard. The Governor's Office called the State Office of Emergency Services, who immediately alerted General Robert Thrasher of the California National Guard. General Thrasher then commenced mobilization activities. Around 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday night, Chief Gates called Sheriff Block to discuss the escalating unrest, and Gates informed Block that the LAPD did not need assistance because the City had already requested the National Guard. At 10:00 p.m., a conference call between Governor Wilson, Mayor Bradley, Chief Gates, Sheriff Block, Richard Andrews (Director of the State Office of Emergency Services), General Thrasher and CHP Commissioner Hannigan occurred. The focus of discussion was the National Guard, although Commissioner Hannigan advised the participants of the California Highway Patrol's resources and offered help.



Looting by all ages, sexes and races became prevalent.

Although all mutual aid requests are supposed to go through the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department pursuant to the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, throughout the unrest, the LAPD continually made requests that circumvented the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Officers in the LAPD's Bureaus routinely requested aid directly from other officers they knew at various other law enforcement agencies. On several occasions, the requests were made without the knowledge of the City's Emergency Operations Center. In addition, these uncoordinated and haphazard efforts were made without the knowledge or consent of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

On Wednesday evening, when the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department first received news that the City had requested the National Guard, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department attempted to confirm this with the City's Emergency Operations Center, but was told that the City's Emergency Operations Center knew nothing about the request for the National Guard. Apparently, South Bureau had made the request without the knowledge of the City's Emergency Operations Center.

At one point during the early stages of the unrest, the City's EOC urgently requested that two platoons of Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies be deployed to the City. It was such a tense situation that a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Commander went to the LAPD's Command Post to talk to the LAPD Commander who supposedly needed the deputies. The LAPD Commander then informed the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Commander that he did not want or need the deputies. While the City's Emergency Operations Center was unconvinced that the additional resources were not necessary, during a conference call among a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department representative, the LAPD Commander and LAPD Deputy Chief Ron Frankle, the LAPD made it clear that in their view, the Sheriff's deputies were not needed.

On Thursday, April 30, at around 10:00 a.m., after the unrest had clearly escalated, Sheriff Block called Chief Gates to again offer assistance. Chief Gates admitted to being short-staffed. He asked Sheriff Block to have Los Angeles County Sheriff's personnel report to an LAPD staging area, but Sheriff Block would only commit to respond to specific mission assignments. Consequently, Chief Gates accepted two Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department platoons (about 112 Officers), which were dispatched to the Crenshaw area around 10:00 a.m., with orders to arrest anyone engaged in criminal activity.

The California Highway Patrol's resources were not effectively utilized on the first night of the civil disturbance either. Sometime after 9:00 p.m., CHP officers were asked to cordon off the freeways leading into South Central Los Angeles and to provide perimeter control at various intersections within South Central, although it was probably too late for such a strategy to be successful, as we discuss in Chapter Eight. Other CHP resources were under-utilized throughout the night. Two California Highway Patrol companies (about 120 officers), as well as other on-duty personnel were prepared to respond to requests for assistance by 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29. Instead, they spent most of that first night watching the events unfold on television.

Not until 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 30, was the California Highway Patrol requested to provide protection to the fire department and ambulances. They had been told in the morning to move two companies of CHP officers to the Coliseum, where they would receive orders from the LAPD to conduct a sweep of the area. When they arrived at the Coliseum, no one from the LAPD was there to meet them. Approximately two hours later, the CHP officers gathered at the Coliseum were ordered to report to the Command Post at 54th and Arlington, to escort the fire department.

For the rest of Thursday night, and most of Friday, the California Highway Patrol worked around the clock, providing escort services to the Los Angeles city and county fire departments and ambulance crews. Once given this mission, communications between the California Highway Patrol, LAPD, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and Los Angeles Fire Department went smoothly and the mission was efficiently carried out. The manner in which California Highway Patrol officers were assigned to escort fire department vehicles went particularly well. At the Command Post at 54th and Arlington, once the Los Angeles Fire Department took charge, the Fire Department created three lines for response vehicles — one for fire trucks, one for ambulances and one for the California Highway Patrol. When a call came in, vehicles from each line would respond. After the call was completed, the vehicles returned to the Command Post and went to the end of the line to wait for their next turn. By Friday night, the California Highway Patrol was also providing escort services to the Department of Water and Power in its attempts to restore power to South Central Los Angeles. That duty continued through Saturday, May 2, 1992.

With few exceptions, the LAPD did not request or utilize assistance from other local police departments. Notable exceptions include the RTD Police Department and the UCLA Police Department. Coordination between the LAPD and RTD Police, and the LAPD and UCLA Police appears to have been effective.

The Rapid Transit District (RTD) Police have jurisdiction over the Southern California Rapid Transit District, which covers approximately 2,300 square miles and five counties. There are 198 sworn RTD officers to ensure the safety of the passengers and the security of RTD personnel and property. There are no formal mutual aid agreements between the RTD Police and other police departments, although there is regular contact because arrestees must be brought to local police departments for booking. The RTD Police generally enjoy good relations

with the LAPD. During the civil unrest, the RTD Police not only secured RTD property, riders and personnel, but also provided security for the LAPD Command Post established at the RTD bus yard at 54th and Arlington. In addition, the RTD Police escorted RTD buses used to transport troops and prisoners during the disorder. The RTD Police, however, were not asked to, nor did they participate in, the arrest of looters during the unrest. In fact, based upon their previous interactions with the LAPD, RTD Police were careful not to overstep their authority and perform what LAPD officers would see as LAPD functions.

The UCLA Police Department is part of the University of California Police Services Agency. The Department has 70 sworn officers, who police both the UCLA campus and one mile of the surrounding area. The UCLA police share jurisdiction over this area with the West Los Angeles and Pacific Areas of the LAPD. In fact, the LAPD normally relies on the UCLA police to handle many of the calls for service in the Westwood area. Since their work together on the 1984 Olympics, the LAPD and the UCLA police have shared a good working relationship.

During the civil unrest, the UCLA police responded to calls in the Westwood area. Because of their prior experience with large gatherings in the area, and the use of barricades, the UCLA officers, together with some LAPD assistance, were able to minimize the damage in the area. In addition, the LAPD requested mutual aid from the UCLA police during the civil disturbance. At one point on Wednesday night, April 29, the LAPD had only six to eight officers policing the entire Westside. The LAPD left to the UCLA police the responsibility of policing major sections of the Westside of the City, including Brentwood, Westwood and West Los Angeles.

The LAPD failed, however, to request or utilize assistance from any of the other local police departments. The Department's failure to request aid from other local police departments appears to be a reflection of the

fact that, in general, the local and independent police departments have little or no contact with the LAPD. There has been little effort by the LAPD to reach out to these departments for joint training, preparation or response. In fact, many local departments believe that the LAPD has a condescending attitude toward local police departments. When there is a need for local police departments to coordinate with the LAPD, those departments often find it difficult to break through the LAPD bureaucracy. Unlike the smaller departments, where Police Chiefs communicate directly with other Police Chiefs during emergency periods, the LAPD has no direct lines of communication with other local police departments. Most local police departments believe, therefore, that they are basically on their own during emergency situations.

There are generally no agreements for assistance from the LAPD, although both University police departments (UCLA and USC) often receive assistance from the LAPD in responding to calls. The most commonly identified reasons as to why the LAPD has not joined in mutual aid pacts with surrounding police departments are: (1) a reported fear that their depleting resources would be further stressed by sharing them with local police departments; and (2) an attitude of superiority that allegedly leads LAPD commanders to believe that there is very little other local law enforcement groups can do to assist the Department.

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

As discussed above, the California National Guard is normally called into action during a civil disturbance through the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. Under normal processes, the Guard would expect to hear about an LAPD request only through their contact with the State Office of Emer-

gency Services. In this case, however, although the National Guard was requested, and subsequently deployed, the State Office of Emergency Services was not contacted, nor did the LAPD initiate the request.

As discussed above, at 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, General Thrasher of the California National Guard was notified that the Governor was calling up 2,000 California National Guard troops for deployment into the Los Angeles area. At the time of the call, General Thrasher was told that the decision to call in the California National Guard was made in response to a request from Mayor Bradley. There was no indication at the time that the LAPD had made a request for California National Guard assistance. Immediately after the telephone call, the California National Guard began the process of calling up troops for mobilization into the California National Guard armories throughout the state.

Approximately one hour after this telephone call, as mentioned above, General Thrasher participated in a conference call with Governor Wilson, Mayor Bradley, Sheriff Block, Chief Gates, California Highway Patrol Commissioner Hannigan, Director Andrews of the State Office of Emergency Services, and a representative of the California Attorney General's Office. This telephone conversation was the first time the LAPD had any direct contact with the California National Guard. During this telephone conversation, Chief Gates stated that the LAPD was completely mobilized, with approximately 1,000 officers currently on duty and calls in to bring an additional 400 to 500 into the area. Additionally, Chief Gates indicated that there were many fires burning out of control in Los Angeles and looting on the streets, but observed that he did not think there were as many people on the streets as there were during the Watts disorders in 1965. At the end of the conversation, however, Mayor Bradley specifically asked Chief Gates and Sheriff Block whether they wanted California National Guard troops on the streets, and both responded affirmatively.

During the period of the mobilization of the California National Guard, there was uncertainty within the National Guard as to which law enforcement agency was in charge of the response to the civil disturbance. The National Guard commanders raised this issue on Wednesday evening when they were first alerted to the request for troops. At that time, both the Governor's office, then later, the State Office of Emergency Services, stated that it was not yet settled who was in charge of determining the missions which would ultimately be assigned to the National Guard.

As late as 1:15 p.m. on Thursday, April 30, 1992, the National Guard still did not have a clear indication from the LAPD or the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department as to who was in charge of directing the National Guard missions during the civil disturbance. The issue finally was resolved at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday during a conference call involving Governor Wilson, Sheriff Block, California Highway Patrol Commissioner Hannigan, Chief Gates, Director Andrews of the State Office of Emergency Services, and General Delk and Major General Thrasher of the National Guard, during which it was agreed that all law enforcement tasking would go through the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Emergency Operations Center.

It was during the early afternoon Thursday, April 30, that the first group of National Guard troops were sent into the streets. At approximately 2:30 p.m., General Delk met with Chief Gates, Sheriff Block, Highway Patrol Commissioner Hannigan, Under Sheriff Edmonds, and three senior California Highway Patrol commanders. At that meeting, Chief Gates asked Highway Patrol Commissioner Hannigan if the Highway Patrol would provide protection for firefighters who were under siege. Commissioner Hannigan agreed to that request. Chief Gates then asked General Delk if the National Guard would handle "everything else." General Delk replied that the National Guard was ready and prepared to do whatever was necessary throughout the duration of the civil disturbance.

Within two days of the original request, and after two additional call ups of 2,000 troops, the National Guard had approximately 7,000 troops available for use in quelling the civil disturbance. Once called, the troops moved into action relatively quickly. As a result, it appears that the call up of the National Guard was a significant factor helping to restore order to the City³. However, the overall effectiveness of the National Guard was impacted by a misunderstanding of the impact of the President's federalization order on May 1, the next subject we will discuss.

FEDERAL TROOPS

The first indication that there was to be a request for federal troops was raised during a press conference held by Mayor Bradley at 11:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 30, 1992. During that press conference, Mayor Bradley announced that there was consideration being given to the possibility of requesting federal troops. During a staff meeting at 3:00 a.m. on Friday, May 1, 1992, Governor Wilson discussed the rationale in requesting federal troops as added insurance for the California National Guard, insofar as there was a concern of having insufficient forces available for law enforcement purposes.

The initial order for activation of federal troops was received on Friday, May 1, 1992 at approximately 3:30 a.m. At that time an order was received by Fort Ord that federal troops would be sent to assist in quelling the civil disturbances in Los Angeles. The entirety of the troop movement from Fort Ord to the El Toro staging area was completed by 3:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 2, 1992. In all, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps deployed 3,500 troops to Los Angeles. The U.S. Army began the training of troops at the El Toro Marine Base on May 2, 1992. Specifically, the Army troops began training for the civil disturbance missions and learning the applicable rules of engagement. There were no missions accepted by the U.S. Army troops on May 2, 1992. The federal troops did not

actually move into the streets of Los Angeles until Sunday, May 3, 1992.

Also on Friday, May 1, 1992, the President issued a Proclamation calling for all persons engaged in acts of violence and disorder in Los Angeles to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably, and signed an Executive Order providing for the restoration of law and order to the City and County of Los Angeles. This Executive Order expressly answered the applicable jurisdictional questions and provided all federal agencies with authority to act in a law enforcement capacity during the civil unrest. The Executive Order provided that the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General were authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective departments the authority conferred on them by the Order.

At this time, the California National Guard was federalized and placed under the direction of the U.S. military. The Attorney General ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be the lead agency in directing the combined federal law enforcement effort, including the efforts of the federalized military troops and other civilian law enforcement agencies. At 9:00 p.m. that night, at a meeting of the heads of federal law enforcement agencies, all military components and Department of Justice representatives, all individuals representing these entities signed an attendance log and advised that they understood the conditions and terms of the Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order.

The first contact between the federal forces and local law enforcement officers occurred at 10:00 p.m. on Friday, May 1, 1992. At that time, General Covault of the U.S. Army met with LAPD Chief Gates and the LAPD liaison officer to the military. Sheriff Block was also present at the meeting. At this meeting, it became apparent that neither Gates nor Block had a clear idea as to the role of the federal military with regard to their presence in Los Angeles. Specifically, Gates appeared to believe that the U.S. Army and

Marines were there to partition up the City and to post soldiers throughout the City in various neighborhoods. On the other hand, Block appeared to believe that the Army and the Marines were present essentially to follow orders from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department in a "rent a soldier" fashion.

In addition, it appears that there was a general misunderstanding on the part of the U.S. Military and the National Guard as to what role the military could fulfill in quelling a civil disturbance. Each of them mistakenly assumed that the federal troops and the federalized National Guard could not undertake missions that required them to perform the role of peace officers. By the time of federalization, the Armed Forces had set up a Joint Task Force, which had concluded that the military would take on non-confrontational functions, allowing the law enforcement officers the support to take on the more common law enforcement type operations. General Covault, who commanded the federal troops, including the National Guard after federalization, refused to accept certain missions because the Army was not trained to carry out such missions. Apparently, General Covault was unfamiliar with the President's Proclamation and erroneously believed that federal troops were prohibited from becoming involved in law enforcement functions under the federal *Posse Comitatus* Act.⁴

It was the limitation imposed on the federal troops and the National Guard by General Covault's orders that ultimately restricted their activities, however, *not* the *Posse Comitatus* Act. By issuing the Proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably, the President met the requirements under federal statute for the exercise of the Presidential power to use federal troops to quell domestic violence. The activities of the federal troops, including the federalized National Guard, were expressly exempted from the restrictions of the *Posse Comitatus* Act, and thus, the federalized troops could assume law enforcement functions.⁵

The *Posse Comitatus* Act prohibits the direct, active participation of Army or Air Force personnel in the execution of civil laws, unless expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution or by statute. Although neither the Navy nor the Marines are legally bound by the *Posse Comitatus* Act, they are made subject to its provisions by U.S. Department of Defense regulations. The *Posse Comitatus* Act applies with equal force to the National Guard only when the National Guard is federalized or otherwise placed in the service of the United States. At all other times, the National Guard is exempt from the *Posse Comitatus* Act. The President's authority to use federal troops to quell domestic violence under federal statute, however, is exempt from the *Posse Comitatus* Act's restrictions. The only qualification placed on this power is the requirement that the President issue a proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes.

Federalization thus had a seriously dilatory impact on the responsiveness by the California National Guard due to the mistaken impression that the *Posse Comitatus* Act prohibited the Guard from engaging in law enforcement activities. Before federalization of the National Guard, there had not been a single request for National Guard troops which had not been fulfilled. After federalization, however, it was estimated that only 20 percent of troop requests were fulfilled by the Guard. When missions were received by the U.S. military and requests for the California National Guard were made, the military commanders would consider whether the request was for a "law enforcement" function or a "military" function. If the request was for a law enforcement function, the request was uniformly denied. For example, there was a request for National Guard troops to transport prisoners arrested during the civil disorder. This was a function which the National Guard would have performed before federalization. After federalization, however, the request was denied because it was believed that performing such a mission would involve a potential violation of the *Posse Comitatus* Act.

The federalization of the National Guard also introduced a new element of bureaucratic overlay in the deployment of the Guard. Before federalization, the National Guard liaison met with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the LAPD at the County Emergency Operations Center, and received specific missions from them both. Once federalization took place, however, the National Guard liaison received the initial assignment request from the LAPD or the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and then contacted the U.S. Army liaison officer to discuss the request. The U.S. Army liaison officer then referred the matter to the U.S. military's Joint Task Force. Frequently, the Joint Task Force would request more information with regard to the specifics of the mission involved. The Joint Task Force would then make a decision as to whether the federalized troops should become involved in the activity or reject it, again, due to the belief that undertaking such a mission would involve a potential violation of the *Posse Comitatus* Act.

Federalization also had an immediate effect on the relationship between the LAPD and National Guard. Before federalization, the National Guard troops were completely supportive of the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies' efforts with regard to the civil disturbance. On a number of occasions, National Guard troops were asked to assist in making arrests or transporting prisoners after arrests were made. Additionally, National Guard troops accompanied LAPD officers in squad cars. However, after federalization, the number of missions or tasks given to the National Guard was significantly reduced. As a result, the National Guard was kept at full strength for the next several days, but had few actual assignments to perform, creating morale problems within the National Guard itself.

It is readily apparent that the call up of the National Guard was important psychologically to the restoration of order, as indicated by our telephone survey. However, the failure to plan and train to use the National

Guard led to under-utilization of this critical resource.

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Prior to the time at which the President signed the Executive Order, each of the federal law enforcement agencies was operating on its own. Some of these agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had already deployed personnel to assist local law enforcement efforts, and were coordinating directly with the LAPD. However, upon the signing of the Executive Order, and the Attorney General's designation of the FBI as the lead agency for coordinating the federal response, each of the agencies sent representatives to the FBI Command Center in Westwood, where they functioned as an inter-agency task force. This inter-agency task force was to provide support and assistance to local law enforcement, and anticipated three principal roles — participating in patrols; escorting high-risk vehicles and accompanying local authorities to high-risk locations; and providing tactical support in high-risk situations (such as those involving gangs or snipers).

In all, during the civil unrest, more than 1,200 federal agents, including both federal agents stationed in Los Angeles and federal agents from outside the Los Angeles area, were deployed to assist the City. The FBI was the first — and probably the most important — federal law enforcement agency to lend assistance to the City. Although there was no prior coordination with respect to post-verdict events, the FBI and LAPD did have a prior ongoing, working relationship. This appears to have assisted the two agencies in quickly establishing informal coordination, which began as early as Wednesday evening, April 29, 1992. On Thursday, April 30, 1992, the FBI Command Center in Westwood

was put into operation. The Command Center was originally designed for use during the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. Also on Thursday, the FBI placed a liaison at the City's Emergency Operations Center. The FBI also placed liaisons at each of the LAPD Bureau Command Posts. After the FBI was designated as the lead agency for coordinating the federal response, the FBI not only continued to assist local law enforcement itself, but also coordinated requests for assistance from and deployment of each of the other federal agencies and federalized troops. All requests for federal assistance were supposed to be placed through the FBI liaison located in the City's Emergency Operations Center. When a request for assistance was received by the FBI liaison, the liaison would forward the request to the FBI's Command Center. Then, the federal agency which could most appropriately respond to each request for assistance was selected for deployment.

The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had a well established working relationship with the LAPD prior to the outbreak of civil disorder, and as a result, ATF's participation in the response to the civil disorder began as early as Thursday, April 30, 1992. ATF prepared and disseminated a current and updated list of all firearms licensees in the Los Angeles area. During that same day, ATF worked with the LAPD to formulate plans as to how to use ATF resources to assist other law enforcement agencies in suppressing the violence. ATF agents rode along with LAPD officers to assist and patrol, as well as provided protection to firefighters in both Los Angeles and Long Beach. ATF is a federal agency specifically designed to assist local law enforcement, and was able to deploy approximately 200 agents to assist local law enforcement during the civil disorder.

Bureau of Prisons officers assisted in patrols and arrests, were involved in investigations, responded to sniper fire and conducted searches for bodies in the rubble of burned-out buildings. The Bureau of Prisons deployed 300 officers from across the nation to

the Los Angeles area. The officers who were deployed were members of Special Operations Teams, trained to handle riot situations, and hostage negotiations.

U.S. Customs Service agents generally assisted local law enforcement in efforts to bring the civil disorder under control, however, they were specifically instructed to assist and not to assume any lead role with respect to enforcing law and order in Los Angeles. The Customs Service mobilized 200 agents from Dallas, El Paso, Houston, San Francisco and Tucson and sent them to Los Angeles to aid in restoring order.

From the beginning of the civil disturbance, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents were assigned to the Los Angeles County Jail, which is a standard assignment for the INS, even during non-emergency periods. During the civil disorder, this support was reinforced. INS agents worked the "release line," in which individual arrestees who were released were then interviewed by INS agents to determine whether they were illegally in the United States, and if so, were taken into INS custody. INS agents also interviewed arrestees who were waiting to be processed and who had not yet been booked or charged. INS detainers were issued to over 700 individuals who were arrested and brought to the Los Angeles County Jail. Additionally, INS offered its services directly to the Police Command Post in interviewing suspected illegal aliens and providing assistance to the LAPD in executing search warrants. We were unable to find any wrongdoing on the part of INS in this sensitive area, but we question the wisdom of involving these resources in any future properly planned mutual aid response.⁶

THE NEED FOR MUTUAL AID PLANNING AND TRAINING

As demonstrated above, the deficiencies in the City's ability to effectively employ mutual aid resources were substantial. The adverse effects of insufficient planning for and training in utilizing mutual aid resources are believed to be major factors which contributed to those deficiencies. The fact that the City and the LAPD failed to coordinate efficiently with other jurisdictions who were providers of mutual aid seems to point to a fundamental problem in adequately preparing for the use of mutual aid resources, including mutual aid training.

Fundamental to an effective mutual aid system are two elements which are also fundamental to an effective law enforcement response to civil disturbance — planning and training. Planning for the possibility that a particular emergency that the City may face may be so large-scale and wide-spread that it will overwhelm the City's own emergency response apparatus is essential to the City's own response preparation. If the City's own emergency response resources prove to be insufficient to control a particular situation, the City will have to call on the resources of surrounding local, and perhaps even state and federal, jurisdictions for assistance. In addition, equally critical is training in concert with the surrounding local, state and federal agencies on whom the City will have to call should the City's own emergency response resources prove inadequate. Only if all potentially involved agencies have trained together will they know who will do what and how should disaster strike.

Our review of the City's mutual aid system suggests that these two indispensable elements were substantially lacking, and that this lack of mutual aid planning and training contributed to the LAPD's and City's inabil-

ity to use mutual aid resources effectively in responding to the civil disorder in April 1992. While the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, as incorporated within the City's Emergency Operations Master Plan, provides a mechanism for drawing upon law enforcement resources in other jurisdictions, this is only one component of an effective mutual aid plan. Thus, the City's mutual aid plan is far from sufficient in terms of an effective mutual aid emergency response plan. The City's mutual aid plan fails to provide the objectives of a coordinated response. Moreover, this mutual aid plan does not establish command and control structures, or delineate areas of responsibility and tasks to be performed to carry out these objectives, nor does the plan provide a mechanism for testing, training and evaluating the adequacy of the plans.

An effective emergency response using mutual aid from other jurisdictions must necessarily include the same elements as any other emergency response scheme — the objectives and prioritization of those objectives, resources, tasks and job assignments. As with any other emergency response scheme, these elements must be thoroughly planned in advance, and tested and evaluated through training and other methods. This planning and training is even more critical with regard to the use of mutual aid because an emergency response using mutual aid is both more complex than, and not as familiar to its participants as, a response involving City personnel alone. Given this complexity, it is not sufficient to simply provide a mechanism for requesting additional resources.

Both a written agreement and a specific plan of mutual assistance must be created in advance of the need to call on mutual aid resources. Such an agreement must address issues such as reciprocity, compensation and indemnification. Equally as important, the agreement must specify how requests for assistance are to be submitted and to whom they are to be submitted, lines of command and control, and the responsibilities of and tasks to be performed by the participants.

In formulating a specific mutual aid plan, the City needs to pay particular attention to making use of local resources, including Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies, California Highway Patrol officers and officers from other local police departments. These resources are logistically more immediate than State resources — local law enforcement personnel can be mobilized and deployed much faster than the National Guard.

There may be certain psychological advantages, however, to ultimately mobilizing and deploying the National Guard onto the City's streets. The presence of the National Guard evidently recalls to our collective memory prior periods of civil disorder, all serious enough to bring in the Guard to put a stop to it, that suggest that this situation, like the others, is not only serious, but that the presence of the Guard means that it is time to stop the looting and burning. When the National Guard is eventually deployed, however, it will be important to utilize the Guard in a manner consistent with the Guard's own training and preparation. Military commanders, especially after federalization, properly insisted that National Guard troops only be deployed in platoon strength (approximately 30), and only under the command of a commissioned officer who accompanied each platoon. LAPD commanders, on the other hand, wanted to use the troops in ones and twos, more in the manner that police normally are deployed. But this would have misused the military forces, who should have been given missions under direction of their officers and consistent with their training. An effective mutual aid plan must take such deployment differences into consideration in advance, so that all participants will be aware of resource-specific deployment methods and missions.

Effective mutual aid preparation necessarily also includes mutual aid training involving all participants. Such training must be conducted regularly in order to coordinate response tactics and assess available resources. Mutual aid training will also provide important feedback as to the adequacy of the City's

mutual aid plan, as well as the degree to which the participants understand the plan and the extent of their preparedness. While it appears that the City currently participates in some mutual aid training with regard to earthquake preparedness and disaster recovery and reconstruction on a County-wide basis, more attention needs to be paid to training, at both the local and state level, for the use of mutual aid resources in the event of civil disorder.

Adequate preparation for the use of mutual aid resources should the City's own emergency response mechanism be insufficient to deal with a particular emergency, such as wide-spread civil disorder, will better position the City and the LAPD to respond more effectively to such emergencies in the future. To prepare adequately, however, will require the development of a more comprehensive mutual aid plan, as well as more extensive and more frequent County- and State-wide mutual aid training, particularly with regard to civil disorder control.

NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

¹ California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan iii (5th ed. Oct. 1991).

² *Id.* at 1.

³ This was confirmed by our Community Attitude Survey, in which more than half of the respondents identified the presence of the National Guard as the most effective factor in stopping the violence. See Appendix 16, at questions 19 and 32.

⁴ See Appendix 14.

⁵ See Appendix 14.

⁶ The INS indicates that it did not conduct any sweeps and deportation efforts during the period of civil disturbance. However, groups such as the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN) have obtained statements from individual immigrants who indicated that they were arrested simply because of their alien status. Further, individual immigrants indicate that arrests were made by the LAPD in contravention to LAPD Special Order No. 40, which prevents (1) the arrest of individuals solely for suspected illegal immigration status; and (2) notification of the INS of the arrest of an undocumented alien unless that individual "is booked for multiple misdemeanor offenses, a high grade misdemeanor or felony offense, or has been previously arrested for a similar offense . . ."

The Border Patrol assumed police duties including curfew enforcement, site security and crowd control. They assert that they were not present to enforce the immigration laws or to pick up illegal aliens. The Border Patrol is the uniformed branch of the INS, and its mandate is to enforce the borders of the United States. While the Border Patrol works closely with the INS, they are not in each other's chain of command and they work independently; much of their cooperation is informal. Approximately 400 Border Patrol agents arrived in Los Angeles Friday night, May 1, 1992, along with their own vehicles and equipment, three helicopters and a horse patrol, to aid local law enforcement personnel.

While we did attempt to ascertain whether the allegations that sweeps with the purpose of arresting and detaining aliens simply because of their alien status were conducted in contravention to LAPD policy were with merit, we were unable to resolve this question. We found no concrete evidence to support these claims. However, the short-term benefits of the use of mutual aid resources from the INS and Border Patrol in a community with as high an immigrant population as Los Angeles probably do not outweigh the potential long-term detriments associated with the use of such mutual aid resources.



PART
FOUR:
THE
FUTURE

10

TOWARDS NEW PRIORITIES

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There are two contending approaches to policing in America today. Most departments still follow the traditional or “professional” model, under which the primary role of the police is to respond to crime. This model is characterized by highly centralized organization and considerable specialization of function within police departments, and has held sway over American policing for much of this century. It is epitomized in the Los Angeles Police Department, and probably not coincidentally, the view we have of the police from television and other forms of popular entertainment.

The second approach, “community-oriented” policing, focuses on increasing police contact with the public outside of the context of criminal activity, partially in order to prevent crime, but also to improve the quality of life more generally. Although community-oriented policing may take a variety of forms, the one most familiar from popular culture is that of the police officer walking the beat, who is familiar with local residents and merchants. In community-oriented approaches, a much higher percentage of the force is out on the streets interacting with members of the community with a much higher degree of autonomy and discretion. Community-oriented policing methods are enjoying a resurgence in response to a widespread perception that the professional model is failing to abate the increase in crime in America’s cities.

THE LAPD EXPERIENCE

The institution of the police as we know it, namely as an arm of the government which has as its charge controlling crime and ensuring public safety, is of relatively recent vintage. Before the introduction of “bobbies,” the first modern police, via Britain’s Metropolitan Police Act in 1829, the task of ensuring public safety was shared by private gentry and the military.¹ The private gentry, who served as watchmen, were ineffectual in the

face of rising social unrest due to the Industrial Revolution, however, while the military were all too effective. As a result, the bobbies were created. They wore uniforms and walked beats but their authority to use force was circumscribed.²

American cities adopted the British model, with the exception that police in the United States were under municipal control. Like their British counterparts, the American police suffered from corruption. A police officer’s beat was essentially a franchise for bribery and running protection rackets for houses of ill repute and other vice operations. Unlike the British, the American police worked in tandem with local political machines, which had substantial control over hiring and firing of officers.³ This gave the police officer on the beat an enormous incentive to affect the voting process by encouraging (or discouraging) people to vote for particular candidates at the direction of political ward captains and their own precinct captains. Furthermore, given the lack of criteria in hiring and the ties of the political machines to the criminal world, local political control over the police sometimes meant that the police officer on the beat, that guardian of public safety, was himself a convicted felon.⁴

Although the existence of political machines and widespread corruption is generally associated with Eastern cities, Los Angeles was not immune from the same problems. As we discuss in Chapter Two above, the LAPD was established in 1876, and in the ensuing fifty-seven years, went through twenty-eight Police Chiefs, many, if not all, of whom were appointed and removed for political reasons. Police reform initiatives were common into the late 1930’s because of frequent dismissal of officers for improper reasons, such as religious affiliation. It was not until 1938, when high-ranking police and city officials, uncomfortable with the success of the reformers, had the LAPD Special Intelligence Section blow up a car owned by a private investigator working for the reformers, that corruption in the Department began to end.

The original American model of policing was not without advantages — the police enjoyed a fair amount of local support and legitimacy and were intimately aware of the problems of the community — but in time, the disadvantages outweighed these benefits. In spite of staunch opposition by both the machines and individuals on the police force who benefitted from the corrupt system, reforms were adopted to remedy the problems. The police were refashioned on a military model, with a focus on training and professionalism. Officers became subject to civil service regulations, making them less vulnerable to shifting political fortunes, and police commissioners and chiefs were granted increasing authority over precinct captains, and indeed the lives of individual officers. To root out corruption, police officers were paid more but restricted from moonlighting, incurring debts, and from being involved in

business or even living in the areas they policed.⁵

Another response to corruption was to remove vice control from the purview of the officer on the street and place it in a specialized vice squad. This move to create specialized units extended to produce the litany of units now familiar from police shows — homicide, narcotics, detectives — but also served to take manpower off the streets and put it behind desks at headquarters.⁶ In the case of the LAPD, over half of the sworn officers now are in special units. Former Chief of Police Daryl Gates exhibited a pronounced preference for special task forces such as SWAT teams; as a result, personnel were moved out of patrol functions and into specialized units.



A National Guardsman helps a cleaning crew cross 85th Street and Manchester Avenue in South Los Angeles.

The movement toward taking officers off of patrol and putting them into special units led to the change in policing that was probably the most visible to the general public — the disappearance of the police officer from the beat and into the roving police cruiser. This permitted fewer police officers to cover a much larger territory, while maintaining a relatively high profile. The shift to motorized patrols had the incidental consequence of minimizing direct contact by individual officers with the public, thereby further reducing opportunities for corruption.

A more subtle shift which accompanied these organization developments was the change of the police role from a general focus as guardian of public safety to a narrower focus on crime control. There was no longer a police officer on the beat who was familiar with, and could therefore respond to, less serious sources of breakdown in the sense of community well-being, such as vandalism. The narrowing of the police mandate made it considerably easier to exercise control over the activities of individual officers on patrol, with some departments specifying step-by-step in their handbooks how to respond to the variety of situations they expected their patrol officers to face.

The development of the Uniform Crime Reports by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1930 — and later given to the FBI to prepare — encouraged this focus on crime response. The Uniform Crime Reports were national crime statistics compiled from departmental reports across the country, and were considered reliable indicators of reported crime levels by the 1960s.⁷ These figures gave the public “objective” numbers by which it could judge the performance of the police, thereby providing the police themselves with a readily measurable benchmark of success. The Uniform Crime Reports serve to focus the police not only on numbers but on certain types of crime, namely those that fall in Part I — murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, arson, and auto theft.⁸ Although these crimes are undeniably serious breaches of public safety, there are many

other violations which affect most peoples’ lives and their perceptions of safety as much as, if not more than, the more sensational acts. Vandalism, already mentioned, provides one example; others include gang activity and drug dealing.⁹

Finally, police departments have made increasing use of high technology, beginning with radios in patrol cars in the 1940s and 1950s, and now with computers. This development, along with the advent of the 9-1-1 response system, further focuses the police on crime response as their primary obligation.

All of these reforms and developments have contributed to form what is the reigning model of policing across the country, namely the so-called “professional” model. Highly centralized organizations with strong police chiefs at the helm, whose focus is serious crime response and number of arrests made, are the hallmarks of this approach. In many cases, this professionalization of the police results in an emphasis on paramilitary discipline and practices. There is an accompanying devaluation of the routine patrol officers’ role in favor of the ostensibly more glamorous specialized units, such as homicide and anti-terrorist programs.

The LAPD has served as a paradigm of the professional model for many years, and is remarkable for its freedom from corruption, a problem still plaguing police forces in Eastern cities. William Parker, Chief of the LAPD in the 1950s and 1960s, was at the forefront of the movement toward the professional model.¹⁰ Patrol officers are evaluated by statistical measures, for example, the number of calls handled and arrests made, and are rewarded for being “hard-nosed.” As a result, the LAPD consistently outperforms other major police departments in the number of arrests for violent crime per sworn officer. Nevertheless, senior LAPD officials, rank and file patrol officers, community leaders, and members of the public all describe the LAPD as having a professional organizational culture that has emphasized crime control over crime prevention and isolated the police

from the communities and the people they serve. These are only some of the drawbacks of the professional approach, however.

Adoption of the professional model did have the effect of reducing corruption and increasing police accountability in certain respects, but the model has fallen short in other important areas. Most significant of these is its paramount goal of crime control. Crime rates continue to be high, while the number of reported crimes solved remains low, as low as 13.8 percent for burglaries.¹¹ As urban violence increases and the communal fabric deteriorates, the police simply do not have sufficient resources and personnel to fight crime and respond adequately to 9-1-1 calls for service. Jails are overcrowded, and those who are sent there must be given early release simply because there is no room to keep them.

Even taking into account other factors which contribute to this state of affairs, the police cannot simply shrug off the fundamental fact that they do not appear to be making headway under the prevailing *modus operandi*. If the public mandate to the police is to control crime, and the current mode of addressing that problem does not appear to be solving it, it is incumbent upon the police to research and adopt methods that will meet with more success. This is especially true if the current mode of operating has other deleterious effects.

In the case of the LAPD, the pride that many of its officers take in being one of the best departments in the country sometimes manifests itself in the form of arrogance toward the general public and an attitude that they need no assistance from outside sources. The word "disrespect" is often used to characterize the LAPD's treatment of members of the public, especially but not exclusively minority members.¹² A number of commanding officers share the opinion that too many LAPD patrol officers view the public with resentment and hostility. Former members of the Department characterize some officers' conduct as being out of control in terms of treating the public rudely and with disrespect, and say

that such conduct tends to exasperate rather than calm potentially volatile situations.

A number of LAPD practices have created enormous antipathy for the police in virtually all sectors of the City. The "prone-out" position used in minority neighborhoods is an example of a police tactic that generates substantial hostility against the LAPD in those communities. (The prone-out position requires that the person being apprehended lie face down on the ground with his or her hands behind the back.) Handcuffing detainees while questioning them is another practice which generates resentment. LAPD training emphasizing a "command presence" on the street also seems to encourage inappropriate confrontations. The LAPD's view of such practices is that they ensure the officer's safety in potentially dangerous situations, but the difficulty is that by increasing the hostility level of those who are subject to the practices, they increase the level of danger beyond what it might otherwise be.

This hostility extends well beyond the confines of any particular encounter with the police, preventing any meaningful partnership with and assistance from members of the community who might otherwise be favorably disposed to helping the police in the daunting task of dealing with crime and protecting public safety in Los Angeles. Part of the professional model is the orientation toward contact with the public being almost exclusively confined to situations in which a criminal act has or is threatening to be perpetrated. The public, therefore, only sees the police pulling people over, standing over prone suspects, and in other tense, confrontational situations. It is thus not surprising that members of the community, both minority and Anglo, view the LAPD with fear and a degree of hostility. Neither is it surprising that some LAPD officers tend to have an "us versus them" mentality in which they portray themselves as guardians of law and order against an array of criminal perpetrators. The LAPD and the public it is intended to protect and serve has so little contact in situations that are non-confrontational and absent the threat of violence that

there is nothing to mediate the atmosphere of fear and distrust existing between the two.

The existence of this climate of hostility and sense of injustice has been clear for some time. There have been repeated expressions of it in the hearings before the Christopher Commission, in our community meetings and survey, in interviews, and in the media. One speaker at a community meeting in September 1992 summarized the situation aptly when he stated, "Well, if we're all going to be looked at as hardened criminals and dangerously dangerous people, then it makes a dangerous situation for us even when we're approached by the LAPD."¹³ See generally Appendix 17. The obvious problem is how to decrease the tension and hostility between the police and the public for the safety and well-being of both.

THE CASE FOR COMMUNITY- ORIENTED POLICING

Los Angeles' problems are not unique. Charges of arrogance and lack of connection with the communities they are supposed to protect have also been leveled at other major police departments. These criticisms, along with the persistence of high crime rates, has led many to call for a new round of reforms in policing. To repeat the words of the IACP: "There is, likely, no more significant factor in preventing or responding to civil disturbances than the quality of the relationship that exist between a police department and the community it serves. Departments should seize initiative to make themselves more reflective of the communities they serve and to establish ways to improve contacts with citizens."

Many of the proposed initiatives fall under the banner of "community-oriented" policing. Of the police departments responding to a survey by the Special Advisor, all 66 are in the process of adopting community-oriented

policing programs.¹⁴ James Q. Wilson describes community oriented policing as having three key components: (1) preventing crime is as important as arresting criminals; (2) preventing disorder is as important as preventing crime; (3) reducing both crime and disorder requires that police work cooperatively with people in neighborhoods to identify their concerns, solicit their help and solve their problems.¹⁵ Community policing emphasizes a department-wide philosophy oriented toward problem solving, rather than arrest statistics. The concept also relies heavily on the articulation of policing values that incorporate community involvement in matters that directly affect the safety and quality of neighborhood life. Officers must interact with residents on a routine basis and keep them informed of police efforts to prevent neighborhood crime. Community policing will ensure police accountability to the community as well as to the department and will promote a better understanding by the community of the realities of police work.¹⁶

Decentralization of the police force is another component of the community-oriented approach. A much higher percentage of the force is put back out on patrol, with fewer officers devoted to specialized units. This is both necessary in a large city in which a high ratio of people to patrol officers makes it difficult for the police to engage in anything more than crime response, and beneficial in that it lessens devaluation and demoralization of patrol officers in comparison to officers in more "elite" units. Indeed, some cities such as Philadelphia have a policy requiring high-level commanders to respond to serious incidents and civil disturbances, and requiring headquarters personnel to serve a tour of duty as uniformed police officers on an annual basis.

Reflecting the recent nationwide trend toward community-oriented policing, the Department is currently in the process of injecting elements of community-oriented policing into its operational focus.¹⁷ The City government in Los Angeles and the State of California both are facing increasingly dire financial circumstances. Something has to

give when resources are scarce, and usually the LAPD chooses to give up community-oriented programs.¹⁸

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

A more subtle but no less serious problem is the need for a reorientation of values within the LAPD. The LAPD has prided itself for many years on its professionalism and the switch to a more community oriented approach will not be an easy one for many members of the department to make. It is nevertheless a change that the department must make if it is to regain the confidence of the people of Los Angeles.

The switch to new values should encompass a redefined and broadened fundamental mission of the police department to include more than just crime fighting but also to focus on crime prevention and problem solving to increase the quality of life in Los Angeles for all of the city's residents. This may seem to be a daunting task, but part of the idea behind community-oriented approaches is that the community will become involved as well in ensuring communal well-being, thus lessening the burden for the police. Adopting a broader mission for policing does not mean neglecting crime fighting necessarily, as the experience of the Wilshire Community Mobilization Project shows. The police and the public do not have to be antagonists; they can work together to fight crime and to improve the lot of Los Angeles residents as well, and possibly even more effectively, by working together in partnership.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

¹ MALCOLM K. SPARROW, MARK H. MOORE & DAVID M. KENNEDY, *BEYOND 911*, at 32 (1990).

² *Id.*

³ *Id.* at 32-33.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.* at 37.

⁶ *Id.* at 38-39.

⁷ *Id.* at 40.

⁸ *Id.* at 41.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.* at 38.

¹¹ LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT STATISTICAL DIGEST 8.5 (1991).

¹² CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* Chapter 3, note 14, at 97-100.

¹³ See Appendix 15-1.

¹⁴ COMMUNITY POLICING: A BINDING THREAD THROUGH THE FABRIC OF OUR SOCIETY, POLICE FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1990).

¹⁵ CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* Chapter 3, note 14, at pages 100 -101.

¹⁶ This response time was moderately high relative to the other Departments. See Appendix 15-2. Departments reported response times as low as two minutes (Buffalo and Philadelphia) and as high as 21 minutes (Fort Worth). *Id.*

¹⁷ See Appendix 15-1.

¹⁸ CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* Chapter 3, note 14, at 102.

11

FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Beginning in the late afternoon of April 29, 1992, the City of Los Angeles was engulfed by a violent firestorm of historic proportions. Sparked by the “not guilty” verdicts handed down in the trial of the four police officer defendants who arrested Rodney King, the firestorm burned for six days before order finally was restored to the City. By the end, the outburst had resulted in the deaths of 42 people, the destruction by fire of more than 700 structures, property damage in a total amount approaching one billion dollars, the loss of hundreds of jobs, the arrest of almost 5,000 people in the City, and incalculable injury to the fabric of community that binds together the City and the lives of its people.

The Board of Police Commissioners charged this inquiry with the task of evaluating the preparation for and response to these events by the Los Angeles Police Department. While the focus of our inquiry has been upon the performance of the police department, our report would be inaccurate and incomplete if we were to ignore the City-wide context in which these events transpired. In most respects, what we have found presents a picture of leadership failure that is not limited to the police department. Many in positions of leadership in City government appear not to have performed well in the periods before and during this crisis. Likewise, there is much to criticize in the performance of many officers at the LAPD Command Staff level — the leaders of the Department with rank of Captain and above.

In the body of our report we have explored much of the detail of our findings and analyses. In this our final Chapter, we present the final conclusions and recommendations of our study. We will consider the subject of prevention first, then questions raised by the preparation and the response.

PREVENTION

The events of April 1992 had many causes, some peculiar to the City of Los Angeles and

others of general concern to urban America. Sadly, we are not the first to observe the impacts of the crushing burden placed upon our cities by poverty, racial intolerance, lack of opportunity, crime, drugs, and the loss of hope. Study after study over the last three decades has repeated this now tragically familiar litany and pleaded for relief. The existence of such circumstances is, thus, in no way unique to the City of Los Angeles, although they undoubtedly have been aggravated here by recent changes in demography and related developments discussed in Chapter Two. These are fundamental problems of our society as a whole, and they still lie at the core of civil unrest in this country.

These are terribly important problems to solve, but this is not the job of our police departments. These problems are the responsibility of our elected national, state and local governments to solve. More than any other agency of government at any level of our society, the police department is called upon to respond to the daily human carnage caused by this cycle of waste and despair. Because police officers daily are put on the “front line” of response to these problems, many in society — and many police officers — have a sense that they should be doing more to find solutions.

This does not mean that our police officers do not have an important role to play in helping to prevent civil unrest. A key factor identified in study after study of disturbances is the relationship between the police and the people of a city. The frequency of daily interaction between police officers and residents makes the nature and quality of that interaction a critical determinant of the City’s social stability. Where hostility and mistrust characterize the relationship, the ground is fertile for unrest. It is essential that police officers treat all individuals in the City with equal dignity and respect.

The Christopher Commission explored the problems of excessive use of force and racial intolerance in the Los Angeles Police Department. The violent outburst of disorder unleashed by the King case verdicts is to some degree a consequence of those prob-

lems in the police force and the climate of hostility, mistrust and suspicion that exists between many people in the City and their police. Witness after witness in our public meetings and private interviews spoke of the poor police-community relationship in their neighborhood as a contributing factor to the violence of April.

This part of the equation the police department can and must address. As the International Association of Chiefs of Police recently noted:

Police relationships with a community must be built upon a platform of clear understanding, effective communications, and strong involvement. Departments should seize initiatives to make themselves more reflective of the communities they serve and to establish ways to improve contacts with citizens.¹

In Chapter Ten, we discussed the importance of moving the LAPD towards a new model of policing. We thus join our voices to those of many before us who have recognized the need for the police to develop non-adversarial working partnerships with the public and other government agencies in the communities they serve. This new model, while preserving the *essential* function that police must perform to respond to crime when it occurs in the City, would purposefully add service to the public and *prevention* of crime to the primary functions of our police. Some call this new model “community-based policing,” but many also know it, in part, as “problem-oriented policing” to the extent that a new approach places emphasis upon pro-active problem-solving activities in partnership with the people of a community.

There are not now enough police officers assigned to patrol duties in the City effectively to implement such a proposal. As we describe in Chapter Four, the LAPD has become a complex organization of highly-specialized units. Less than half of the force is available for patrol duty in the geographical Bureaus, and, at most, four percent of these

are on the street in patrol cars during a given watch period.

This deployment configuration places too many officers in staff and special unit assignments to leave a sizeable enough force seriously to implement a community-based or problem-solving approach in the field. A more effective use of available resources would appear to require a reduction in emphasis of special units and a corresponding re-emphasis of the importance of basic patrol duties as the cornerstone for a new Area-based problem-solving approach. Some headquarters and staff units will still be necessary, but it would seem that all levels of the Department should be required to perform some patrol duties on a regular basis. Given the evident importance of field command experience, it would also seem that such experience should be a prerequisite to promotion at the Command Staff level, and that most officers serving at that level should have field command responsibilities.

Accordingly, we make the following recommendations:

1. While continuing to perform the essential mission of responding to crime in the City, the Department should adopt a pro-active problem-solving model of policing in partnership with the communities of the City. The Chief of Police should oversee the development of a specific Department Plan to implement this change.
2. As part of the Department Plan, Department priorities should be fundamentally altered to de-emphasize special units and re-emphasize Area-based patrol duties. As soon as practical, the Department should begin to adjust deployment to reflect the new priorities by reducing the number of officers assigned to special units and staff positions and to re-allocate officers to patrol assignments. To the greatest extent possible, Command Staff level officers — those holding the rank of Captain or above — should be placed in positions

of field command. Their deployment and assignments should correspond to the general re-allocation of police officers to patrol assignments.

3. As part of the change of its priorities to place renewed emphasis upon Area-based patrol duties, the Department should make corresponding re-allocations of vehicles and other equipment as well. In particular, every effort should be made to re-assign to patrol duty as many as possible of the more than 1,600 "unmarked" sedans in its fleet after having them outfitted properly and repainted black and white. In our view, the Department needs these vehicles for patrol duty more than for other purposes.
4. In addition to overall policy and procedural guidance, the Department Plan should detail a process for development of problem-solving plans for the communities served by the police Areas of the City. This process should involve the communities themselves, other affected City agencies, and the LAPD in a problem-solving partnership.
5. To improve police-community relations, the Department should implement a training program to increase the level of understanding with regard to the special concerns of the many diverse communities and cultures that now populate Los Angeles, and to ensure that LAPD police officers treat all individuals in the City with equal dignity and respect.

PREPARATION

After prevention, the next highest priority must be to give serious attention to the City's state of readiness to respond to emergencies. We consciously choose here to employ the broad term, "emergencies," rather than the narrower term, "civil disorders." Our review



Aerial shot of burned-out buildings at the intersection of Vermont and Manchester.

of the state of preparations made by the City in advance of the April disorders inevitably led to examination of the emergency preparedness of the City and, as we have noted elsewhere in this report, the ability of the police department to prepare and respond to civil disorder is bound up with the City's preparation and response mechanisms.

What we have seen gives us cause for grave concern. On the face of it, the City of Los Angeles appears to have put in place an impressive combination of organizations and plans to deal with a wide variety of emergencies and disasters. Below the surface, however, there is reason to question seriously the quality of the City's emergency planning and training, generally, and in the area of civil disorder preparation, in particular.

As we describe in Chapter Five, neither the City nor the LAPD had a real plan for what to do in this emergency. Documents produced by each, and called "plans," upon closer inspection prove to consist in the main of procedure manuals coupled with vague and unspecific statements of policy. On top of their general lack of substance, these documents reveal the almost complete absence of City inter-departmental planning. The general *modus operandi* seems to leave every department to operate on its own, even in emergencies. The failure to work together carries over to training as well. As we note in Chapter Six, there appears to have been little or no joint agency training for civil disorders. The police department, in particular, has been somewhat reluctant to get involved in such "mutual aid" activities, preferring to believe in its ability to handle any problem in the City on its own. Of special concern, there appears to have been no table-top exercises or other training for the leadership levels of either the City or the LAPD to develop their crisis management skills. It is our view that significant change must occur in all areas of emergency preparation so that inter-departmental and mutual aid efforts become an integral part of the City's preparation program.

Over time, the Los Angeles City government has evolved into a diffused power structure. One consequence of this evolution is that it has become difficult to identify who in the City government specifically is responsible for what the City does or does not do. Such was the case in the period of time leading up to the April violence when Los Angeles City government resembled nothing so much as a dysfunctional family. The Mayor, the Police Commission, and the LAPD Deputy Chiefs all appear to have had poor working relationships and communication with the Chief of Police, a condition aggravated in no small part by the City Council's reversal of the attempt to suspend the Chief following the King beating. Indeed, the ascendancy of the 15-member Council to the dominant position of power in the City government structure unduly has complicated the lines of authority and responsibility in the government.

The Council is "the governing body" of the City with broad legislative and budget-making powers, subject to the Mayor's veto power, including the power to create positions, fix salaries, and authorize the number of employees in City departments. The Mayor is the executive officer of the City, with general responsibility, subject to the Council's authority, to supervise all City officers and employees and to secure cooperation between City departments and offices. The combination of his unique reporting relationship with his financial and oversight duties makes the City Administrative Officer, who reports directly to both the Mayor and Council, one of the most powerful officials in the City government. Among other things, the CAO is responsible for preparation and administration of the budget, conducting periodic management audits of City departments, administering the City's risk management program, and coordinating the City's emergency preparedness activities and programs.

The Police Department is placed by ordinance under the "control and management" of the citizen Police Commission, but for

most practical purposes the Department was “controlled and managed” by the Chief of Police during the time period relevant to this report. As general manager and chief administrative officer of the Department, the Chief’s powers and duties were coextensive with its mandate to enforce the law and maintain public order. The Command Staff of the Department — officers with the rank of Captain and higher — are responsible for the day to day supervision of the Department, subject to direction by the Chief.

As we discuss in Chapter Three, under the local emergencies ordinance, the Mayor becomes “Director” of the City’s Emergency Operations Organization (“EOO”) with extraordinarily broad powers and direct supervisory control over operations and personnel, including the Emergency Operations Board (“EOB”), established to manage preparations and response to emergencies. The Chief of Police, as “Deputy Director” of the EOO and permanent Chair of the EOB, appears to have been placed in charge of operations during actual periods of emergency response. The CAO, as Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator, appears to have responsibility for management of preparedness activities during non-emergency times.

In our view, all of these City leaders had some responsibility in the diffused City government structure to oversee emergency preparedness. The Council and Mayor failed to exercise their responsibilities as the City’s “governing body” and “executive officer,” respectively, to make certain that the City and its departments had a plan and were prepared. The City Administrative Officer has failed to take the active part in City-wide planning and training that he is supposed to perform as the City’s coordinator of emergency preparedness. The Police Commission failed to press the question of departmental readiness; plainly it could and should have pursued the matter vigorously. The Chief of Police, and the top levels of his Command Staff, failed to provide a real plan and meaningful training to control the disorder, and were wrong to lead City officials to believe

otherwise. On top of these failures, none of these leaders themselves appear to have engaged in serious efforts individually or collectively to develop their crisis management skills. Consequently, all must bear some of the responsibility for the inadequate performance of City government in this area.

To remedy the situation for the future, we make the following recommendations:

1. The Mayor should direct the Emergency Operations Board as soon as possible to put in place a true master plan for City emergency preparedness, including preparedness for civil disorders. This plan should be developed through an integrated inter-departmental planning process that identifies all reasonably probable contingencies, establishes relevant priorities for emergency response, and puts in place the resource assignments and action steps necessary for the City to achieve these priorities. Specific attention should be given in this process to comprehensive plans that identify probable needs for the use of mutual aid resources and the means of securing such aid in emergencies. As part of this process, all City departments should be required to develop detailed emergency plans for performing their specific assignments.
2. The City Administrative Officer should be placed in charge of completing this process and of producing an adequate master plan, together with adequate departmental plans, under the overall direction of the Mayor. There is some urgency to this task, so it should be completed as soon as possible and, in all events, no later than February 15, 1993. Thereafter, the City Administrative Officer should be responsible for leading the Emergency Operations Board in a comprehensive annual review of the City Master Plan and all related departmental emergency plans.

3. The Mayor should also direct the Emergency Operations Board to develop and put in place a comprehensive program for emergency preparedness training. The development of this program should involve all City departments and agencies necessary to emergency response and should include integrated training for all levels within departments, between departments, and, where possible, with mutual aid resources that are likely to be involved with City resources. Specific attention should be given to putting in place a training program for elected officials, senior managers, and uniformed service commanders to ensure the development of crisis management leadership skills and experience.

4. The Chief of Police should actively participate in this process of developing City-wide priorities, plans, and training programs for emergency preparedness, and should oversee the development of a true Department emergency preparedness plan and training program that reasonably anticipates contingencies and permits the LAPD to operate effectively in support of the City's priorities in cases of civil disorder and other emergencies. Specific attention should be given to the following:

- a. The Department's mechanisms for tactical alert and mobilization during emergencies should be streamlined and made more specific.
- b. Concepts of command and control for emergency response should be simplified. Consideration should be given to reducing or even eliminating requirements for the use of a duplicate command structure and Field Command Posts.
- c. Some method must be found to establish and maintain communications during emergencies from the field to headquarters, between LAPD field units, and between

LAPD and non-LAPD field units.

- d. Attention must be given to logistical support during emergencies, such as transportation, equipment, food, and the like.
- e. Specific plans must be developed for use of mutual aid resources, including especially what assignments to make to mutual aid resources, what command and control to use and how to operate with them.
- f. Strategies and tactics for civil disorder response should be reviewed in light of recent experience in Los Angeles and elsewhere. Particular attention should be given to development of coordinated Department-wide approaches for use in a City-wide emergency, such as improved initial response capability, rapid containment, and an arrest strategy that is fully coordinated with all other agencies that must be involved.
- g. A triage scheme should be developed for the 9-1-1 response system that permits the Department to reduce and restore service according to pre-selected priorities as needed in the event of an emergency.
- h. Plans should be developed to make use of all of the Department's personnel during emergencies. In this connection, consideration should be given to requiring Department personnel who are not involved in undercover work to report periodically and train in uniform to improve readiness.
- i. In addition, the Department should implement a comprehensive program of integrated emergency response training, that includes training for all levels within the Depart-

ment as well as combined training with inter-departmental and mutual aid resources. Field exercises should be routinely carried out as part of the Department's normal training cycle. Significant attention should be given in this program to training officers at the Command Staff level in classroom, tabletop and field exercise settings to improve their leadership and decision-making skills.

5. A comprehensive review should be conducted of the quality and quantity of emergency equipment available for use by the Department. Special attention should be given in this review to the need for higher-quality personal gear (helmets, face-guards and bullet-proof vests); the availability of tear gas and masks; and mobile communications equipment, including hand-held ROVER radios for all police use and cellular telephones for commanders.
6. We recognize that some of our recommendations may result in additional costs. However, even in this time of severe budgetary constraints, the Mayor and Council should ensure that the City budget, and all relevant departmental budgets, includes sufficient funding for adequate emergency preparedness activities and equipment. The failure to fund emergency preparation activities and essential emergency equipment will cause needless loss of life and injury to persons and property in any future emergency.
7. The Chief of Police as general manager and chief administrative officer of the Department must be responsible for the day-to-day management of the police department. However, it is in the best interests of the City and the Department that the citizen Police Commission perform real oversight functions in connection with the Department's operations. To this end, we urge imple-

mentation of recommendations by the Christopher Commission that call for establishment of an independent staff to support the Police Commission.

RESPONSE

Given adequate preparation, response should have been a question of competent performance. While the absence of planning before the April disturbance has complicated the task of evaluating the competency of the performance here, the evident inadequacy of the response requires additional comment. No organization can function if its decision-making mechanism is paralyzed, and that appears to be what happened to both the City and its police department in late April and early May. For a variety of reasons, the decision-making mechanism virtually shut down. Perhaps this might be explained, although not excused, on April 29 in part by the apparent element of "surprise" — the "clean sweep" of defense verdicts, and the speed and ferocity of the outburst that followed seem not to have been anticipated. But the failure more rapidly to reassert control over the next five days in the seven police Areas where the disorder concentrated cannot easily be explained.

Morning meetings at the Emergency Operations Center are reported to have been disorganized and indecisive. Police officers in the field were given little direction from the top and no coordinated City-wide response strategy ever seems to have emerged. Undoubtedly, this helps to explain why the violence mushroomed on April 30. Police efforts in the field helped to reduce the level of activity on Day Three, but it remained relatively high and refused to die out completely for several days after that. It is even possible to argue — with some support from our telephone survey of community attitudes — that only the deployment of National Guard troops, slow as it was, had any real impact in dampening the disorder within the seven most active

Areas. We do not reach such a conclusion, although it is apparent that the coming of National Guard was an important psychological factor in ending the disorder. With the promise of the troops, a general sense of impending return to normalcy appears to have developed. At the same time, police officers began to make arrests to clear the streets. Gradually, order returned to the City.

Even with inadequate preparation, the response should have been quicker, better organized and more effective. That it was not must be attributed first and foremost to the performance of the Chief of Police and his Command Staff. These top police officers appear to have been unable to come to grips with the situation and provide meaningful direction to the rank and file under their command. The Chief of Police, in particular, did not take personal command of the Department's response, as he seemingly should have given the seriousness and confusion of the situation. Even when help appeared in the form of volunteered mutual aid and, eventually, the National Guard and federal troops, the Command Staff seems to have not known how to use the much-needed assistance. This confusion itself appears to have delayed deployment of the troops.

Many observers inside the Department and outside attribute this poor performance to the relative lack of field command experience at the Command Staff level of the Department. In the view of some patrol veterans, too many officers now hold high rank based largely upon a career of staff jobs "in the building"² where they had the time and opportunity to study for promotion examinations. These officers, it is believed, did not have the field experience to know what to do during the crisis. Certainly, the experience of the event bears out this view. Some experienced Command Staff officers appear to have taken charge competently and performed well in the crisis, but many of the most senior Department commanders seem to have been unable to make decisions.

The personal leadership style of Chief Gates also seems to have contributed to the general unwillingness on the part of the Command Staff to make decisions. In one widely-repeated incident, a Deputy Chief who had inquired before April 29 about the need for a plan reminded the Chief of this fact at a morning EOC meeting and was "roundly chewed out" by Gates. "Everyone left the room with their eyes on the ground," according to several accounts of this episode, but no one had a doubt about the wisdom of keeping his or her mouth shut. This reported incident seems indicative of a style that discouraged open discussion and the taking of initiative.

The complete ineffectiveness of the Emergency Operations Center itself deserves special note. Many of the persons assigned to the EOC by City departments appear to have been untrained and of too low a level to perform the coordination job they were there to do. The EOC appears to have been unable for most of the disorder to send or receive real-time communications to and from the outside world, and its primitive information mechanisms collapsed under the pressures of the event. The City must make it a priority to find and equip adequate space for an above-ground EOC as soon as possible. In addition, thought should be given to staffing the emergency center with a small but permanent group of key employees on call 24 hours each day. In addition, serious attention must be given to the basic communications backbone for all of the City's emergency operations.

Accordingly, we make the following additional recommendations:

1. **The Chief of Police should make it a high priority to improve the training, experience and leadership skills of the Command Staff level of the Department. While retaining necessary respect for and responsiveness to superior rank, the command environment of the Department should be altered so**

- as to encourage the exercise of initiative and the willingness to accept decision-making responsibility.
2. As part of the comprehensive emergency planning process recommended above, the Emergency Operations Board should pay particular attention to the operational problems experienced by the City's Emergency Operations Center. Consideration should be given to the following:
 - a. Moving the EOC to a new above-ground facility, perhaps established in Exposition Park, and consisting of a main building with separate satellite buildings to house the operations of City departments.
 - b. Upgrading the level of participation at the EOC in times of serious or major emergencies to department head or deputy levels.
 - c. Putting in place adequate telephone capabilities to permit the EOC to send and receive information and orders as required in an emergency.
 - d. Putting in place a mini-computer network with hardware and software sufficient to allow the EOC to manage information flow as required in emergencies, including some form of "electronic mail" or other like mechanism to facilitate internal communication.
 3. The Chief of Police should review the recent experience of the LAPD Department Command Post, and give consideration to the following:
 - a. Separating the LAPD Department Command Post from the City's EOC.
 - b. Simplifying the organization of the Department Command Post.
 - c. Establishing capabilities to gather and assess information before and during crises, including the placement and use of television sets in all command locations, the use of the Department's helicopter units for air reconnaissance, and systems for meaningful information exchange between field commanders and the Department Commander.
 4. There is great need for a complete overhaul of the City's emergency communications facilities, for they are the critical "backbone" for command and control of all of the City's emergency services. Hopefully, Ordinance Proposition M, to provide funding for this critical modernization, will be approved by the voters in the Special Municipal Election.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN

¹ IACP REPORT, *supra* Chapter 8, note 3, at 2.

² The phrase "in the building" is used by patrol officers to refer to Police Department headquarters at Parker Center.



QUICK

REFERENCE

GUIDE

"A" WATCH: 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. duty hours during a mobilization.

AFTER ACTION REPORT: See Unusual Occurrence After-Action Report.

AIR SUPPORT DIVISION (ASD): A division, consisting of 18 helicopters, that is responsible for providing air support and surveillance to regular operations, and assisting field commanders during unusual events.

ANDREWS, RICHARD: Director, State Office of Emergency Services.

AREA: One of 18 geographic subdivisions of the four geographic Los Angeles Police Department Bureaus, that includes field services and detective divisions. The Areas are: 77th Street Area, Central Area, Devonshire Area, Foothill Area, Harbor Area, Hollenbeck Area, Hollywood Area, Newton Area, Northeast Area, North Hollywood Area, Pacific Area, Rampart Area, Southeast Area, Southwest Area, Van Nuys Area, West Los Angeles Area, West Valley Area, and Wilshire Area.

ASD: See Air Support Division.

ASSISTANT CHIEF: Deputy Chief II. The three police officers immediately below the Chief of Police, who head the three offices into which the Los Angeles Police Department is divided. The three offices are (1) the Office of Administrative Services ("OAS"); (2) the Office of Operations ("OO"); and (3) the Office of Special Services ("OSS").

"B" WATCH: 6:30 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. duty hours during a mobilization.

BANKS, RONALD: On April 29, 1992, Commander Banks was Assistant Commanding Officer of South Bureau, reporting to Deputy Chief Hunt. Currently: Chief of Staff to Chief Willie Williams.

BLOCK, SHERMAN: Sheriff, Los Angeles County. Regional Director, Region I, California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System.

BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS: A five-member citizen commission, appointed by the Mayor for staggered five-year terms; responsible for oversight of the Los Angeles Police Department.

BOOTH, WILLIAM: Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Bureau of Special Investigation. During the disorder, Deputy Chief Booth served as one of the two LAPD Department Commanders.

BRADLEY, TOM: Mayor of the City of Los Angeles.

BUREAU: A major segregation, either functional or geographic, of kindred phases of activities within an office. As used in this report, the term most frequently refers to one of four geographic operations divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department headed by a Deputy Chief, that encompasses smaller geographic subdivisions called Areas. The four geographic operations Bureaus are: Central Bureau, South Bureau, Valley Bureau, and West Bureau.

BUREAU FIELD COMMAND POST CADRE: A temporary cadre activated to assign trained personnel to the Field Command Post for staffing during an unusual occurrence. These personnel remain under the line command of the Bureau Commanding Officer while providing assistance to the Field Commander.

C³I: (Pronounced "C-Cubed-I" or "C-Three-I") Command, Control, Communication and Information (or Intelligence).

CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID PLAN: The plan utilized by California law enforcement entities throughout the state to combine resources and responses to a variety of emergency situations. This plan is prepared by the California Office of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Division and divides the state into seven Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Regions to facilitate coordination of mutual aid. A sheriff from each region is designated the Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator.

CASUALTY INFORMATION CENTER (CIC): An element of the Unusual Occurrence Control Task Force which provides a centralized location for the recordation of all Unusual Occurrence-related casualties. The CIC gathers, records, and disseminates information concerning deaths, injuries, and missing and found persons.

CDC: See Central Dispatch Center.

CENTRAL BUREAU: One of four Los Angeles Police Department geographic operations bureaus encompassing five Los Angeles Police Department Areas: (1) Central Area; (2) Rampart Area; (3) Hollenbeck Area; (4) Northeast Area; and (5) Newton Street Area. On April 29, 1992 the Commanding Officer of Central Bureau was Deputy Chief Bernard Parks.

CENTRAL DISPATCH CENTER (CDC): Located in City Hall East, fourth sub-level, the CDC is the 9-1-1 answer point for all police, fire and paramedic calls for service in Los Angeles, and is the point of dispatch for all police 9-1-1 calls for service in Los Angeles.

CHARTER AMENDMENT F: Charter Amendment based on the recommendations of the Christopher Commission that was adopted by the voters in June, 1992. Among other things, the Charter Amendment (1) provides that the Chief of Police be limited to two five-year terms; (2) facilitates removal of the Chief of Police; (3) provides for greater input by the Mayor and City Council in the selection process for the Chief of Police; and (4) provides that members of the Police Commission serve staggered five-year terms.

CHIEF OF POLICE: General manager and chief administrative officer of the police department.

CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION: The Special Independent Commission appointed by Mayor Bradley in April 1991, after the videotaped beating of motorist Rodney King, to review the structure and operation of the Los Angeles Police Department.

CIC: See Casualty Information Center.

CODE 2H: Radio designation indicating an urgent call for police service; will be assigned immediately to a police unit.

CODE 3: Radio designation indicating an emergency call for police service (e.g., violent crime in progress); assigned police unit will activate red lights and siren when responding.

COMMAND: In the context of responding to a civil disturbance, the command concept includes all of the city's organizational levels from the Emergency Operations Organization to the police officers and firefighters responding to the emergency. The command concept involves receiving and analyzing information about the situation, generating and considering options, selecting the best option, and sending out orders to implement that option.

COMMAND POST: See Field Command Post.

COMMAND POST CADRE: Personnel who are specially trained in the functions of the Command Post.

COMMANDING OFFICER: LAPD officer in charge of a bureau, group, area, or a division of the Department.

COMMUNICATIONS: The means by which information is sent back and forth between a commander and the commander's forces.

COMRIE, KEITH: Los Angeles City Administrative Officer (CAO).

CONTROL: The organization or structures or lines of command through which a commander's decisions in the form of orders are passed to the forces charged with carrying those orders out.

COVAULT, MARVIN: Major General, 7th Infantry Division, U.S. Army; Commanding Officer of the federal troops, including the National Guard after federalization, during the disturbance.

CP: See Command Post.

CRASH: Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums; LAPD unit that focuses on gang violence.

CROWD: A group of individuals who have temporarily identified themselves with common values and who are experiencing similar emotions. It is characterized as law abiding, unorganized, without leadership, hesitant, ruled by reason, and lacking the intent to violate the law.

DELK, JAMES: Brigadier General, Military Field Commander of California National Guard during the civil disturbance in April, 1992.

DEPARTMENT COMMAND POST: A location staffed with personnel charged with the responsibility of formulating overall emergency control strategy during a disaster or other emergency. The Emergency Control Center (ECC) is the Department Command Post during a Serious or Major Unusual Occurrence.

DEPARTMENT COMMANDER: The Chief of Police, unless the Chief designates another LAPD officer as the Department Commander.

DEPUTY CHIEF: Deputy Chief I. The police officers that rank, in order of command, immediately below the Assistant Chiefs. The Deputy Chiefs usually are in charge of Bureaus. There are nine Deputy Chiefs in the Los Angeles Police Department.



DETECTIVE SERVICES GROUP: The Los Angeles Police Department Group that includes the Detective Headquarters Division, the Detective Support Division, the Bunco-Forgery Division, the Robbery-Homicide Division, the Burglary-Auto Theft Division, the Juvenile Division, the Investigative Analysis Section, and the Traffic Coordination Section. In addition to providing investigative services, the Detective Headquarters Division is responsible for special duties when the Office of the Chief of Police is closed, or during an unusual occurrence.

DIRECTOR: The Commanding Officer of one of the three LAPD Departmental Offices: Office of Administrative Services, Office of Operations and Office of Special Services.

DOTSON, DAVID: The former Assistant Chief and Director of the LAPD Office of Administrative Services; retired from the Department in early June 1992.

ECC: See Emergency Control Center.

ECCCS: See Emergency Command Control Communications System.

EMC: See Emergency Management Committee.

EMERGENCY: An incident involving potential or actual death, injury and/or property loss.

EMERGENCY COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (ECCCS): The LAPD's emergency command, control and communications system; is the 9-1-1 answer point for all police, fire and paramedic calls for service in Los Angeles; dispatches all 9-1-1 police calls for service; interfaces between the LAPD Command Staff, the police officers, and the public; provides law enforcement database capabilities.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC): The Department Command Post and headquarters for the Department Commander during a Serious or Major Unusual Occurrence. It is staffed to coordinate and provide services, personnel, equipment and supplies to the Field Task Force.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER DIVISION: A temporary division activated for purposes of staffing the Emergency Control Center (ECC). Personnel assigned provide staff assistance to the Department Commander but remain under line command of the ECC Commanding Officer.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (EMC): The working staff of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB). Representatives from the Los Angeles Police Department, Fire Department, Office of the City Administrative Officer, Public Works, Water and Power, Harbor Department, Department of Airports, City Planning, Building and Safety, Animal Regulation, Recreation and Parks, Transportation, General Services, Personnel, and the City Attorney's Office are members of the EMC. The EMC is chaired by the Chief Administrative Analyst in the Office of the City Administrative Officer.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD (EOB): The EOB manages the affairs of the City's Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) and issues instructions to the chiefs of the Emergency Operations Organization divisions. The EOB has the power to make and enforce necessary regulations to govern the Emergency Operations Organization during periods of planning and during emergencies. The EOB may also appoint committees for the administration of its affairs. The EOB reports directly to the Mayor in his role as EOO Director. The EOB is chaired by the Chief of Police, who is also the Deputy Director of the EOO. The EOB also consists of the following members: Chief Engineer and General Manager, Fire Department; City Administrative Officer; Commissioner, Department of Public Works; General Manager and Chief Engineer, Department of Water and Power; General Manager, Department of Personnel; Superintendent of Building and General Manager, Department of Building and Safety; General Manager, Department of General Services; General Manager, Department of Transportation.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC): Located in City Hall East, fourth sub-level, the EOC is a facility for the centralized direction and control of the City's Emergency Operations Organization (EOO). It communicates with all City departments and selected outside agencies.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MASTER PLAN: A document that is supposed to provide a basis for the conduct and coordination of resources during disasters and/or major emergencies in the City of Los Angeles. The document outlines the operation of the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO), and provides a general description of City and departmental functions during a disaster.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION (EOO): An organization, comprised of representatives of each City department, that is divided into 12 divisions with special responsibilities for planning and emergency response. The EOO was established to coordinate and direct the City's resources toward controlling disasters and other emergencies. The EOO is comprised of the following divisions: Police Division; Fire Suppression and Rescue Division; Transportation Division; Public Works Division; Utilities Division; General Services Division; Building and Safety Division; Personnel and Recruitment Division; Public Welfare and Shelter Division; Harbor Division; Airports Division; and Animal Regulation Division.

EOB: See Emergency Operations Board.

EOC: See Emergency Operations Center.

EOO: See Emergency Operations Organization.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION COORDINATOR: The City Administrative Officer (CAO), who is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the powers and responsibilities of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) and the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) itself, liaising with city departments and other governmental and private agencies, assigning personnel from the CAO's Office to staff the EOB and Emergency Management Committee (EMC), and coordinating and providing public information relating to the emergency.

FCP: See Field Command Post.

FIELD COMMANDER: An LAPD officer who has line command over a given tactical area of responsibility; the Field Commander's command includes administrative and operational responsibility for the tactical area and the Field Command Post.

FIELD COMMAND POST (FCP): A temporary location, comprised of personnel and equipment, established by a Field Commander to direct Field Task Force operations toward control of an emergency, assemble and assign Department resources, collect intelligence, communicate with control forces and maintain necessary records. A FCP may be mobile or fixed, according to the location, nature, and extent of the emergency.

FIELD COMMAND POST DIVISION: A temporary division activated for the purpose of staffing the Field Command Post (FCP) during a Serious or Major Unusual Occurrence, or when a Serious or Major Unusual Occurrence appears imminent. Personnel assigned provide staff assistance to the Field Commander, but remain under the line command of the FCP Division Commanding Officer.

FIELD JAIL UNIT: A field facility or temporary location for the preliminary reception, field identification, initial processing and detention of arrestees pending transportation to a designated detention facility for formal processing.

FIELD TASK FORCE: The LAPD's overall field operations concerned with the control of an emergency, regardless of how many Field Command Posts are in operation. The Field Task Force does not include the Emergency Control Center (ECC), Intelligence Control Center (ICC), or Casualty Information Center (CIC).

FIELD TASK FORCE COMMANDER: The commanding officer of the operations bureau in which a unusual occurrence occurs, unless another staff officer is appointed by the Department Commander. If the unusual occurrence encompasses more than one operations bureau, the Director, Office of Operations, designates which bureau commanding officer will be the Field Task Force Commander. The Field Task Force Commander is responsible for evaluating the Field Task Force needs, and coordinating the distribution of resources to the involved area. The Field Task Force Commander is also responsible for advising the Department Commander as to the utilization of personnel and equipment.

FORWARD STAGING AREA: A location in proximity to an incident where personnel and equipment are assembled and may be deployed or held in ready reserve.

FRANKLE, RONALD: Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, LAPD Headquarters Bureau. During the disorder, Deputy Chief Frankle served as one of the two LAPD Department Commanders.

GATES, CHIEF DARYL F.: Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department on April 29, 1992. Chief Gates subsequently retired.

GEOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS BUREAUS: Four geographic divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department responsible for providing uniformed, traffic, and investigative activities within their jurisdiction. The four geographic operations bureaus are: Central Bureau, South Bureau, Valley Bureau and West Bureau. In addition to administrative offices, each geographic operations bureau is composed of its Area subdivisions, a traffic division, and a CRASH Section.

HANNIGAN, MAURICE: Commissioner, Commanding Officer, California Highway Patrol, on April 29, 1992.

HEADQUARTERS BUREAU: LAPD Bureau that includes the Uniformed Services Group, and the Detective Services Group.

HUNT, MATTHEW: Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, LAPD South Bureau.

ICC: See Intelligence Control Center.

INCIDENT: Information received from the first 9-1-1 call reporting a crime, which is entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) System (part of the LAPD's Emergency Command Control Communications System (ECCCS)). All subsequent calls regarding the same incident are treated as duplicates of the prior incident.

INTELLIGENCE CONTROL CENTER (ICC): An element of the Unusual Occurrence Control Task Force which provides a centralized location of the recordation, evaluation, and dissemination of information gathered during an Unusual Occurrence or any emergency which requires an information gathering operation.

INVOLVED AREA: That portion of the City directly affected by an emergency where there has been, or there exists, a threat to life and/or property and the boundaries have been, or are to be, prescribed.

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER: Major General Covault, 7th Infantry Division, U.S. Army; commander of federal troops, including California National Guard troops after federalization, during April, 1992 civil disturbance.

JEFFERSON, PAUL: Captain, Commanding Officer, LAPD 77th Street Area on April 29, 1992. Currently: Chief of Police, Modesto, California.

JONES, JAMES: Commander, Commanding Officer, LAPD Support Services Bureau on April 29, 1992. Currently: Acting Director, Office of Administrative Services.

KALISH, DAVID: Captain, Commanding Officer, LAPD Planning and Research Division; in charge of Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during April, 1992 civil disturbance.

KERNER COMMISSION: National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders created by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 and chaired by Otto Kerner.

KROEKER, MARK: Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, LAPD Valley Bureau.

LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID: The support and assistance rendered by regular and reserve peace officers of one jurisdiction to another in declared emergencies. Law Enforcement Mutual Aid is provided in accordance with the provisions of the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, pertinent portions of other state codes, and agreements between local law enforcement agencies.

LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID SYSTEM (LEMAS): The system, through which the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan is administered. LEMAS contemplates the involvement of individuals and agencies at four levels: city, county, region, and state.

LEMAS: See Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System.

LEVANT, GLENN: Deputy Chief, Former Commanding Officer, LAPD West Bureau.

LEWIS, BAYAN: Commander, Commanding Officer, LAPD Uniformed Services Group (includes Metro Division, Air Support Division and Tactical Planning Section).

LINE COMMAND: The exercise of the authority of command delegated by the Chief of Police to the Chief's immediate subordinates, and by them to their subordinates, down the lines of direct command to the lowest level of authority.

LOCAL EMERGENCIES ORDINANCE: Ordinance amending Chapter 3 of Division 8 of the Los Angeles Administrative Code that contains provisions for local emergency preparedness in the City of Los Angeles.

LOCAL EMERGENCY: The existence of a disaster or extreme peril to persons and/or property within the City, proclaimed by the Mayor or someone acting in his stead, resulting from fire, flood, storm, epidemic, air pollution, earthquake, civil disturbance, or conditions other than those arising out of a labor controversy.

LOGISTICS: The procurement, maintenance, and transportation of material, facilities and personnel.

MAGNIFICENT SEVEN ("MAG 7") PROGRAM: The program whereby community-based policing was instituted in seven Los Angeles Police Department Areas — Foothill, 77th Street, Harbor, Southeast, Hollenbeck, Northeast and Pacific — under the direct control of Former Chief Daryl Gates.

MATTINGLY, SHIRLEY: Chief Administrative Analyst, Office of the City Administrative Officer (CAO); Chair of the Emergency Management Committee (EMC).

McCONE COMMISSION: The Governor's Commission on the 1965 Watts Riots, chaired by John A. McCone, that investigated the underlying causes of the Los Angeles Watts Riots.

MDT: See Mobile Digital Terminal.

METRO: See Metropolitan Division.

METROPOLITAN DIVISION: Elite LAPD unit; includes the Rapid Response, SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics), and Crisis Negotiation Teams.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: The support and assistance rendered by state or federal military forces during a riot, rebellion, insurrection, or other emergency in accordance with the California Emergency Services Act, California Master Mutual Aid Agreement, California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, and various state and federal codes.

MINIMUM OPERATING FORCE: The minimum number of personnel needed by an Area or division to perform essential police activities, e.g., police work of major importance during an Unusual Occurrence.

MOB: A group whose members, under the stimulus of intense excitement or agitation, lose their sense of reason and respect for law and follow leaders in lawless acts. Mobs are usually organized, have leadership, and a common motive for action, but are ruled by emotion.

MOBILE DIGITAL TERMINAL (MDT): A computer terminal located in patrol vehicles that receives automatic dispatches and allows officers in the field direct access to Emergency Command Control Communications System (ECCS) information. MDTs allow officers to send and receive messages to other personnel in the field, as well as to the bureaus or areas.

MOBILIZATION: The principal LAPD plan to marshall personnel resources for control of a Major Unusual Occurrence. The preliminary stage of a Mobilization is a Tactical Alert. A Mobilization includes: the immediate implementation of 12-hour "A" and "B" watches, the deferment of days-off, and the recalling of off-duty officers.

MOTORS: LAPD Motorcycle officers.

MOULIN, MICHAEL: Lieutenant, Watch Commander, 77th Area on April 29, 1992.

MUELLER, ROBERT S. III: Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) during April, 1992 civil disturbance.

MUTUAL AID: See Law Enforcement Mutual Aid.

MUTUAL AID REGION: One of seven geographic regions under the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan.

OAS: See Office of Administrative Services.

OCID: See Organized Crime Intelligence Division.

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS): One of three LAPD offices under the Chief of Police. The OAS is comprised of three Bureaus: the Fiscal Support Bureau, the Personnel and Training Bureau and the Support Services Bureau. The function of the OAS is, in part, to administer personnel services and training programs; research, develop, and report on various areas of potential improvement in Department policies and procedures, and computer-based programs; coordinate and control grant programs; conduct fiscal operations; provide legal research, statistical analyses and audits of Department forms; prepare directives amending policies and procedures; provide auxiliary services; and monitor and track lawsuits involving, or of interest to, the Department.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE: The Office of the Chief of Police is composed of the Anti-Terrorist Division, Administrative Section, Inspection and Control Section, Liaison Section, Press Relations Section, Community Relations Section, Employee Relations Section, and the Chief's General Staff.

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES (OES): The office responsible for Law Enforcement Mutual Aid coordination at the State level, through the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. In times of emergency, the OES receives requests for mutual aid from Regional Law Enforcement Coordinators. Additionally, the OES is responsible for the receipt and dissemination of information relating to existing or potential disasters or other emergencies.

OES: See Office of Emergency Services.

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS (OO): One of three LAPD offices under the Chief of Police. The OO accounts for roughly 84 percent of total, and 89 percent of sworn, LAPD personnel. The OO includes five operations Bureaus: Headquarters, and the four geographical Bureaus, Central, South, West, and Valley. The OO's functions are to stimulate general mutual understanding between the Department and the community in order to prevent crime; patrol the street to deter crime; identify, arrest, and cooperate in prosecution of criminal offenders; recover and return lost or stolen property; enforce traffic laws, direct traffic, and investigate traffic collisions; assist and advise the public in routine and emergency situations; coordinate Area vice enforcement and vice enforcement support activities, and maintain any vice special files.

OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES (OSS): One of three LAPD offices under the Chief of Police, the OSS is composed of the Bureau of Special Investigation, the Internal Affairs Division, and the Organized Crime Intelligence Division. The function of the OSS is to record and investigate complaints against Department employees, and process disciplinary cases; collect and disseminate intelligence information relative to organized crime; monitor narcotic and vice enforcement efforts; monitor labor disputes and investigate related crimes; direct and coordinate public relations programs; maintain an Undesirable Informant File; issue consular identification cards; maintain a record of aggravated incidents involving consular officers and their families; and report to the Chief of Police on Department contacts with consular officers.

OFFICER/SWORN PERSONNEL: Those employees of the Los Angeles Police Department, regardless of rank, who are sworn in, as provided by law, to perform the duties of a regular police officer of the City of Los Angeles. This includes reserve officers while on-duty.

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE: An LAPD officer having charge of a section or unit.

OO: See Office of Operations.

ORGANIZED CRIME INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (OCID): A division of the LAPD Office of Special Services; OCID personnel staff the Intelligence Control Center (ICC), once the ICC is activated during an Unusual Occurrence (UO).

OSS: See Office of Special Services.

PARKER CENTER: Headquarters of the Los Angeles Police Department.

PARKS, BERNARD: Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, LAPD Central Bureau.

PERIMETER: An imaginary line or boundary of a closed or involved area which has been prescribed by a Field or Incident Commander. A perimeter can designate the involved and/or closed area(s). There may be several types or a combination of perimeters employed during emergency control efforts.

PIC: See Planning, Intelligence and Control.

PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE AND CONTROL (PIC): The PIC concept is **planning** and **control** based on **intelligence**. Plans are implemented by monitoring the progress, success, or failure of each mission. The intelligence process from field units is circular: intelligence from the field is compiled into reports concerning such things as mob size, tactics, locations, damage assessments, perimeter adjustments and the estimated duration of the emergency. These reports are necessary for evaluation and modification of control plans. New directions are then communicated back to field units.

PLANNING AND RESEARCH DIVISION (PRD): LAPD Division responsible for directing the research and planning of various issues for the Department. PRD staff is transferred to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to assist in its operations whenever the EOC is activated.

POLICE COMMISSION: See Board of Police Commissioners.

POLICE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE (PSR): Civilian employee in the Emergency Command Control Communications Systems (ECCCS) Division, who answers and dispatches 9-1-1 calls.

POLICY: Principles and values which guide the performance of LAPD activity; establishes the limits of action; *not* a statement of what must be done in a particular situation.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A statute, codified at Title 18 U.S.C. § 1885, that prohibits involvement of the U.S. military in traditional law enforcement functions, with certain exceptions.

PRD: See Planning and Research Division.

PROCEDURE: A method of performing an operation or proceeding on a course of action; directs response within the limits of action established by policy.

PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: A City Council committee that has oversight responsibility for the Police, Fire and Animal Regulation Departments. This committee is currently chaired by Councilmember Marvin Braude.

RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT: The Southern California Rapid Transit District (RTD). The RTD has jurisdiction over an area that covers approximately 2,300 square miles and five counties, and serves 1.3 million transit passengers daily.

READY RESERVE: The status of those officers who are assigned to the Field Task Force and, at the direction of the Field Commander, are being held in reserve, usually in the vicinity of the Field Command Post.

REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR: The sheriff designated the Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator of one of seven regions in the state. The Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator receives requests for Law Enforcement Mutual Aid from the Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator(s) within that same Region. Sheriff Sherman Block is the Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator for Los Angeles County and the Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator for Region I (Los Angeles and Orange Counties).

ROVER: Mobile hand-held radio.

RTD: See Rapid Transit District.

SCRAG: Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General; determines acceptability of missions for purposes of federal troop and federalized national guard troop deployment during civil disturbance. Position held by Robert Mueller, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice during the April, 1992 civil disturbance.

SECTOR: A subdivision of an involved area established for more effective control of deployed personnel and to ensure accountability for a particular geographic portion of an emergency. A sector may be divided into zones.

SENIOR LEAD OFFICER (SLO): The leader of a basic car plan team who acts as a community relations officer. Designated to monitor conditions within an assigned neighborhood, organize neighborhood watch groups and hold crime-prevention meetings.

SITUATION REPORT: A periodic report, from a Field Command Post or the Emergency Control Center, containing significant Unusual Occurrence-related information, distributed to the Department Commander and/or the Office of the Chief of Police.

SLO: See Senior Lead Officer.

SOUTH BUREAU: One of four LAPD geographic operations bureaus, encompassing four Areas: (1) Southwest Area; (2) Harbor Area; (3) 77th Street Area; and (4) Southeast Area. On April 29, 1992 the Commanding Officer of the South Bureau was Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt.

SOUTH BUREAU COMMAND POST: The field command post for the South Bureau that was set up in the Crenshaw Plaza Shopping Center during the April, 1992 civil disturbance.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40: The order signed by Former Chief Daryl Gates on November 27, 1979 setting forth the official policy for the LAPD concerning undocumented aliens. The order provides that the Department shall not arrest or book a person for illegal entry or being an undocumented alien. The order further provides that only when an undocumented alien has been booked for "multiple misdemeanor offenses, a high grade misdemeanor or felony offense, or has been previously been arrested for a similar offense, shall the Los Angeles Police Department notify the INS of the arrest." The purpose behind the policy is to encourage undocumented aliens, who are often victims of crimes, to report the crimes to the LAPD and otherwise communicate with the Department without fear of deportation.

SPECIAL ORDERS: Directives issued only by the Chief of Police to establish or implement Department policy and procedure, and also to amend the Department Manual.

STAFF OFFICER: An LAPD Officer above the rank of Captain.

STAFF RESPONSIBILITY: Responsibility given to an LAPD staff member for developing and recommending policies and procedures, and evaluating the Department's compliance with those policies and procedures.

STAGING AREA: A location approved by the Field Commander for the collection, storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of personnel, vehicles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve. The Staging Area may also be used for the temporary storage of booked property and impounded vehicles.

STANDING PLAN: Emergency plan made by each LAPD Area, containing priorities and plans unique to the Area.

SUPERVISOR: LAPD employee engaged in field supervision or in general supervision of a section or unit.

TACTICAL ALERT: The preliminary stage of the Department Mobilization Plan. A Tactical Alert is an announcement of the anticipated redistribution of on-duty officers to achieve personnel levels necessary for controlling an emergency.

TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: That portion of an Involved Area which is the responsibility of a Field Commander, or assigned to any individual, unit, or Field Task Force element.

TACTICAL MANUAL: The LAPD's overall plan for response to all types of Unusual Occurrences, including civil disturbances.

TACTICAL PLANNING SECTION (TPS): The Section responsible for the LAPD's Tactical Manual. The Section also coordinates planning for natural emergencies and unusual occurrences, training and exercises to prepare for such operations, maintains and deploys the Mobile Command Fleet, and monitors the activities of the Field Command Post Division.

"THIN BLUE LINE": A phrase coined by Former Police Chief William Parker, that became synonymous with the LAPD, referring to the Department's image: a professional, but tough, crime-fighting police force.

THRASHER, ROBERT: Major General, Commanding Officer, California National Guard.

TPS: See Tactical Planning Section.

UNITY OF COMMAND: The imperative that subordinates are subject to the direction of a single supervisor at any one time. Unity of command assures unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal.

UNITY OF EFFORT: The coordinated action of all forces toward the common goal of emergency control.

UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE (UO): An event involving potential or actual personal injury and/or property damage arising from fire, flood, storm, earthquake, tidal wave, landslide, wreck, enemy action, civil disturbance, or other natural or man-caused incident necessitating the declaration of a Tactical Alert or Mobilization. An Unusual Occurrence has three classifications:

- **Minor:** An Unusual Occurrence which can be controlled by on-duty field personnel from the Area involved, Metropolitan Division, traffic divisions, and the assistance usually available from other Areas (patrol units responding to radio calls in adjacent Areas on a normal basis).
- **Serious:** A Unusual Occurrence of such proportion that the facilities usually available to one Area are inadequate to establish control and which may require temporary modification of the LAPD organization.
- **Major:** An Unusual Occurrence which threatens the safety of the City to such an extent that it is necessary to mobilize the entire Department, or major portions of the Department, to fulfill its responsibilities. During a Major UO, the Department will be reorganized to that extent necessary to accomplish control and termination of the emergency.

UO: See Unusual Occurrence.

UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE CONTROL TASK FORCE: All LAPD personnel committed to line and support activities directly concerned with the control of an Unusual Occurrence (UO). The UO Control Task Force includes the Department Commander, and personnel assigned to the Field Task Force, Emergency Control Center, Casualty Information Center, Intelligence Control Center, and Field Command Post(s).

UO CONTROL TASK FORCE: See Unusual Occurrence Control Task Force.

VALLEY BUREAU: One of four LAPD geographic operations bureaus, comprised of the following five areas: (1) Van Nuys Area; (2) West Valley Area; (3) North Hollywood Area; (4) Foothill Area; and (5) Devonshire Area. On April 29, 1992, the Commanding Officer was Deputy Chief Mark Kroeker.

VERNON, ROBERT: Former LAPD Assistant Chief who was the Director the Office of Operations until he went on leave on April 24, 1992, in conjunction with his retirement in early June, 1992.

WATCH COMMANDER: A Los Angeles Police Department employee having charge of a specific watch (shift) in a division or geographic Area.

WEST BUREAU: One of four LAPD geographic operations bureaus, comprised of the following Los Angeles Police Department Areas: (1) Hollywood Area; (2) Wilshire Area; (3) West Los Angeles Area; and (4) Pacific Area. On April 29, 1992, the Commanding Officer was Deputy Chief Glenn Levant.

ZONE: A subdivision of a sector. A zone may be divided into beats.



THE STUDY

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Special Advisor William H. Webster and Deputy Special Advisor Hubert Williams were appointed on May 11, 1992, by the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, who asked them to investigate and report back to the Commissioners on the preparation and response of the Los Angeles Police Department to the events following the verdict in the trial of the four officers involved in the arrest of Rodney King. The Commissioners also asked the Special Advisor and Deputy Special Advisor to identify what improvements may be necessary in Departmental policy and procedures in the event of a similar outbreak of civil disturbance in the future.

With the advice of their Staff, the Advisors designated specific subjects in which intensive work was to be undertaken. Then, the Staff, on the basis of consultation with the Advisors and Police Consultants, prepared preliminary work plans relating to these subjects. The Staff also began the process of gathering and analyzing data and preparing, for review and analysis by the Advisors, drafts of material in furtherance of development of the final report.

The work of the Staff was initially divided into major substantive areas, based on sources of data: The Los Angeles Police Department, Other Law Enforcement and Public Safety Agencies, Public Officials, Community, and Other Police Departments. Concentrating on each area was a team consisting of Deputy General Counsel, Counsel and Police Consultants. The volunteer Staff numbered well over 100, and included lawyers, police officers, and a variety of professional consultants. The General Counsel and Staff Director directed the Staff's work. All told, the staff devoted more than 25,000 hours to the study.

The Staff's research and inquiries over 160 days took many forms. The Staff interviewed over 100 current and former Los Angeles

Police Department officers, more than 50 current and former City and County officials, over 50 representatives of other local law enforcement agencies, close to 100 State and Federal officials and agency personnel, almost 50 high level police officials from across the country, and close to 60 members of the Los Angeles community. The Staff also collected and reviewed tens of thousands of pages of documents from the Los Angeles Police Department, City, County, State and Federal agencies, other law enforcement agencies, and a variety of public sources.

In addition, the Advisors held seven community meetings, during which close to 150 members of the community stepped to the microphone to speak. The Staff also conducted over 1,000 telephone interviews of community members during a three-day community attitude survey. In an effort to obtain comparative data, the Staff surveyed the police departments in 72 of the largest cities across the country through a detailed written questionnaire.

The final product of the Advisors' work consists of this report, and the accompanying appendices, which contain an explanation of the Advisors' findings and recommendations.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTERVIEWS

Lieutenant Steven P. Allen, Pacific Area
Sergeant Lee Allen, Foothill Area
Commander Ronald C. Banks, Chief of Staff to Chief Willie L. Williams, former Assistant Commanding Officer, South Bureau
Sergeant Dennis Barbello, Assistant Watch Commander, Pacific Area
Al M. Beuerlein, Commanding Officer, Fiscal Support Bureau
Detective John H. Byun, Burglary Auto Theft Division
Sergeant Chris Bonilla, Southeast Area
Tonja Boutney, Police Service Representative
Linda Bunker, Commanding Officer, Emergency Command Control Communications System Division
Sergeant Tom Burris, Central Area
John Byun, Korean American Officers of LAPD
Captain Janice L. Carlson, Commanding Officer, Pacific Area
Officer Rodney Cato, Wilshire Area
Officer John Celentano, Wilshire Area
Captain Jerry W. Conner, Commanding Officer, Central Area
Officer Donna Cox, Pacific Area
Sergeant Leonard Cross, Foothill Area
Captain Julius I. Davis, Commanding Officer, Wilshire Area
Sergeant William De La Torre, West Los Angeles Area
Captain Alan B. Deal, Commanding Officer, Rampart Area
Lieutenant Vincent Di Mauro, Foothill Area
Commander Charles F. Dinse, Assistant Commanding Officer, Valley Bureau, former Administrative Commander, Office of the Chief of Police
Commander Lawrence E. Feters, Assistant to the Director of Operations
Sergeant Robert Gandy, Officer-In-Charge, Long-Range Planning Unit, Planning & Research Division
Daryl F. Gates, Former Chief of Police
Officer Brian Gilman, Newton Area
Lieutenant George G. Godwin, Communications Division
Sergeant Gerald Goodrich, Southeast Area
Detective David Grabelski, South Bureau CRASH Unit
Officer Mark Green, Pacific Area
Officer Adam Greenburg, Pacific Area
Sergeant Paul Haberman, A.M. Watch Commander Foothill Area Patrol Division
Lieutenant Bruce E. Hagerty, Commanding Officer, South Bureau Homicide, former Commanding Officer, 77th Street Area Detective Division
Officer Chris Hajduk, Central Area
Lieutenant Donald C. Hartwell, Detective Headquarters Division
Officer Brent Honore, Central Area
Deputy Chief Matthew V. Hunt, Commanding Officer, South Bureau
Paul D. Jefferson, former Captain, Commanding Officer, 77th Street Area
Commander James D. Jones, Acting Commanding Officer, Support Services Bureau
Sergeant Jerry Jones, Emergency Command Control Communications System Division
Captain David J. Kalish, Planning & Research Division
Sergeant Leo Kerchenske, Wilshire Area
Officer Mike Koeller, Foothill Area CRASH Unit
Captain Robert E. Kurth, Commanding Officer, Wilshire Area Patrol Division

Officer Paul Lambert, Wilshire Area
Sergeant Al Landry, Southeast Area
Sergeant Scott Landsman, Pacific Area
Captain Russell K. Leach, Commanding Officer, Pacific Area Patrol Division
Commander Bayan Lewis, Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group
Sergeant Dominic Licavoli, Rampart Area
Sergeant Don Linfield, Central Area
Officer Michael Lockett, Southeast Area
Officer Claudia Lomeli, Central Area
Lieutenant Thomas W. Lorenzen, Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons & Tactics Platoon
Lieutenant S. Ludwig, Central Area
Officer Julie Mackey, Patrol Officer
Lieutenant Lawrence A. Manchester, Southeast Area
Captain James T. McBride, Commanding Officer, Foothill Area
Sergeant Paul McConnel, Assistant Watch Commander, Newton Area
Sergeant John Mealy, Central Area
Commander George Morrison, Former Chief of Staff to Chief Daryl Gates
Lieutenant Rick T. Morton, Commanding Officer, Newton Area Detectives Division
Lieutenant Michael M. Moulin, 77th Street Area
Lieutenant James P. Murphy, Burglary-Auto Theft Division, former Adjutant, Fiscal Support Bureau
Sergeant Jose Najera, Foothill Area
Captain Gabriel E. Ornelas, Commanding Officer, Foothill Area Patrol Division
Sergeant John Paige, Newton Area
Captain Willie L. Pannell, Commanding Officer, Southeast Area Patrol Division
Sergeant Whitney Pauley, Newton Area
Officer Stephany Payne, Foothill Area
Commander Frank E. Piersol, Liaison to the Board of Police Commissioners
Officer Christine Pimes, Wilshire Area
Sergeant Sol Polen, P.M. Watch Commander, Foothill Area Patrol Division
Detective Cesario Reyes, Bunco-Forgery Division
Sergeant Michael Rogers, Pacific Area
Lieutenant Kent Setty, Pacific Area
Sergeant Morris Smith, Planning & Research Division
Sergeant Charles Stubbs, Pacific Area
Captain John R. Trundle, Southeast Area
Sergeant Peter Vanson, Southeast Area
Robert Vernon, Former Assistant Chief and Director of the Office of Operations
Lieutenant Bruce S. Ward, Commanding Officer, Tactical Planning Section
Lieutenant Marlin D. Warkentin, Commanding Officer, Rampart Area Detective Division
Captain Daniel B. Watson, Personnel Division
Bill Williams, former Lieutenant, Watch Commander, Pacific Area
Lieutenant Gary S. Williams, Inspection and Control Section
Officer Isaiah Williams, Wilshire Area
Sergeant Bruce Wilson, Hollywood Area
Lieutenant Paul F. Wright, Watch Commander, Communications Division
Officer Glen Younger, Foothill Area
Anonymous, Burglary Auto Theft Division
Anonymous, Central Area
Anonymous 1, Newton Area
Anonymous 2, Newton Area
Anonymous 3, Newton Area
Anonymous 1, Rampart Area
Anonymous 2, Rampart Area

Anonymous 3, Rampart Area
Anonymous 4, Rampart Area
Anonymous 5, Rampart Area
Anonymous 6, Rampart Area

CITY OFFICIALS **INTERVIEWS**

MAYOR

Tom Bradley, Mayor

Mark Fabiani, Deputy Mayor and Chief of Staff
Linda Griego, Deputy Mayor
Philip Depoian, Special Counsel to the Mayor
Jane Ellison, Counsel to the Mayor

CITY COUNCIL

Richard Alatorre
Ernani Bernardi
Hal Bernson
Marvin Braude
Ruth Galanter
Nate Holden
Joy Picus
Mark Ridley-Thomas
Joel Wachs
Rita Walters
Michael Woo
Zev Yaroslavsky

BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

Jesse Brewer, President
Anthony De Los Reyes
Ann Reiss Lane
Stanley Sheinbaum
Michael Yamaki

Melanie Lomax, former President
Reva Tooley, former Commissioner

CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

Keith Comrie, City Administrative Officer

Stephen Wong, Assistant City Administrative Officer
Robert Canfield, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Peter DiCarlo, Police Budget Analyst
Shirley Mattingly, Chief Administrative Analyst

CHIEF LEGISLATIVE ANALYST

William McCarley, Chief Legislative Analyst
Ron Deaton, Assistant Legislative Analyst

CITY ATTORNEY

James Hahn, City Attorney

OTHER CITY AGENCIES **INTERVIEWS**

FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Engineer Donald Manning

Assistant Chief Ed Allen
Deputy Chief Donald F. Anthony
Battalion Chief David Badgett
Chief Alan R. Cowen, Commander, Bureau of Emergency Medical Services
Battalion Chief Claud Creasey
Battalion Chief Terry Manning
Battalion Chief Tim Manning
Battalion Chief Robert McMillan
Assistant Chief Jim O'Neill
Assistant Chief Robert R. Ramirez
Assistant Chief Merlin Rudd
Battalion Chief Warford

DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER

Paul Jensen, Manager, Distribution Operation Section

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICIALS **INTERVIEWS**

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

Michael Antonovich, Supervisor
Dean Dana, Supervisor
Edmund C. Edelman, Supervisor

Bradley Pye, Jr., Assistant Chief Deputy to Kenneth Hahn
Jim Cleaver, Senior Deputy to Supervisor Kenneth Hahn

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Ira Reiner, District Attorney

Gregory Thompson, Chief Deputy District Attorney
John F. Lynch, Director of Central Operations
Jack White, Chief of Bureau of Investigation

PUBLIC DEFENDER

Michael P. Judge, Assistant Public Defender

PROBATION DEPARTMENT

Bert X. Davila, Director of Specialized Gang Supervision Program
Roger Tobey, Supervising Deputy Probation Officer, Metropolitan Specialized Gang Unit

HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Eugene Mornell, Executive Director

OTHER LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES **INTERVIEWS**

BELL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief James Edwards

BEVERLY HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Marvin D. Iannone

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

Commissioner Maurice Hannigan

Investigator Jim Abele
Captain Augusta
Captain Ray Blackwell, Commander, East Los Angeles Area
Chief Edward Gomez, Southern Division
Sergeant Robert Grimsley, Southern Division
Deputy Commissioner Dwight Helmick
Assistant Chief Bill Kelley
Captain Cal Minor, Commander, West Los Angeles Area
Assistant Commissioner Robert Rengstorff, Field Operations
Assistant Commissioner Ted Starr, Chief of Staff

COMPTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Acting Chief Hourie Taylor

CULVER CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Elwin E. Cooke

DOWNEY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief D. Clayton Mayes

HAWTHORNE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Stephen Port

HUNTINGTON PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Patrick M. Connolly

INGLEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Oliver Thompson

LONG BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief William C. Ellis

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SAFETY POLICE

Chief Robert Harris

Lieutenant Clifford Green

Officer Milton Triggs

Officer George West

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Sheriff Sherman Block

Acting Chief Larry Anderson, Region 3

Chief William Baker, Technical Services Division

Chief Bill Baker

Commander Ken Bayless, Region 3

Chief Roy Brown, Field Operations, Region 1

Undersheriff Robert Edmonds

Assistant Sheriff Richard Foreman

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
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	THE	
	CITY	
	IN	
	CRISIS	

THE CITY IN CRISIS

APPENDICES

A Report by the Special Advisor
to the Board of Police Commissioners
on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles

October 21, 1992

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THE

CITY

IN

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APPENDICES

**A Report by the Special Advisor
to the Board of Police Commissioners
on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles**

October 21, 1992

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1

MOTION TO
APPOINT
SPECIAL
ADVISOR AND
DEPUTY
SPECIAL
ADVISOR

M O T I O N

1

In light of the events that have consumed this City since the verdict in the criminal prosecution of the four officers involved in the arrest of Rodney King, the Police Commission will undertake an investigation to examine the Police Department's preparations in the event of a civil disturbance and to understand what worked and what did not work in the days following April 29, 1992, with a view toward improving Departmental systems intended for that purpose.

Accordingly, I hereby move that the Commission:

1. Appoint Judge William H. Webster as Special Advisor and Chief Hubert M. Williams as Deputy Special Advisor to investigate and report back to the Commission on the preparation and response of the Los Angeles Police Department to the events following the verdict in the trial of the four officers involved in the arrest of Rodney King and to identify what improvements may be necessary in Departmental policy and procedures in the event of a similar outbreak of civil disturbance in the future. The focus of this investigation is not intended to lay blame or to point fingers; but rather, is designed to move the Department ahead.
2. Accomplish such appointment by entering into a special contract with Judge Webster. Judge Webster, as Special Advisor, will be drawing on the pro bono resources of the Los Angeles office of his law firm, Millbank, Tweedy, Hadley and McCloy. In addition, it is expected that other law firms in Los Angeles will cooperate under the aegis of the Special Advisor and the Deputy Special Advisor on the same terms. Similarly, Chief Williams, as Deputy Special Advisor, will be drawing on primarily pro bono law enforcement resources through the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., of which he is President. In all cases, out of pocket costs will be reimbursed. The end product will be a written report to the Commission detailing the team's findings and conclusions. The Commission will give the Special Advisor and the Deputy Special Advisor its assurance in the strongest possible terms that their team shall have the complete independence and freedom of inquiry and action in their investigation.

Presented by: **A. Lane**

Seconded by **J. Brewer**

2

CITY OF

LOS ANGELES

ADMINISTRATIVE

CODE

SELECTED

PROVISIONS

LOCAL

EMERGENCIES

CHAPTER 3

LOCAL EMERGENCIES

ARTICLE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 8.21. General Provisions.

It is hereby found and declared that it is necessary to centralize the direction and control of local emergency preparations, response and recovery, the duties, responsibilities and activities of all persons, organizations, departments of the City government, and officers and employees of the City performing services or rendering aid in the event of a local emergency, and to enable the City to more effectively cooperate with political subdivisions, municipal corporations and other public agencies of the State of California in preparing to cope with and guard against conditions which may result in extreme peril to life and property and the resources of the City as the needs of the citizens of Los Angeles may demand in the event of a local emergency; and to assist, coordinate and cooperate with the local emergency organizations and authorities of the State of California and the Federal Government in the successful prosecution of emergency services.

It is further found that it is necessary to declare and define the duties and responsibilities of various departments, boards, commissions and officers of the City of Los Angeles when functioning as part of the emergency operations forces of the City of Los Angeles, and to provide the means whereby citizens may cooperate with and assist in preparing for and coping with a local emergency to the end that the maximum protection of life and property may be afforded to the residents of the City of Los Angeles.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; Ord. No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

Sec. 8.22. Local Emergency.

The term "local emergency" as used in this chapter shall mean any occurrence which by reason of its magnitude is or is likely to become beyond the control of the normal services, personnel, equipment and facilities of the regularly constituted branches and departments of the City government.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 138,826, Eff. 8-10-69; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.23. Activated or Activation.

The term "activated" or "activation" as used in this chapter shall mean the placing into operation of the Emergency Operations Organization hereinafter provided for, upon receipt of official warning of an impending or threatened emergency, or upon the declaration by the Mayor of the existence of a local emergency.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.24. Board.

The term "Board" shall mean the Emergency Operations Board.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

ARTICLE 3

DECLARATION OF LOCAL EMERGENCY

Sec. 8.27. Powers of Mayor and Council.

The Mayor is hereby empowered to declare the existence of a local emergency or disaster when he finds that any of the circumstances described in Section 8.22 hereof exist, or at any time a disaster or local emergency is declared by the President of the United States or the Governor of California. Said declaration by the Mayor shall be in writing and shall take effect immediately upon its issuance. The Mayor shall cause widespread publicity and notice to be given of such declaration through the most feasible and adequate means of disseminating such notice throughout the City.

Whenever a local emergency is declared by the Mayor, the City Administrative Officer shall prepare, with the assistance of the City Attorney, as resolution ratifying the existence of a local emergency and the need for continuing the state of local emergency. Such resolution shall be submitted by the Mayor to the City Clerk for presentation to the Council. The Council shall approve or disapprove such resolution within seven days from the date of the original declaration by the Mayor and at least every 14 days thereafter unless the state of local emergency is sooner terminated.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.28. Activation of Emergency Operation Organization.

Upon receipt of official warning of an impending or threatened emergency, or upon the declaration of a local emergency, the Emergency Operations Organization shall be immediately activated and all of such portions of its personnel as the Mayor may direct shall be called into active service.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.29. Director of Emergency Operations Organization.

During the period of a local emergency, the Mayor shall be the Director of the Emergency Operations Organization, and all powers and duties herein conferred upon the Board or any officer or chief of a division shall be exercised subject to the direction and approval of the Mayor. The Director is authorized to promulgate, issue and enforce rules, regulations, orders and directives which the Director considers necessary for the protection of life and property. Such rules, regulations, orders and directives shall take effect immediately upon their issuance, and copies thereof shall be filed in the Office of the City Clerk.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.30. Power to Requisition Supplies and Personnel.

The Director of the Emergency Operations Organization may obtain vital supplies and other such property as is needed for the protection of life and property of the people, and bind the City for the fair value thereof, and, if required immediately, may commandeer the same for public use; may require emergency service of any City officer or employee, or any citizen, and may requisition necessary personnel or material of any City department or agency.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.31. Termination of Local Emergency.

The Mayor shall keep the Council fully advised as to the status of the emergency. The Council shall declare and publicize the termination of such local emergency at the earliest possible date that conditions warrant. Upon the announcement by the Council of the City of Los Angeles of the termination of the existence of the local emergency by operation of law, such rules, regulations, orders and directives shall terminate and be of no further force or effect.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

ARTICLE 5 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION COORDINATOR

2

Sec. 8.37. Powers and Duties.

Subject to the provisions of the Charter and the rules, regulations and instructions of the Board, the City Administrative Officer is designated as the Emergency Operations Organization Coordinator and shall:

- (1) Coordinate the authorities, powers, duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Operations Board and Organization.
- (2) Establish and maintain liaison with other governmental agencies, City departments, and such private agencies as may be deemed necessary.
- (3) Prepare and process emergency operations program papers and applications for Federal or State funds.
- (4) Notify the Board in writing prior to the beginning of each fiscal year of the recommended budgetary items relating to emergency services activities of each City Department having control of a division of emergency service and which items are included in the City Administrative Officer's annual budgetary recommendations to the Mayor.
- (5) Assign necessary personnel from the City Administrative Office to perform staff duties for the Emergency Operations Board as may be required by said Board.
- (6) Coordinate and provide for dissemination of public information relating to the emergency operations activities as required.
- (7) Exercise such further powers and duties as may be conferred upon the City Administrative Officer by the Board.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

ARTICLE 6

CREATION OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD

Sec. 8.40. Designation and Membership of Board.

There is hereby created an Emergency Operations Board hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the "Board" Said Board shall consist of the following members:

Chief of Police who is hereby designated as permanent chairman.

Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Fire Department.

City Administrative Officer.

Chief of the Public Works Division.

General Manager and Chief Engineer of the Department of Water and Power.

General Manager of the Personnel Department.

Superintendent of Building and General Manager of the Department of Building and Safety.

General Manager of the Department of General Services.

General Manager of the Department of Transportation.

General Manager of the Department of Recreation and Parks.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 142,521, Eff. 11-27-71; General Manager, Dept. of Transportation added by Ord. No. 151,832, Eff. 2-10-79, Oper. 2-25-79; Ord. No. 152,427, Eff. 6-29-79; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; Word Charter to Chapter. Ord. No. 158,695, Eff. 3-12-84; In Entirety, Ord. No. 162,404, Eff. 6-27-87; In Entirety, Ord No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

Sec. 8.40.01. The City Attorney.

The City Attorney or an attorney designee thereof in said office shall be the legal advisor to the Emergency Operations Board.

SECTION HISTORY

Added by Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

ARTICLE 7
DUTIES OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD

Sec. 8.41. General Nature of Powers and Duties.

It shall be the duty of the Board, subject to the provisions of the Charter, to supervise, regulate, control and manage the affairs of the Emergency Operations Organization of the City of Los Angeles, including the right to issue instructions to the Chiefs of the Divisions of Emergency Services as set forth in this chapter. The Board shall also have the power to make and enforce all necessary and desirable rules and regulations for the purpose of governing the said Emergency Operations Organization during periods of preparation, local emergency, response and recovery and for the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by this chapter. The Board may appoint committees of the Board or other committees as it deems advisable for the administrations of its affairs.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; Ord. No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

ARTICLE 8 CREATION AND POWERS OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

Sec. 8.43. Designation and Composition of the Emergency Operations Organization.

There is hereby created an Emergency Operations Organization of the City of Los Angeles hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the "Organization". Said Organization shall constitute the operational forces deemed necessary to meet successfully the conditions of a local emergency. It shall be composed of the various divisions hereinafter designated, the offices in command thereof, the personnel, services and material held or used by said divisions, together with all other personnel under the direction of the Director of the Organization, and all other services, equipment and facilities which may be loaned, donated or contributed to the City, or commandeered by the Director of the Organization.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.43.01. Emergency Operations Center

The Emergency Operations Center and all emergency operations equipment shall be under the control of the Emergency Operations Organization. The Emergency Operations Center may be activated at the request of any division or City department notwithstanding the absence of a declaration of local emergency

SECTION HISTORY

Added by Ord. No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

Sec. 8.44. Director – Powers and Duties Of.

During the period of a local emergency, the Mayor, as Director of the Organization, shall, with the advice of the Board, exercise full authority, command, and control over the operations of the various divisions of the Emergency Operations Organization in the accomplishment of the purposes of this Division. The Director shall direct coordination and cooperation between the chiefs of divisions and resolve questions of authority and responsibility that may arise among them. The Director shall organize necessary additional divisions of emergency service and prescribe their duties. The Director may include in the divisions of emergency service other necessary volunteer groups, and may appoint necessary additional staff officers and assign them duties.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.45. Deputy Director – Powers and Duties Of.

The Chairman of the Emergency Operations Board shall be the Deputy Director of the Emergency Operations Organization. The Deputy Director shall act on behalf of the Director on all matters within the purview of this chapter which the Director may delegate to the Deputy Director; coordinate divisions, units or groups, and, under the direction of the Director, may arrange with other municipalities and State and Federal agencies, for cooperation, mutual aid and protection during a local emergency; and perform such other duties pertaining to the proper functioning of the Emergency Operations Organization as the Director may designate.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.46. Structure of the Functions of Emergency Organization.

Subject to the provisions of the Charter, the powers conferred by this chapter upon the Mayor, and the rules, regulations and instructions of the Emergency Operations Board and the Deputy Director, the Emergency Operations Organization shall be divided into major divisions as set forth herein. Each of the divisions of the Emergency Operations Organization shall be under the command of a chief of the division. The chief shall have as assistants a chief deputy and a second deputy, who shall succeed the chief in that order in the event of the absence or inability of the chief of the division to act.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.47. Chief of Division – Powers and Duties Of.

The Chief of division shall formulate and maintain operational plans for the division, including a written plan regarding activation of the division, subject to the approval of the Board. Each chief shall organize the division into such sections as are deemed necessary for the proper functioning of the division. Each chief shall have the power to appoint, discharge, suspend, transfer, and train personnel; and to plan and prepare the logistics for the personnel and material of the division.

In the event of a local emergency, the chief of each division shall immediately activate the division and carry out such orders and directions as are received from the Director.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

ARTICLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

Sec. 8.50. Distribution of Duties.

The functions and duties of the Emergency Operations Organization shall be distributed among the following divisions:

1. Police Division
2. Fire Suppression and Rescue Division
3. Transportation Division
4. Public Works Division
5. Utilities Division
6. General Services Division
 - Supplies Section
 - Communications Section
 - Maintenance Section
7. Building and Safety Division
8. Personnel and Recruitment Division
9. Public Welfare and Shelter Division
10. Harbor Division
11. Airports Division
12. Animal Regulation Division

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; Ord. No. 156,935, Eff. 8-16-82.

Sec. 8.51. Police Division.

The Police Division shall be under and subject to the control of the Police Department of the City of Los Angeles. The chief of this division shall be the Chief of Police. In addition to the regular powers and duties of this office, and during the period of a local emergency, the chief shall have the power and duty to direct such Police Division personnel as may be necessary to perform the duties under this chapter. The chief shall enforce all laws of the State and City for the preservation of life and property and shall maintain peace and order.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.52. Fire Suppression and Rescue Division.

The Fire Suppression and Rescue Division shall be under and subject to the control of the Fire Department of the City of Los Angeles. The chief of this division shall be the Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Department. In addition to the regular powers and duties of this office, and during the period of a local emergency, the chief shall have the power and duty to direct such Fire Suppression and Rescue Division personnel as may be necessary to perform the duties under this chapter. The chief shall have charge of and direct the use and control of all explosives and hazardous materials; the demolition of buildings or structures; and the control of all petroleum, chemicals and petroleum or chemical pipelines. The chief shall direct and control all fire suppression, rescue operations, emergency medical services and radiological defense, and shall retain administrative authority for supervision of personnel and equipment provided by other divisions or jurisdictions, and exercise such other powers as may be assigned to this division.

The chief of this division shall coordinate with other governmental and private agencies providing or administering medical services during a local emergency.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; In Entirety, Ord. No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

ARTICLE 9.5
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FUND

Sec. 8.72. Emergency Operations Fund.

There is hereby established in the City Treasury an Emergency Operations Fund. Into it shall be deposited money provided by the City in the annual budget or at other times for the purposes of this chapter, and, as directed by the City Council, such additional money as the City receives for such purposes from other sources. Money in the Emergency Operations Fund shall be expended by the General Manager of the Department of General Services, subject to the approval of the Chairman of the Emergency Operations Board and the Coordinator of the Emergency Operations Organization, or their designated representatives. Money in the Fund received by the City from other sources shall be regarded as a Trust Fund and shall not be transferred to the Reserve Fund as provided in Charter Sec. 382.

SECTION HISTORY

Article and Section added by Ord. No. 156,955, Eff. 9-4-82.

ARTICLE 10 GENERAL PROVISIONS

2

Sec. 8.73. Cooperation by City Departments.

Each officer, board, department, and employee of the City shall render all possible assistance to the Mayor, the Board, and the Deputy Director in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, including but not limited to planning, training, and/or response to emergency incidents. While engaged in emergency services, officers and employees of the City shall be deemed to be engaged in their regular duties.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; In Entirety, Ord. No. 165,083, Eff. 9-4-89.

Sec. 8.74. Status of Personnel.

a. All persons, other than officers and employees of the City rendering services pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, shall serve without compensation from the City. While engaged in such services, they shall have the same immunities as officers and employees of the City performing similar duties.

b. Officers and employees of the City rendering services pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall receive additional compensation for overtime in accordance with the appropriate departmental rules or Memorandum of Understanding. All compensation for overtime shall be paid in cash.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.75. Conflict in Instructions—Mayor to Resolve.

In the event any direction, order or instruction given or issued by any officer, board, or person under the provisions of this chapter conflicts with a direction, order or instruction given to the chief of any division by any other duly constituted authority, the matter shall be referred to the Mayor for determination and decision as to which direction, order or instruction shall govern.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.76. Appointment of Citizen Committees.

The Mayor shall have the power to appoint such citizen committees as he deems advisable in order to facilitate accomplishing the objectives and purposes of this chapter and to foster and encourage cooperation between the public and the Deputy Director, the Emergency Operations Board, and the Emergency Operations Organization.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 126,966; Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80.

Sec. 8.77. Punishment of Violations.

It shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed \$1,000.00 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both, for any person, during a local emergency declared pursuant to this chapter, to:

a. Willfully obstruct, hinder or delay any member of the Emergency Operations Organization in the enforcement of any lawful rule or regulation, order or directive issued pursuant to this chapter in the performance of any duty imposed by virtue of this chapter.

b. Do any act forbidden by any lawful rule, regulation, order or directive issued pursuant to this chapter, if such act is of a nature as to give, or be likely to give, assistance to any national enemy, or imperil the lives or property of other inhabitants of this City, or to prevent, hinder or delay the defense or protection thereof.

SECTION HISTORY

Based on Ord. No. 97,600.

Amended by: Ord. No. 153,772, Eff. 6-18-80; 1st para., Ord. No. 160,064, Eff. 7-28-85.

3

LOS ANGELES

POLICE

DEPARTMENT

UNUSUAL

OCCURRENCE


CONTROL TASK

FORCE

ORGANIZATION


CHARTS

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC)*




Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

INTELLIGENCE CONTROL CENTER (ICC)*




Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

CASUALTY INFORMATION CENTER (CIC)*




Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

FIELD TASK FORCE*




Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

FIELD COMMAND POST PERSONNEL SECTION*




FIELD COMMAND POST INTELLIGENCE SECTION*




* Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

FIELD COMMAND POST OPERATIONS SECTION*



FIELD COMMAND POST LOGISTICS SECTION*



Source: LAPD Tactical Manual

4

LOCAL EMERGENCY DECLARATION AND ORDERS

DECLARATION OF LOCAL EMERGENCY

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. 153,772 as amended, I hereby find that:

The City of Los Angeles is experiencing a civil disturbance involving unlawful conduct by large numbers of individuals commencing on or about April 29, 1992 in the South Central Area. Some damage has been reported. By reason of the fact that these conditions are likely to become beyond the control of the normal services, personnel, equipment and facilities of the regularly constituted branches and departments of the City government, and said actions may threaten to cause extraordinary loss of life and property.

NOW THEREFORE, I hereby declare the existence of a local emergency and direct the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) to be immediately activated to take such steps that are necessary for the protection of life and property in the affected area.

I FURTHER REQUEST that the Governor of the State of California declare a State of Emergency for the City of Los Angeles.

I THEREFORE DIRECT that the Declaration of Local Emergency shall take effect immediately and that widespread publicity and notice shall be given said declaration through the most feasible and adequate means of disseminating such notice throughout the City.

Dated at Los Angeles, California

Apr. 29, 1992

Tom Bradley

TOM BRADLEY
Mayor


REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIED RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby declare the following orders to be necessary for the protection of life and property.

1. No person shall be upon any public street, avenue, boulevard, place, alley, park, or other public place or unimproved private realty within the area bounded as follows: by Vernon Avenue on the north, the east City limits, Century Boulevard on the south, and Crenshaw Boulevard on the west between sunset and sunrise of the following day.
2. No person shall sell, or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
3. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
4. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel.
5. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: April 30, 1992


Mayor

Time: 12:15 a.m.

REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIED RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT NO. 1

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby declare the following orders to be necessary for the protection of life and property.

1. No person shall be upon any public street, avenue, boulevard, place, alley, park, or other public place or unimproved private realty within the area bounded as follows: by Jefferson Blvd on the north, on the east Central Avenue, Century Boulevard on the south, and Crenshaw Boulevard on the west between sunset and sunrise of the following day.
2. No person shall sell or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
3. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
4. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel.
5. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: 4-30-92

Tom Bradley
Mayor

Time: 10:15 ^{a.} p.m.

REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIED RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT NO. 2

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby declare the following orders to be necessary for the protection of life and property.

1. No person shall be upon any public street, avenue, boulevard, place, alley, park, or other public place or unimproved private realty anywhere within the City boundaries between sunset and sunrise of the following day.
2. No person shall sell or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
3. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
4. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel.
5. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: 4-30-92

Tom Bradley
Mayor

Time: 12:45 p.m.

REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIED RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT NO. 3

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby declare the following orders to be necessary for the protection of life and property.

1. No person shall be upon any public street, avenue, boulevard, place, alley, park, or other public place or unimproved private realty anywhere within the City boundaries between sunset and sunrise of the following day.
2. No person shall sell or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
3. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
4. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel, or to activities that are necessary and essential for health, safety, or emergency-related purposes. This order expires at sunrise on Friday, May 1, 1992.
5. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: 4-30-92


Mayor

Time: 3:55 p.m.

REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT NO. 4

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby declare the following orders to be necessary for the protection of life and property.

1. No person shall be upon any public street, avenue, boulevard, place, alley, park or other public place or unimproved private realty anywhere within the City boundaries between sunset and sunrise of the following day.
2. No person shall sell or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
3. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
4. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel, or to activities that are necessary and essential for health, safety, or emergency-related purposes.
5. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: May 1, 1992


Mayor

Time: 9 a.m.

REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE ORDERING
CURFEW AND OTHER SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS
DURING EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT NO. 5

WHEREAS, a Local Emergency now exists within the City of Los Angeles, and the existence of the same has been duly declared and published;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority invested in me as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to the provisions of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.29, to promulgate, issue, and enforce rules, regulations and directives, I hereby rescind all previous orders and regulations published under this Regulation and Directive not reaffirmed herein. The curfew is hereby rescinded as of sunrise, Monday, May 4, 1992.

1. No person shall sell or dispense any gasoline or other flammable liquids except for normal filling of motor vehicle gasoline tanks within the City boundaries.
2. No person shall sell or transfer possession of any ammunition of any type within the City boundaries.
3. These restrictions shall not apply to peace officers, fire fighters, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) personnel, and National Guard or other military personnel.
4. Any violation of these regulations shall be punished as provided by the Los Angeles Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Section 8.77.

Date: 5-3-92

Tom Bradley
Mayor

Time: 5¹⁵ p.m.

5

9-1-1

INCIDENTS ANALYSIS

9-1-1 INCIDENTS ANALYSIS

The 9-1-1 incidents analysis reflects all police 9-1-1 calls for service coded 2H or higher that were received and dispatched by the LAPD Central Dispatch Center (CDC) from 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, 1992 through 11:59 p.m. on Monday, May 4, 1992.¹ There are a total of 10,595 records in the database. The data were provided by the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Section of the LAPD Emergency Command Control Communications System (ECCCS) Division.

The database includes only police 9-1-1 calls for which an incident was created, which were assigned a code of 2H or higher (emergency). All duplicate records (subsequent 9-1-1 calls) related to a specific incident are attached automatically by the CAD system to the incident. An incident is closed out once the disposition of the incident is recorded by the appropriate LAPD officer. The data provide the following information about a specific incident: date and time of the call, street address of the incident, crime code for the incident, and the LAPD police division from which the CAD system selected officers to be dispatched to the site of the incident.

DUPLICATE RECORDS

Although the CAD system is designed to automatically attach duplicate calls to a specific incident, according to ECCCS Division personnel, it is not unusual for a certain number of duplicate records to exist in the CAD system data. In order to account for duplicate records, a duplicate record conservatively was defined to be any 9-1-1 call which was received by the CDC one hour or less apart from another 9-1-1 call with the same incident address and crime code.² If the CDC received two 9-1-1 calls regarding an incident at the same location, but each call was assigned a different crime code, or the calls were more than an hour apart, the second record was not considered to be a duplicate. This analysis

yielded a total of 1,316 duplicate records. According to ECCCS Division personnel, this number of duplicate records in a total record population of 10,595 records was normal. After eliminating the 1,316 duplicate records, the database contains 9,279 records.

TIME CODES

In order to analyze trends in police 9-1-1 incidents over time, a time code was assigned to each hour, commencing at 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 (Hour 1) and ending at 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992 (Hour 129).

CRIME CODES

To simplify the analysis, the universe of crime codes that could be assigned to an incident were grouped into four categories:

<u>Code & Category</u>	<u>Crime Code & Description</u>
Code 1, Property	459 - Burglaries 906 - Alarms 484 - Thefts 921 - Prowlers 503 - Vehicles 594 - Vandalism
Code 2, Disturbances	415 - Disturbances 246 - Shots Fired 620 - Disputes
Code 3, Individual	242 - Battery 245 - Assault/Deadly Weapon 999 - Help 261 - Attacks 162 - Screaming 211 - Robberies 207 - Kidnapping
Code 4, Other	100 - Other 146 - Impersonatin/Officer 288 - Child 374 - Dump 390 - Intoxication 470 - Forgery 605 - Open 720 - Meet 900 - Unknown Trouble 903 - Traffic/Direct 904 - Traffic 907 - Injury 918 - Mental 929 - Down 990 - Back-up 991 - Assistance

ABANDONED CALLS

An analysis of the percentage of abandoned police 9-1-1 calls, as compared to all other calls answered by the CDC, was performed. An abandoned call is a call that disconnects before a 9-1-1 operator is able to answer. Abandoned call data were provided by the LAPD Special Projects Unit.³ The data identify the total 9-1-1 (all codes) Spanish, secondary and abandoned calls for the period from Wednesday April 29, 1992 through Saturday, May 2, 1992.

BASELINE ANALYSES

Two different baselines were used to compare the number of police 9-1-1 calls hour-by-hour during a normal six-day period to police 9-1-1 calls during the first six days of the April 1992 civil disturbance. Actual police 9-1-1 calls during the civil disturbance period were compared with (1) the normal 9-1-1 emergency call cycle and (2) the volume of emergency calls made to LAPD Bureaus during a normal cycle.

1. 9-1-1 Emergency Call Cycle

According to LAPD Communications Division personnel, the CDC has, on average, received approximately seven percent more 9-1-1 calls in 1992 than in 1991. The average number of 9-1-1 calls received during each hour on each day of the week in 1992 was calculated using the results of an LAPD study by hour, by day of 9-1-1 calls received in 1991,⁴ and increasing the average number of calls received by seven percent. This analysis yielded an estimate of 203,528 9-1-1 calls received during an average 28-day period, in 1992.

LAPD data concerning the number of emergency (Code 3 and 2H), urgent (Code 2 and H) and routine (no code) 9-1-1 calls dispatched within a certain number of minutes to each police bureau over the period from March 22, 1992 through April 18, 1992 were used to determine the number of 9-1-1 calls received by the CDC which were dispatched during a normal period.⁵ During this 28-day period, there were a total of 75,054 9-1-1 calls received and dispatched. Thus, approximately 37 percent of all 9-1-1 calls received are dispatched (75,054 calls received and dis-

patched divided by 203,528 total calls received during an average 28-day period). Out of these 75,054 calls received and dispatched over this 28-day period, 16,279, or approximately 22 percent, were emergency calls. These percentages were applied to the estimated 1992 9-1-1 calls received to estimate, on an hourly basis, the numbers of calls and emergency calls dispatched, during a normal period.

2. Emergency Calls Made to LAPD Bureaus

The same data described in (1.) above were used to estimate emergency calls received and dispatched during a normal period of 5.38 days (3:00 p.m., Wednesday through 11:59 p.m., Tuesday). Total emergency calls received and dispatched over the full 28-day period as calculated above were divided by 28 to get an average daily count, and this daily average was multiplied by 5.38.

NOTES

¹ The CDC is the answer point for all police, fire and paramedic 9-1-1 calls for service in the City of Los Angeles. Upon receipt by the CDC, all fire and paramedic 9-1-1 calls for service are automatically transferred to the Los Angeles Fire Department's communications center for coding and dispatch, and thus, are not included in the 9-1-1 incidents database.

² In the following example, the asterisk indicates a duplicate record:


Call 1: Crime 200 111 West Rd. May 1, 1:00 p.m.
Call 2: Crime 200 111 West Rd. May 1, 1:45 p.m.*
Call 3: Crime 200 111 West Rd. May 1, 2:30 p.m.

³ LAPD Report, DELAY BEFORE ABANDONED PHONE CALLS.

⁴ LAPD Report, 1991 — DEPLOYMENT PERIODS 3, 7, AND 11, AVERAGE BY DAY OF THE WEEK.


⁵ LAPD Report, TOTAL CALLS FOR SERVICE BY AREA/BUREAU/SERVICE SUMMARY (March 22, 1992 - April 18 1992)

TOTAL INCIDENTS ALL BUREAUS



SOURCE: 911 CALLS


NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)



SOURCE: 911 CALLS


NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

INCIDENTS SOUTH BUREAU



SOURCE 911 CALLS
NOTE DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)


**INCIDENTS
WEST BUREAU**



SOURCE: 911 CALLS

NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)


INCIDENTS VALLEY BUREAU



SOURCE: 911 CALLS

NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)


INCIDENTS BY BUREAU BY DAY



SOURCE: 911 CALLS


NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

INCIDENTS BY AREA APRIL 29 - MAY 4




SOURCE: 911 CALLS

INCIDENTS FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS BY DAY APRIL 29 - MAY 4




SOURCE: 911 CALLS

**INCIDENTS
BY CRIME CATEGORIES
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**



SOURCE: 911 CALLS

INCIDENTS BY CRIME CATEGORIES FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS APRIL 29 - MAY 4



SOURCE: 911 CALLS
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

6

FIRE
ANALYSIS

FIRE ANALYSIS

The fire analysis reflects data derived from two sources: (1) all fire 9-1-1 calls received by the LAPD Central Dispatch Center (CDC)¹ (Reported Fires); and (2) Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety data regarding structures in the City of Los Angeles that were actually destroyed by fire (Actual Fires).²

For structures allegedly damaged during the period of the civil disturbance, the Department of Building and Safety data identify the specific address or address range of the damaged structure and the cause (fire or vandalism) of the damage. The Department of Building and Safety database contains 731 records of structures damaged and/or destroyed by fire during the relevant period. Of these 731 records, 720 contain identifiable fire start times, using the 9-1-1 system data.

Data from the 9-1-1 system for the period from 7:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 through 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992 was loaded directly into a database for analysis. The data fields include date, time, address of caller reporting the fire and nearest cross street.

ASSUMPTIONS

To develop a fire chronology and an analysis of the geographic concentration of the fires, the start date and time of the fire which damaged and/or destroyed the structures listed on the Department of Building and Safety report was required. Additionally, it was necessary to identify the LAPD Area location of the actual structure fires.

Re-lights were defined as a fire site that had burned that was re-lit with human assistance as opposed to a fire that re-kindled on its own. The purpose of identifying such fires was to distinguish those situations where a fire re-kindled on its own from situations where the fire likely resulted from a criminal act — arson. In addition, it was recognized that during the disturbance, the Fire Department was not able to “knock down” every fire completely. This led to situations where a fire would smolder

or continue to burn, but often with much less intensity. Thus, it was thought that re-lights likely represented fire situations where another commitment of resources by the Fire Department and Police Department was required, while re-kindles often did not require such a re-commitment of resources.

The dates and times of the original fires that burned the structures identified by the Department of Building and Safety were determined by matching the structure address with an address of a fire contained in the 9-1-1 system database. Based on consultation with Los Angeles Fire Department personnel, re-lights were determined by review of all 9-1-1 fire calls subsequent to the original fire time by greater than six hours. For each of the re-lights, all 9-1-1 fire calls regarding the particular address subsequent to the re-light time by greater than an additional six hours were also identified as re-lights.

The analysis assumes that the first call to 9-1-1 identifies the start date and time of the actual structure fire. This may introduce some error, as many calls were placed directly to the Fire Department bureaus, and other fires were identified by air reconnaissance. The 9-1-1 data, however, provide the most comprehensive information regarding reported structure fires during this period.

DATE, TIME AND LOCATION OF FIRES

Fires as reported by the Department of Building and Safety were matched to entries in the 9-1-1 fire reporting files first by reference to exact matching addresses, then by reference to matches within the same city block, and finally, in order, by matches of a reported address range to a specific 9-1-1 listed address. The database contains 720 structures damaged and/or destroyed by fire, and 324 re-lights, totalling 1,044 fires.

BASELINE ANALYSIS


The Fire Department, on average, receives reports of 32 structure fires per day in the City of Los Angeles. Of these, approximately 25 reports are of actual structure fires — slightly more than one per hour. A baseline analysis was performed to compare the average hourly structural fires in a normal day with the average number of structure fires (including re-lights) during each of the 60 hours after 7:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992.

NOTES

¹ The CDC is the answer point for all police, fire and paramedic 9-1-1 calls for service in the City of Los Angeles. Upon receipt by the CDC, all fire and paramedic 9-1-1 calls for service are automatically transferred to the Los Angeles Fire Department's communications center for coding and dispatch.


² REPORT, LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING AND SAFETY (July 7 1992)

**STRUCTURE FIRES
ALL BUREAUS**




SOURCES: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES BY BUREAU APRIL 29 - MAY 4




SOURCE: 911 CALLS & OBS REPORT

STRUCTURE FIRES CENTRAL BUREAU




SOURCES: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)




SOURCES: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES WEST BUREAU




SOURCES: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES VALLEY BUREAU




SOURCES: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES BY BUREAU, BY DAY




SOURCE: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES BY BUREAU ORIGINAL FIRES VERSUS RE-LIGHTS APRIL 29 - MAY 4




SOURCE: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES BY AREA APRIL 29 - MAY 4



SOURCE: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) IS FOR A 5 HOUR PERIOD (7:00PM - 12:00AM)

STRUCTURE FIRES FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS BY DAY




SOURCE: 911 CALLS & CITY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING & SAFETY
 TABLE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 5 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (7:00PM - 12:00AM)


7

SELECTED INCIDENTS CHRONOLOGY


SELECTED **INCIDENTS** **CHRONOLOGY**


The Selected Incidents Chronology reflects the 9-1-1 Incidents Analysis and Fire Analysis and their underlying data. These data were used to create computerized maps, corresponding to LAPD Area maps, which display the location (LAPD Area) and number of incidents and fires which occurred, both cumulative over time and by hour. Hour 1, Day 1 is defined to be from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, 1992. Hours one through 33 are analyzed, with Hour 33 defined to be from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. on Thursday, April 30, 1992 (Day 2).







APPENDIX 7-2








APPENDIX 7-4


























8

ARREST
ANALYSIS

ARREST ANALYSIS

The arrest analysis reflects data from two sources, the LAPD's Police Arrest Crime Management Information System (PACMIS) and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Automated Justice Information System (AJIS).

The PACMIS data used span the period from 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 through 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992. Each record in the PACMIS database contains: booking number, name, race, sex, date of birth, arrest location and time, offense charge code, and area code of the arresting agent. The PACMIS database contains a record of all arrests made within the City of Los Angeles by any law enforcement agency. The PACMIS database contains 6,024 arrests during this period.

The AJIS data used span the period from 6:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 through 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992. In addition to the same information as that contained in each record in the PACMIS database, each record in the AJIS database also contains the arrestee's home address. The AJIS database contains a record of all arrests made within the County of Los Angeles by any law enforcement agency, including those arrests made within the City of Los Angeles. The AJIS database contains 12,545 arrests during this period.

The source of the AJIS data for those arrests made within the City of Los Angeles is the PACMIS database. Through a reconciliation of booking numbers between the two databases, it was determined that all arrests contained in the PACMIS database are included in the AJIS database.¹ As a result, it was determined that the PACMIS database would be used for most arrest analyses.²

Out of the 6,024 arrest records contained in the PACMIS database for the period from 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 through 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992, the following records were eliminated:

Arrest records with no LAPD Area indicated	14
File 92 records (suspect questioned but not booked)	222
Arrests outside selected crime categories ³	786
Total arrest records eliminated from database	1,022
	=====

Thus, 5,002 arrest records remain in the database. Because a unique booking number is assigned to each arrestee and is then logged into the system during the booking process, no duplicate arrest records exist in the database.

TIME CODES

In order to analyze trends in arrests over time, by crime type and by LAPD Area, a time code was assigned to each hour, commencing at 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 (Hour 1) and ending at 11:59 p.m. on May 4, 1992 (Hour 129).

CRIME CATEGORIES

To simplify the analysis, arrests were grouped into five crime categories, and as shown above, arrests for crimes outside those five crime categories were eliminated from the database. The five crime categories are:

- Group I Disturbances
- Group II Violence Against Persons
- Group III Arson
- Group IV Property Crimes
- Group V Curfew Violations

AREA CODE OF ARRESTING AGENT

The arresting agent and the LAPD Area in which the arresting agent made the arrest are identified in the PACMIS database. For example, code 4208 designates an arrest made by an LAPD officer or Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) officer in LAPD Area 8. The breakdown of the 5,002 arrest records by arresting agency is as follows:

<u>Codes 4201-4218</u> — All arrests made by LAPD or LASD officers within the City of Los Angeles ⁴	4,302
<u>Codes 4219-4299</u> — All arrests made by an LAPD officer from an LAPD special unit within the City of Los Angeles	497
<u>Codes 9900-9999</u> — All arrests made by CHP officers within the City of Los Angeles	8
<u>All other codes</u> — All arrests made by all other arresting agencies	195
Total Arrest Records	5,002
=====	

As a result of re-deployment of LAPD officers from one LAPD Area to another during the civil disturbance, it was necessary to confirm that the arrest area code was the actual geographic location of the arrest, and not the arresting officer's assigned LAPD Area. A random selection of 226 arrest records with codes 4201-4218 was tested by locating the arrest location address on the LAPD Area maps. Using this method, only six arrest records were identified where the arrest area location did not match the arrest area code of the arresting agent. Thus, the hypothesis that the arrest area code also identifies the geographic location of the arrest by LAPD Area was accepted.

It also was necessary for all arrest records to be coded to the same geographical base: LAPD Area codes 4201 through 4218. Arrests made by special LAPD units and by an agency other than the LAPD were reviewed and re-coded, based on the arrest location, to correspond to one of the eighteen LAPD Area codes.

COMPARISON OF ARRESTEE'S HOME ADDRESS WITH ARREST LOCATION

In an attempt to ascertain whether a particular arrest took place in the arrestee's home neighborhood, or in another part of the City, the arrest area code identifying the location of the arrest was compared with the arrestee's home address, using the AJIS database. This analysis was limited to the 1,911 arrest records with the crime categories of arson, assault, battery and looting (including theft and burglary). The PACMIS records for these arrests were compared with the AJIS records for the same arrests using booking numbers, resulting in 1,883 matched records. The difference of 28 records is believed to be a result of errors in recording and updating booking numbers between the PACMIS and AJIS systems.

After elimination of all arrest records with blank or transient data for the home address from the analysis, 1,646 records were left for analysis. The LAPD Area maps and the Thomas Guide were reviewed to identify the location of the arrestee's home address within the LAPD Areas or within the County. A total of 1,560 arrestee home addresses were identified in this manner. The remaining 86 records lacked sufficient information for purposes of making such an identification.

These 1,560 arrest records were then used to analyze, at both the LAPD Bureau and Area levels, the pattern of arrests, whether within or outside the arrestee's home Area. The Area analysis was limited to the seven most active LAPD Areas, based on the 9-1-1 incidents analysis.

NOTES


¹ There was only a .6% variance between the two databases.

² The exception is the comparison of the arrestee's home address with the arrest location discussed below.

³ As discussed below, only arrests for crimes in the five major crime categories were considered in the analysis.


⁴ Because the number of arrests made by LASD officers within the City of Los Angeles was statistically insignificant, these arrests were left in the database.

TOTAL ARRESTS ALL BUREAUS




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

**ARRESTS BY BUREAU
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

TOTAL ARRESTS CENTRAL BUREAU




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

TOTAL ARRESTS SOUTH BUREAU




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

**TOTAL ARRESTS
WEST BUREAU**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

TOTAL ARRESTS VALLEY BUREAU




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

ARRESTS BY BUREAU, BY DAY




SOURCE: LAPD ARRESTS DATABASE
 NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

ARRESTS BY BUREAU BY AREA APRIL 29 - MAY 4



SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE


ARRESTS FOR 7 SELECTED AREAS, BY DAY



SOURCE: 911 CALLS AND LAPD ARRESTS DATABASE


NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)

**ARRESTS
BY CRIME CATEGORIES
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

ARRESTS BY CRIME CATEGORIES BY DAY




SOURCE: LAPD ARRESTS DATABASE

**ARRESTS BY RACE
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

**ARRESTS BY SEX
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**



SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE


ARRESTS BY AGE APRIL 29 - MAY 4



SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE
NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00AM)


PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS BY RESIDENCE FOR CENTRAL BUREAU ARRESTS

APRIL 29 - MAY 4




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

**PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS BY RESIDENCE
FOR SOUTH BUREAU ARRESTS
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

**PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS BY RESIDENCE
FOR WEST BUREAU ARRESTS
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**




SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

**PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS BY RESIDENCE
FOR VALLEY BUREAU ARRESTS
APRIL 29 - MAY 4**



SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

ARRESTS BY AREA FOR AREA RESIDENTS



SOURCE: LAPD ARREST DATABASE

9

CIVIL DISTURBANCE- RELATED DEATHS ANALYSIS

CIVIL DISTURBANCE- RELATED DEATHS ANALYSIS

The Civil Disturbance-Related Deaths Analysis reflects data from the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office, the Los Angeles Police Department, and public sources, such as the *Los Angeles Times*. Cases of conflicting information, for example, different reported times of death, were resolved by deferring to the data from the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office. The determination as to whether a death was considered to be related to the civil disturbance was made by the Coroner's Office. In making the determination, the Coroner's Office asked whether the victim would have died if there had not been a civil disturbance. In the majority of cases, the Coroner's Office determined that the victim would not have died "but for" the civil disorder.

The data were used to determine the number of civil disturbance-related deaths that occurred within the City of Los Angeles. A computerized map was created that displays the location (LAPD Area) and the number of civil disturbance-related deaths that occurred over the course of the civil disorder. The data were also analyzed to determine whether there were any discernible patterns to the deaths in terms of time of day, age, sex, cause of death, and race or ethnicity.


NOTES

1. The following sources were consulted in compiling the data on civil disturbance-related deaths that occurred in the City of Los Angeles:

Marc Lacey & Paul Feldman, *Delays, Chaos Add To Woes In Solving Riot Homicides; Slayings: Workload And Reluctant Witnesses Hamper Efforts. Policy Indicate Many Cases May Never Be Cracked*, L.A. Times, June 21, 1992, at A1.

Marc Lacey & Paul Feldman, *Victims Came From All Walks Of Life; Killings: One Man Stopped At A Market To Pick Up Some Milk. Another Was Shot Apparently By Merchants He Was Trying To Protect*, L.A. Times, June 21, 1992, at A26.

Marc Lacey, *Riot Death Toll Lowered to 51 After Coroner's Review*, L.A. Times, August 12, 1992, at A1.



Civil Disturbance-Related Deaths

	Asian-American	African-American	Anglo	Hispanic	Total
Fatalities	1	21	7**	12	42*
Average Age	18	31	38	30	29
Day	0	10	3	4	17
Night	1	11	3	8	23
Male	1	18	7	11	37
Female	0	3	0	1	4
Assault	0	0	1	1	2
Drive-By	0	4	0	4	8
On-Foot	1	8	4	4	17
LAPD	0	3	0	2	5
Other	0	1	0	0	1
Unknown	0	0	1	1	2
Traffic Accident	0	4	0	0	4
Fire	0	1	1	1	3

* Includes One John Doe of Unknown Ethnicity

** One time of death is uncertain

CITY OF LOS ANGELES CIVIL DISTURBANCE - RELATED DEATHS

DATE/TIME OF DEATH	SEX	AGE	ETHNICITY/ RACE	CAUSE OF DEATH	DEATH BY VIOLENCE	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
04/29/92 20:23	Male	18	African American	Shot outside swap meet that was being looted. Police believe he was the intended victim of a gang member because the victim had refused to join the neighborhood gang. Gunshot wound - head.	X	Vernon & Vermont Avenues.
04/29/92 20:46	Male	42	African American	Shot outside swap meet that was being looted. Police believe gunman was trying to shoot Louis Watson. The victim was on his way to visit his estranged wife and their children, but stopped to pick up some milk. Killers still at large. Gunshot wound -- check & neck. Drive-by shooting.	X	West MLK Blvd.
04/29/92 21:30	Male	20	Hispanic	Shot while sitting in the back seat of a car on the way home from a soccer game. Although the shooting happened within blocks of Martin Luther King Jr./Drew Medical Center, the victim's friends did not know the area and so drove the victim several miles to Gardena Memorial Hospital. His co-workers raised enough money so his body could be returned to Guerrero, his hometown. Gunshot wound - chest. Drive-by shooting.	X	120th Street & Central Avenue.
04/29/92 21:37	Male	33	Hispanic	Bakersfield restaurant manager shot while waiting in his broken-down car while a co-worker went to find a telephone. Gunshot wound - abdomen.	X	Shot on W. Slauson Avenue.
04/29/92 23:12	Male	29	African American	Traffic Accident. Thrown from a truck at an intersection where traffic signals had failed. Multiple traumatic injuries. Fell from back of pick-up truck.		Unknown location, L.A.

DATE/TIME OF DEATH	SEX	AGE	ETHNICITY/ RACE	CAUSE OF DEATH	DEATH BY VIOLENCE	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
04/30/92 17:06	Male	36	Hispanic	Blunt force trauma. Assaulted by unknown persons.	X	16th Street East of Central
04/30/92 17:23	Male	49	Hispanic	Shot outside a block of retail shops by an unknown gunman during a looting melee. Gunshot wound - neck. Drive-by shooting.	X	3rd Street & Vermont Avenue.
04/30/92 20:36	Male	15	African American	Shot outside swap meet that was being looted. Police believe gunman was trying to shoot Louis Watson. Gunshot wound - head.	X	Vermont & 43rd Street, Los Angeles.
04/30/92 20:52	Male	27	African American	Shot in the back while looting a video store and cleaners. Gunshot wound - chest.	X	Sunset Boulevard & Kingsley.
04/30/92 22:00	Male	20	Hispanic	Shot by unknown persons at unknown location in Los Angeles. Gunshot wound - chest.	X	Unknown.
04/30/92 22:05	Male	27	Hispanic	Salvadoran immigrant shot by LAPD who claim that the victim pointed a shotgun at them after an attempted robbery of a gas station. Multiple gunshot wounds. Officer involved shooting while robbing.	X	Vermont & Western.
04/30/92 22:07	Male	21	African American	Shot. Struck in the head by a random bullet while riding in a car. Gunshot wound - head.	X	78th & San Pedro Streets.

DATE/TIME OF DEATH	SEX	AGE	ETHNICITY/ RACE	CAUSE OF DEATH	DEATH BY VIOLENCE	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
04/30/92 22:30	Male	18	Asian American	Korean American shot (struck by several bullets) by fellow Korean-Americans who mistook him for a looter when the victim was attempting to protect shops. Killed during a firefight between the victim's armed convoy and gunmen on a roof. Multiple gunshot wounds.	X	3rd St. & Hobart Ave.
04/30/92 23:03	Male	19	Hispanic	Honduran immigrant shot by LAPD who claim that the victim raised a toy gun toward them when he was arrested with more than 40 other alleged looters. Gunshot wound - chest and abdomen.	X	Near 6th Street & Westlake Avenue.
04/30/92 23:18	Male	20	Hispanic	Shot, several bullets, during a firefight outside Auto Color Plus, Inc., a car paint and supply shop. A suspect has been charged. Multiple gunshot wounds. Drive-by shooting.	X	West Santa Monica Boulevard.
04/30/92 23:45	Male	27	African American	Shot, drive-by shooting outside a liquor store. Gun shot wound - chest.	X	92nd Street & Western Avenue.
05/01/92 00:52	Male	25	Hispanic	Shot by security guard while looting. Gunshot wound - back.	X	Vermont Avenue & Santa Monica Boulevard.
05/01/92 01:10	Male	24	Anglo	Fell through a roof while trying to put out a fire at a check-cashing store. Fire victim set by unknown persons on Braddock Drive. Smoke inhalation, crushed chest.	X	11849 Braddock Dr.
05/01/92 09:22	Male	33	African American	Found inside a market that had been firebombed. Smoke inhalation.	X	Vermont & 9th Street.
05/01/92 12:18	Male	38	African American	Shot by unknown persons (drug transaction). Multiple gunshot wounds.	X	E. Walnut Street, Los Angeles.

DATE/TIME OF DEATH	SEX	AGE	ETHNICITY/ RACE	CAUSE OF DEATH	DEATH BY VIOLENCE	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
05/01/92 17:26	Male	68	Anglo	Strangled by a supermarket produce manager in a dispute over corn husks.		W. Gateway Blvd., L.A.
05/01/92 17:55	Male	22	African American	Shot by off-duty sheriff's deputy after a friend allegedly fired at an officer. Multiple gunshot wounds.	X	Florence & Harbor Freeway.
05/01/92 19:32	Female	56	African American	Traffic accident while attempting to deliver food to a friend before the curfew began. Traffic lights were out throughout the area. Investigators trying to determine whether that was the cause of the accident. Multiple traumatic injuries.		Main and 51st Streets.
05/01/92 20:19	Male	32	African American	Shot in the neck in a drive-by shooting. He had been wearing a body cast at the time from a previous shooting. Gunshot wound - neck.	X	5400 block of S. Van Ness.
05/02/92 00:22	Female	43	African American	Hit-and-run accident. She was dragged 180 feet. No relatives claimed her body and so she was cremated at County-USC Medical Center. Multiple traumatic injuries.		Harbor Freeway north of Slauson.
05/02/92 12:20	Female	65	Hispanic	Shot in the stomach by 15-year-old boy who authorities say was aiming for two other youths. Gunshot wound - abdomen.	X	7608 Compton Ave.
05/02/92 14:00	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Man's body found in the rubble of a Pep Boys. Smoke inhalation.	X	Vermont & 58th Street, Los Angeles.
05/02/92 23:30	Male	20	African American	Drive-by shooting. Multiple gunshot wounds.	X	Pacoima on Cometa Street.
05/03/92 09:20	Female	89	African American	Suffered heart attack. Was distressed by riots.		1649 W. 60th Street, Los Angeles.

DATE/TIME OF DEATH	SEX	AGE	ETHNICITY/RACE	CAUSE OF DEATH	DEATH BY VIOLENCE	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
05/03/92 22:09	Male	25	Hispanic	Shot by Nat'l Guardsmen when his car threatened authorities securing the neighborhood. Gunshot wound - head.	X	Pico & Vermont Avenues.
05/04/92 09:40	Male	38	African American	Traffic Accident. His car collided with another. The traffic signal was apparent out. Multiple traumatic injuries.		Slauson and Avalon Boulevards.
05/04/92 10:55	Male	20	Hispanic	Cause of death unknown; found inside burnt business called Collective Merchandise, Inc.	X	31st Street and Main.
Date and time uncertain; found 08/12/92	Male	20	Anglo	Skeletonized remains found in burnt out building. No cause of death determination as yet.	X	1601 S. Western.

RECAP

Total Dead: 42

By Ethnicity:

African American: 21 (50%)
 Hispanic: 12 (29%)
 Anglo: 7 (17%)
 Asian American: 1 (2%)
 Unknown: 1 (2%)

By Sex:

Female: 4 (10%)
 Male: 38 (90%)

By Age:

15-19: 6 (14%)
 20-29: 13 (31%)
 30-39: 13 (31%)
 40 and over: 9 (22%)
 Unknown: 1 (2%)

By Cause of Death:

Gunshots: 30 (71%)
 Traffic Accidents: 4 (10%)
 Fire: 3 (7%)
 Assaults: 2 (5%)
 Heart Attack: 1 (2%)
 Unknown: 2 (5%)


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CIVIL DISTURBANCE CHRONOLOGY

CIVIL DISTURBANCE CHRONOLOGY

The Civil Disturbance Chronology displays the number of incidents, arrests, fires and deaths which occurred over the course of the first six days of the civil disturbance. This chronology reflects the 9-1-1 Incidents Analysis, Fire Analysis, Arrest Analysis and Civil Disturbance-Related Deaths Analysis.

Civil Disturbance Chronology



Incidents	146	1,190	2,047	1,410	1,039	971	516	599	468	332	446	115
Arrests	34	355	245	1,103	362	734	301	871	134	633	167	63
Fire	0	269	341	171	136	41	41	13	14	8	10	0
Deaths	0	10	5	11	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0

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FIREARMS

STOLEN FROM

GUN STORES

FIREARMS STOLEN FROM GUN STORES

This analysis of firearms stolen from gunstores reflects data from LAPD police reports. In addition, each gun store listed on LAPD logs of gun stores in all 18 LAPD Areas was telephoned and a representative of the store was asked five questions: (1) Were any firearms stolen? (2) What type of firearms were stolen? (3) Was any ammunition stolen? (4) On what dates were the firearms stolen? and (5) Did you file a police report? Then, the data collected from each of these sources was compiled and is displayed in the following table.

September 18, 1992

FIREARMS STOLEN FROM GUN STORES

LAPD AREA	NO. OF FIREARMS STOLEN	NO. OF STORES IN AREA	NO. OF STORES WITH FIREARMS STOLEN	AMMO STOLEN	FILED POLICE REPORT	COPY OF REPORT ON FILE	UNLISTED OR OUT OF BUSINESS
1	0	8	0	0	0	0	1
2	131	5	2	0	2	1	2
3	1,010	6	4	1	4	4	2
4	40-50	6	1	1	1	1	3
5	6	9	1	0	1	0	0
6	951	10	1	1	1	1	3
7	200	11	3	0	3	3	2
8	0	5	0	0	0	0	2
9	0	17	0	0	0	0	9
10	0	12	0	0	0	0	2
11	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
12	1,227	7	4	2	4	2	1
13	450	3	1	1	1	0	2
14	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	8	0	0	0	0	2
16	306	7	2	1	2	1	3
17	0	11	0	0	0	0	1
18	0	2	0	0	0	0	1

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DEPLOYMENT
ANALYSIS

DEPLOYMENT ANALYSIS

A. LAPD DEPLOYMENT

The LAPD's deployment during the civil unrest was determined based on the available Daily Work Sheets from all 18 LAPD Areas and all four LAPD Traffic Divisions, covering the period from 6:00 a.m. on April 29, 1992 through 6:00 a.m. on May 3, 1992. Each Area and Traffic Division is required to fill out a Daily Work Sheet for every shift of every day. The Daily Work Sheets are rosters identifying which officers are on duty during a particular watch and their assignments, (i.e., patrol or desk).

It is not clear from some of the Daily Work Sheets that were completed during the civil unrest how many officers were actually deployed in the field, and roughly one-third of the Daily Work Sheets from the relevant period were not available. Data for the shifts for which a Daily Work Sheet was not available were estimated using another source, the Mobilization Watch Personnel Roster, or based upon reasonable proxies. The Mobilization Watch Personnel Roster is a report which is prepared by each LAPD Area and Traffic Division. The report documents the Area's personnel assignments to the "A" and "B" watches during a mobilization.

Officers Deployed Into the Field

The officers who appeared to be assigned to the field were counted from these Daily Work Sheets. The decision to include an officer was based on markings or classifications identified on the Daily Work Sheet. Although there were differences in the way each Area or Traffic Division filled out the Daily Work Sheets, the counting was standardized by including:

1. All officers listed in the Name(s) column of the report, including their commanding officers;
2. All officers who were identified as having been assigned to a squad;
3. All field jail officers; and
4. All CRASH officers.

The officers on the Daily Work Sheets who were excluded from the count include all officers listed as watch commanders, jail personnel, detectives, operations, desk, station security, transportation, special detail and those with days off.

Watch Periods

For simplicity of presentation, the varying times for watch periods at each of the Los Angeles Police Department Areas were standardized by aggregating all watch periods into the "A" and "B" watch periods. LAPD typically divides each day into three watches — the "a.m." watch starts at approximately 11:00 p.m. the previous evening and ends during the current day at about 7:45 a.m.; the "day" watch begins 45 minutes before the "a.m." watch ends, i.e., 7:00 a.m., and ends at approximately 3:45 p.m.; the "p.m." watch begins 45 minutes before the "day" watch ends, i.e., 3:00 p.m., and ends at approximately 11:45 p.m. Each LAPD Area, however, sets its own beginning times for the three watches based on the level of crime activity in their respective Area. In general, however, most Area watches begin within an hour of the times quoted. Although there are some minor watches throughout the day, i.e., "mid-day" watch, these are the three primary watches.

Once an LAPD Area mobilizes, the Area converts from the three-watch staffing to a two-watch staffing, consisting of two twelve-hour shifts, or an "A" and "B" watch. The "A" watch for all LAPD Areas begins at 6:00 a.m. and lasts until 6:00 p.m.; the "B" watch runs from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

A tactical alert was called at 6:45 p.m. on April 29, 1992. Shortly afterwards, the Department was mobilized and most LAPD Areas went to "A" and "B" watch staffing during the early evening, or during the "p.m." watch. As a result, the April 29, 1992 "p.m." watch became the April 29 "B" watch. To standardize the analysis, the April 29 "day" watch, the watch preceding the p.m./"B" watch, is referred to as the April 29 "A" watch. Thus, the deployment levels reported for April 29 in the accompanying charts are relatively imprecise, particularly from around 3:00 p.m. through mid-evening. No conclusions are possible

from this data as to the exact level of deployment during any of these critical first post-verdict hours.

Due to the nature of the methodology used, LAPD deployment is depicted as being constant throughout each 12-hour period. This obviously was not the case. However, with the limited deployment information available, there is little from which a more accurate picture can be derived.

Alternative Deployment Data

An alternative source of deployment information is provided in daily Unusual Occurrence Situation Report Summary (U/O Report). These reports summarize deploy-

ment derived from the Daily Work Sheets and those derived from the U/O Reports. As the table above indicates, the difference appears to be substantial:

B. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL (CHP) DEPLOYMENT

The CHP provided a table containing data regarding CHP field deployment during the period from 9:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 through 9:00 a.m. on May 4, 1992. The appendixes depict average deployment in the County of Los Angeles for three-hour segments, and are based on scheduled staffing, not actual staffing. A representative of the CHP indicated that the data depict a best estimation of minimum de-

	6:00 a.m. <u>April 30</u>	6:00 a.m. <u>May 1</u>	6:00 a.m. <u>May 2</u>	6:00 a.m. <u>May 3</u>
Deployment per U/O Reports	1,804	2,894	2,912	3,270
Estimated Deployment based on Daily Work Sheets	<u>997</u>	<u>2,371</u>	<u>2,500</u>	<u>2,403</u>
Difference	807	523	412	867
	=====	=====	=====	=====
Possible explanations for these differences include:				
1. Officers loaned to command posts could have been excluded from an Area's Daily Work Sheet. Consequently, these reports could understate deployment.				
2. Area responses to the EOC's request for deployment numbers could have been in error.				
3. Desk officers can be deployed during an unusual occurrence, thus explaining an understatement in the deployment appendixes contained in the Daily Work Sheets.				
4. Deployment appendixes from the U/O reports could double count officers at stations and command posts.				
5. The U/O reports include detectives in the deployment count.				

ment information received by the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) from the 18 LAPD Areas and the four LAPD Traffic Divisions for each 24-hour period from April 30, 1992 through May 3, 1992.

Unlike the other sources of deployment information described above, these U/O Reports include detectives in the deployment count. A further comparison of the various sources of deployment information reveals a material difference between de-

ployment, and that after 6:00 p.m. on April 30, 1992, nearly all personnel listed in the table were deployed to the City of Los Angeles, except for 250 officers who were assigned to the balance of Los Angeles County.

A graph of the estimated City-wide deployment shows that significant CHP deployment did not occur until April 30, 1992, and then peaked at over 900 officers on May 1, 1992, declining slowly thereafter.

C. LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT DEPLOYMENT

Data concerning the deployment of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) officers was obtained through interviews of various LASD personnel. Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on the evening of April 29, 1992, approximately 75 Sheriff's deputies were deployed to the Hall of Justice to squelch the crowds which were breaking windows and throwing objects at the building. At that time, there were approximately 200 additional Sheriff's deputies deployed inside the Hall of Justice, who helped break up the crowd. The deputies remained at the Hall of Justice for approximately two hours before they returned to the Carson Station.

On Thursday, April 30, 1992 at around 10:00 a.m. two platoons of Sheriff's deputies (approximately 112 deputies) were deployed to the Crenshaw area in an attempt to stop looting that was taking place at that location. These deputies did not return to the Carson Station until approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening. Other than the deployment of these Sheriff's deputies, there does not appear to have been any other deployment of LASD personnel during the civil disturbance.

D. CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT

Reports provided by the California National Guard were used to determine the level of the National Guard's deployment to the City of Los Angeles during the period from 10:30 a.m. on April 29, 1992 through 11:00 p.m. on May 2, 1992. National


Guard personnel who were located at headquarters operations, as identified on the reports provided by the National Guard, were excluded from the analysis. Some of the troops deployed did not have locations indicated; these troops were assumed to have been deployed to the City of Los Angeles. Other entries show troops being deployed to locations outside the City of Los Angeles.

According to a representative of the California National Guard, the number of troops indicated in the reports provided represent the National Guard's best estimate of each division's or element's head-count based upon actual deployment into the streets. The National Guard believes these numbers represent minimum levels, and probably grew over time. In addition, it is difficult to know exactly how many National Guard troops were deployed because some troops were deployed in groups of only two or three, a situation that is not reflected in the reports provided. The deployment data are presented in a cumulative line based on the unit strength identified by the National Guard as initially deployed onto the streets. Subsequent troop rotation and potential increases or decreases in street strength are not captured in the data available.

E. DEPLOYMENT OF FEDERAL TROOPS AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL


Data concerning deployment of the federal troops and other law enforcement personnel was derived from interviews of personnel from relevant military and law enforcement agencies.

TOTAL LAPD DEPLOYMENT APRIL 29 - MAY 3



SOURCE: LAPD DAILY WORK SHEETS
 (A) DEPLOYMENT AT 6PM ON APRIL 29 REFLECTS STAFFING AS OF THE END OF THE SHIFT PERIOD, 6AM APRIL 30. DEPLOYMENT BUILD UP ACTUALLY OCCURRED SPORADICALLY DURING THIS SHIFT, 6PM TO 6AM.


LAPD DEPLOYMENT - ALL BUREAUS APRIL 29 - MAY 3



SOURCE: LAPD DAILY WORK SHEETS


(A) DEPLOYMENT AT 6PM ON APRIL 29 REFLECTS STAFFING AS OF THE END OF THE SHIFT PERIOD, 6AM APRIL 30. DEPLOYMENT BUILD UP ACTUALLY OCCURRED SPORADICALLY DURING THIS SHIFT, 6PM TO 6AM.

INCIDENTS VERSUS LAPD DEPLOYMENT ALL BUREAUS



SOURCE: 911 CALLS, LAPD DAILY WORK SHEETS
 NOTE: DAY 1 (APRIL 29, 1992) REPRESENTS A 9 HOUR PERIOD ONLY (3:00PM - 12:00PM)
 (A) DEPLOYMENT AT 6PM ON APRIL 29 REFLECTS STAFFING AS OF THE END OF THE SHIFT PERIOD, 6AM APRIL 30. DEPLOYMENT BUILD UP ACTUALLY OCCURRED SPORADICALLY DURING THIS SHIFT, 6PM TO 6AM.


CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL DEPLOYMENT APRIL 29 - MAY 4



SOURCE: CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL DEPLOYMENT REPORT


INCIDENTS VERSUS CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL DEPLOYMENT

APRIL 30 - MAY 4




SOURCE: CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL DEPLOYMENT REPORT

CUMULATIVE NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT
APRIL 30 - MAY 2



SOURCE: NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT REPORT
NOTE: ASSUMES THAT TROOPS DEPLOYED REMAINED DEPLOYED INDEFINITELY
OR WERE RELIEVED BY OTHER TROOPS.

INCIDENTS VERSUS NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT ALL BUREAUS



SOURCE: NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT REPORT
 NOTE: ASSUMES THAT TROOPS DEPLOYED REMAINED DEPLOYED INDEFINITELY
 OR WERE RELIEVED BY OTHER TROOPS.

13

DEMOGRAPHICS
ANALYSIS

DEMOGRAPHICS ANALYSIS


The Demographics Analysis reflects data which are based upon 1990 and 1991 available Census data maintained and compiled by Max 3-D, a database access facility. The data include population density (percentages of actual population in a given area), racial make-up of the population, per capita income and an index of crimes against persons and property.


The crime index survey was based upon the following crime categories:

Homicide	Larceny
Rape	Motor Vehicle Theft
Robbery	Crimes against Persons
Aggravated Assault	Crimes against Property
Burglary	Crimes against Persons and Property


Index scores were referenced to an average of 100 as standard for the nation. A rating of 50 would be an area having only one-half the vulnerability to a crime compared to the nation. A location with a rating of 200 would be twice as likely to be a victim of the potential crimes.


The data were used to create computerized maps, corresponding to LAPD Area maps, which display the relevant data by LAPD Area.







APPENDIX 13-2






APPENDIX 13-4





APPENDIX 13-6



14

POSSE

COMITATUS ACT

THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 18 U.S.C. § 1385

In response to Southern complaints over the activities of federal troops in the South during Reconstruction, Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 (hereinafter “the Act”).¹ Its immediate objective was “to end the use of federal troops in former confederate states where civil power had been reestablished.”²

PROVISIONS AND SCOPE

The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct, active participation of Army or Air Force personnel in the execution of civil laws, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statute.³ It reads:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force⁴ as a posse comitatus⁵ or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.⁶

Although neither the Navy nor Marines are legally bound by the Act, they are made subject to its provisions by Department of Defense regulations.⁷

The Act applies with equal force to the Army or Air National Guard only when they are federalized or otherwise placed in the service of the United States. Once federalized, the Army and Air National Guard become part of the regular Army and Air Force, respectively, and are governed by the same laws applicable to the armed forces of the United States.⁸ At all other times, the National Guard is exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act.⁹

EXEMPT ACTIVITY

Not every direct use of the armed forces is proscribed by the Posse Comitatus Act, however. Activities expressly authorized

by the Constitution¹⁰ or by statute are exempt from the Act’s restrictions. One such statutory exemption is the President’s authority to use federal troops to quell domestic violence:¹¹

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the United States, makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces to suppress the rebellion.¹²

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

- (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
- (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.¹³

The President’s discretionary authority to use federal troops under these sections is plenary and is not subject to judicial review.¹⁴ The only statutory qualification placed on the use of this power is the requirement that the President issue a proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes.¹⁵

Although no applicable case law exists, federal regulations interpreting the extent

of Posse Comitatus Act proscriptions make clear that actions taken pursuant to the President's authority to use federal troops to quell domestic violence¹⁶ are exempt from the Act.¹⁷ Furthermore, at least two Attorney General Opinions have concluded that the President's authority to use federal troops pursuant to these sections is not impaired by the Posse Comitatus Act.¹⁸

Like his predecessors,¹⁹ President Bush used the authority given him²⁰ to federalize the California National Guard and send active duty troops to Los Angeles to restore order during the civil disturbance which began on April 29, 1992.²¹ Therefore, actions taken by active duty troops or by the California National Guard during the Los Angeles unrest are exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act.²²

APPLICATION

Although the Act is more than a century old, no one has been prosecuted for a Posse Comitatus Act violation.²³ Rather, the Act has been used primarily as a defense in criminal cases. Defendants have used the Act to challenge the court's jurisdiction,²⁴ to challenge the sufficiency of indictments,²⁵ and to exclude evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Act.²⁶

In this context, courts have applied three tests to determine whether a Posse Comitatus Act violation has taken place. These tests emerged from three criminal cases in which defendants were indicted for their participation in the uprising at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973.²⁷ Although each of these cases involved the same fact pattern, the tests employed and the results reached differed considerably.

During the standoff at Wounded Knee, members of the American Indian Movement took control of a village, held hostages, burglarized a U.S. post office, looted stores, and established an armed perimeter around the area.²⁸ As the siege continued, elements of the U.S. Army and the South Dakota National Guard cooperated with F.B.I. agents, United States marshals, Bureau of Indian Affairs police, and other civil law enforcement officers to restore order. Among other things, Army person-

nel supplied civilian officials with military equipment; repaired and maintained that equipment; advised civilians about logistics, negotiations, and rules of engagement; and drafted contingency plans for implementing a possible presidential order for military intervention.²⁹

The court in *Red Feather* was called upon to determine whether evidence of the military's involvement at Wounded Knee, should be limited at trial. In so doing, the court concluded that the test for determining a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, was whether civilian law enforcement agents made "direct active use" of military personnel to execute the laws.³⁰

[The Posse Comitatus Act] make[s] unlawful the direct active participation of federal military troops in law enforcement activities. . . . Activities which constitute an active role in direct law enforcement are: arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a person; search of a building; investigation of crime; interviewing witnesses; pursuit of an escaped civilian prisoner; search of an area for a suspect and other like activities.³¹

Although the court's analysis implied that none of the Army's activities at Wounded Knee involved direct active participation of federal military troops, it nevertheless allowed defendants to introduce evidence of the military's role in the uprising.³²

By contrast, the court in another case held that the use of military personnel to repair civilian equipment and the giving of advice to civilian authorities violated the Posse Comitatus Act.³³ In reaching this conclusion, the court developed a second test for determining whether a Posse Comitatus Act violation had occurred. The test, according to the court, was whether "use of any part of the Army or Air Force pervaded the activities" of civilian law enforcement agents.³⁴

The third test arising out of the Wounded Knee prosecutions, is whether the "military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in na-

ture, either presently or prospectively.”³⁵ Using this test, the court concluded that the defendants did not produce enough evidence to disprove the presumption that civil law enforcement officials were lawfully engaged in the performance of their duties at Wounded Knee.³⁶

Although several other courts have found violations of the Posse Comitatus Act by applying these tests,³⁷ few have been willing to exclude evidence or dismiss charges against the defendant merely because of this violation. For example, in one case, the court rejected dismissal as a remedy for alleged violations of the Posse Comitatus Act.³⁸ And in another case, the court refused to adopt a rule that would exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Act.³⁹

RECENT AMENDMENTS

Because the language of the Posse Comitatus Act led to confusion and contradictory interpretation, as evidenced in the Wounded Knee cases, Congress in 1981 delineated the types of activities permitted under the Act by adding several new sections to the Armed Forces Code.⁴⁰ These amendments were designed specifically to aid in the war on drugs by allowing the armed forces to provide material and technical assistance to civilian officials without running afoul of the Act.⁴¹

The new sections permit the Secretary of Defense to provide civilian law enforcement officials with a) information collected during military operations, b) use of military equipment and facilities, c) training and advice in the operation and maintenance of military equipment and d) military personnel to operate, maintain or repair needed equipment.⁴²

Borrowing language from the court’s opinion in the Red Feather case, the amendments also require the Secretary of Defense to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity . . . does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.”⁴³

CONCLUSION

The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct, active participation of Army or Air Force personnel in the execution of civil law, unless otherwise authorized by the Constitution or by statute. Although neither the Navy nor Marines are mentioned, they are made subject to the Act’s proscriptions as a matter of Department of Defense policy. When federalized, the National Guard is also subject to the Posse Comitatus Act; at all other times, the Act does not apply to its activities.

Military activity otherwise subject to the Posse Comitatus Act is exempted if it is expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statute. One such exception is the President’s authority to use both active federal troops and state National Guard units to quell civil unrest. Because President Bush’s use of federal and state troops during the Los Angeles uprising was undertaken pursuant to express statutory authority, the actions of either the California National Guard or active duty federal troops are exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act.

Today, the Act is primarily used as a defense in criminal prosecutions. In this context, courts have employed three tests when determining whether a Posse Comitatus Act violation has taken place. The tests are whether civilian officials made direct, active use of military personnel, whether use of any part of the Army or Air Force pervaded the activities of civilian officials, or whether military personnel subjected citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.

In order to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the scope of permissible military activity, Congress added several new sections to the Armed Forces Code in 1981. These sections were designed primarily to allow federal troops to assist civilian law enforcement authorities in the war on drugs without violating the Posse Comitatus Act. The 1981 amendments make clear that, unless otherwise authorized, the direct participation of any branch of the armed forces in the search, seizure or arrest of civilians is forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act.

NOTES

- ¹ 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (West 1984).
- ² *U.S. v. Yunis*, 681 F. Supp. 891, 892 (D.D.C. 1988).
- ³ See *United States v. Red Feather*, 392 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D.S.D. 1975).
- ⁴ The Air Force was added to the statute in 1956.
- ⁵ Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "posse comitatus" as "The power or force of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1991).
- ⁶ 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
- ⁷ See 32 C.F.R. § 213.2 (1992). The activities of the Coast Guard during peace time are exempt, however. See *United States v. Chaparro-Almeida*, 679 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1982).
- ⁸ 10 U.S.C. §§ 3078, 8078 (West 1983).
- ⁹ See Note, *Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement*, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 404, 407 (1986).
- ¹⁰ No Constitutional exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act exist. See H.R. Rep. No. 71, pt. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1785, 1789 n. 3.
- ¹¹ 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (West 1983).
- ¹² 10 U.S.C. § 332.
- ¹³ 10 U.S.C. § 333.
- ¹⁴ *Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia*, 353 F. Supp. 1249 (D.C.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 683, 686, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021.
- ¹⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 334.
- ¹⁶ 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (West 1983).
- ¹⁷ 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(2)(iii). See also H.R. Rep. No. 71, pt. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1785, 1789 [hereinafter "H.R. Rep. No. 71"].
- ¹⁸ 41 Op. Att'y. Gen. (1957); 19 Op. Att'y. Gen. 570 (1890).
- ¹⁹ In recent times, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson have relied on these provisions for authority to federalize the National Guards of the respective states or to send federal troops to restore order after the outbreak of civil unrest. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957) (federalizing the Arkansas National Guard to facilitate the enrollment of black children in Little Rock, Arkansas); Exec. Order No. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962) (federalizing the Mississippi National Guard to end rioting at the University of Mississippi after the enrollment of James Meredith); and Proclamation No. 3795, 32 Fed. Reg. 10905 (1967) (ordering all persons engaged in domestic violence and disorder in Detroit, Michigan to disperse).
- ²⁰ 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334.
- ²¹ See Exec. Order No. 12804, 57 Fed. Reg. 19361 (1992); Proclamation No. 6427, 57 F.R. 19359 (1992).
- ²² Governor Wilson's mobilization of the California National Guard before they were federalized by the President also is exempt from the *Posse Comitatus* Act. As explained above, the *Posse Comitatus* Act only applies to the National Guard once the Guard is federalized.
- ²³ H.R. Rep. No. 71, at 1787.
- ²⁴ See *Chandler v. U.S.*, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948).
- ²⁵ See e.g. *United States v. Banks*, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974).
- ²⁶ See *United States v. Roberts*, 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986).
- ²⁷ See *Yunis*, 681 F. Supp. at 892.
- ²⁸ See *Bissonette v. Haig*, 776 F.2d 1384, 1385 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing, No. 84-2617 (Sept. 16, 1986) (en banc).
- ²⁹ See *Red Feather*, 392 F. Supp. at 921. The President did not exercise his authority to quell domestic violence, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 331-334. See *United States v. Jaramillo*, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Neb. 1974). All three courts erroneously assumed that the National Guard had been federalized.
- ³⁰ *Red Feather*, 392 F. Supp. at 921.
- ³¹ *Id.* at 924, 925.
- ³² *Id.* at 925.
- ³³ *U.S. v. Jaramillo*, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379, 1381 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
- ³⁴ *Id.* at 1379, 1381; See also *Yunis*, 681 F. Supp. at 892.
- ³⁵ *United States v. McArthur*, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1976), aff'd sub nom. *United States v. Casper*, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
- ³⁶ *McArthur*, 419 F. Supp. at 195.
- ³⁷ See, e.g., *United States v. Walden*, 490 F.2d 372, 376 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
- ³⁸ *U.S. v. Cotten*, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
- ³⁹ *United States v. Roberts*, 779 F.2d at 568.
- ⁴⁰ 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
- ⁴¹ See H.R. Rep. No. 71, at 1785.
- ⁴² 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-374.
- ⁴³ 10 U.S.C. § 375. The regulations promulgated pursuant to this section are found at 32 C.F.R. §§ 213.1-213.11.

Presidential Documents

Proclamation 6427 of May 1, 1992

Law and Order in the City and County of Los Angeles, and Other Districts of California

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation


WHEREAS, I have been informed by the Governor of California that conditions of domestic violence and disorder exist in and about the City and County of Los Angeles, and other districts of California, endangering life and property and obstructing execution of the laws, and that the available law enforcement resources, including the National Guard, are unable to suppress such acts of violence and to restore law and order;

WHEREAS, such domestic violence and disorder are also obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States, in the affected area; and

WHEREAS, the Governor of California has requested Federal assistance in suppressing the violence and restoring law and order in the affected area.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, do command all persons engaged in such acts of violence and disorder to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this first day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and sixteenth.



Presidential Documents

Executive Order 12804 of May 1, 1992

Providing for the Restoration of Law and Order in the City and County of Los Angeles, and Other Districts of California

WHEREAS, I have today issued Proclamation No. 6427; and

WHEREAS, the conditions of domestic violence and disorder described therein continue, and the persons engaging in such acts of violence have not dispersed;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Units and members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Federal law enforcement officers will be used to suppress the violence described in the proclamation and to restore law and order in and about the City and County of Los Angeles, and other districts of California.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Armed Forces as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 1. To that end, he is authorized to call into the active military service of the United States units or members of the National Guard, as authorized by law, to serve in an active duty status for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. Units or members may be relieved subject to recall at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.


In carrying out the provisions of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall observe such law enforcement policies as the Attorney General may determine.

Sec. 3. Until such time as the Armed Forces shall have been withdrawn pursuant to section 4 of this order, the Attorney General is further authorized (1) to coordinate the activities of all Federal agencies assisting in the suppression of violence and in the administration of justice in and about the City and County of Los Angeles, and other districts of California, and (2) to coordinate the activities of all such agencies with those of State and local agencies similarly engaged.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to determine when Federal military forces shall be withdrawn from the disturbance area and when National Guard units and members called into the active military service of the United States in accordance with section 2 of this order shall be released from such active service. Such determination shall be made in the light of the Attorney General's recommendations as to the ability of State and local authorities to resume full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the affected area.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General are authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective Departments any of the authority conferred upon them by this order.

Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization, enforceable against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers, or its employees.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 1, 1992.

15

POLICE

DEPARTMENT

SURVEY

POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEY

The Police Department Survey was designed to elicit detailed information from police departments across the country concerning: (1) the composition, size and structure of the police department; (2) the operational philosophy of the police department; (3) the performance of the police department as indicated by certain measures; (4) training of police officers; (5) planning for civil disturbances; (6) resources, including communications equipment, available to the police department and individual police officers; and (7) budgeting and expenditures for law enforcement. The Police Department Questionnaire was developed principally through the efforts of law enforcement professionals serving as consultants to the Special Advisor.

The Questionnaire was sent to the police departments in 64 U.S. cities with 1990 populations of 250,000 persons or more as reflected in the "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991," published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Questionnaires were also sent to the police departments in five additional cities selected because either they were known to have had previous incidents of civil disorder or to have instituted a department-wide program of community-oriented policing. These additional cities are: Madison, Wisconsin; Newport News, Virginia; Richmond, Virginia; Teaneck, New Jersey; and Toronto, Canada. Additionally, Questionnaires were sent to the police departments in three counties known either to have had previous incidents of civil disorder or to have instituted a department-wide program of community-oriented policing. The three counties are: Bergen County, New Jersey; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Dade County, Florida.

Of the 72 Questionnaires sent out, 66 were completed and returned to the Office of the Special Advisor as of August 31, 1992.¹ Completed Questionnaires received after this date were not included in the survey sample.

In order to facilitate the comparison of information obtained from the completed Questionnaires, the responses to the survey questions were entered into a computerized database. This computerized database was used to make comparisons between the LAPD and the 65 other police departments with regard to procedures, policies, philosophy of policing, planning (including civil disturbance planning), training, department resources and equipment, department budget, department size and department composition. Data compiled from 1990 Census data provided by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, as well as law enforcement data gathered from the publications of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, were used to normalize these comparisons.

The completed Questionnaires, as well as the normalized comparisons of the responses to the survey, will be provided to the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C. for further review and study by police departments across the country.

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	B	A,C,D,G,I,J,K
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	B,D	A,C,G,H,I
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	B,E	A,B,C,F,G,H,I
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	B,E	B,C,D,F,G,H,I,J
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	B,E	A,C,G,K
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	C	A,C,D,G,I,J,K
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	C	A,G,I,J
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	C	C,H,I
CLEVELAND, OHIO	C	A,B,C,D,F,G,H,I,J,K
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	C	ALL
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	C	A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	C	A,B,C,E,F,G,H,I,J,K
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	C	A,B,C,G,H,I,J
MIAMI, FLORIDA	C	A,B,C,F,G,H,I,J,K
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	C	A,B,C,G,I,J
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	C	A,B,C,D,F,G,I,J
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	C	A,B,C,D,F,G,H,I,J,K
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	C	A,B,C,G,I,J
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	C	A,B,D,G,I,J
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	C	A,C,G,H,I,J
TAMPA, FLORIDA	C	A,B,C,D,F,G,H,I,J
TOLEDO, OHIO	C	A,C,F,G,H,I,J
TORONTO, CANADA	C	ALL
WICHITA, KANSAS	C	C,G,H,I,J
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	C,D	A,C,F,G,H,I,J
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	C,D	A,B,C,F,G,H,I,J
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	C,D	A,B,C,G,H,I,J
CINCINNATI, OHIO	C,E	A,C,D,G,H,I,J,K
DENVER, COLORADO	C,E	A,B,D,E,F,G,H,I,J
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	C,E	A,B,F,G,H,I,J,K
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	C,E	A,C,H,I,J
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	D	ALL
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	D	A,B,C,E,F,G,H,I,J
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	D	A,B,C,D,F,G,I,J
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	D,E	A,B,C,D,G,I,J
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	E	ALL
AUSTIN, TEXAS	E	ALL
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	E	A,B,C,E,F,G,H,I,J,K
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	E	A,B,C,F,G,H,I,J
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	E	A,B,C,F,G,I,J,K
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	E	A,B,C,F,G,H,I,J
COLUMBUS, OHIO	E	A,B,F,G,I,J
EL PASO, TEXAS	E	A,C,D,F,G,I,J
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	E	A,C,F,G,I,J
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	E	A,C,D,G,H,I,J
MESA, ARIZONA	E	B,G,I,J
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	E	B,C,F,G,H,I,J,K
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	E	A,C,G,H,I,J
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	E	ALL

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	E	A,B,C,D,F,G,H,I,J,K
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	E	A,B,F,G,H,I,J
WASHINGTON, D.C.		

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Call Screening and Response Time

Column A: Is it your department's policy to screen calls for service?

Column B: It is your department's policy to dispatch response units to low-priority calls for service, i.e., after incident reports, after-the-fact incidents of malicious destruction of property, etc.?

Column C: What was your department's average response time to call for service for "Part One" crime in 1991 (in minutes)?

N/A - Indicates that the information either was not available or otherwise not provided by the police department.

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	N	28
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	N	21
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	Y	19
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	Y	12
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	Y	11
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	N	Y	10
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	Y	10
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	Y	8
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	Y	8
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	N	8
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	Y	8
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	Y	8
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	Y	7
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	7
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	Y	7
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	N	7
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y		6
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	Y	6
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	N	6
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	N	Y	6
EL PASO, TEXAS	Y	Y	5
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	N	Y	5
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y	N	5
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	N	4
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	Y	4
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	4
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	Y	4
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	Y	4
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	4
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y		3

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	Y	3
MESA, ARIZONA	Y	Y	3
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	Y	3
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	Y	Y	2
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	Y	Y	2
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	N	Y	2
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	Y	
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	Y	N	N/R
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	N	N/R
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	Y	Y	N/R
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	Y	N/R
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	Y	Y	N/A
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	N/A
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	Y	N/A
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	N	N/A
CLEVELAND, OHIO	Y	N	N/A
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	Y	N/A
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	N	N/A
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	Y	Y	N/A
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	N/A
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	Y	N	N/A
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	Y	N/A
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	N	N/A
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	N	N/A
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	Y	N	N/A
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	Y	N/A
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	N	N/A
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	Y	Y	N/A
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	N	N/A
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y	N/A
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	N	N/A
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	N	N/A
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	N	N/A
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	N	N/A
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	Y	N	N/A
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	Y	N/A

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Civil Disturbance Plan - Update Schedule

Column A: Does your department have a written plan detailing your department's response to a civil disturbance?

Column B: How frequently is that written plan detailing your department's response to a civil disturbance reviewed and updated?

A - Annually

B - Bi-Annually

T - Tri-Annually

AR - As Required

N/R - Indicates that the question is not relevant or not applicable because of the department's response to the (or a) prior question

CITY/STATE	A	B
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	A
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	A
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	A
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	A
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	A
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	N/R
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	A
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	A
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	A
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	A
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	A
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	A
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	A
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	A
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	A
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	A
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	Y	A
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Y	A
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	A
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	A
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	A
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	A, A/R
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	A/R

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	Y	A/R
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	Y	A/R
CLEVELAND, OHIO	Y	A/R
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	A/R
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y	A/R
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	A/R
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A/R
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	A/R
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	A/R
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	A/R
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	A/R
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	A/R
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	A/R
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	A/R
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	Y	A/R
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	A/R
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	Y	A/R
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A/R
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A/R
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	A/R
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	A/R
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y	A/R
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	A/R
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y	A/R
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	A/R
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	A/R
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	B
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	Y	
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	Y	
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	N	N/R
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	N	N/A
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	N	A
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	N	
MESA, ARIZONA	N	A/R
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	N	N/A
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N	
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	N	N/A
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	I/P	N/R
EL PASO, TEXAS	I/P	A/R
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	I/P	A/R
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	I/P	

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Mutual Inter-Agency Training Plan

Column A: Is there a department plan for mutual inter-agency assistance when responding to a civil disturbance?

Column B: If applicable, have the involved agencies agreed to conduct combined training or practice sessions for handling a civil disturbance?

N/R - Indicates that the question is not relevant or not applicable because of the department's response to the (or a) prior question

CITY/STATE	A	B
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N/A	N/A
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	N
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	Y
AUSTIN, TEXAS	N	N
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	N
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	N
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	Y
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y	N
BUFFALO, NEW YORK		
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	N	N/A
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	N/R
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	N
CLEVELAND, OHIO	N	N/A
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	Y
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y	N
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	N/A
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	Y
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	Y
DETROIT, MICHIGAN		
EL PASO, TEXAS	Y	N
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	Y
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	N/A
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	Y

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA		
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	N/A
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	N
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	N
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	Y
MESA, ARIZONA	Y	N
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	Y
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	N
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	Y
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	N
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	Y
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N	
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	N
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	N
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	N
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	N
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	Y
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	N	
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	Y	N
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	N	
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	Y	N
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	N	N
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	N
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	Y
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	Y
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	Y
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	Y
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y	Y
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	N
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	Y
TUCSON, ARIZONA	N	N
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	N	N/A
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	Y
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	Y
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	N

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Frequency of Field Readiness Testing

Column A: If applicable, when was the last time your department initiated a field readiness test of the full civil disturbance plan?

Column B: Is the field readiness test of the full civil disturbance plan conducted with or without prior notification?

W/O - Without Prior Notification
W - With Prior Notification

CITY/STATE	A	B
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N/A	
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	1984	
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Feb-88	W
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Jan-92	W
AUSTIN, TEXAS	N/A	
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	N/A	
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	N/A	
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Jun-92	W
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	N/A	
BUFFALO, NEW YORK		
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	N/A	
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Jun-92	W/O
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Jun-92	W/O
CLEVELAND, OHIO	NEVER	
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Jun-92	W/O
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Jul-92	W
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Mar-92	
DALLAS, TEXAS	Apr-92	W/O
DENVER, COLORADO	N/A	
DETROIT, MICHIGAN		
EL PASO, TEXAS	N/A	W/O
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	May-92	W/O
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	NEVER	
HONOLULU, HAWAII	1990	W

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	1960's	
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA		
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	N/A	
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Apr-92	W/O
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	N/A	
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Apr-91	W
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	N/A	
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	1975	W
MESA, ARIZONA	NEVER	
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Feb-92	W
MIAMI, FLORIDA	May-92	W,W/O
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	May-92	W/O
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	1965	
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	N/A	W/O
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N/A	
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	N/A	
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Jun-92	W/O
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	N/A	
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	N/A	W
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	N/A	
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	May-92	W/O
OMAHA, NEBRASKA		
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA		
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Sep-90	W/O
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	N/A	
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	N/A	
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Apr-92	W
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	May-92	W
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA		W
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	May-92	W
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	NONE	
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	1970	
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	N/A	
TAMPA, FLORIDA	May-92	W/O,W
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Apr-92	W
TOLEDO, OHIO	NEVER	
TORONTO, CANADA	May-92	W/O,W
TUCSON, ARIZONA	NEVER	
TULSA, OKLAHOMA		W
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	N/A	
WASHINGTON, D.C.	May-92	W/O
WICHITA, KANSAS	Jul-91	W

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Components of Field Readiness Test of the Civil Disturbance Plan

Column A: If applicable, select the items that are components of your field readiness test of the civil disturbance plan.

- A - Telephone Mobilization Check, No Reporting to Duty
- B - Telephone Mobilization Check, With Reporting to Duty
- C - Mobilization Response is Evaluated
- D - Field Exercises Without Practice Crowd
- E - Field Exercises With Practice Crowd
- F - Field Exercises are Evaluated

CITY/STATE	A
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N/A
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	ALL
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	B,C,D,F
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	C,E
AUSTIN, TEXAS	D
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	D,E,F
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	A,C
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	N/A
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	N/A
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	B,D
CINCINNATI, OHIO	A,D
CLEVELAND, OHIO	N/A
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	A,C
COLUMBUS, OHIO	A
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	
DALLAS, TEXAS	A,D
DENVER, COLORADO	B,D,E,F
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	
EL PASO, TEXAS	N/A
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	A,D,E
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	
HONOLULU, HAWAII	C,D,E,F
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	N/A
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	N/A
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	A,D,F
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	D
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	B,D
MESA, ARIZONA	N/A
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	D,E,F
MIAMI, FLORIDA	C,D,E,F
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	A,C
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	D
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	B,C,D,E,F
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N/A
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	A
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	N/A
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	A,B,D,F
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	N/A
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	ALL
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	ALL
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	D
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	D
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	A,C,D,F
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	D,F
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	D
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	A
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	A,B,C,D,F
TAMPA, FLORIDA	C,F
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	A,D,E,F
TOLEDO, OHIO	N/A
TORONTO, CANADA	B,C,D,E,F
TUCSON, ARIZONA	N/A
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	N/A
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	N/A
WASHINGTON, D.C.	B,E
WICHITA, KANSAS	B,D

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Number of Instructional Hours Allocated to Civil Disturbance Training

Column A: How many instructional hours are allotted to Civil Disturbance Riot Control issues in the basic recruit / pre-service training program?

Column B: How many instructional hours are allotted to General Dispute Resolution Techniques, i.e., techniques for resolving street fighting, domestic disturbances, neighbor trouble and landlord-tenant disputes in the basic recruit/ pre-service training program?

Column C: How many instructional hours are allotted to training on the validity of and sensitivity to the cultures and traditions of major ethnic groups in your community in the basic recruit / pre-service training program?

Column D: How many instructional hours are allotted to Community Relations issues in the basic recruit / pre-service training program?

Column E: How many instructional hours are allotted to Use of Physical Force issues in the basic recruit / pre-service training program?

Column F: How many instructional hours are allotted to Use of Deadly Force issues in the basic recruit / pre-service training program?

CITY/STATE	A	B	C	D	E	F
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND						
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	4	40	30		84	20
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	2	4	16	15	55	86
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	10	40	12	4	40	4
AUSTIN, TEXAS	8	80	40	20	16	16
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	10	30	5	30	42	40
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	4	20	8	24	36	72
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	24	22	1	25	120	120
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	16	10	6	N/R	24	46
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	4	32	4	32	10	10
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	12	18	8	8	24	24
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	10	52	27	6	40	4
CINCINNATI, OHIO	6	20	24	4	38	122
CLEVELAND, OHIO	24	32	16	10	38	12
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	8	16	4	4	32	16
COLUMBUS, OHIO	17	40	40	7	15	4
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	8	24	2	40	40	60
DALLAS, TEXAS	5	26	24	37	88	52
DENVER, COLORADO	4	30	13	20	10	19
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	N/R	9	16	16	61	8
EL PASO, TEXAS	4	76	8	8	76	92
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	2	4	20	4	37	8
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA		39	16	16	3	3
HONOLULU, HAWAII	5	14	0	12	137	111

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B	C	D	E	F
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	16	N/R	72	N/R	147	48
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	1	12	24	7	64	60
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	4	28	20	33	4	4
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	5	70	35	10	150	70
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	6	7	16	17	88	57
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	8	62	16	2	80	76
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	28	29	33	8	6	4
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	8	37	10	8	37	8
MESA, ARIZONA	0	10	4	1	8	8
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	2	83	8	86	88	92
MIAMI, FLORIDA	1	25	9	16	64	56
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	2	6	10	10	8	8
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	4	30	14	7	30	4
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	4	32	8	N/A	40	100
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	3	40	12	20	3	3
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	9	9	10	8	37	5
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	16	16	6	28	12	
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	1	48	12	14	87	161
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	4	24	8	13	70	90
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	4	12	30	N/R	102	N/R
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	0	20	8	4	80	120
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	0					
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	12	17	54	39	24	74
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	4	14	12	20	64	64
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	16	40	8	4	40	40
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	8	35	30	12	120	120
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	8	80	8	8	20	16
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	8	18	60		80	8
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	18	34	40	40	122	8
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	10	40	8	4	30	60
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	5	18		18	85	48
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	0	44	8	27	4	4
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	1	48	40	40	60	4
TAMPA, FLORIDA	1	12	24	25	64	12
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	8	16	14	7	11	11
TOLEDO, OHIO	20	16	24	16	20	4
TORONTO, CANADA	1	8	7	2	30	21
TUCSON, ARIZONA	2	19	9	8	62	50
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	4	2	18	6	4	14
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	20	16	12	12	40	40
WASHINGTON, D.C.	8	24	16	5	93	64
WICHITA, KANSAS	3	19	16	11	20	8

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Training in Tactics in Responding to Civil Disturbances

Column A: Does your department conduct training for sworn members in tactics for handling civil disturbances / riots?

Column B: If "yes", how many hours are required?

N/R - Indicates that the question is not relevant or not applicable because of the department's response to the (or a) prior question

Column C: If "yes", how frequently is this training conducted?

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N		
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	N		
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	N		
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	N		
CINCINNATI, OHIO	N		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	N		
EL PASO, TEXAS	N		
MESA, ARIZONA	N		
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N		
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	N		
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	0	AS NEEDED
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	N/R	AS NEEDED
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	8	BI-WKLY
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	0	EV. 3 YRS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	5	AS NEEDED
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	32	ANNUALLY
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y	24	ANNUALLY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	35	AS NEEDED
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	16	ANNUALLY
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y	4	AS NEEDED
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	8	N/R
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	2	AS NEEDED
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	8	ANNUALLY
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	16	ANNUALLY
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	10	MONTHLY

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	N/A	AS NEEDED
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	16	N/R
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	4	ANNUALLY
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y		AS NEEDED
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	8	ANNUALLY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	3	BI-ANNUALLY
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	4	QUARTERLY
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y		ANNUALLY
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	8	ANNUALLY
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	8	BI-ANNUALLY
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	8	ANNUALLY
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	16	BI-ANNUALLY
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	4	SEMI-ANNUALLY
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	8	CONTINU
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	16	ONCE ONLY
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	8	ANNUALLY
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	AS NEEDED	AS NEEDED
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	Y		AS NEEDED
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	10	MONTHLY
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	Y	8	ONCE ONLY
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	4	ANNUALLY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	Y	4	EV. 2 YRS
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	4	ANNUALLY
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Y	8	N/R
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	8	EV. 2 YRS
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	8	AS NEEDED
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	8	AS NEEDED
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	4	ANNUALLY
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y		
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	N/R	AS NEEDED
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	12	AS NEEDED
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y	AS NEEDED	BI-MONTHLY
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	8	EV. 3-4 YRS
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	40	10 PER 2 MNTH
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y	4	QUARTERLY
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	8	ANNUALLY
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	40	QUARTERLY
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	AS NEEDED	AS NEEDED
DETROIT, MICHIGAN			
OMAHA, NEBRASKA			
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA			

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Police Departments Which Conduct Civil Disturbance Training For All Ranks

Column A: Does your department conduct civil disturbance /
riot training exercises that require the combined
participation of all ranks within the department?

CITY/STATE	A
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	N
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	N
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	N
AUSTIN, TEXAS	N
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	N
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	N
CINCINNATI, OHIO	N
CLEVELAND, OHIO	N
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	N
COLUMBUS, OHIO	N
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	N
DALLAS, TEXAS	N
DENVER, COLORADO	N
EL PASO, TEXAS	N
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	N
HONOLULU, HAWAII	N
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	N
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	N
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	N
MESA, ARIZONA	N
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	N
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	N
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	N

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	N
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	N
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	N
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	N
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	N
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	N
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	N
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	N
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	N
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	N
TOLEDO, OHIO	N
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	N
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	N
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y
TORONTO, CANADA	Y
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Types of Inter-Agency Training Conducted

Column A: If applicable, select the type(s) of inter-agency training conducted by your agency.

- A - Other Police Departments
- B - State Police
- C - National Guard
- D - Fire Department
- E - Other

CITY/STATE	A
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	A
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	
AUSTIN, TEXAS	
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	A
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	E
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	A,B,D,E
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	A,E
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	
CINCINNATI, OHIO	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	A
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	D
COLUMBUS, OHIO	N/A
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	D
DALLAS, TEXAS	A
DENVER, COLORADO	
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	
EL PASO, TEXAS	E
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	A
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	E
HONOLULU, HAWAII	N/A

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	N/A
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	B
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	C,E
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	A,D,E
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	A,C,D
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	D,E
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	A
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	
MESA, ARIZONA	A,E
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	A,B,D
MIAMI, FLORIDA	A,D
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	A,D
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	A,E
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	A,B,D,E
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	A,B,E
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	A,B,C
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	A,D,E
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	N/A
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	D
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	A
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	A,B,D
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	A
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	E
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	A,D
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	A,B,C,D
TAMPA, FLORIDA	A
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	A
TOLEDO, OHIO	
TORONTO, CANADA	A,B,D,E
TUCSON, ARIZONA	A,D
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	N/A
WASHINGTON, D.C.	A,E
WICHITA, KANSAS	

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Initiators of Tactical Action

Column A: If applicable, who (what rank(s) or position(s) of responsibility) in your department can initiate tactical action under the civil disturbance plan?

CITY/STATE	A
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	ANYONE
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	ASST. CHIEF
DALLAS, TEXAS	BUREAU COMMANDER
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	CAPTAIN
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	CAPTAIN
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	CAPTAIN
HONOLULU, HAWAII	CAPTAIN
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	CAPTAIN
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	CAPTAIN
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	CAPTAIN
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	CAPTAIN
TAMPA, FLORIDA	CAPTAIN
WICHITA, KANSAS	CAPTAIN
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	CHIEF
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	CHIEF
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	CHIEF /DESIGNEE
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	CHIEF, COMMANDER
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	CHIEF/CAPTAIN
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	COMM,LIEUT
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	COMMANDER
MESA, ARIZONA	COMMANDER
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	COMMANDER
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	COMMANDER
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	COMMANDER

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	DEPUTY CHIEF
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	DEPUTY CHIEF
TORONTO, CANADA	DEPUTY CHIEF
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	DUTY CHIEF
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	FIELD COMMANDER
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	FIELD COMMANDER
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	FIELD COMMANDER
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	FIELD COMMANDER
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	FIELD SERGEANT
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	FIELD SUPER
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	FIRST OFFICER
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	LIEU/COMMANDER
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	LIEUTENANT
COLUMBUS, OHIO	LIEUTENANT
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	LIEUTENANT
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	LIEUTENANT
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	LIEUTENANT
MIAMI, FLORIDA	LIEUTENANT
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	LIEUTENANT
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	LIEUTENANT
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	LT/CAPT
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	MAJOR
TUCSON, ARIZONA	OFFICER
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	PRECINCT COMMANDER
CINCINNATI, OHIO	SERGEANT
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	SERGEANT
TOLEDO, OHIO	SERGEANT
WASHINGTON, D.C.	SERGEANT
DENVER, COLORADO	SHIFT COMMANDER
CLEVELAND, OHIO	STREET SUPERVISORS
EL PASO, TEXAS	SUPERVISOR
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	SUPERVISOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS	WATCH COMMANDER
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	WATCH COMMANDER
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	N/A
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	N/A
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Mobilization of Special Strike Force Under Civil Disturbance

Column A: Does your department's civil disturbance plan provide for a specialized strike force, i.e., a mobile field force or tactical unit for rapid deployment?

Column B: If "yes", select the category that best reflects the makeup of this force.

S - Specially Selected Personnel

G - General Patrol Officers

N/R - Indicates that the question is not relevant or not applicable because of the department's response to the (or a) prior question

CITY/STATE	A	B
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	G
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	G
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	Y	G
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	G
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	G
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	G
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	G
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	G
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	Y	G
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y	G
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	G
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	S
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	S
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	S
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	S
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	S
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y	S
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	Y	S
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	S
CLEVELAND, OHIO	Y	S
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	S
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	S
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	S
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	S

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
EL PASO, TEXAS	Y	S
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	S
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	S
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	S
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	S
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	S
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	S
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	S
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	S
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	S
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	S
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	S
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Y	S
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	S
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	S
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	S
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	S
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	S
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	S,G
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	S,G
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	S
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	P	
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	N/F	S
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	N/A	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	N	G
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	N	
MESA, ARIZONA	N	N/R
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	N	
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	N	N/R
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	N	
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	N	
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	N	
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	N	S,G
TOLEDO, OHIO	N	
TUCSON, ARIZONA	N	
BUFFALO, NEW YORK		
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA		

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

The Use of Mobile Command Post Vehicles

Column A: Does your Department have a mobile command post vehicle?

Column B: If so, select the equipment that it contains.

- A - Telephones
- B - FAX Machines
- C - Radio that is Capable of Communicating with Other Governmental Agencies
- D - Television Monitors
- E - Reserve Flex-Cuffs
- F - Spare Radios
- G - Spare Radio Batteries

N/R - Indicates that the question is not relevant or not applicable because of the department's response to the (or a) prior question

CITY/STATE	A	B
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	N	
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	N	
WICHITA, KANSAS	N	
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	N	N/R
MESA, ARIZONA	N	N/R
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	A,B,C
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	A,B,C
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	Y	A,B,C,D
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,B,C,D
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,B,C,D,E
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Y	A,B,C,D,E,F
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	A,B,C,D,F,G
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	A,B,C,D,F,G
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	A,B,C,D,F,G
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	Y	A,B,C,D,F,G
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	A,B,C,E,F,G
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,B,D,E
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	A,B,E,F,G
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	A,C
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	A,C,D,E,F,G
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	Y	A,C,D,E,G
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	A,C,D,F,G
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	A,C,D,F,G
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	A,C,E
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,C,E
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	A,C,E,F
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	A,C,E,F,G
CLEVELAND, OHIO	Y	A,C,E,F,G
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y	A,C,E,F,G
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	A,C,E,F,G
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	A,C,E,F,G
TORONTO, CANADA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	Y	A,C,E,F,G
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	A,C,E-G
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	Y	A,C,F,G
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	Y	A,C,F,G
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	A,C,F,G
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	A,C-G
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	A,D,E
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	Y	A,D,E,F,G
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	A,D,E,F,G
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	A,E,F,G
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	A,E,F,G
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	Y	A,E,F,G
EL PASO, TEXAS	Y	A,E,F,G
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	ALL
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	ALL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	ALL
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	ALL
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	ALL
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	ALL
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	ALL
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	ALL
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	Y	C,E,F,G

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Civil Disturbance Equipment

Column A: Select the equipment items made available to department personnel for civil disturbance response.

- A - Gas Masks
- B - Full Length Shields
- C - Helmets
- D - Bullet Resistant Vests
- E - Riot Batons
- F - Flex Cuffs

CITY/STATE	A
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	A,C,D,E,F
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	ALL
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	A,C,D,E,F
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ALL
AUSTIN, TEXAS	ALL
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	A,C,D,E,F
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	A,C,D,E,F
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	ALL
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	B,C,D,E
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	A,D
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	A,C,D,E,F
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	A,C,D,E,F
CINCINNATI, OHIO	A,B,C,D,F
CLEVELAND, OHIO	C,D,F
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	ALL
COLUMBUS, OHIO	ALL
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	ALL
DALLAS, TEXAS	A,C,D,F
DENVER, COLORADO	A,B,C,E,F
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	A,C,D,E
EL PASO, TEXAS	ALL
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	ALL
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	C,D,E,F
HONOLULU, HAWAII	ALL

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	ALL
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	A,B,C,D,F
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	ALL
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	A,C,D,E,F
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	C,D,E,F
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	A,C,D,E,F
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	ALL
MESA, ARIZONA	C,D,E
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	ALL
MIAMI, FLORIDA	ALL
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	ALL
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	C,E,F
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	C,D,E,F
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	ALL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	A,B,C,D,F
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	ALL
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	ALL
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	A,C,D,E,F
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	ALL
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	ALL
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	ALL
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	B,C,D,F
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	ALL
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	A,C,D,E,F
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	ALL
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	A,C,E,F
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	ALL
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	C,D,E,F
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	A,C,D,F
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	ALL
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	C,D,E,F
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	D,E,F
TAMPA, FLORIDA	ALL
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	A,C,D,E,F
TOLEDO, OHIO	ALL
TORONTO, CANADA	
TUCSON, ARIZONA	ALL
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	ALL
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	ALL
WASHINGTON, D.C.	ALL
WICHITA, KANSAS	A,C,D,E,F

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Police Departments Using Tear Gas

Column A: Does your department approve the use of tear gas in civil disturbances?

Column B: If "yes", who (what ranks) can authorize the use of tear gas in civil disturbances?

CITY/STATE	A	B
CINCINNATI, OHIO	Y	
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	Y	ANY SUPERIOR
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	Y	AS CHIEF
AUSTIN, TEXAS	Y	CAPT./LT.
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	Y	CAPTAIN
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	Y	CAPTAIN
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	Y	CAPTAIN
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	Y	CHIEF
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	Y	CHIEF
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY	Y	CHIEF
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	Y	CHIEF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	Y	COM. SGT.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND	Y	COMMANDER
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	Y	COMMANDER
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA	Y	COMMANDER
NEW YORK, NEW YORK	Y	COMMANDER
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	Y	COMMANDER
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	Y	COMMANDER
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	Y	COMMANDER
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	Y	COMMANDING OFFICER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	Y	COMMANDING OFFICER
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	Y	DEPUTY CHIEF
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	Y	DEPUTY CHIEF
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	Y	DEPUTY CHIEF

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY/STATE	A	B
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	Y	DEPUTY CHIEF
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	Y	DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	Y	DUTY OFFICER
BUFFALO, NEW YORK	Y	DUTY OFFICER
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	Y	EXEC OFFICER
CLEVELAND, OHIO	Y	FIELD COMMANDER
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	Y	FIELD COMMANDER
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	Y	FIELD COMMANDER
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	Y	HIGHEST AVAILABLE
COLUMBUS, OHIO	Y	LIEUTENANT
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	Y	LIEUTENANT
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	Y	LIEUTENANT
MIAMI, FLORIDA	Y	LIEUTENANT
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	Y	LIEUTENANT
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	Y	LIEUTENANT
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	Y	LIEUTENANT
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	Y	LIEUTENANT
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	Y	LIEUTENANT
TAMPA, FLORIDA	Y	LIEUTENANT
TUCSON, ARIZONA	Y	LIEUTENANT
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	Y	LIEUTENANT
DENVER, COLORADO	Y	LT. SERGEANT
HONOLULU, HAWAII	Y	MAJOR
DALLAS, TEXAS	Y	RANKING ADVISOR
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	Y	SERGEANT
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	Y	SERGEANT
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	Y	SERGEANT
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	Y	SERGEANT
MESA, ARIZONA	Y	SERGEANT
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	Y	SERGEANT
TOLEDO, OHIO	Y	SERGEANT
WASHINGTON, D.C.	Y	SERGEANT
WICHITA, KANSAS	Y	SGT./LT.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	Y	SPECIAL COMMANDER
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	Y	SUP./SGT.
EL PASO, TEXAS	Y	SUPERVISOR
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	Y	SWAT
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	Y	SWAT COMMANDER
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	N	
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA	N	N/R
TORONTO, CANADA		
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA		

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Number of Officers per Thousand Population

Column A: Total Sworn Officers, 1990

Column B: Total Population, 1990 (in thousands)

Column C: Sworn Officers per thousand persons, 1990

CITY NAME	TOTAL SWORN OFFICERS	TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	SWORN OFFICERS PER THOUSAND PEOPLE
WASHINGTON DC	4740	607	7.81
SAN ANTONIO	1565	294	5.32
HONOLULU	1827	365	5.01
LAS VEGAS METRO	1209	258	4.69
DETROIT	4508	1028	4.39
CHICAGO	12048	2784	4.33
PHILADELPHIA	6651	1586	4.19
NORFOLK	1070	261	4.1
ATLANTA	1569	394	3.98
ST. LOUIS	1574	397	3.96
NEWARK	1070	275	3.89
BALTIMORE	2839	736	3.86
NEW YORK	26844	7323	3.67
BOSTON	1979	574	3.45
CLEVELAND	1724	506	3.41
BUFFALO	1029	328	3.14
PITTSBURGH	1147	370	3.1
TAMPA	848	280	3.03
MIAMI	1080	359	3.01
MILWAUKEE	1867	628	2.97
DENVER	1302	468	2.78
DALLAS	2747	1007	2.73
BIRMINGHAM	723	266	2.72
NEW ORLEANS	1347	497	2.71
KANSAS CITY	1178	435	2.71
CINCINNATI	959	364	2.63
HOUSTON	4104	1631	2.52
SEATTLE	1264	516	2.45
LOUISVILLE	649	269	2.41
LOS ANGELES	8381	3485	2.4

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY NAME	TOTAL SWORN OFFICERS	TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	SWORN OFFICERS PER THOUSAND PEOPLE
MEMPHIS	1379	610	2.26
COLUMBUS	1394	633	2.2
MINNEAPOLIS	794	368	2.16
FORT WORTH	953	448	2.13
NASHVILLE	994	488	2.04
ALBUQUERQUE	783	385	2.03
CHARLOTTE	801	396	2.02
TOLEDO	671	333	2.02
SAN DIEGO	1882	936	2.01
OKLAHOMA CITY	882	445	1.98
PHOENIX	1940	983	1.97
ST. PAUL	528	272	1.94
TULSA	699	367	1.9
JACKSONVILLE	1208	635	1.9
TUCSON	757	405	1.87
PORTLAND	811	437	1.86
OMAHA	606	336	1.8
SACRAMENTO	622	369	1.69
OAKLAND	627	372	1.69
AUSTIN	768	466	1.65
SAN FRANCISCO	1783	1111	1.6
VIRGINIA BEACH	622	393	1.58
EL PASO	799	515	1.55
SAN JOSE	1112	724	1.54
LONG BEACH	641	429	1.49
WICHITA	445	304	1.46
CORPUS CHRISTI	370	257	1.44
COLORADO SPRINGS	399	281	1.42
MESA	396	288	1.38
INDIANAPOLIS	984	731	1.35
ARLINGTON	350	262	1.34
ANAHEIM	344	266	1.29
FRESNO	429	354	1.21
SANTA ANA	387	782	0.49

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Police Department Budget — Per Person

Column A: Total Police Department Budget, 1990 (in thousands)

Column B: Total Population (in thousands), 1990

Column C: Police Department Expenditures per person

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
WASHINGTON, D.C.	\$250,000	607	\$411.86
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	96,000	258	372.09
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	333,000	1028	323.93
LOS ANGELES	954,000	3405	273.74
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	194,000	724	267.96
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	97,000	372	260.75
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	169,000	736	229.62
MIAMI, FLORIDA	82,000	359	228.41
CLEVELAND, OHIO	112,000	506	221.34
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	129,000	635	203.15
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	98,000	516	189.92
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	81,000	429	188.81
TAMPA, FLORIDA	51,000	280	182.14
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	112,000	628	178.34
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	47,000	266	176.89
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	74,580	435	171.45
DALLAS, TEXAS	172,000	1007	170.80
DENVER, COLORADO	76,000	468	162.39
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	56,500	369	153.12
COLUMBUS, OHIO	94,000	633	148.50
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	137,000	983	139.37
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	69,000	497	138.83
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	51,000	368	138.59
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	107,000	782	136.83
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	40,000	294	136.05
MESA, ARIZONA	39,000	288	135.42
TOLEDO, OHIO	44,000	333	132.13
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	139,000	1111	125.11
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	47,000	385	122.08
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	54,000	448	120.54
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	109,000	936	116.45
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	31,000	269	115.24
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	67,000	610	109.84
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	29,420	281	104.70
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	27,000	261	103.45
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	49,000	488	100.41
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	38,970	393	99.16
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	23,300	257	90.66
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	23,000	262	87.79
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	34,000	396	85.86
EL PASO, TEXAS	39,710	515	77.11

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Police Department Budget — Per Sworn Officer

Column A: Total Police Department Budget, 1990 (in thousands)
 Column B: Total Sworn Officers, 1990
 Column C: Police Department Expenditures per sworn officer, 1990

CITY/STATE	A	B	C
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	97,000	710	136,620
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA	47,000	351	133,903
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA	54,000	412	131,068
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	81,000	660	122,727
LOS ANGELES	954,000	7875	121,142
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	129,000	1230	104,878
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA	40,000	391	102,302
MESA, ARIZONA	39,000	409	95,588
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA	96,000	1006	95,427
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	56,500	611	92,471
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA	107,000	1210	88,430
TORONTO, CANADA	496,000	5652	87,757
METRO-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	221,000	2539	87,042
DETROIT, MICHIGAN	333,000	3886	85,692
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	98,000	1229	79,740
MIAMI, FLORIDA	82,000	1031	79,534
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	139,000	1895	73,351
TOLEDO, OHIO	44,000	635	69,291
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	137,000	1980	69,192
CLEVELAND, OHIO	112,000	1674	66,906
COLUMBUS, OHIO	94,000	1407	66,809
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	109,000	1544	70,596
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	29,420	449	65,523
ARLINGTON, TEXAS	23,000	353	65,156
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA	38,970	599	65,058
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	74,580	1148	64,965
TAMPA, FLORIDA	51,000	821	62,119
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS	23,300	376	61,968
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	51,000	827	61,669
CITY/STATE	A	B	C
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO	47,000	767	61,278
DALLAS, TEXAS	172,000	2864	60,056
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	169,000	2827	59,781
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	112,000	1898	59,009
DENVER, COLORADO	76,000	1348	56,380
WASHINGTON, D.C.	250,000	4448	56,205
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	54,000	967	55,843
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA	15,170	286	53,042
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	32,320	637	50,738
EL PASO, TEXAS	39,710	787	50,457
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	31,000	645	48,062
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	67,000	1403	47,755
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE	49,000	1062	46,139
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	69,000	1551	44,487
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	27,000	678	39,823
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA	34,000	872	38,991

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1990 Crime Statistics - Homicides per Thousand Population

Column A: Total Homicides, 1990 (murder and non-negligent manslaughter)

Column B: Total Population, 1990 (in thousands)

Column C: 1990 Homicide Rate (homicides per thousand persons)

CITY NAME	1990 TOTAL HOMICIDES (ACTUAL)	1990 TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	1990 HOMICIDES PER THOUSAND (ACTUAL)
WASHINGTON DC	472	607	0.78
SAN ANTONIO	208	294	0.71
NEW ORLEANS	304	497	0.61
ATLANTA	231	394	0.59
DETROIT	582	1028	0.57
BIRMINGHAM	125	266	0.47
ST. LOUIS	177	397	0.45
DALLAS	447	1007	0.44
BALTIMORE	305	736	0.41
NEWARK	112	275	0.41
OAKLAND	146	372	0.39
MIAMI	129	359	0.36
HOUSTON	568	1631	0.35
CLEVELAND	168	506	0.33
MEMPHIS	195	610	0.32
PHILADELPHIA	503	1586	0.32
NEW YORK	2245	7323	0.31
LAS VEGAS METRO	79	258	0.31
CHICAGO	851	2784	0.31
FORT WORTH	130	448	0.29
LOS ANGELES	983	3485	0.28
KANSAS CITY	121	435	0.28
JACKSONVILLE	176	635	0.28
BOSTON	143	574	0.25
LONG BEACH	106	429	0.25
MILWAUKEE	155	628	0.25
NORFOLK	63	261	0.24

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY NAME	1990 TOTAL HOMICIDES (ACTUAL)	1990 TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	1990 HOMICIDES PER THOUSAND (ACTUAL)
CHARLOTTE	93	396	0.23
TAMPA	60	280	0.21
FRESNO	66	354	0.19
TULSA	57	367	0.16
OKLAHOMA CITY	68	445	0.15
LOUISVILLE	39	269	0.14
SAN DIEGO	135	936	0.14
DENVER	67	468	0.14
COLUMBUS	89	633	0.14
NASHVILLE	67	488	0.14
CINCINNATI	49	364	0.13
PHOENIX	128	983	0.13
SACRAMENTO	43	369	0.12
CORPUS CHRISTI	29	257	0.11
BUFFALO	37	328	0.11
TOLEDO	37	333	0.11
SEATTLE	53	516	0.1
AUSTIN	46	466	0.1
PITTSBURGH	35	370	0.09
HONOLULU	34	365	0.09
SAN FRANCISCO	101	1111	0.09
ALBUQUERQUE	34	385	0.09
INDIANAPOLIS	58	731	0.08
PORTLAND	33	437	0.08
ANAHEIM	20	266	0.08
TUCSON	30	405	0.07
ST. PAUL	18	272	0.07
EL PASO	34	515	0.07
WICHITA	18	304	0.06
SANTA ANA	43	782	0.05
SAN JOSE	35	724	0.04
VIRGINIA BEACH	16	393	0.03
OMAHA	11	336	0.03
COLORADO SPRINGS	9	281	0.03
MESA	9	288	0.03
ARLINGTON	8	262	0.03
MINNEAPOLIS	N/A	368	N/A

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1990 Crime Statistics - Violent Crimes Per Thousand Population

Column A: Total Violent Crimes, 1990 (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault)

Column B: Total Population, 1990 (in thousands)

Column C: 1990 Violent Crime Rate (violent crimes per thousand persons)

CITY NAME	1990 TOTAL VIOLENT CRIMES (ACTUAL)	1990 TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	1990 VIOLENT CRIMES PER THOUSAND (ACTUAL)
MIAMI	15607	359	43.47
ATLANTA	16097	394	40.86
NEWARK	10684	275	38.85
ST. LOUIS	13682	397	34.46
TAMPA	8608	280	30.74
CHICAGO	79121	2784	28.42
DETROIT	27747	1028	26.99
KANSAS CITY	11087	435	25.49
WASHINGTON D.C.	14919	607	24.58
DALLAS	24550	1007	24.38
BALTIMORE	17942	736	24.38
LOS ANGELES	83809	3485	24.05
NEW YORK	174542	7323	23.83
BOSTON	13664	574	23.8
CHARLOTTE	9119	396	23.03
NEW ORLEANS	11227	497	22.59
LONG BEACH	8403	429	19.59
SAN ANTONIO	5730	294	19.49
JACKSONVILLE	11654	635	18.35
CLEVELAND	9190	506	18.16
PORTLAND	7836	437	17.93
LAS VEGAS METRO	4510	258	17.48
FORT WORTH	7826	448	17.47

POLICE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY NAME	1990 TOTAL VIOLENT CRIMES (ACTUAL)	1990 TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	1990 VIOLENT CRIMES PER THOUSAND (ACTUAL)
LAS VEGAS METRO	4510	258	17.48
FORT WORTH	7826	448	17.47
BUFFALO	5275	328	16.08
BIRMINGHAM	4193	266	15.76
OAKLAND	5845	372	15.71
SEATTLE	7780	516	15.08
MEMPHIS	9082	610	14.89
NASHVILLE	6886	488	14.11
HOUSTON	22637	1631	13.88
PHILADELPHIA	21387	1586	13.48
TULSA	4898	367	13.35
ALBUQUERQUE	5121	385	13.3
PITTSBURG	4893	370	13.22
SAN DIEGO	12047	936	12.87
FRESNO	4399	354	12.43
CINCINNATI	4476	364	12.3
SAN FRANCISCO	12388	1111	11.15
COLUMBUS	7022	633	11.09
NORFOLK	2851	261	10.92
PHOENIX	10665	983	10.85
OKLAHOMA CITY	4813	445	10.82
SACRAMENTO	3978	369	10.78
TOLEDO	3541	333	10.63
ST. PAUL	2763	272	10.16
MILWAUKEE	6282	628	10
EL PASO	5111	515	9.92
OMAHA	3139	336	9.34
TUCSON	3680	405	9.09
DENVER	4205	468	8.99
INDIANAPOLIS	6224	731	8.51
LOUISVILLE	2281	269	8.48
WICHITA	2189	304	7.2
ARLINGTON	1876	262	7.16
AUSTIN	3326	466	7.14
ANAHEIM	1802	266	6.77
HONOLULU	2412	365	6.61
SAN JOSE	4698	724	6.49
CORPUS CHRISTI	1607	257	6.25
MESA	1724	288	5.99
COLORADO SPRINGS	1184	281	4.21
SANTA ANA	2663	782	3.41
VIRGINIA BEACH	902	393	2.3
MINNEAPOLIS	0	368	0

16

COMMUNITY

ATTITUDE

SURVEY

COMMUNITY ATTITUDE SURVEY

The Community Attitude Survey was designed to measure the attitudes in the community about the City's response to the civil disorder that occurred beginning on April 29, 1992. The Survey, which consisted of 53 closed-ended multiple-choice questions, was designed by an independent firm which specializes in surveying opinions and attitudes. This Appendix consists of the Community Attitude Survey questionnaire. The number shown beside each response alternative reflects the percentage of respondents who chose that particular response.

The Survey was conducted by more than 300 volunteers over a three-day period, Friday, July 31, 1992 through Sunday, August 2, 1992. Over 2,000 telephone calls were made to randomly selected households throughout Los Angeles that were targeted to be representative of the City's diverse communities. Out of the total households contacted, 1,020 individuals who either live or work in Los Angeles responded to all 53 questions asked. Some of the telephone interviews lasted as long as one hour; most averaged approximately 30 minutes. Interviews were conducted in four languages: English, Spanish, Chinese and Korean.

COMMUNITY ATTITUDE STUDY
(n=1020)

Hello, my name is _____. I'm a volunteer working on a study being conducted by Special Advisor William Webster relating to how the LAPD responded to the riots that occurred in our city. I am wondering if you can spare some time to share your views with us. I will not ask your name and all of your answers will be confidential. We are not selling anything. It would be a valuable public service if you could take 20 minutes and help us.

INFO 1 2 3 4

*Note to reader: "No response" refers to those respondents who were asked the question but responded "unable to respond."

1. Do you live in the city of Los Angeles?

OR

2. Do you or does someone in your household work in the city of Los Angeles?

(1) 100 YES

(2) 0 No **DISCONTINUE IF FIRST TWO ANSWERS ARE NO**

3. How old are you? **35 Years (Mean)**

DISCONTINUE IF LESS THAN 16

4. Have you ever been a victim of a crime?

(1) 50 YES

(2) 50 NO

<1 NO RESPONSE

5. Have you ever been a victim of a violent crime?

(1) 18 YES

(2) 81 NO

<1 NO RESPONSE

6. Do you personally know anyone who has been or who now is a sworn police officer or civilian employee of the LAPD?

(1) 36 YES

(2) 63 NO

<1 NO RESPONSE

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

7. Have you ever personally been helped by an LAPD officer?
(1) 53 Never
(2) 25 Seldom
(3) 18 Occasionally
(4) 3 Frequently
<1 NO RESPONSE
8. How many times have you been stopped by an LAPD officer?
(1) 32 Never
(2) 17 Once
(3) 30 Two or three times
(4) 8 Four or five times
(5) 12 More than five times
<1 NO RESPONSE
9. Have you or has anyone close to you ever been arrested by an LAPD officer?
(1) 41 YES
(2) 58 NO
<1 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
10. What kind of job do you personally feel the LAPD generally has done over the last two years?
- (a) Solving local problems?
(1) 3 Superior
(2) 7 Excellent
(3) 24 Good
(4) 31 Fair or
(5) 31 Poor job?
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (b) Preventing crime?
(1) 3 Superior
(2) 7 Excellent
(3) 24 Good
(4) 31 Fair or
(5) 31 Poor job?
3 NO RESPONSE
4 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

(c) Dealing with people in your neighborhood?

- (1) 4 Superior
- (2) 12 Excellent
- (3) 29 Good
- (4) 24 Fair or
- (5) 22 Poor job?
- 9 NO RESPONSE
- 1 I DON'T KNOW

11. Do you believe the LAPD should focus its efforts on:

- (1) 4 Making arrests
- (2) 9 Helping people in trouble
- (3) 50 Doing both or
- (4) 25 Preventing crime
- 5 3 & 4 COMBINATION
- 3 1,2,4 COMBINATION
- 4 1 & 4 COMBINATION
- 4 ALL
- 1 2 & 4 COMBINATION
- 4 2,3,4 COMBINATION

12. Do you believe police work in LA is:

- (1) 3 Not very dangerous
- (2) 10 Somewhat dangerous
- (3) 36 Dangerous
- (4) 50 Extremely dangerous
- <1 3 & 4 COMBINATION
- <1 NO RESPONSE

13. The LAPD employs about 8,000 sworn police officers. This is about one officer for every 435 persons in LA. Do you think this means the LAPD is:

- (1) 12 Adequately staffed
- (2) 82 Understaffed or
- (3) 4 Overstaffed
- 2 NO RESPONSE
- <1 I DON'T KNOW

14. Do you think the LAPD should:

- (1) 75 Respond to every call it receives or
- (2) 20 Respond only to those calls that fight crime on the streets?
- <1 BOTH
- 5 NO RESPONSE
- <1 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

15. Which of the following do you trust?

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Teacher	(1) <u>62</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>25</u>	(3) <u>13</u>
(b) Businessperson	(1) <u>17</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>48</u>	(3) <u>35</u>
(c) Police officer	(1) <u>47</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>36</u>	(3) <u>16</u>
(d) Elected official	(1) <u>11</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>40</u>	(3) <u>47</u>
(e) Doctor	(1) <u>55</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>34</u>	(3) <u>10</u>
(f) Lawyer	(1) <u>20</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>45</u>	(3) <u>34</u>
(g) Judge	(1) <u>46</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>37</u>	(3) <u>16</u>

16. Now I'm going to read some statements to you and ask if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with them:

	<u>STRONG- LY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>DIS- AGREE</u>	<u>STRONG- LY DIS- AGREE</u>
(a) The City would be safer with more police officers on patrol in our neighborhoods.	(1) <u>46</u> <u><1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>46</u>	(3) <u>7</u>	(4) <u>1</u>
(b) The LAPD's relations with people in the city would improve if officers were more involved with the community.	(1) <u>53</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>43</u>	(3) <u>2</u>	(4) <u>1</u>

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

20. Do you think the LAPD response to the rioting was impacted by:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Lack of available police officers	(1) <u>37</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>13</u>	(3) <u>47</u>
(b) Lack of police equipment	(1) <u>24</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>12</u>	(3) <u>61</u>
(c) Poor planning	(1) <u>76</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>7</u>	(3) <u>15</u>
(d) Fear of the media	(1) <u>36</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>17</u>	(3) <u>44</u>
(e) Fear of facing new charges of using excessive force	(1) <u>47</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>17</u>	(3) <u>32</u>
(f) Lack of cooperation from the people of LA	(1) <u>42</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>17</u>	(3) <u>38</u>
	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(g) Lack of leadership	(1) <u>76</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>10</u>	(3) <u>13</u>

21. Where did you watch the LA riots?

- (1) 15 At the scene
(2) 73 Somewhere where you only saw the rioting on TV
(3) 2 Did not watch the riots
9 1 & 2 COMBINATION
<1 NO RESPONSE

22. Do you know anyone who participated in the rioting?

- (1) 17 YES
(2) 82 NO
<1 NO RESPONSE

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

23. Do you believe the LAPD had enough information about the likelihood of a riot following the King verdict?

- (1) 60 YES
(2) 13 MAYBE
(3) 25 NO
2 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

24. Should the LAPD keep information or intelligence files on people that contain:

YES MAYBE NO

(a) Arrest records

(1) 71 (2) 11 (3) 16
2 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

(b) Mug shots

(1) 77 (2) 10 (3) 12
2 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

(c) Fingerprints

(1) 83 (2) 7 (3) 9
2 NO RESPONSE

(d) Known associates

(1) 54 (2) 15 (3) 27
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

YES MAYBE NO

(e) Newspaper articles

(1) 48 (2) 15 (3) 34
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

(f) Reports of public demonstrations

(1) 43 (2) 13 (3) 40
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

(g) Legal wiretaps

(1) 39 (2) 12 (3) 44
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

(h) Surveillance reports

(1) 52 (2) 18 (3) 27
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

25. Before April 29, do you think the LAPD had good reason to prepare for a riot?

- (1) 53 Definitely
(2) 15 Probably
(3) 15 Possibly
(4) 16 No IF NO, GO TO 27
1 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

26. If your answer to the last question was yes, why do you think so?

- n=859 (1) 15 You knew there would be trouble
(2) 9 You heard others say there would be trouble
(3) 1 You knew about plans to burn and loot certain stores
(4) 40 Common sense
(5) 10 OTHER SPECIFY _____
<1 1 & 5 COMBINATION
1 2 & 4 COMBINATION
7 1 & 4 COMBINATION
17 1,2,4 COMBINATION
4 1,2 COMBINATION

27. Do you believe the fires in the LA riots were:

- (1) 43 Started spontaneously
(2) 46 Targeted and planned
6 BOTH
4 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

28. Do you believe the looting in the LA riots was:

- (1) 67 Started spontaneously
(2) 26 Targeted and planned
5 BOTH
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

29. If some victims were targeted, do you believe any of the following were targets?

- | | <u>YES</u> | <u>MAYBE</u> | <u>NO</u> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|---------------|
| (a) Gun shops | (1) <u>63</u>
<u>4</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>16</u> | (3) <u>16</u> |
| (b) Grocery stores | (1) <u>60</u>
<u>3</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>16</u> | (3) <u>21</u> |

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

YES MAYBE NO

- (c) Stores run by people who don't live in the area
 (1) 60 (2) 17 (3) 19
4 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (d) Stores run by Asian-Americans
 (1) 72 (2) 12 (3) 13
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (e) Stores run by Koreans
 (1) 78 (2) 10 (3) 9
3 NO RESPONSE
- (f) White homes in nonwhite neighborhoods
 (1) 27 (2) 19 (3) 48
5 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (g) Public buildings
 (1) 43 (2) 18 (3) 35
4 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (h) Any place that had merchandise desired by rioters
 (1) 71 (2) 12 (3) 13
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW
- (i) Enemies of the gangs
 (1) 37 (2) 22 (3) 35
6 NO RESPONSE
1 I DON'T KNOW

30. If some victims were targeted, whom do you believe did the targeting?

- (1) 35 Gangs
 (2) 42 Opportunists
 (3) 18 African-Americans
 (4) 13 Hispanics
 (5) 8 Whites
 (6) 27 DON'T KNOW
2 NO RESPONSE

31. Do you believe the riots stopped because:

YES MAYBE NO

- (a) Of the curfew
 (1) 45 (2) 18 (3) 34
2 NO RESPONSE

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

- | | <u>YES</u> | <u>MAYBE</u> | <u>NO</u> |
|---|--|---------------|---------------|
| (b) The rioters got tired | (1) <u>21</u>
<u>3</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>13</u> | (3) <u>63</u> |
| (c) The rioters made their point | (1) <u>29</u>
<u>4</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>16</u> | (3) <u>51</u> |
| (d) Of the actions by the LAPD | (1) <u>28</u>
<u>3</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>16</u> | (3) <u>53</u> |
| (e) Of the presence of the National Guard | (1) <u>80</u>
<u>1</u> NO RESPONSE | (2) <u>10</u> | (3) <u>8</u> |
| (f) There were no more close targets for looting or burning | (1) <u>19</u>
<u>4</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>13</u> | (3) <u>64</u> |
| (g) Their anger faded | (1) <u>20</u>
<u>4</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | (2) <u>15</u> | (3) <u>61</u> |
| 32. What worked best to stop the rioting? | (1) <u>19</u> Community leadership
(2) <u>4</u> Leadership of elected officials
(3) <u>9</u> Performance of fire department
(4) <u>9</u> Performance of LAPD
(5) <u>58</u> Presence of National Guard
(6) <u>5</u> Actions of the mayor
(7) <u>4</u> Actions of the governor
(8) <u>5</u> Public statements by elected officials
(9) <u>24</u> Curfew
(10) <u>16</u> Arrests
<u>3</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | | |
| 33. If a curfew is imposed during a riot, should it be: | (1) <u>69</u> Citywide
(2) <u>29</u> Only in areas where there is looting or rioting
<u>2</u> NO RESPONSE
<u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW | | |

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

34. Do you think the curfew in the LA riots was:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Effective in preventing violence	(1) <u>69</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>13</u>
(b) Effective in stopping the riots	(1) <u>59</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>19</u>	(3) <u>21</u>
(c) Unfortunately necessary	(1) <u>84</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>4</u>	(3) <u>10</u>
(d) A curtailment of individual rights	(1) <u>35</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>13</u>	(3) <u>48</u>
(e) Wrong since it isn't imposed on all equally	(1) <u>25</u> <u>5</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>11</u>	(3) <u>60</u>
(f) Unfair to nonwhites	(1) <u>18</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>9</u>	(3) <u>70</u>
(g) Unfair to the poor	(1) <u>22</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>8</u>	(3) <u>67</u>

35. During the rioting, if you tried to use the 911 system, did you get:

- (1) 4 No response
 (2) 3 A helpful response
 (3) 3 An unhelpful response
 (4) 89 Did not use 911
2 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

36. Do you think the arrests made by the LAPD in the LA riots were:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Effective in preventing more violence	(1) <u>52</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>18</u>	(3) <u>27</u>

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(b) Effective in stopping the riots	(1) <u>39</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>21</u>	(3) <u>38</u>
(c) Racially motivated	(1) <u>25</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>56</u>
(d) Only those easy to arrest	(1) <u>42</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>18</u>	(3) <u>36</u>
(e) Fair and reasonable	(1) <u>57</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>19</u>	(3) <u>19</u>

37. During the riots, do you believe LAPD officers were afraid to arrest:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Young African-American males	(1) <u>40</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>18</u>	(3) <u>39</u>
(b) Hispanics	(1) <u>26</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>56</u>
(c) Koreans	(1) <u>14</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>12</u>	(3) <u>71</u>
(d) Whites	(1) <u>12</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>11</u>	(3) <u>75</u>
(e) Gang members	(1) <u>39</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> PARTIALLY	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>44</u>

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

38. What impact did television coverage have during the LA riots?

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) Kept people informed	(1) <u>89</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>7</u>	(3) <u>3</u>
(b) Made people angry	(1) <u>72</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>10</u>	(3) <u>17</u>
(c) Scared people	(1) <u>79</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>9</u>	(3) <u>12</u>
(d) Showed people where to avoid police	(1) <u>46</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW <u>YES</u> <u>MAYBE</u> <u>NO</u>	(2) <u>15</u>	(3) <u>36</u>
(e) Increased racial tension	(1) <u>60</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>14</u>	(3) <u>24</u>
(f) Helped stop the riots	(1) <u>18</u> <u>1</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>10</u>	(3) <u>70</u>
(g) Encouraged the riots	(1) <u>47</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>18</u>	(3) <u>33</u>

39. Which of the following was prepared to respond to the LA riots?

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) All City agencies	(1) <u>16</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>63</u>
(b) The mayor	(1) <u>19</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>13</u>	(3) <u>63</u>
(c) City council	(1) <u>15</u> <u>4</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>16</u>	(3) <u>65</u>

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(d) LAPD	(1) <u>24</u>	(2) <u>13</u>	(3) <u>60</u>
	<u>3</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u><1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

(e) LA Fire Department	(1) <u>60</u>	(2) <u>14</u>	(3) <u>24</u>
	<u>2</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u><1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

40. Which of the following is prepared now to react to an earthquake?

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(a) All City agencies	(1) <u>42</u>	(2) <u>25</u>	(3) <u>27</u>
	<u>5</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u>1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(b) The mayor	(1) <u>37</u>	(2) <u>23</u>	(3) <u>34</u>
	<u>5</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u>1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

(c) City council	(1) <u>35</u>	(2) <u>28</u>	(3) <u>31</u>
	<u>5</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u>1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

(d) LAPD	(1) <u>50</u>	(2) <u>25</u>	(3) <u>21</u>
	<u>5</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u><1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

(e) LA Fire Department	(1) <u>78</u>	(2) <u>12</u>	(3) <u>7</u>
	<u>3</u>	NO RESPONSE	
	<u><1</u>	I DON'T KNOW	

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

41. In an emergency situation in LA, such as an earthquake, whom do you want to be in charge of directing the response:
- (1) 18 The mayor
 - (2) 5 City council
 - (3) 12 Police chief
 - (4) 44 Fire chief
 - (5) 5 LA County Sheriff
 - (6) 13 A State official
 - (7) 15 A Federal official
 - 5 NO RESPONSE
 - <1 I DON'T KNOW
42. Would you expect looting or violence to follow an earthquake?
- (1) 34 Definitely
 - (2) 22 Probably
 - (3) 22 Possibly
 - (4) 21 No
 - <1 NO RESPONSE
43. Do you expect another riot to occur in LA in the near future?
- (1) 29 YES
 - (2) 36 MAYBE
 - (3) 33 NO
 - 1 NO RESPONSE
 - <1 I DON'T KNOW
44. What do you think is the best way to prevent riots?
- (1) 50 Jobs
 - (2) 20 Social programs
 - (3) 12 Recreational programs
 - (4) 28 Better LAPD-community relations
 - (5) 20 Better organized and trained LAPD
 - (6) 20 Other
 - 1 NO RESPONSE
45. Preserving public order in LA is primarily the responsibility of:
CHOOSE ONLY TWO
- (1) 33 The mayor
 - (2) 13 City council
 - (3) 55 LAPD
 - (4) 25 Community leaders
 - (5) 51 All residents of LA
 - (6) 10 Churches and religious leaders
 - 1 NO RESPONSE
 - <1 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

46. When there is a riot, what should residents do?

CHECK ALL THAT APPLY

- (1) 1 Join in
- (2) 23 Go about daily life as usual
- (3) 2 Go watch
- (4) 78 Stay home
- (5) 49 Help calm violence
- (6) 74 Help neighbors
- (7) 53 Help police
- (8) 13 Leave the city
- (9) 75 Stay off the streets
- (10) 12 Get a gun
- 1 NO RESPONSE

47. What do you think is the action that presents the greatest threat in a riot?

- (1) 12 Crowds throwing rocks and bottles
- (2) 45 Gunfire by rioters
- (3) 30 Violence by rioters
- (4) 11 Displays of anger by rioters
- (5) 11 Looting
- (6) 20 Fires
- (7) 12 Gunfire by law enforcement
- (8) 13 Violence from law enforcement
- 3 NO RESPONSE

48. In an emergency situation such as the LA riots, whom do you want to be in charge of directing the response?

- (1) 22 The mayor
- (2) 5 City council
- (3) 42 Police chief
- (4) 12 Fire chief
- (5) 5 LA County Sheriff
- (6) 9 A State official
- (7) 14 A Federal official
- 4 NO RESPONSE
- <1 I DON'T KNOW

49. Appropriate action in response to a riot should include:

YES MAYBE NO

(a) Disbursing crowds with tear gas

(1) 37 (2) 25 (3) 35
<1 PARTIALLY
3 NO RESPONSE
<1 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

	<u>YES</u>	<u>MAYBE</u>	<u>NO</u>
(b) Arresting looters and rioters	(1) <u>86</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE	(2) <u>8</u>	(3) <u>4</u>
(c) Closing businesses	(1) <u>78</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>12</u>	(3) <u>7</u>
(d) Closing schools	(1) <u>80</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>10</u>	(3) <u>9</u>
(e) Closing freeways and roads	(1) <u>44</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>21</u>	(3) <u>33</u>
(f) Imposing an immediate curfew	(1) <u>78</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>12</u>	(3) <u>8</u>
(g) Calling out the National Guard	(1) <u>73</u> <u>2</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>19</u>	(3) <u>7</u>
(h) Letting events run their course	(1) <u>7</u> <u>3</u> NO RESPONSE <u><1</u> I DON'T KNOW	(2) <u>5</u>	(3) <u>86</u>

Now I have a few questions for background purposes.

50. What is your employment status?

- (1) 53 Work full time
- (2) 10 Work part time
- (3) 9 Unemployed
- (4) 12 Retired
- (5) 3 Disabled
- (6) 11 Student
- (7) 6 Work in the home
- 1 NO RESPONSE
- <1 I DON'T KNOW

Community Attitude Study (n=1020)

51. Highest level of education:

(1) 10 LESS THAN HS

(2) 24 HS GRAD

(3) 3 TECH FIELD _____

(4) 31 SM COLL

(5) 17 COLL GRAD

(6) 14 GRAD WK/DEG

FOR ANY COLLEGE, ASK MAJOR _____

<1 2 & 4 COMBINATION

1 2 & 3 COMBINATION

<1 REFUSED

52. Race:

(1) 27 HISPANIC

(2) 28 AFRICAN-AMERICAN

(3) 30 CAUCASIAN

(4) 4 CHINESE

(5) 3 KOREAN

(6) 1 AMERICAN INDIAN

(7) 7 OTHER SPECIFY _____

3 REFUSED

53. SEX:

(1) 44 MALE

(2) 56 FEMALE

<1 NO RESPONSE

17

EXCERPTS FROM
RECORD OF
COMMUNITY
MEETINGS

**EXCERPTS FROM RECORD
OF COMMUNITY MEETINGS**

PAGE	COMMENT
South Central -- Fosay Jr. High	
11	<p>. . .It was more or less a breakdown in communication.</p> <p>...We're dealing with here with more or less a breakdown in communication that may on one hand feel as though they don't have a voice, may feel as though they've been left out, may feel as though they're dejected and ignored,. . .they have nowhere to voice their concerns,....</p>
12	<p>...the bottom line is communication.</p> <p>...once you get the community involved in decisions, i.e., community-based policing...</p> <p>I hope that particular program is given an opportunity to be implemented within the city, especially within our area, so that the community will have a voice. The police can communicate, and with that communication going on hopefully we can come to a better understanding of one another....</p>
21	<p>...I feel that L.A.P.D.'s response to the riot was no response...I feel that L.A.P.D. needs to be educated in ethics, especially in diversities....</p>
22	<p>...when we need help we like to have a response also.</p>
23	<p>...we pay taxes just like everyone else does, and we deserve the right when we pick up the phone and call 911 for someone that is trained, not a rookie that's been on the job for two weeks, to come out and see if there is an actual cry for help.</p>
24	<p>Black people in the U.S. through 200 years or more have never received justice in any court in this country, and until that starts we will have more uprisings and more uprising.</p>
26	<p>...the police response was quite adequate. If I were a policeman, I would have struck and refused to go out there to be the dirty worker for a broken-down machinery.</p> <p>I live in a society where nothing works.....the people are under attack by the very government they finance, by the very government that many of the men in this community fought as veterans...</p>
27	<p>...if the police would have jumped on the situation on Florence and Normandie when it first started, then it would have been resolved right then and there,....</p>
29	<p>...the response the police have is no different -- I'm glad that it happened that way so the rest of the community, people that live north of Washington or wherever South Central starts, see how when we on a daily basis call the police this is the response that we get from them.</p>
29	<p>...it's not basically the problem of the police. It's a problem of the community, people being unemployed.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
31	Walk the beat and get to know the people in the neighborhood.
31	...one of the basic problems with the Los Angeles police response to the incident that occurred, Florence and Normandie, is that they were forced into a position of living down a bad reputation, the bad reputation being that the bully boy attitude that the Los Angeles Police Department has had connected with it since the days of Chief Parker...
32	...they made a very bad mistake of withdrawing, and as they withdrew it gave the forces that were building up an opportunity to collect themselves and then really go at it in a serious way.
32	Had the current report's findings been followed and had any real sociological force been established in this city whereby we treat people all alike, we give justice in our courts on an even-handed basis, you would not have had the conflagration that we had April 29th.
33	You begin today to retrain your police to give them a different image of themselves and have them respect the minority community....
34	Black people are fed up.
35	<p>We have been disrespected everywhere,....</p> <p>I don't say the rest of the pledge of allegiance to the flag because it's a blatant lie. This is not one nation under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all. It is not. It is one nation under white people with liberty and justice for those who've got money and who are lucky.</p>
36	<p>...policemen have been trained from infancy to see people of color as people who are substandard, less than equal.</p> <p>They don't know anything about us.</p>
37	...this is a country that only serve those than have, and the police are there to beat and oppress those who have not.
37	I think what worked for L.A.P.D. and what worked was the L.A.P.D. now has a new police chief, and he has his job cut out for him....
37	...Police Chief Gates was a large factor in that riot.
39	<p>One of the solutions to the problems that we had would be public accountability of officer-on-duty behavior.</p> <p>When they feel they're being persecuted, they slack off on your service, give you a taste of life without them. This is what happened April 29th, but they were not expecting the fire storm to blow that high.</p>
43	Their response was normal.

PAGE	COMMENT
43	...by letting the crowd get out of hand...they demonstrated, "See, these really are dangerous folks. That's why these officers did that."
44	If the riot would have took place in a predominantly white neighborhood, it would have been faster response than what it was in a white neighborhood...it seems like you're teaching them to think with their fists instead of with their brains because they do not have the common sense to talk to us like we are humans,...
51	...I saw...people looting the store while the police -- while the firemen 20 yards away were fighting a fire that eventually left approximately 200 people homeless. There were no police at that scene. As people have already stated, that's rather common in South Central L.A.
51	The police response time is either slow or no response,....
52	...if the police do come on the scene, what they do is overreact. So what we get in South Central is either no response or an overreaction to an incident.
53	...the police didn't do a thing until the commanding officer got hit by an egg. And then they overreacted.
54	I think one of the things we can do is to establish a police reform -- police review committee similar to the one that operates in Berkeley, California.
59	There is no way you can control a population that is disturbed and angry. It is impossible.
61	Unless we can get at the cause of the problem, it's very difficult to effect a solution to the problem.
62	The people who are in the political arena, from the mayor on down or up, they -- there's a need for them to come and see before the crisis happens, come and see and -- so they can, one on one, before anything happens, before problems occur, and establish this rapport,...
63-64	...there's a need to develop strategic plan for establishing a preventive measure as relating to future uprising, and evidently it wasn't established, because through the hearing of the Rodney King there, that particular trial, you could tell that the emotions was building, building, building.
66	...you must have community involvement, police and community involvement.
72	...you need community involvement with the police.
74	My community involvement idea was the best because I see police and they're like strangers in a foreign land.
76	...you first of all got to change the police manual, how they're being trained to work on us.

PAGE	COMMENT
91-92	<p>L.A.P.D. needs to hold some community open houses at their police station.</p> <p>I bet you nobody's even been inside any of these police stations. I know I haven't. I'm not welcome there.</p> <p>...ask you police bigwigs to stop hiding down there at Parker Center....you need to ask those people to get in their big expensive cars and come out to the community.</p>
93	<p>Get some more women on your police force. Get some more Latinos on your police force. ...You need to have your police force look like the face of this community.</p>
94	<p>Come into your high schools and talk to your young people so they don't see you as the occupying force --</p>
96	<p>...they called 911 and they got no response.</p>
South Central -- Gompers Intermediate	
128	<p>The police response is as it always has been: too much, too little, too late, or none at all.</p>
139	<p>...for so many years the police really never been there for us.</p>
146	<p>The riot broke out and didn't nobody want to react because Daryl Gates was on his way to a luncheon. It wasn't L.A.P.D. Department. It was the leadership. ...It was those who were running the department who said, "I ain't doing nothing till I hear from Daryl Gates."</p>
149	<p>I watched L.A.P.D. not respond. I called 911, and nobody was at work,...</p>
154	<p>...the L.A.P.D. responded miserably, it took them three hours to get into the streets.</p>
156	<p>...we've got to be careful is not recommending to this committee that we want to see the L.A.P.D. have its rapid deployment and its massive show of force at the risk of our lives.</p>
162	<p>We want to be treated like people. We are people. We want them to understand us. Don't treat us like dogs.</p>
162	<p>This is our community. We've been here for years. The Koreans have not been here for years. They came into our community. We did not go into their community. They came into our community. We did not go where they are. They came here.</p>
175	<p>What worked[?] Obviously, it didn't work. The bottom line of the whole thing is that people were saying that the response was slow. I didn't find the response any slower than I normally find it when I called the police.</p>
176	<p>...we have a system of 911 and so often you'll get the following: "All our lines are busy. Please stay on the line and the next available operator will help you."</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
484	<p>... "How should we prepare to respond for the future?" My thought is that delegated authority should come to a lower level within the Police Department, that it should not all rest with the Chiefs, that it should rest in the hand of Commanders and Captains, to have a plan of preparation, to be able to implement it according to their own timing, their own judgment, and their own appraisal of the situation. We should not rely just on top management to make all those decisions.</p>
485-486	<p>...I'm President of the Beverly-Wilshire Homes Association.</p> <p>The Beverly Center, the Beverly Connection, the Nikko Hotel, would have all been on fire if it wasn't for the private patrols that hung over the garages with guns aimed at people driving up and down the streets.</p> <p>The police did not respond to the Westside during the riots. They were busy elsewhere, and as other people have stayed, they were told to stay away from the looting. We had fires in that area. At Pico and La Cienega we had shopping centers burn down....The police came by, did absolutely nothing. The neighbors were horrified as they saw people drive up with Uzis keeping people at bay while they looted. They called the police. There was no response.</p>
487	<p>We need as many police officers as the City of New York. We need community-based policing. We need more small divisions in our community so that people get to know their policy officers. We need a better neighborhood watch response to the community.</p>
502	<p>...for years the Civil Libertarians have admonished the police to exercise restraint, and that's what happened in the riot. Exercising restraint is a euphemism for doing nothing, and that's exactly what happened, so we got what we asked for.</p>
509	<p>What didn't work is that they were not there when the people really needed them.</p>
532	<p>In answer to the second one, what to do in the future, well, I think we've already taken care of that. We got rid of Gates, and hopefully we're gonna get rid of Bradley.</p>
539	<p>...just being a block and a half from the 77th Street Division....</p> <p>I had a direct view of all 77th and all other responding units for 77th was the focal point. There seemed to be no end to the raging fires and looting from all directions, yet the police were notably very visible and in as many places as humanly possible day and night.</p>
539	<p>...I covered the areas on my trike and witnessed greedy people running around, taking anything that wasn't nailed down, and some took what too. The police did their damndest to stop this, but they were extremely outnumbered.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
464	<p>...I am the Coordinator of the Riot Relief Project administered by the Chinese-American Coalition and Chinatown Service Center.</p> <p>...we have a lot to say about what didn't work.</p> <p>...why were Asian-American police officers not immediately assigned to areas where their language and cultural expertise could be utilized?</p>
464-465	The lack of deployment of Asian-American officers is more than an oversight and most certainly reflects a lack of planning and an unconscionable misuse of existing resources.
466	...until the underlying socio-economic conditions that divide our multi-ethnic and multi-cultural city are eliminated it is naive and unrealistic to expect that such emergencies, as you term the, will simply go away.
466	...five key challenges facing L.A.P.D. in preparing for the future. Number one, significantly increase recruitment of qualified bilingual and bicultural Asian officers.
466	Two, devote energies to establishing stronger community relations in ethnic communities,....
467	Three, develop emergency community response units that utilize bilingual and bicultural officers. Four, mandate training for all new recruits and existing officers to educate and sensitize them to cultural diversities and potential areas of ethnic conflict.
467	...community-based policing, and obviously this transition is going to require major changes, both in attitude and policy, and these changes must start at the top.
472	...we are not prepared for any disaster. We had a Police Chief and a Mayor who didn't speak to each other for eight years, which I found absolutely astounding.
472	...the City is in a mess, not only in the Police Department but in City Government itself.
473-474	...the description of the politics in Los Angeles that you've heard this evening seemed to me to be perfectly accurate. That needs to change. We need to have a political organization in the city that functions. If you have a dysfunctional organizational unit, you have a dysfunctional city.
481	...we had an L.A.P.D. that was demoralized because of the Rodney King assault.
484	...what went right was the fact that citizens got to see firsthand what happens with wanton lawlessness.

PAGE	COMMENT
443	...I want to take this opportunity to thank you for having this meeting tonight and asking for our input. This is well appreciated.
444	During the Rodney King beating trial -- the City Council, the Mayor, was aware that this riot was going to happen, they did not put their act together. They're putting all the blame on the Los Angeles Police Department....Everything is coming down on the cops....this is very unfair to them. We need more cops. They are overworked.
446	...it's very important to avoid any more of this kind of catastrophe. We need more police.
447	...it's not the response of the L.A.P.D. on April 29th but the response of the L.A.P.D. throughout the years. They are continually abusive. They continually deny people's rights.
451	In the early '70s I moved to England for one reason: fear of the L.A.P.D.
451-452	<p>On the day of the King verdict I watched T.V. helplessly as newscaster after newscaster in their helicopters begged newscaster after newscaster in the studios to call 9112. I watched helplessly as L.A.P.D. car after L.A.P.D. car drive right through the intersection of Florence and Normandie, drove right past the truck driver incident.</p> <p>I saw L.A.P.D. video of the officers inside that command post at the onset of the riots. They were playing cards, eating, watching the action on T.V. They said their orders were to stay put. There is no excuse for that.</p>
453	...there will be no peace without justice.
457	The City of L.A. doesn't need reports. The City of L.A. has reports up to their ears. You know what's wrong. I know what's wrong. Everybody here knows what's wrong. And what's wrong is we have nonresponsive politicians, we have politicians who couldn't give a good God Damn what happens to the people.
461	...what we saw was the complete breakdown and discrediting of the City Government of Los Angeles. The Mayor is a corrupt, old, vain fool. The Police Chief is a perfect match. The two fools hadn't talked to each other for over a year.
461	The Council despises the Mayor. Almost every member of the Council thinks a Mayor's a buffoon and a tool of the Chandlers and the "L.A. Times."
461	So you have a problem. The Police Commission is a bunch of hacks appointed by the Mayor. The Chief hates him. The Council hates both of them. And we have situation when the riot started it was almost like -- it was unbelievable.
461-462	The Mayor's at a church making a wildly racist and irresponsible speech. The God Damn Chief of Police is over in West L.A. at a fundraiser. The City is going up in flames.

PAGE	COMMENT
426-428	<p>A group of us went out to try and protect the stores along the boulevard..and just our presence and just the fact that we were standing around stopping the opportunistic looters who were rolling around and just looking for anything they could, we were able to prevent them from breaking into the stores along the street.</p> <p>...three of us drove off about 20 people -- he pulled a gun and started shooting at us, and he shot I think three times.</p> <p>...as I was laying on the boulevard I noticed right up the street there was a Los Angeles police car, and later as I found out there were two officers in the car, and later I found there were two other additional units at the corner...a total of seven officers who witnessed the shooting and who witnessed the looting, and those officers -- those officers declined to be involved in any way in what was going on while the three of us drove off 20 people.</p> <p>The officers were not interested. They simply refused to get involved.</p>
429	<p>...they told us they were under orders not to get involved with the looting,....Their only job was to protect the fire fighters.</p> <p>So if you ask me what worked and what didn't work, the cops didn't work during the riots....They were not interested in protecting citizens. They were not interested in protecting the businesses....The should have done something to protect the people who were in a situation when they had the weapons and they had the manpower.</p>
432	<p>...I would like...to see Chief Williams initiate and instigate those things that he did in Philadelphia, especially, the Auxiliary Police Department sections within each neighborhood,...</p>
434	<p>When I questioned officers during the period in which the National Guard was present in Los Angeles about why no action was taken, not only to stop the activities under way at Florence and Normandie but to seal off the intersection, I was told by officers with whom I spoke, Quite, "We were told to stay entirely out of the area.</p> <p>This is incomprehensible,...</p>
436	<p>It means pumping enough money into services that support the existing social infrastructure so that we don't have vast sectors of our population who feel locked out of the economy. We have to spend that money. That money exists.</p>
441	<p>The Hollywood Police Department is disconnected from the kids of Los Angeles, from the homeless, from the poor, and from the small businessman and from most of the people here. In fact, our local government here is disconnected from Hollywood.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
383	<p>I'm the first vice-president of the Western Homeowners Association.</p> <p>I turned on the TV at 4:30 p.m. and saw what was happening to the truck driver. I was horrified that there were no policemen, no police cars, no motorcycle cops, no LAPD enforcement at all in the whole area.</p> <p>I immediately called the 77th police district. The line was busy. I called the Pacific division and asked, "Do you have a special number for the 77th precinct?" and they gave it to me. Unfortunately, when I called the number, I was told the number is temporarily out of order. I was horrified. I don't even live there. All the people living there have no recourse to get to the police in their area.</p>
389	I think we should call out the National Guard. There should be a program established. We're putting too much responsibility on the LAPD.
389	As soon as we know when a verdict like this is coming down, the National Guard should be immediately put on alert. They should be ready.
394	The issue of racism is at the heart of the whole matter.
395-396	To me what's happened is there was no response. There was fear of the community because they don't have a relationship with the community.
405	<p>Alan Hamilton:</p> <p>...I have been now with the Los Angeles Police Department for three years,....</p>
406	The Los Angeles Police Department is a society with problems right now.
407	...we're seriously understaffed. Morale is a whole different issue.
Hollywood -- Le Conte Jr. High	
425	The Police Department, in my opinion, does not have enough personnel to have contended with the situation that occurred because when they had to protect the Fire Department which was being attacked it left no one else.
426	...the number of policemen now has been cut to less than what it was when there weren't enough to start with.

PAGE	COMMENT
373	I would recommend: A comprehensive contingency plan for civil disturbances to include assigning teams of police to each community.
373	Citizen support should be enlisted and encouraged, business owners, apartment owners and managers. Homeowner associations and neighborhood watch captains should be brought into the plan.
373	A potential target list should be compiled in each community:
373	Drug stores, gun shops, liquor stores, banks, radio and TV stations.
373	In particular the control of contraband, alcohol, drugs and firearms is critical.
373-375	<p>One of the things I quickly noticed was that there were few arrests in the early stages of the disturbance. Staging areas such as the [C]oliseum, [S]ports [A]rena and university campuses can be utilized to temporarily detain large numbers of people. Court commissioners, magistrates, public defenders and district attorneys can be brought to those sites to conduct arraignments and preliminary hearings to prevent clogging the system.</p> <p>In summation, there must be a secure central command center where the Chief of Police, Fire Department Chief, heads of other law enforcement agencies, special agents in charges of the DEA, FBI, tobacco and firearms, the U.S. Marshall, the Mayor's office and representatives of other agencies such as the [u]tilities [c]ompanies should be in constant communication and coordinating and implementing the plan.</p> <p>The whole thing was like a ship sailing through the night without a rudder.</p>
379-380	<p>...I majored in Law Enforcement in the School of Criminology at UC. Throughout those years and since, I have seen both planned and spontaneous civil disturbances close up and from both sides.</p> <p>Neighborhood crime and violence is the direct result of political failure on the local level. If a community's leadership pulls together on a positive level, crime virtually comes to a halt. When an at risk community's leadership becomes fractured, crime surges.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
354	The L.A.P.D. did as best as they could considering that they have at the present time 7,830 officers.
West Los Angeles - Webster Jr. High	
366	<p>I have a business, hardware store, on 50th and Central, Los Angeles, that was burned out in the riot. I'm 62 years old, and I was born behind my store. Those are my roots.</p> <p>...my store was broken into three times, and my warehouse in particular, and all three times my burglar alarm went off. The police responded and caught the culprits. The police work fine during normal situations.</p> <p>At that intersection where the beatings took place, the police -- it was such an obvious thing, that the police should have been stopping the traffic two or three blocks from that point....people were just driving into like as holocaust literally.</p>
367	<p>...at 3:00 a.m., my burglar alarm company called me to tell me the alarm had gone off and my first thing was to say, "Did you call the police?"</p> <p>And they said, "The police aren't taking any calls because of the disturbances."</p>
370-372	<p>I served in the United States Air Force from 1963 to 1965 as an air policeman. From 1966 to 1972 I was employed with the City of Baltimore as a correction officer and supervisor. From 1972 through 1985 I served in the United States Bureau of Prisons as a manager in locations throughout the United States....</p> <p>For me it was like deja vu, having experienced a major civil disturbance in Baltimore City, following the assassination of Dr. King in 1968. I have also been involved in five major violent prison disturbances....</p> <p>One thing that I have learned in evaluating the anatomy of a riot over the years is that the first few hours are critical....</p> <p>...the response on Thursday from law enforcement should have been massive in conveying a sense of being in control and if not in control at least the appearance of being in control so that the images going out on the air was one of normalcy not anarchy. Instead the images that the public received was no one was in control. In this day and age of instant electronic feedback, time is critical....from my vantage point as a citizen watching T.V., as did many of us, there was a great deal of irresponsible coverage. I would urge you to address the media's role in your final report. There must be a balance between the public's right to know and the public's right to be safe and secure.</p>
373	If there was a plan in existence for a widespread disturbance as occurred here in Los Angeles, it certainly was not implemented.

PAGE	COMMENT
324-325	<p>Mike Hernandez:</p> <p>I stand here before you as the councilperson who represents this particular area.</p> <p>...on April 29th, for whatever reason, there was no government assistance in this area.</p> <p>...even though we had some of the highest crimes in this city, for some reason our officers were deployed someplace else when we were already short to start,...</p> <p>We could not find police officers. For three days we tried to find police officers as buildings were burning and people were getting hurt, and the few officers that were present were just trying to protect areas where they were finding bodies.</p>
333-334	<p>...Number one, improve the emergency communication system in L.A.P.D.</p> <p>Number two, improve the relationships with the local residents.</p> <p>Number three, hire more minority people as officers, according to the ethnic population and geographical regions.</p>
337-338	<p>...the police response at the time of the riot, there was no response. And When I watch the T.V. at the first instant happened Florence and Normandie, and the police were having the orders to pull out,...I think that was really ridiculous.</p> <p>My personal feeling of that action was the police were -- if they (inaudible) they not respond, the riot could never get spread so far.</p>
339	<p>Police could not possibly have done anything to quell the disturbance of Los Angeles. We will not be able to do that if there is another disturbance.</p>
344	<p>I own the small grocery market in South Central L.A. My store was looted the first day...so I called the Police Department, but they said that they cannot do anything. I kept -- me and my wife kept calling police, but they do nothing.</p>
348-349	<p>April 29 that I do not want to even think about. On that night my store was burned down and my entire three years of American life has also burned down. But because we did believe you, we had to press 911, even though our hands were hurting, because we wanted to desperately request for help. And we screamed our lungs out. But for us, what have you guys done for us? And also what have you given us?</p> <p>Only thing that you have given us, you gave us disappointment, anger, and emptiness and ashes of those that burned down, and also mental illness you have given us.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
309-310	<p>I talked to the Police Department one of the police. "What happened? Police didn't take care of us. You don't have any department for the emergency care?"</p> <p>They said, "I don't know. No order from the (inaudible)."</p> <p>This is a Korean store, Korean area, Korean people area. Maybe they didn't much concern about it....they go to the Beverly Hills area and they stop there.....Please, help us.....Protect us, please.</p>
310	<p>Richard Kim:</p> <p>...The police response from where I moved from, which is in the suburbs next to Pasadena, used to be between three to five minutes, if you called the police, they would arrive, between three to five minutes.</p>
311-312	<p>...in Los Angeles we learned very quickly that when you call the police, about 15 years ago, they took approximately 30 to 45 minutes to respond. That was about 15 years ago.</p> <p>On the second morning of the riots, I got a call from my mother, who lived behind the store on Venice Boulevard. She told me that the store was being broken into.</p> <p>While I was going down, I tried calling the Police Department, 911. There was as busy signal, at 911....</p> <p>...when I got there,...my mother had been shot in the leg....</p> <p>I got out of the car., I said, "Don't shoot." They stopped for about two seconds and turned the gun on me and started shooting.</p> <p>....We continually tried to call the 911, and we kept on getting a busy signal.</p> <p>...when the police got there, they got there to arrest us for having arms and trying to protect our property.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
295-296	<p>...the verdict in the Rodney King trial may have been the spark to ignite the riots, but the fuel was and is the discrimination and prejudice that wells in us all. It takes many forms, between neighbors, store owners and customers, between the media, police and public, but most importantly between city government and the public that has elected them.</p> <p>Los Angeles is a city divided along these lines. The city government, police and media have worked long and hard to entrench themselves along these lines and in doing this have provided the means for discrimination and prejudice to spread.</p>
299	<p>...L.A.P.D. failed to take the initial action they should have. They seemed to sit back and say, "if this is the kind of response that they -- the people want to do and take it to the streets, then let them kill themselves. Let them hurt each other rather than us going in. We'll hold back and see how many of their own they can take care of."</p>
299	<p>Their initial response should have been to become more visible, stay in the area, and go in and stop the fighting. That would have stopped entirely the whole process, but, no, they elected to stand back and retreat because they were afraid that one or two of their officers was going to be injured.</p>
302	<p>I do want to speak to how they can possibly avoid future problems.</p> <p>My experience as a homeowner is that I get completely different -- a different kind of response from the police than when I lived in the Fairfax District. I don't live in America. I live in a Third-World country where people are reluctant to do anything for me.</p> <p>The police come to my neighborhood only to cause problems. When we call them to help us, they don't come. We want the same thing the people in Beverly Hills want, the same things the people in West L.A. want. We want peace. We want quiet.</p>
303	<p>...my husband is black. I shouldn't have to worry when he walks out of the house. And I don't worry about gangs. I worry about the police.</p>
307-308	<p>Kim Youn Ja:</p> <p>...1:00 p.m., after it was looting and fire, I said, "I called the police many times at home. I said, 'Please come. Protect our business. This is our only one business.'"</p> <p>They never answered. They never come....Police Department should have protect us.....What happened you didn't come to protect us?</p> <p>They said no order from the Police Department.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
282	With regard to the question of what should be done in the future, there are many suggestions that come to mind. The one that occurs to me most immediately is that the establishment of a civilian review board to hear citizens' complaints against offending officers of the L.A.P.D.
286	I thought it was my obligation as a citizen to voice my outrage. So I went to Parker Center to participate in a -- what I think is incumbent upon all Americans, to participate in our government. And I went down there and expressed my outrage, and I was amazed to see the behavior of the police in what in their tactics in confronting the demonstration.
288	These cats were real cocky. They think that -- they think that -- it's a weird sort of antagonism between the citizens and the police. And I really hope that there's some resolution that can occur.
289- 290	<p>Korean Interpreter: When I called [the police] they would get angry and say, "We will protect your store. Don't worry." And they would hang up, even before I would hang up.</p> <p>And I would call and my wife would call, and we'd call probably at least ten times, and they already know -- recognize my voice. So before even I had a chance to talk they would hang up because they knew it was me.</p> <p>And the next morning, when I went there at 6:00 o'clock, a fire was all burned up. My store (inaudible) was all burned up. Was that the price of my calling the Sheriff Department to protect me?</p> <p>...even before, when I was told the police saying that somebody stole something, somebody hit somebody, it would usually take them about an hour or an hour and a half to arrive. Because of that, they know that even if I call they could come late. They come after taking care of whatever they need to take care of of their personal chores, and by the time they come the problem has disappeared.</p>
291- 292	<p>When we called to the police, there was of course no response. They're only superficial response during the time that the burning began in the Pico-Union area.</p> <p>...they were guarding Parker Center as we watched our business and we watched our homes almost go up in flames.</p>
292	...one by one we watched the buildings on Pico Boulevard go up in flames. We called the police. They did not come. When we called the fire engines they would not come because the police were not there.
292	...we had no response in the Pico-Union. We had no police in the Pico-Union.

PAGE	COMMENT
220	...you have these officers that come from another community....They come from Simi Valley. They don't know what it's like to live in a ghetto. They don't care nothing about us.
225	It's a top down situation. In L.A.P.D. we've had Daryl Gates at the top and we see the results.
225	The city is totally unprepared for disaster in terms of public and private protection, in terms of reactions to any disaster, in terms of allocating or issuing out its resources, in terms of issuing out personnel to deal with the problems. It's lacking equipment, it's lacking communication between the agencies. It lacks communication between the agencies. It lacks communications within the agencies, and it definitely lacks communication with the population that it serves.
225- 226	Our city leadership is increasingly out of touch with the population that it claims to be leading.... The mayor failed while L.A. burned.
235	...if you're here to find causes you need to start at the top, the so-called leadership of this city. If you're here to find solutions, start with the community.
242	The L.A.P.D. is undermanned, it is overworked, and for that reason the community hates it.
253	...we've already paid enough taxpayers money to prepare, and you should have already been prepared., And in fact you probably were. But because Daryl Gates did not want yo to respond is the reason you didn't respond.
Koreatown -- Berendo Jr. High	
273- 275	...it was devastating in the sense that I as a parent, as a member of this community had to see my community destroyed, not by strangers, and not with the issue of the King issue but by people within mu community. ...we walked down to where Pico Boulevard is, and everything around me was burning. I don't know how many of you have been in a war, but to me that was a war, a war within my community, within my people. Members of our community got trash cans from Berendo Junior High. We blocked what is 12th Street and Pico Boulevard to protect our houses, our immediate businesses. And do you know what? We were successful, and we're proud of it, and I take off my hat, not only to my community members but the people around us. And that's what we got to do. Come together and address the issues and solve them.
276	Problems are not going to be solved until people like myself and other members of our community come together and start solving that problem.

PAGE	COMMENT
205	I've lived most of my life in the Nickerson Garden Housing Project. I saw brutal female cops, white cops, black cops, Latino cops. A responsible police officer has nothing to do with gender, racial makeup, or whatever. To me, a responsible policy officer comes down to individuality.
209	...the response by the L.A.P.D., I think that if they had come in with more force at the time of the disturbance, I think that it would have been a bad thing because it gave the citizens a chance to vent their anger and frustration, but don't misunderstand me. I'm not saying that it was right to do damage to other citizens' property or to other citizens.
210-212	<p>It's up to the point where the police are treating everybody here as if everybody's a hardened criminal,....</p> <p>If we're all going to be looked as hardened criminals and dangerously dangerous people, then it makes a dangerous situation for us even then we're approached by the L.A.P.D.</p> <p>They need to know more about the people they're policing if they're going to be policing.</p>
213	<p>No matter what I do, I'm still a wetback to the police. My black friends, no matter what they do, they're still niggers. They never come when we call them, and when we don't call them they beat the shit out of us.</p> <p>...I think I speak for most of the young people in the Inner City....As you can see, they're not here. They have no faith in you guys. They don't believe you will put any of your words to action.</p>
213	Spokesperson for La Resistencia, a national immigrant rights activities organization. My purpose here is to request that you people not issue a whitewash report, as was done by the Warren Christopher Commission.
215-216	<p>...the big problem with the response of the police, is that there is none in this city at any time, whether it's April 29th or January 1st. When you do get a response from a police officer, unfortunately he's overworked. He's underinformed of what's going on in the neighborhood. And he really doesn't know who is in the neighborhood and who is who. He has no idea of the continuing problems in the neighborhood or the continuing work by many courageous people in that neighborhood.</p> <p>The lack of response comes down to one thing: We don't have enough police in this community....We need enough police in this community so that police officers have enough time to relate to those people in the community and find out what's going on....April 29th, I didn't see any L.A.P.D. officers. There were none in my neighborhood. ...there weren't for three days as the burning went on and on and on.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
179	...I don't think it's a matter of preparing the L.A.P.D. I think it's a matter of preparing the entire community and preparing ourselves.
179	During the riot, uprising, or whatever you want to call it, we had no police. There was none.
180	During the uprising, I went down to the L.A.P.D., and I talked to a couple of the officers in there, and I said, "They're getting ready to burn this market down around the corner here." "Well, what do you expect me to do about it?" This is during the uprising.187
187	...I'd like to say to you that there's a lot of things wrong with L.A. There's a lot of things going on. You didn't solve them in the '65 riot, and you still haven't solved them today. The same issues are here. We have the same problems we had in '65. We still have them in '92. And you still haven't solved them. We need jobs, we need educational programs, we need things for our children, programs.
Pico-Union -- Adams Junior High	
198	...what we was on April 29th and 30th was the power of the people. The oppressed masses rose against this racist, unjust system and delivered the verdict of history upon it.
200-201	...we aren't counting on the police to do anything for us anymore.... We gave you the opportunity. And only thing that you do for African-Americans is that you dehumanize us, you stop us for no reason at all and we're speeding, but then you have us sit out on the corner while you go through our cars illegally.
201	As far as what the police can do in the next civil unrest, well, evidently you do already believe that there's going to be another civil unrest so you're preparing for that already, as we are. And so that my best advice that I can give you is that have the police just stay at home on those days,....
203	I'm the Executive Committee Chairman of Baldwin Neighborhood Homeowner Association....I would say that the relationship between our organization and the police department is very good. We have mutual respect for each other. Unfortunately, however, our commercial area at La Brea and Rodeo Road was severely damaged...during the riots....We lost 15 businesses, and in about five major fires. We saw several systems break down at the same time. The police response was certain inadequate. The fire fighting response was not up to the task. The phones simply went out, so even if there was possibility of getting police or fire protection we couldn't because the phones didn't work.
204	...there are inadequate resources that come into our community. The police, we believe, should be working more closely with the community and helping us solve those problems that we point out.

PAGE	COMMENT
542-544	<p>I'm Legal Director of the Central American Refugee Center.....this is Walter's story.</p> <p>Walter ended up spending a total of three weeks in I.N.S. custody, including several days in a juvenile delinquent center in Nogales, Arizona,before he was finally released by I.N.S. to the custody of his aunt in Los Angeles,....</p>
544	<p>While he was in their custody, the Los Angeles Police never accused Walter of any crime, nor did they tell him why he had been arrested....This is something that happened to nearly 500 people in the days after the riots,</p>
550-552	<p>I come from the community-based organization, two community-based organizations, Hermandad Mexicana Nacional and Union de Comercientes Latinos-Americanos y Afiliados,....</p> <p>What didn't work? The Police Department. Simple as that.</p> <p>"How should the Los Angeles Police Department prepare to prevent it?"...</p> <p>...for a strong community relations department within the Police Department that can outreach to the communities that could gain a thorough understanding of the community's needs in order to prevent these from happening again.</p>
552-553	<p>...L.A.P.D. to offer its utmost assistance in collaboration with those C.B.A.'s, community-based organizations,....</p> <p>...more bilingual and culturally cognizant police officers who can communicate with a monolingual community more effectively.</p> <p>...L.A.P.D. to immediately desist working with the I.N.S. It just undermines the whole process of law enforcement.</p> <p>...each one of our elected officials to...meet on a periodic basis, conduct town meetings with people in the community,...</p>
553	<p>...the inaction of the L.A.P.D. at Florence and Normandie like the spark of the civil disturbances was deliberate and cold.'</p>
557	<p>Their response to the 29th was typical in being slow and arbitrary and ineffective.</p>
573	<p>I'm Secretary for the Central City Echo Park Chapter of the Mexican-American Political Association and also an organizer for the Labor Community Strategy Center and a resident of East Los Angeles for 35 years.</p>
583	<p>...I would like the police to devote themselves to arresting delinquents and people who do bad things rather than delivering people to the Department of Immigration and Naturalization.</p>

PAGE	COMMENT
584	...the leadership of the City didn't respond to what happened at the riots.
587	...first question about the opinion of what they did. They did it wrong, of course. And my only fear is that it was maybe done on purpose.
587-588	<p>What worked? Nothing worked. The only thing that did finally alleviate was the National Guard, but that was not L.A.P.D.</p> <p>What didn't work?....Gates.</p> <p>How should the L.A.P.D. prepare for and respond for future emergencies? Community involvement is the only answer.</p>
590-591	<p>[LAPD officer]</p> <p>...what in the world does an attorney know about police work?</p> <p>...on any day in L.A. you're lucky to have 400 police officers working for the entire city,....You're lucky to have, on one division, you're lucky to have 18 officers working.</p> <p>...as long as I'm with L.A.P.D. I will have to look at and live with the fact that we let the public down that day.....If the Mayer and the Chief would have told me, "Go out there and snatch all these people down, take them into custody the first night," I would have did it.....We set there that night waiting for the order to do it.</p>
598	Recommendation Number One,...recommend to the Police Commission that it require reading of this panel's report, the McCone Commission's Report, the Christopher Commission's Report, and the City's Emergency Preparedness Plans by all those completing Police Academy training.
598	Recommendation Number Two...require successful passage of a test upon those reports....
599	Recommendation Number Three...require preparation of a series of narrow menus of responses for a series of different sparks or outbreaks of civil disorder.
599	...require the Chief of Police to request the Governor to mobilize and/or deploy the California National Guard under specified precisely delineated circumstance, be they planned circumstance -- foreseen circumstances or unforeseen circumstances.
600	Recommendation Number Five...seek state legislation requiring the Governor or Lieutenant Governor in his absence to mobilize or mobilize and deploy per the particular request a National Guard upon local request.
600-601	Fifth Recommendation...examine the precursors or sparks of all previous United States urban riots, to identify circumstances which may indicate in the future precursors of future riots.

PAGE	COMMENT
606	<p>[LAPD OFFICER]</p> <p>When you have community-based policing in this town. Which is really good, that's what we need. But if you don't change the conditions of that community, they what hell [difference] does it make that you have community-based policing in a slum or in a project or in a poor area where there are no jobs?</p>
609	<p>I'm also an L.A.P.D. officer.</p> <p>I only have one favor to ask. ...help us make change.</p>